Australian Rugby Union Limitd v Hospitality Group Pty Limitd & Ors [1999] FCA 1098
Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1098
AUSTRALIAN RUGBY UNION LTD v HOSPITALITY GROUP PTY LTD & ORS
N 324 OF 1999
JUDGE: SACKVILLE J
PLACE: SYDNEY
DATE: 9 AUGUST 1999
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY N 324 OF 1999
BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN RUGBY UNION LIMITED Applicant
AND: HOSPITALITY GROUP PTY LIMITED First Respondent
ICM (MARKETING) PTY LIMITED
Second Respondent
AUSTRALIAN TOURS FOR SPORT PTY LIMITED
Third Respondent
CAMERON JACKSON
Fourth Respondent
JUDGE: SACKVILLE J DATE: 9 AUGUST 1999 PLACE: SYDNEY
RULING ON EVIDENCE 1 Objection has been taken to pars 5.5 to 5.9 of Professor Bewley's affidavit. Par 5.5 is illustrative of the issues that have been raised by Mr Gleeson's submission that these sections of the affidavit should be rejected. In par 5.5, Professor Bewley addresses the following question:
"What is the likely effect in the Hospitality Market of the imposition by the ARU of the Condition on all ticket sales?"
Professor Bewley answers this question by stating his opinion that the likely effect of the Condition on the Match Hospitality market is to reduce competition in that market, by preventing the development of a secondary market in premium tickets at the Matches (that is, the Centenary Test and the Bledisloe Cup).
2 Professor Bewley reasons that, since there are no primary allocations of premium tickets to unofficial March Hospitality providers (that is, those providers not approved by the ARU), the Condition excludes them from supplying their services at the Matches. Professor Bewley concludes that the Condition puts the ARU and its affiliated companies in the position of being a monopolist in the relevant market, that is, the market for hospitality services at the Matches.
3 Mr Gleeson's objection is that this is evidence that goes to the ultimate legal issue that I have to decide.
4 Section 80 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ("Evidence Act") provides as follows:
"Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about(a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue;
...".
5 On the face of it, s 80(a) would seem to provide an answer to Mr Gleeson's submission. However, he relies on the judgment of Lindgren J in Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 33) (1996) 64 FCR 79. In that case, his Honour rejected the evidence of an expert in United States law that certain omissions in a prospectus were materially misleading for the purposes of the Securities Act 1933 (US).
6 Lindgren J pointed out that, under the general law, a distinction is drawn between the content of foreign law, which is a question of fact on which evidence is receivable, and the application of the foreign law to the facts, which is a matter exclusively for the court. He considered that this distinction had been preserved by the Evidence…
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- Case
- [1999] FCA 1098
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court acknowledged that the expert's opinions, while touching on legal standards, primarily addressed factual matters such as market definitions and the impact of the condition on competition. It distinguished this from legal opinions that would directly address the ultimate issue of the case. The court referenced the judgment in Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 33) (1996) 64 FCR 79, which held that certain evidence was inadmissible as it intruded into the court's function of applying the law. However, the court found that the expert's evidence in the present case was different, as it did not directly address legal standards but rather described market consequences.
The court concluded that the probative value of the expert's opinions should be assessed based on the persuasiveness of the underlying analysis, but the expressions of opinion themselves were admissible. The court found that the expert's opinions were relevant to the facts of the case and did not intrude into the judicial function of applying the law. The court thus allowed the evidence in question to be considered in the proceedings.
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi