"Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union v Royal Automobile Association of South Australia Inc
[2016] FWC 7491
•19 OCTOBER 2016
| [2016] FWC 7491 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.739 - Application to deal with a dispute
"Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union
v
Royal Automobile Association of South Australia Inc
(C2016/3383)
COMMISSIONER PLATT | ADELAIDE, 19 OCTOBER 2016 |
Alleged dispute about any matters arising under the enterprise agreement and the NES;[s186(6)].
Background
[1] In March 2016, the Royal Automobile Association of Australia Inc. (RAA) undertook an investigation and disciplinary process over the alleged misconduct of an employee. The employee was a member of the Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union trading as the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU). The investigation and disciplinary process resulted in a dispute about the capacity and role of the AMWU to represent its members under the RAA Automotive and Technical Grades Agreement 2014 (the Agreement). 1
[2] The matter was unable to be resolved at a conference held by Senior Deputy President O’Callaghan in May 2016.
[3] SDP O’Callaghan subsequently issued directions for the filing of submissions and witness statements, and confirmed that the parties agreed that the dispute concerns:
“What obligations apply to the RAA under the terms of the and the Fair Work Act 2009 with respect to recognition of the capacity of the AMWU to represent its members, as distinct from being present in meetings as a support person.”
[4] On 27 July 2016, the matter was allocated to me to conduct an arbitration by consent pursuant to s.739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). The matter was subsequently listed for hearing in Adelaide on 15 and 16 August 2016.
[5] Mr Hardie appeared on behalf of the AMWU and Mr Bakewell was given permission to appear for the RAA pursuant to s.596(2)(a) of the Act.
[6] The Agreement was approved by the Commission on 15 September 2014, and commenced operation on 23 September 2014. The Agreement covers persons engaged by the RAA in classifications listed in the Agreement. The AMWU is covered by the Agreement. The Agreement applies to the exclusion of any applicable award or prior agreements.
The Agreement
[7] The provisions of the Agreement that relate to the dispute are as follows:
“5. No extra claims
…
5.2 The Parties agree that the Agreement is intended to be exhaustive of the terms and conditions of the employment relationship and the relationship between the Parties.
…
8. Relationship to Employer Policies, Award(s), the Act and the NES
…
8.2. Awards
(a) This Agreement forms the basis of the employment relationship between the
Parties. No other agreement or Award shall have any application to the parties, except where specifically stated herein.
(b) The Manufacturing and Associated Industries and Occupations Award 2010 was used as the basis for the creation of this Agreement and will serve as a reference instrument for this Agreement, however the terms and provisions of this Agreement will prevail exclusively.
…
11. Dispute Resolution
“11.1 In the event of a dispute in relation to a matter arising under this agreement, or a dispute in relation to the NES, in the first instance the parties will attempt to resolve the matter at the workplace by discussions between the Employee or Employees concerned and the relevant supervisor. If such discussions do not resolve the dispute, the parties will endeavour to resolve the dispute in a timely manner by discussions between the Employee or Employees concerned and more senior levels of management and the Union as appropriate.
11.2 An Employee who is party to the dispute may appoint a representative for the purposes of the procedures in this term.
11.3 If a dispute about a matter arising under this award or a dispute in relation to the NES is unable to be resolved at the workplace, and all appropriate steps under Clause 11.1 have been taken, a party to the dispute may refer the dispute to Fair Work Australia.
11.4 The Parties may agree on the process to be utilised by Fair Work Australia including mediation, conciliation and consent arbitration.
11.5 Where the matter in dispute remains unresolved, Fair Work Australia may exercise any method of dispute resolution permitted by the Act that it considers appropriate to ensure the settlement of the dispute.
11.6 An employer or Employee may appoint another person, organisation or association to accompany and/or represent them for the purposes of this Clause.
11.7 The parties to the dispute agree to be bound by a decision made by Fair Work
Australia in accordance with this term.
11.8 While the dispute resolution procedure is being conducted work must continue in accordance with this Agreement and the Act. Subject to applicable workplace health and safety legislation, an Employee must not unreasonably fail to comply with a direction by the employer to perform work, whether at the same or another workplace, that is safe and appropriate for the Employee to perform.
…
36. Union Related Matters
…
36.3. Union Delegate Rights
(a) Workplace union delegates hold a vital position in the union.
