Aut 6 P/L v Wellington Place P/L and Ors
[1993] FCA 69
•19 FEBRUARY 1993
Re: AUT 6 PTY LTD
And: WELLINGTON PLACE PTY LTD; ALFARO PTY LTD; ANDERSON NOMINEES PTY LTD and
CITYWIDE INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
No. WA G175 of 1992
FED No. 69
Number of pages - 4
Costs
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
French J.(1)
CATCHWORDS
Costs - apportionment - unsuccessful applicant - issue raised by respondents - respondents unsuccessful on specific issue - minor costs apportionment ordered.
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v. Razzi (1991) 101 ALR 425
J-Corp Pty Ltd v. BLF and BTA (unrep Fed Ct 19.2.93)
HEARING
PERTH, 10 February 1993
#DATE 19:2:1993
Counsel for the Applicant : Mr N. McKerracher
Solicitors for the Applicant : Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Respondent : Mr M. McCusker QC and Mr C. Tolson
Solicitors for the Respondent: Tolson and Co.
ORDER
The Court orders that:
1. The applicant is to pay seven-eighths (7/8ths) of the
respondents' costs of the action.
2. The applicant to have the costs of the submission on the
question of the appropriate costs order.
Note: Settlement and entry of Orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ON RULING AS TO COSTS
JUDGE1
FRENCH J. On 3 December 1992 I dismissed an application by Aut 6 Pty Ltd claiming relief against the respondents for alleged misuse of market power in contravention of s.46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974. An order was made that the applicant should pay the respondents costs of the action unless within seven days it filed a motion for a different order as to costs. On 10 December 1992 the applicant filed a motion seeking orders in the following terms:
1. The costs payable by the applicant exclude the costs incurred by the respondents in relation to matters raised in paragraph 16 of the respondents' amended defence and particularised in answer number 5 to the respondents' further and better particulars of amended defence.
2. The costs incurred by the applicant in addressing the matters raised in paragraph 16 of the amended defence be set off against the costs payable by the applicant referred to in 1 above.
In paragraph 16 of the amended defence the respondents asserted that they gave notice of non-renewal of the applicant's dealership agreement "for the purpose of the legitimate protection of their commercial interests". Particulars of that pleading were sought by the applicant in relation to:
(a) The commercial interests which the respondents sought to protect by giving the notice to the applicant.
(b) How the giving of the notice would achieve such protection.
(c) The specific facts which render "legitimate" the protection of such commercial interests by giving the notice.
The answers were as follows:
(a) The commercial interests which the respondents sought to protect by giving the notice to the applicant were the preservation of its Distributorship Agreement with MBAu and the ongoing financial viability of the business of Diesel Motors.
(b) The respondents will receive greater market penetration in Western Australia for Mercedes Benz passenger vehicles if there is only one dealer.
(c) The facts that the respondents could lose their Distributorship Agreement with MBAu if the market penetration of Mercedes Benz passenger vehicles in Western Australia reduces and that the applicant has not achieved satisfactory market penetration and that the applicant has conflicting interests, because of its dealerships for competing passenger motor vehicles.
The letters "MBAu" referred to Mercedes Benz (Australia) Pty Ltd, the national distributor of Mercedes Benz vehicles.
The applicant contends that it was a "major allegation" raised by para.16 of the amended defence and particulars that the respondents were in danger of losing their distributorship agreement due to low market penetration of Mercedes Benz passenger vehicles in Australia which in turn was due to the applicant's unsatisfactory market penetration. It was contended also that the matters raised in particulars 5(a) and (b) rely upon those raised in 5(c). I should say at once that I do not accept that the first two sub-paragraphs of particular 5 were contingent or dependent upon the allegation made in the third sub-paragraph. The applicant went on to make reference to findings in the judgment bearing upon these aspects of the defence as particularised. At p 39 of the judgment I said:
"Despite concern from the respondent about contraction in the market and losses on the commercial vehicle side of its operations, there is nothing to suggest that either of the existing dealerships is presently or likely to be commercially unviable. In that respect I should say at this stage that I do not accept the suggestion that the applicant was performing badly or that the respondent so perceived it. There was a deal of evidence given on behalf of the respondent on that issue relevantly to the purpose of the proposed non-renewal of the dealership agreement. But as I indicated during closing addresses, I do not accept that as a fact or as the reason for the proposed non-renewal."
And at p 41 I said that:
"In coming to the conclusion I have I should also say, although it is strictly unnecessary to do so, that I did not accept the explanation advanced on behalf of the respondent, of its purpose in not renewing the dealership in so far as it reflected upon the performance of the applicant. I do not accept that the alleged poor performance by the applicant was a factor in the decision. In my opinion the probability is that the respondent's purpose was to increase its market penetration and profitability by adding to its existing sales those derived from sales which would otherwise have been made by the applicant and to protect its position with MBAu. In so doing it has taken advantage of contractual powers, but while those may be an element of market power they do not constitute or form part of a substantial degree of market power in the relevant sense."
The applicant contends that the issues raised in para.16 of the amended defence were not issues which were reasonably raised and as such they multiplied issues in the proceedings. It contends that a substantial proportion of its costs were incurred in addressing the matters raised by those allegations which were dominant in the proceedings as was apparent from the third affidavit of Gregory Lle Arnold and the lengthy cross-examination of Rayder Sandon. Mr Arnold was a director of the applicant and the cross-examination referred to is of Mr Sandon by counsel for the applicant. The applicant says it was forced to address the matters raised in para.16 of the amended defence and the particulars pertaining to that paragraph. It was not open to it to have merely elected not to address that issue. The applicant submits that the respondent's conduct in raising the issue of purpose was unreasonable and as such it should not be entitled to be compensated by a costs order in relation to its costs in raising that issue. Furthermore the applicant says the respondents should be ordered to pay its costs in that respect. It relies upon the observations of Wilcox J. in Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v. Razzi (1991) 101 ALR 425 at 430.
I have recently reviewed the principles applicable to applications for apportionment of costs as between successful and unsuccessful parties in the judgment in J-Corp Pty Ltd v. BLF and BTA (unrep. Fed Ct. 19.2.93). I do not propose to repeat what I have said in that judgment which was also published today. In my opinion the allegations of unsatisfactory market penetration and conflict of interest which were made against the applicant were red herrings. I do not accept however, that they were issues which required a lot of attention at trial. But they did involve some diversion of time and resources. In the circumstances I think a minor apportionment is appropriate. I propose therefore to reduce the costs recoverable by the respondents by one-eighth to take account of that issue on which they did not succeed and in which, in my opinion, never had any prospect of success.
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