IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S59 of 2022
B e t w e e n -
AVANT INSURANCE LIMITED
Applicant
and
SRI BALAKRISHNAN DARSHN
First Respondent
MEDICAL INSURANCE AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GAGELER J
GLEESON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 2022, AT 2.00 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend MR M.T. McCULLOCH, SC for the applicant. (instructed by Carter Newell Lawyers)
MR S. HABIB, SC: If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend MS K.A. MORRIS for the first respondent. (instructed by William Roberts Layers)
GAGELER J: Thank you. Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: May it please your Honours. The policy in question contained terms that you will find extracted by their Honours in the Full Court at pages 129 and 130 of the application book. It is, to use the jargon, a claims made policy – as the heading quoted in paragraph 9 of their Honour’s reasons makes clear – where the time of notification is one of the important elements of how one can claim an indemnity.
Over the page, on page 131, still containing quotations from the terms of the cover, you will see that upon the acceptance of a claim for indemnity, the insured agrees that the insurer will have the conduct of a claim and that the insurer has the liberty to defend or settle as they think fit. Under the heading “We will appoint the lawyer or other person”, the stipulation between the parties, that is, insured and insurer, is that the insurer:
will appoint the lawyer . . . to provide services to us –
meaning the insurer:
for the benefit of you –
meaning the insured, the indemnified defendant in a classic case:
When we –
the insurer:
appoint the lawyer . . . we do so in our own capacity and not as an agent for you.
That, as your Honours know, in the reasons in the Full Court, is treated as a contraindication to the nature of the argument we put concerning retainer and the consequential authority to communicate. But, in our submission, that was reasoning that obviously overlooked the context in which those words appear. The appointment of the lawyer by the insurer is to “provide services” to the insurer:
for the benefit of you.
The benefit being, of course, in the form of the promised indemnity, which preserves the liberty to defend or settle as the insurer sees fit. That is spelled out in what might be called a less than grand fashion, but certainly a sharp‑edged fashion concerning a claim, if not a stipulation, concerning the incidence of GST. The services are supplied by the lawyer to the insurer, not to the insured.
If I could then ask your Honours to go to the…
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- Case
- [2022] HCATrans 210
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Federal Court was whether the policy's exclusion clause, specifically relating to "any claim arising from or in connection with the provision of advice or services in relation to the management of a patient's medical records," operated to exclude cover for the claim made against Dr. Darshn. The court was required to determine the scope and application of this exclusion in the context of the alleged professional negligence.
The Full Federal Court held that the exclusion clause was not applicable to the claim. Their Honours reasoned that the claim against Dr. Darshn was fundamentally based on allegations of negligent medical treatment and diagnosis, not on the management of medical records. While the management of records was a component of the overall medical service, the core of the alleged wrongdoing did not fall within the specific wording of the exclusion. The court applied the principle that exclusion clauses in insurance policies are to be construed strictly against the insurer and in favour of the insured, and that the language of the exclusion did not clearly and unambiguously encompass the nature of the claim made.
The appeal was dismissed, with the Full Federal Court affirming the primary judge's decision that Avant was not entitled to rely on the exclusion clause to deny indemnity.
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