(b) The union Delegate has a key role of representing the collective and individual hopes, aspirations and needs of their work colleagues and can bring together the individual creativity, skills, and knowledge of a group of people at a workplace to improve how a job is done
(c) Workplace union delegates are recognised through this Charter of Workplace Union Delegate Rights, for the key role they play.
(d) Workplace union delegates agree to act in good faith, and in the best interests of their work colleagues and the workplace. This Charter of Workplace Union Delegate Rights is a guide for fair standards for all union delegates.
(e) The Union has the right to elect or appoint one or more Employees as Union Delegates in accordance with the Union rules.
(f) Once an Employee has been elected or appointed to the position of Union Workplace Delegate, the Union will inform the Employer. The Employer will then formally recognise the Union Workplace Delegate as a legitimate representative of the Union until informed otherwise.
(g) Union Workplace Delegates shall have the right to:
(i) be treated fairly and to perform their role as union Delegate without any discrimination in their employment;
(ii) formal recognition by the employer that endorsed union Delegates speak on behalf of union members in the workplace.
(iii) bargain collectively on behalf of those they represent;
(iv) consultation, and access to reasonable information about the workplace and the business;
(v) paid time to represent the interests of members to the Employer and industrial tribunals;
(vi) reasonable paid time during normal working hours to consult with union members;
(vii) reasonable time off to participate in the operation of the union;
(viii) reasonable paid time off to attend approved union education;
(ix) provide information to new employees about the benefits of union membership;
(x) reasonable access to telephone, facsimile, photocopying, internet and e mail facilities for the purpose of carrying out work as a delegate and consulting with workplace colleagues and the union;
(xi) place union information on a notice board in a prominent location in the workplace
(h) The Parties agree that up to 12 elected Workplace Union Delegates may be elected.
(i) Union Workplace Delegates may meet monthly at the Union facilities as determined.
(j) Duly elected Union Workplace Delegates are authorised by the Employer to use the work vehicles to attend Union Workplace Delegates meetings if they are on shift during the time of the meeting or on shift immediately prior to or immediately after the meeting time.”
Evidence
[8] The AMWU provided witness statements and led evidence from the following persons:
● Mr Barry De Pledge - Road Side Patrol Technician and AMWU workplace delegate;
● Mr Paul Gunner - Road Side Patrol Technician from May 1982 until his retirement in November 2015; and
● Mr Derek Winter - elected official of the AMWU.
[9] Mr De Pledge’s evidence which is relevant to the matters in dispute is summarised as follows:
● he was involved in the negotiations for the Agreement;
● in the last six months, the RAA had tried (with varying degrees of success) to prevent employee members of the AMWU from being represented by union delegates or officials during disciplinary hearings, and sought to confine the delegate or official’s role to that of a support person; 2
the collective and individual representation of members was of great importance (from both his and the AMWU perspective), 3 this included the capacity of endorsed union delegates to speak on behalf of union members;4
there was an on-going debate about the representation under clause 11 of the Agreement;
the AMWU sought to address concerns regarding representation during the negotiations for the Agreement. The RAA opposed the AMWU’s position. 5 The AMWU proposed an alternative position that a “Charter of Delegates Rights” be inserted into the Agreement.6 The parties agreed to insert clause 36 into the Agreement;7
it was clear to everyone negotiating the Agreement that clause 36.3(g)(ii) applied to disciplinary matters; 8 and
the Agreement provided that all covered employees have a general right to representation. 9
[10] Mr Gunner’s evidence which is relevant to the matters in dispute is summarised as follows:
● he was a union bargaining agent for the Agreement and all enterprise agreements in the period of his employment;
● from an award perspective, RAA employees were originally covered by the RAA Automotive, Engineering and Technical Grades Award (AETG) which was replaced by the modern Manufacturing Associated Industries Award 2010.
● from an agreement perspective, the Agreement was preceded by the RAA Automotive and Technical Grades Agreement 2009 10 (the 2009 Agreement which is referred to in the transcript as the 2010 Agreement) which replaced the RAA Automotive and Technical Grades Agreement 4027 of 2005.
