[2003] FamCA 1114
FAMILY LAW ACT 1975
IN THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT No. SY 5067 of 2002
IN THE MATTER OF: | AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION | Applicant | |
AND | RICH | John David | First Respondent |
AND | RICH | Maxine Nicole | Second Respondent |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
| CORAM: | O’Ryan J |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 20 December 2002 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 15 October 2003 |
APPEARANCES:
| Mr Brereton and Mr Abadee | Of Senior Counsel Of Junior Counsel (instructed by the Solicitor for the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, DX 653 SYDNEY NSW) appeared on behalf of the Applicant. |
| Mr Richardson | Of Senior Counsel (instructed by Joanne Kelly, solicitor, 501/184 Forbes Street, DARLINGHURST NSW 2010) appeared on behalf of the First Respondent. |
| Mr Broun | Of Queen’s Counsel (instructed by Broun Abrahams, solicitors, DX 11551 SYDNEY DOWNTOWN NSW) appeared on behalf of the Second Respondent. |
FAMILY LAW – financial agreement under s 90C Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – whether Family Court has jurisdiction to set aside financial agreement pursuant to ss 90K(1)(b) and 90KA on the application of a third party creditor – meaning of “matrimonial cause” under s 4(1) – whether power arises from s 90K or other provisions
Application dismissed. The Family Court has no jurisdiction to deal with an application by a third party to set aside a financial agreement.
Proceedings
On 23 August 2002 an Application was filed by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission for an order pursuant to ss 90K(1)(b) and 90KA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) setting aside a Financial Agreement entered into on 31 May 2001 by John David Rich and Maxine Nicole Rich. ASIC also seeks consequential orders.
On 8 October 2002 a Response objecting to jurisdiction was filed on behalf of the husband and on 20 November 2002 a Response was filed on behalf of the wife. The husband and the wife seek that the application by ASIC be dismissed.
The issue before me is whether the Family Court has jurisdiction to deal with the application by ASIC. The husband contends that there is no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by ASIC. The application by the wife, in substance, is an application for summary dismissal and thus, it is necessary that I be satisfied that there is an absence of a triable issue, and/or that the application is so untenable that it cannot possibly succeed.[1]
Background
The husband was born on 1 February 1960 and the wife was born on 30 June 1962. The respondents were married on 6 December 1987 and are still living together. Their marriage has not broken down. They have three children.
The husband was a founding director of One.Tel Limited having been appointed as a director on 3 March 1995. He occupied the position of joint managing director until 17 May 2001 when he resigned.
One.Tel Limited was the holding company…
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- Case
- [2003] FamCA 1114
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether Rich had contravened provisions of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth) relating to insider trading. Specifically, the Court was required to determine if Rich possessed and used, or procured others to use, information that was not generally available but would, if it were generally available, have been expected to have a material effect on the price of shares in a particular company.
The Court considered the evidence presented regarding the timing of Rich's acquisition of the information and the subsequent trading activity. It applied the legal principles governing insider trading, focusing on the definition of "information" and "generally available," as well as the requirement for the information to have a "material effect" on the price of securities. The Court analysed whether the information Rich possessed met these criteria and whether his actions constituted a contravention of the relevant statutory provisions.
The Court found that Rich had contravened the insider trading provisions of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth). Consequently, the Court made orders including pecuniary penalties against Rich and disqualified him from managing corporations for a specified period.
Background
Background to the litigation
The husband and wife were married on 6 December 1987 and had three children. The husband was a founding director of One.Tel Limited until his resignation on 17 May 2001. On 31 May 2001, the husband and wife entered into a Financial Agreement assigning the husband's interest in their Vaucluse property to the wife and providing for maintenance payments to the wife. The agreement recited that the husband's financial affairs had deteriorated and that the wife had a potential claim under the Family Law Act.
On 31 May 2001, ASIC commenced an investigation of the husband relating to suspected contraventions of the Corporations Law. The husband and wife transferred their interests in the Vaucluse property to the wife on 4 June 2001. On 12 December 2001, ASIC commenced proceedings against the husband in the Supreme Court claiming declarations and orders for contraventions of the Corporations Act.
