Australian Rural Group Ltd v Main Camp Tea Tree Oil Ltd

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CITATION: Australian Rural Group Ltd v Main Camp Tea Tree Oil Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1111
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2716 of 2001
HEARING DATE(S): Monday, 12 November 2001
Monday, 3 December 2001
JUDGMENT DATE:
3 December 2001

PARTIES :


Australian Rural Group Limited (Plaintiff)
Main Camp Tea Tree Oil Limited (Defendant)
JUDGMENT OF: Master McLaughlin
COUNSEL : C.C. Hodgekiss, T. Bartush-Peek (Plaintiff)
K. Eassie (Defendant)
SOLICITORS: Tey McMahon Solicitors (Plaintiff)
Cordato Partners Solicitors (Defendant)
LEGISLATION CITED: Corporations Act
CASES CITED: Bluecrest Holdings Pty Limited v Steve Blyth Electrical Engineering & Contracting Pty Limited 241 FCA (23 February 2001)
Daewoo Australia Pty Limited v Suncorp-Metway Limited (2000) 33 ACSR 481
David Grant & Co Limited v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265
Gray Winter Properties Pty Limited v Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund (1996) 21 ACSR 581
Topfelt Pty Limited v State Bank of New South Wales (1993) 120 ALR 155
DECISION: See paragraph 70.


IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION

MASTER McLAUGHLIN

Monday, 3 December 2001

2716/01 AUSTRALIAN RURAL GROUP -V- MAIN CAMP TEA TREE OIL LIMITED

JUDGMENT

1 MASTER: By originating process filed on 18 May 2001 the plaintiff, Australian Rural Group Limited, claims against the defendant, Main Camp Tea Tree Oil Limited, substantively an order in the following terms:

          "An order pursuant to section 459H and/or section 459J that the Creditor's Statutory Demand for Payment of Debt pursuant to section 459E dated 2 May 2001 be set aside."

2 There was filed in support of that originating process an affidavit of Michael John Teys. That affidavit bears the date 30 March 2001. It will be appreciated that that date is a date considerably before the date of the originating process and, indeed, considerably before the date of the service of the statutory demand, which is the subject of the proceedings.

3 A subsequent affidavit by Mr Teys, sworn on 16 July 2001, states that the earlier affidavit "inadvertently referred to 30 March 2001 as the date of being sworn". Mr Teys states that the date of swearing was 18 May 2001.

4 A further somewhat curious aspect of that original affidavit of Mr Teys is that paragraph 2 thereof commences with the words, "This is a further affidavit in support of an application by the plaintiff." No other, or earlier, affidavit in support of that application appears to have been filed or, indeed, to be relied upon.

5 The principal affidavit of Mr Teys (which, although dated 30 March 2001, I will treat as having been sworn on 18 May 2001) annexes copies of documents which were served on the plaintiff on 3 May 2001, those documents being described as a creditor's statutory demand and an affidavit.

6 Mr Teys, in paragraph 4 of his affidavit, states as follows:

          "I note that the demand does not properly follow prescribed form 509H and that:

          (a) the demand is not addressed to the plaintiff directly but to its company secretary;

          (b) there is a…

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Details
Case
[2001] NSWSC 1111
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Australian Rural Group Limited (ARL) sought to have a statutory demand issued by Main Camp Tea Tree Oil Limited (MCTTOL) set aside. The application was made pursuant to the Corporations Act, specifically sections 459H and 459J. ARL contended that the statutory demand contained several defects, including that it was addressed to the company secretary rather than the company directly, omitted the defendant's address, contained two conflicting amounts, and lacked an affidavit verifying the debt. ARL also argued that there was a genuine dispute over the amount owed. MCTTOL opposed the application.

The court considered whether the statutory demand contained defects that caused substantial injustice or whether there was some other reason to set it aside. The court held that while some defects did not cause substantial injustice, the use of two conflicting amounts in the demand did. The court also found that MCTTOL failed to comply with the statutory requirement to include an affidavit verifying that the debt was payable. This constituted a mandatory requirement that, if not complied with, provided a reason to set aside the demand. The court declined to consider the argument of a genuine dispute as ARL had not raised this ground within the 21-day period prescribed by the statute.

Consequently, the court set aside the statutory demand. It ordered MCTTOL to pay ARL's costs and stayed execution of the order to allow MCTTOL time to pay the costs. The matter was stood over to allow MCTTOL to pay the costs before the stay was lifted.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a statutory demand for payment of debt issued by Main Camp Tea Tree Oil Limited (the defendant) against Australian Rural Group Limited (the plaintiff). The statutory demand, dated 2 May 2001, was served on the plaintiff on 3 May 2001. The plaintiff filed an originating process on 18 May 2001, seeking to have the statutory demand set aside. The plaintiff's primary contention is that the statutory demand contains several defects, including an incorrect address, missing required statements, and conflicting amounts, which caused substantial injustice. Additionally, the plaintiff asserts that there is a genuine dispute regarding the existence and amount of the debt.

The matter was heard by Master McLaughlin in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division. The plaintiff, Australian Rural Group Limited, filed an originating process on 18 May 2001, invoking the provisions of Division 3 of Part 5.4 of the Corporations Act. The defendant, Main Camp Tea Tree Oil Limited, responded to the application. Both parties submitted written outlines of their arguments, which were considered by the court. The court heard the matter on 12 November 2001 and 3 December 2001, and delivered its judgment on 3 December 2001.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the statutory demand contains defects that cause substantial injustice, thereby justifying its setting aside under section 459J of the Corporations Act.
2. Whether the failure to comply with the mandatory statutory requirement for the accompanying affidavit constitutes a reason to set aside the statutory demand.
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to raise a genuine dispute as a ground for setting aside the statutory demand.

Held
1. The court held that the statutory demand contained defects that caused substantial injustice, thereby justifying its setting aside under section 459J of the Corporations Act. Specifically, the court found that the use of two completely disparate figures in the demand caused confusion and substantial injustice.
2. The court held that the failure to comply with the mandatory statutory requirement for the accompanying affidavit constituted a reason to set aside the statutory demand. The court found that the accompanying affidavit did not verify that the debt was payable by the company, which was a mandatory requirement under the statute.
3. The court did not need to decide whether the plaintiff was entitled to raise a genuine dispute as a ground for setting aside the statutory demand, as it found that the statutory demand should be set aside based on the defects and the failure to comply with the mandatory requirement for the accompanying affidavit.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the statutory demand and the accompanying affidavit to determine if there were defects that caused substantial injustice or if there was some other reason to set aside the demand. The court found that the demand was defective in several ways, including the use of two completely disparate figures, which caused confusion and substantial injustice. The court also found that the accompanying affidavit did not comply with the mandatory requirement of verifying that the debt was payable by the company, which constituted some other reason to set aside the demand. The court relied on previous cases such as Daewoo Australia Pty Limited v Suncorp-Metway Limited to determine the importance of compliance with the mandatory requirements for statutory demands. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a statutory demand may be set aside if it contains defects that cause substantial injustice or if there is some other reason, such as failure to comply with a mandatory requirement for the accompanying affidavit. The court distinguished previous cases that required strict adherence to the prescribed form for the affidavit, finding that substance must take precedence over form, but emphasized the importance of complying with mandatory statutory requirements.