Australian Superfloors Pty Ltd v Morgan Media
[2013] QCATA 120
•23 April 2013
| CITATION: | Australian Superfloors Pty Ltd v Morgan Media [2013] QCATA 120 |
| PARTIES: | Australian Superfloors Pty Ltd (Applicant/Appellant) |
| v | |
| Morgan Media (Respondent) |
| APPLICATION NUMBER: | APL091-13 |
| MATTER TYPE: | Appeals |
| HEARING DATE: | On the papers |
| HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
| DECISION OF: | Peta Stilgoe, Senior Member |
| DELIVERED ON: | 23 April 2013 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
| ORDERS MADE: | 1. Leave to appeal refused |
| CATCHWORDS: | MINOR CIVIL DISPUTE – whether grounds for leave to appeal Cachia v Grech [2009] NSWCA 232 Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1 Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549 |
APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):
This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (QCAT Act).
REASONS FOR DECISION
Australian Superfloors Pty Ltd engaged Morgan Media to create a website for a quoted cost of $2,000. Shortly before the website was finished, the parties fell into dispute. Australian Superfloors engaged another website designer to finish the website. It did not pay Morgan Media for its work. Morgan Media filed a claim in the tribunal for the quoted cost of $2,000. The tribunal ordered that Australian Superfloors pay Morgan Media the amount of the quote less $25 for one hour’s rectification work.
Australian Superfloors wants to appeal that decision. It says that the learned Member was misled by suggestions that Mr Sarra had engaged in threatening behaviour. Australian Superfloors says that the learned Member did not refer the dispute to mediation because of these suggestions. Australian Superfloors also suggests that the suggestions operated to pervert the course of justice.
Because this is an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal in its minor civil disputes jurisdiction, leave is necessary. The question whether or not leave to appeal should be granted is usually addressed according to established principles. Is there a reasonably arguable case of error in the primary decision?[1] Is there a reasonable prospect that the applicant will obtain substantive relief?[2] Is leave necessary to correct a substantial injustice caused by some error?[3] Is there a question of general importance upon which further argument, and a decision of the Appeals Tribunal, would be to the public advantage?[4]
[1] QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
[2] Cachia v Grech [2009] NSWCA 232 at 2.
[3] QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
[4]Glenwood Properties Pty Ltd v Delmoss Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 388 at 389; McIver Bulk Liquid Haulage Pty Ltd v Fruehauf Australia Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 577 at 578, 580.
The transcript confirms that the learned Member suggested that the parties should attempt to settle the dispute rather than wait for a decision. Mr Slockee, of Morgan Media, told the learned Member that he didn’t think that the parties could sort out anything by themselves. The learned Member accepted that submission and advised that she would make a decision. The dispute had already been referred to mediation. It did not settle. The claim was for less than $3,000. The debt had been outstanding for over 18 months. There comes a time, as Mr Slockee observed, when disputes like this simply need a decision.
In any event, Mr Sarra, the principal character for Australian Superfloors was not present at the hearing. There was no utility in referring the dispute to mediation. The learned Member’s decision to finalise the dispute by giving reasons meets the Tribunal’s obligation to deal with matters quickly.[5] There is nothing in the transcript which persuades me the learned Member should have taken a different view.
[5] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, s 3(b).
The learned Member gave clear and explicit reasons for her decision. The dispute was a simple case of breach of contract. There is no suggestion that the learned Member was influenced by a suggestion that Mr Sarra was prone to violence.
The learned Member did conclude her reasons for decision by reassuring Mrs Sarra that she did all she could to present the case for Australian Superfloors. I do not understand that comment to be an acknowledgement that Mr Sarra is prone to violence. Instead, the remark should be taken at its face value. Mr Sarra was not present at the hearing. He would want to know why the order was made. The learned Member was simply telling Mrs Sarra she did the best she could and Mr Sarra would not have done any better.
There is no question of general importance that should be determined by the Appeals Tribunal. There is no reasonably arguable case that the learned Adjudicator was in error. There is no reasonable prospect of substantive relief on appeal. There is no evidence that a substantial injustice will result if leave is not granted. Leave to appeal should be refused.
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