●there were concerns that in the past the RAA had unilaterally introduced policies which were inconsistent with the requirements of the Act and/or the Agreement, and that the RAA had not accepted the AMWU’s view that employees had a right to be represented (as opposed to have a support person) during disciplinary processes;
●the AMWU worked with the RAA to transition the AETG and the 2009 Agreement into one document;
●the Agreement was the first agreement that was not read in conjunction with the underpinning Award and was not intended to result in any diminution of conditions; 11
●the AMWU intended that clause 8.1 of the Agreement addressed the potential for HR policies to be implemented which were inconsistent with the terms of the Agreement or the Act; 12 ●the objective of clause 8.2, according the AMWU was to ensure that the Agreement reflected the “whole of the employment relationship;”
●the AMWU’s objective in relation to clause 36 of the Agreement was to “recognise and enshrine, inter alia, the role of the Union at the RAA which included effective representation of its members in all relevant circumstances;”
●clause 11 of the Agreement provides employees with a general right of representation. Historically the definition of dispute has included any conflict with management (including productivity, quality of work, conduct or performance);
●the RAA accepted clause 36.3 “in full knowledge of the Union’s intentions as to how the terms would be used” 13 and the Clause should be interpreted as it has been written.
[11] Mr Winter’s evidence which is relevant to the matters in dispute is summarised as follows:
● he has represented AWMU members at the RAA since 2011 and was involved in the negotiation of the Agreement;
● he supported Mr Gunner’s evidence concerning the origins of clause 11 of the Agreement and the view that the Agreement provided a general right of representation;
● historically a broad definition of a dispute for the purposes of clause 11 had been adopted;
● in 2012, the RAA took the position that persons attending disciplinary meetings could only do so as a support person and not engage in “representation” and he had witnessed this in meetings with RAA and members; 14
●clause 8.1 of the Agreement was intended from the AMWU’s perspective to address the potential for HR policies to be implemented which were inconsistent with the terms of the Agreement;
●the intention of the AMWU was that clause 8.2 of the Agreement ensure that the Agreement reflected the “whole of the employment relationship.” The current Agreement was the sole instrument covering the employment relationship; 15 and
●it was the AMWU’s contention that the purpose of clause 36 of the Agreement was to “enshrine the effective Union representation of its members in all relevant circumstances.” 16
[12] The RAA provided witness statements and led evidence from the following persons:
● Ms Stacy Williams - HR Consultant;
● Mr Kym Waters - Senior Manager HR & Facilities; and
● Mr Peter Bray - Senior Manager, Road Service Delivery.
[13] The RAA had intended to call Ms Wallace as a witness but during the hearing the parties agreed that the following facts could be drawn from her affidavit:
“an incident [which] occurred between the RAA and Mr De Pledge that resulted in an interview. During that interview Mr De Pledge sought to be represented and the RAA decline to request and that resulted in this s.739 dispute being lodged.” 17
[14] Ms Williams’ evidence which is relevant to the matters in dispute is summarised as follows:
- ● she took minutes of the negotiations of the current Agreement for meetings to which she was invited. 19 The minutes she took did not include any reference to clause 36.3(g)(ii) and she did not have any independent recollection of the topic. 20
● she was involved in negotiations as an industrial relations subject matter expert for the Agreement, its two predecessors and other agreements between the RAA and the Australian Services Union; 18 0
●her understanding is that the Agreement does not cover disciplinary processes;
●RAA has a Counselling, Discipline and Termination Policy which was introduced in May 2010 and was last updated in October 2015. This policy regulates how RAA managers are to deal with disciplinary issues such as performance and conduct matters;
●employees are entitled to have a support person during a disciplinary meeting;
●support persons are not permitted to “advocate” on behalf of the employee they are supporting;
[15] Mr Waters’ evidence which is relevant to the matters in dispute is summarised as follows:
● he was involved in negotiations as an industrial relations subject matter expert for the current Agreement, its two predecessors and other agreements between the RAA and the Australian Services Union; 21
●in his view the Agreement did not regulate disciplinary processes, this was the province of RAA policy; 22
●clause 8.1 was the subject of negotiation and redrafting. He received advice that clause 8.1 does not incorporate policies into the Agreement and this was the intent of RAA; 23
●clause 8.2 was intended by the RAA to remove references and reliance on the enterprise award;
●the role of a support person is defined in the Counselling and Discipline Policy; 24