This case involves an application by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to set aside a financial agreement entered into between John David Rich and Maxine Nicole Rich on 31 May 2001. The application was filed on 23 August 2002, and the respondents objected to the jurisdiction of the Family Court to hear the application. The husband and wife also filed responses seeking that ASIC's application be dismissed. The key issue before the court was whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application by a third party, such as ASIC, to set aside a financial agreement. ASIC argued that the Family Court had jurisdiction to set aside the agreement on the basis that it was void, voidable or unenforceable, and that it was intended to defraud creditors. The respondents argued that the Family Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the application as it was not a "matrimonial cause" as defined in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The court found that the Family Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain ASIC's application to set aside the financial agreement, as it was not a "matrimonial cause" within the meaning of the Family Law Act. The court noted that while there were public policy reasons for allowing third parties to set aside financial agreements in certain circumstances, the absence of any language in s 90K of the Act confining its operation to applications by a party to a marriage did not operate to broaden the scope of jurisdiction. The court also found that ASIC's application under s 37A of the Conveyancing Act was not tenable, as there was no cause of action available to ASIC at the time. The application by ASIC was dismissed.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the Family Court have jurisdiction to entertain an application by a third party to set aside a financial agreement under sections 90K(1)(b) and 90KA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)?
2. Is the application by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to set aside the financial agreement a "matrimonial cause" within the definition in section 4(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)?
3. Can the Family Court grant the relief sought by ASIC under sections 90K(1)(b) and 90KA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)?
4. Does the financial agreement between the husband and wife contravene the principles of public policy or the rights of third parties, including ASIC?
Held
1. The Family Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an application by a third party to set aside a financial agreement under sections 90K(1)(b) and 90KA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
2. The application by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to set aside the financial agreement is not a "matrimonial cause" within the definition in section 4(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
3. The Family Court cannot grant the relief sought by ASIC under sections 90K(1)(b) and 90KA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
4. The financial agreement between the husband and wife does not contravene the principles of public policy or the rights of third parties, including ASIC.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Australian Securities and Investments Commission & Rich, the Family Court addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to entertain an application by a third party to set aside a financial agreement under sections 90K(1)(b) and 90KA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The Court concluded that it did not have such jurisdiction. This case note examines the court's reasoning, identifying the legal principles applied, the authorities relied on, and the ratio decidendi.
The court began by considering the jurisdiction of the Family Court under section 31(1)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975, which confers jurisdiction on the Family Court with respect to matters arising under the Act in respect of which "matrimonial causes" are instituted or continued. The definition of "matrimonial cause" in section 4(1) of the Act was crucial in determining whether the application by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) fell within the jurisdiction of the Family Court. The court noted that the definition of "matrimonial cause" provided jurisdiction for proceedings between parties to a marriage for the approval or revocation of a maintenance agreement, but did not provide any part of the definition that supported a claim by ASIC. Consequently, the application by ASIC was not a "matrimonial cause."
The court also considered whether the jurisdiction could be found under section 31(1)(d) of the Act, which confers jurisdiction with respect to matters with respect to which proceedings may be instituted under the Family Law Act. The court held that although the language of sections 90K and 90KA, together with extrinsic material, indicated that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain applications to set aside binding financial agreements at the suit of third parties, the absence of any language in section 90K confining its operation to applications by a party to a marriage did not, upon proper construction, operate to broaden the scope of jurisdiction. The court held that the construction contended for by ASIC was not supported by consideration of the terms of section 90K and section 90KA. If it had been intended that jurisdiction would be conferred by those provisions, it would have been a matter of simply stating it. The terms of these provisions were to be compared with section 67ZC, which supported the 'welfare' jurisdiction.
The court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to make the orders sought by ASIC pursuant to section 90K and proposed to dismiss its application. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Family Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an application by a third party to set aside a financial agreement under sections 90K(1)(b) and 90KA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The court distinguished the present case from previous authorities, such as Chemaisse and Chemaisse, where the court had jurisdiction to entertain applications to set aside orders or agreements at the suit of third parties because those cases involved proceedings between parties to a marriage. In this case, there were no proceedings when parties entered into a financial agreement, and therefore, the Family Court did not have jurisdiction to deal with the application by ASIC.
In summary, the court held that the Family Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an application by a third party to set aside a financial agreement under sections 90K(1)(b) and 90KA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The court distinguished the present case from previous authorities and held that the absence of any language in section 90K confining its operation to applications by a party to a marriage did not broaden the scope of jurisdiction. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Family Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain such an application by a third party.