●the “fact sheet” was not a new policy and was consistent with the rights and entitlements from the Agreement and the Act;
●the RAA’s position is that a support person is not entitlement to speak “on behalf” of an employee and that position has been applied consistently in the last six months;
●the disputes settlement clause was based on the “Model Clause”;
the Agreement does not define the term “dispute,” and he believes that a dispute was where there was a disagreement pertaining to matters covered by an agreement or an award or something within the National Employment Standards; 25
● the RAA intended that policies would complement the Agreement, with policies that were more beneficial taking precedence; 26
representation under clause 36.3 of the Agreement refers to the representation of the employee group as a whole (i.e. in consultative meetings with management);
the intention or meaning of the words in clause 36.3 were not subject to discussion or and/or agreement between the RAA and the AMWU; 27 and
the RAA would not have knowingly included a clause in an Agreement which allowed representation in disciplinary proceedings. 28
[16] Mr Bray’s evidence which is relevant to the matters in dispute is summarised as follows:
● he lead the negotiations for the Agreement; 29
he did not recall stating to Mr Gunner that the Agreement was intended to “constitute the whole employment relationship,” believing he said something similar which had been taken out of context;
RAA intended to remove the references to the enterprise award with the aim of having one industrial instrument, this was reflected in clause 8.2; and
● it was not intended that RAA policies and procedures formed part of the Agreement as evidenced by clause 8.1. 30
Submissions
[17] The parties’ submissions on the interpretation of the relevant clauses of the current Agreement are summarised below.
[18] The AMWU contends that:
● the term industrial dispute is a broad term and should not be narrowly defined;
● clause 11.2 of the Agreement allows a party to a dispute to appoint a representative;
● the reference to the “basis of the employment relationship” in clause 8.2(a) has the effect of allowing a dispute over any matter relating to an employee or the employer to fall within the dispute referenced in clause 11;
● as the AMWU is a party to the Agreement under clause 3.1(c), clause 11 is also enlivened when a dispute exists between the AWMU and the RAA;
● the RAA’s Human Resources Management Policy cannot override the rights and obligations provided by the Agreement (including clause 11);
● clause 36.3 of the Agreement was intended to authorise the AMWU to speak on behalf of union members at the workplace, this authority extends to all workplace matters not just disciplinary processes;
● clause 36.3(b)(ii) provides a right of representation at the individual and collective level;
● the current Agreement entitles AMWU members to be represented in all instances including investigations and disciplinary processes;
● the witness evidence presented by the RAA does not establish any common intention as to the Agreement provisions in dispute; and
● the opinions of the RAA witnesses as to the meaning of the provisions in dispute cannot be properly considered in the Commission’s interpretation of the provisions.
[19] The RAA contends that:
● RAA Policies and Procedures do not form part of the current Agreement;
● the union’s capacity to represent members only occurs where it is expressly provided for by the Agreement (e.g. Consultation regarding Change, Dispute Resolution);
● clause 5.2 and/or 8.2 do not operate such that the Agreement is the sole source of rights and obligations for the employment relationship, and thus the operation of clause 11 (Dispute Resolution) is not so broad as to deal with disputes concerning policies and procedures not provided in the current Agreement; and
● the rights and obligations provided by clause 36(g) apply to collective representation by the AMWU (e.g. bargaining for an agreement) and not to individual disputes, and were not intended to confer representation rights to disputes that fall outside the ambit of the dispute resolution process.
Principles of Interpretation
[20] The principles to be applied to the interpretation of enterprise agreements were detailed by the Full Bench of the Commission in The Australian Meat Industry Employees Union v Golden Cockerel Pty Ltd. 31
[21] In summary, these principles are:
● the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) does not apply to the construction of an enterprise agreement made under the Act;
● in construing an enterprise agreement it is first necessary to determine whether an agreement has a plain meaning or contains an ambiguity;
● regard may be given to evidence of surrounding circumstances to assist in determining whether an ambiguity exists;
● if the agreement has a plain meaning, evidence of the surrounding circumstances will not be admitted to contradict the plain language of the agreement;
● if the language of the agreement is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one meaning then evidence of the surrounding circumstance will be admissible to aid the interpretation of the agreement.
● admissible evidence of the surrounding circumstances is evidence of the objective framework of fact and will include:
- evidence of prior negotiations to the extent that the negotiations tend to establish objective background facts known to all parties and the subject matter of the agreement;
- notorious facts of which knowledge is to be presumed; and
- evidence of matters in common contemplation and constituting a common assumption;
● the resolution of a disputed construction of an agreement will turn on the language of the agreement understood, having regard to its context and purpose.
● context might appear from:
- the text of the agreement viewed as a whole;
- the disputed provision’s place and arrangement in the agreement; and
- the legislative context under which the agreement was made and in which it operates;
● where the common intention of the parties is sought to be identified, regard is not to be had to the subjective intentions or expectations of the parties. A common intention is identified objectively, that is by reference to that which a reasonable person would understand by the language the parties have used to express their agreement; and
● the task of interpreting an agreement does not involve rewriting the agreement to achieve what might be regarded as a fair or just outcome. The task is always one of interpreting the agreement produced by parties.
[22] I adopt the principles as set out and applied by the Full Bench in Golden Cockerel and the authorities it refers to within.
Discussion
[23] The evidence of the AMWU and RAA’s witnesses provided valuable context surrounding the negotiations of the Agreement, including their preferred positions, attempts to negotiate towards their preferred position, and how they subjectively understood the current provisions should be interpreted as to disciplinary and other matters.
[24] I observe that the AMWU’s claims were actively pursued and their representatives had a belief that the insertion clause 36.3 was a step forward.
[25] I accept that the RAA vigorously opposed the AMWU’s claims concerning representation rights and clause 36.3 was seen as a compromise which from the RAAs position did not afford individual representation rights.
[26] In interpreting the meaning of an agreement provision, the common intention of the parties to the agreement should be given effect, 32 provided that the words appearing in the instrument can be reasonably interpreted to mean what the parties has intended them to mean.33 Common intention can be identified objectively and the tribunal must to look “to the objective framework of facts within which the contract came into existence, and to the parties’ presumed intention in this setting.”34
[27] Other than the consensus that the Agreement was to be the sole industrial instrument applying to the work, the evidence of the AMWU and RAA witnesses does not evince any common objective intention as to the operation of the clauses 5.2, 8.2(a), 11 and 36.3.
[28] Clause 36.3 appears to have been inserted into the Agreement as a compromise, unaccompanied by any explanation of its meaning, or any stated agreement as to its intention. It appears as each party had a different (and unexpressed) view of the effect of clause 36.3.
Clause 11 - Dispute Resolution
[29] Clause 11.5 of the Agreement confers right to employees to be represented in relation to disputes which arise under the Agreement or the National Employment Standards. I do not accept the submission that clause 5.2 and/or 8.2(a) has the effect of allowing disputes over policies and procedures not expressly the subject of the current Agreement provisions to be resolved under clause 11. Whilst clause 8.2 could be better expressed, in my view the clause was intended by both parties, and has the effect of ensuring that the Agreement is the sole industrial instrument covering the work. Clause 5.2 appears on the face of it to support the AWMU’s contentions that the Agreement contains all of the employment conditions. However, if that were the case then any written contract of employment, employer policies or procedures would not be of any effect. This result would be absurd. 35 In my the proper construction of clause 5.2 is that it duplicates the effect of clause 8.2. Thus clauses 5.2 and/or clause 8.2 of the Agreement do not operate so as to expand the ordinary meaning of “a matter arising under this Agreement” in clause 11.1.
[30] In light of my finding in the previous paragraph, clause 11 does not provide a blanket entitlement to employees to represented on any matter. The right to representation applies to matters which are the subject of a dispute within the parameters of clause 11.1 that is a matter arising under the Agreement or a dispute in relation to the National Employment Standards. I reject the AMWU’s submission and accept the RAA’s submission in this regard.
Clause 36.3 - Union Delegate Rights
[31] I now turn to clause 36.3. There is no evidence of common intention in respect to this clause. The proper approach is to the review the plain meaning of the words contained in the clause so as to try and determine its intent.
[32] The provisions contained in clause 36.3 have a plain and unambiguous meaning, readily apparent by a review of the text. On this basis, evidence of the surrounding circumstances will not be used to contradict the plain language of the agreement. 36
[33] The provision requires Union Workplace Delegates (Delegates) to be recognised by the employer, be treated fairly and not subject to discrimination. Delegates may speak on behalf of union members, collectively and individually. In my view the individual capacity arises from sub clauses 36.3(b) and clause 36.3(g)(v) where the delegates represent the “collective and individual hopes, aspirations and needs…[and] will be given paid time to represent the interests of members to the Employer.” The clause does not contain any express provision restricting representation to a collective basis. I do not accept the RAA’s submission that the operation of clause 36.3 is restricted to collective representation. The subject matter upon which delegates may represent employees is not limited by clause 36.3.
Representation generally
[34] As to the role of a representative, I do not accept the AMWU’s contention that the representative is entitled to answer questions that are directed to an employee where an inquiry of fact is being undertaken, or that an employee cannot be required to directly answer a question of fact. My observations are that in many cases, disciplinary processes are preceded by an inquiry. The role of a representative should not frustrate a fact based inquiry. In many cases employees have direct knowledge of facts important to the inquiry and it would not be appropriate for the employee to refer such questions to their representative. That is not to say that the representative should not be able to be present, make submissions on matters including process or how facts should be considered, or disciplinary outcomes.
Interaction of Policies and Agreements
[35] I note that the parties agree that insofar as any procedure or policy (including a fact sheet) purports to provide a lesser benefit or more onerous obligation than that provided by the Agreement or the Act, that portion of the policy or procedure is not valid. I agree with this position. The fact sheet in question dealt with the issue of the provision of support persons. The Agreement does not expressly refer to support persons. It appears that the fact sheet was prepared in response to a Commission decision concerning the consideration of the provision of a support person in the determination of an unfair dismissal application under s.394 of the Act. In my view this fact sheet is not relevant to the issue of representation before me.
Conclusion
[36] I now turn to the question of “what obligations apply to the RAA under the terms of the current Agreement and the Fair Work Act 2009 with respect to recognition of the capacity of the AMWU to represent its members, as distinct from being present in meetings as a support person.”
[37] As a result of clause 36.3 employees covered by the Agreement are entitled to have their collective and individual interests represented by a Union Delegate (as defined). In addition employees have right to be represented in matters dealt with under the dispute resolution process in clause 11 and where the Agreement expressly provides for representation rights, the RAA is required to recognise the representative.
[38] Under clause 36.3 an employee may be represented during a disciplinary process however, this does not prevent the employee being required to answer directly questions during an investigation.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
T Hardie on behalf of the Applicant.
S Bakewell with M Hii of EMA Consulting, with permission, on behalf of the Respondent.
Hearing details:
2016
Adelaide
August 16.
1 AE41041, [2015] FWCA 6462.
2 Transcript – PN265.
3 Transcript –PN265.
4 Transcript – PN314.
5 Transcript – PN511.
6 Transcript – PN512-513.
7 Transcript – PN517.
8 Transcript – PN564.
9 Transcript – PN385.
10 [2010] FWAA 613.
11 Transcript - PN800.
12 Transcript – PN829, Exhibit A2 at [6].
13 Transcript –PN 881, 889, Exhibit A2 at [8].
14 Transcript –PN1166, Exhibit A3 at [6] –[7].
15 Exhibit A3 at [11].
16 Exhibit A3 at [13].
17 Transcript – PN1182.
18 Exhibit R3 at [2].
19 Transcript – PN1338-1345.
20 Transcript – PN1387-1394.
21 Exhibit R3 at [2].
22 Exhibit R3 at [8] – [10].
23 Exhibit R3 at [11].
24 Attachment SW1 to Exhibit R1.
25 Transcript – PN1823.
26 Transcript – PN1808 -1813.
27 Transcript – PN1882.
28 Transcript – PN1886.
29 Exhibit R2 at [2].
30 Transcript – PN1545.
31 [2014] FWCFB 7447
32 National Union of Workers v GrainCorp Operations Limited PR18164 at [47].
33 Australian Timber Workers’ Union v W Angliss and Co Pty Ltd (1924) 19 CAR 172.
34 Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 332 per Mason J.
35 See George A Bond & Co Ltd (in liq) v McKenzie [1929] AR (NSW) 498, 503-504 (Street J); City of Wanneroo v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union (2006) 153 IR 426 at[52].
36 The Australian Meat Industry Employees Union v Golden Cockerel Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 7447.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
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