Australian Postal Corporation v Chalkley

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Postal Corporation v Chalkley [2010] FCA 342

Citation: Australian Postal Corporation v Chalkley [2010] FCA 342
Appeal from: Chalkley and Australian Postal Corporation [2009] AATA 558
Parties: AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION v TANYA GAIL CHALKLEY
File number: NSD 918 of 2009
Judge: EDMONDS J
Date of judgment: 14 April 2010
Catchwords:

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION—Appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal—whether the respondent is entitled to payments pursuant to ss 16 and 19 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) for injuries sustained whilst carrying out her duties as a postal delivery officer for the applicant—whether the Tribunal had incorrectly diagnosed the respondent—whether the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s submissions—whether the Tribunal had wrongly treated the applicant’s prior acceptance of liability and payments as estoppel or as relevant to the question of liability—whether the Tribunal had considered the irrelevant consideration of the effect of medical examinations for medico-legal purposes on the respondent.

Held: Appeal dismissed; the respondent is entitled to payments pursuant to ss 16 and 19 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth); the Tribunal did not incorrectly diagnose the respondent; the Tribunal did not fail to consider the applicant’s submissions; the Tribunal did not treat the applicant’s prior acceptance of liability and payments as constituting estoppel or as relevant to the question of liability; and the Tribunal did not consider irrelevant considerations.

Legislation: Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 16, 19
Cases cited: Commonwealth Banking Corporation v Percival (1988) 20 FCR 176 cited
Date of hearing: 19 November 2009
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 38
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms RM Henderson
Solicitor for the Applicant: Graham Jones Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D Richards
Solicitor for the Respondent: Slater & Gordon

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 918 of 2009
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION
Applicant
AND:

TANYA GAIL CHALKLEY
Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 APRIL 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 918 of 2009
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION
Applicant
AND:

TANYA GAIL CHALKLEY
Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE:

14 APRIL 2010

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Mr MD Allen SM) (‘the Tribunal’), [2009] AATA 558, setting aside a decision, affirming a prior determination, that the respondent (‘Mrs Chalkley’) had no present entitlements pursuant to ss 16 and 19 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 342
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Australian Postal Corporation v Chalkley involved a dispute between the Australian Postal Corporation and Mrs Chalkley regarding compensation for injuries sustained in a workplace accident. Mrs Chalkley, an employee of Australia Post, suffered a neck injury on 21 May 2001. Initially, Australia Post accepted liability for a 'neck and shoulder muscle strain' and made payments for medical treatment and loss of earnings. However, subsequent medical examinations and reports led Australia Post to determine that Mrs Chalkley's injuries were the aggravation of pre-existing conditions, specifically cervical spondylosis and an adjustment disorder with depressed mood. Consequently, Australia Post concluded it had no ongoing liability for compensation. Mrs Chalkley sought review of this decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which ultimately found in her favour, leading to an appeal by Australia Post.

The legal issues at the heart of the appeal centred on the interpretation of the Tribunal's findings and its authority to determine the nature and extent of Mrs Chalkley's injuries. Australia Post argued that the Tribunal erred in diagnosing Mrs Chalkley with a "chronic pain disorder," claiming that the Tribunal lacked the necessary medical expertise and that there was insufficient evidence to support such a diagnosis. Additionally, Australia Post contended that the Tribunal mischaracterised the diagnoses provided by the medical experts and incorrectly concluded that Mrs Chalkley's ongoing pain was a result of the 2001 accident.

The Court examined the Tribunal's reasoning and found that while the Tribunal's language at times conflated symptoms with a specific condition, this did not amount to an erroneous diagnosis. The Court highlighted that symptoms such as chronic pain are integral to the condition for which compensation is sought. The Court also noted that the Tribunal's conclusion that Mrs Chalkley's pain syndrome was caused by the accident was supported by the evidence, including the persistence of her symptoms and the medical reports. The Court rejected Australia Post's argument that the Tribunal lacked the expertise to make such determinations, reaffirming the Tribunal's authority to assess and interpret medical evidence in workers' compensation cases.

The Court's decision ultimately upheld the Tribunal's conclusion that Mrs Chalkley remained entitled to compensation for her ongoing pain, which was causally linked to the 2001 workplace accident. The appeal was dismissed, and the matter was remitted to Australia Post for further consideration of Mrs Chalkley's compensation entitlements.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Over the next couple of days Mrs Chalkley continued to work but found she began to experience neck pain which worsened. She contacted her general practitioner but some days elapsed before that general practitioner was able to make an appointment.BACKGROUND On 6 June 2001, Australia Post accepted liability pursuant to s 14 of the SRC Act for ‘neck and shoulder muscle strain’. Various payments were then made for medical treatment and loss of earnings pursuant to ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act. Mrs Chalkley received medical treatment for her physical condition for several years, initially from Dr Kuru, but principally from Dr Schwarzer, who performed nerve blocks and denervation procedures between May 2005 and April 2007. On 23 November 2006, Mrs Chalkley was examined by Dr McGill, a rheumatologist, at Australia Post’s request. Dr McGill diagnosed ‘degenerative change in the cervical spine (cervical spondylosis) including disc degeneration and facet joint disease’ and also commented that it was ‘very likely she is currently depressed’. Australia Post notified Mrs Chalkley on 10 January 2007 that:‘Based on Dr McGill’s report, please be advised that the diagnosis of your injury will now reflect “aggravation of pre-existing constitutional condition – cervical spondylosis”.’In the same correspondence, Australia Post invited Mrs Chalkley to submit a fresh compensation claim if she wished to claim compensation for a psychological condition. On 20 January 2007, Mrs Chalkely claimed compensation for ‘depression (secondary to injury)’. She was examined at Australia Post’s request by Dr Lovric, a psychiatrist, and on 8 February 2007, Dr Lovric reported that Mrs Chalkley was suffering from an adjustment disorder with depressed mood. On 1 March 2007, Australia Post notified Mrs Chalkley that:‘[T]he diagnosis of your injury will now reflect “aggravation of pre-existing constitutional condition – cervical spondylosis and adjustment disorder with depressed mood”.’ On 6 June 2008, Australia Post determined that it had no present liability under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act in respect of the incident. That decision was affirmed on reconsideration on 30 June 2008 and Mrs Chalkley applied to the Tribunal for a review.IN THE TRIBUNAL The documents filed by Australia Post pursuant to s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) included reports prepared by various specialist medical practitioners. The practitioners were, in alphabetical order:·Professor Beran (neurologist)·Dr Best (orthopaedic surgeon)·Dr Bracken (orthopaedic surgeon)·Dr Burke (occupational medicine)·Dr Chase (occupations physician)·Dr Gorman (consulting physician and pain management)·Dr Graham (occupational medicine)·Dr Kuru (spinal and orthopaedic surgeon)·Dr Lovric (psychiatrist)·Dr Maxwell (orthopaedic and spinal surgeon)·Dr McGill (consultant rheumatologist)·Dr Muratore (sports physician)·Professor Oakeshott (consulting surgeon)·Dr Phillips (psychiatrist)·Dr Pierides (occupational medicine)·Dr Russo (pain medicine)·Dr Schwarzer (rheumatology, musculoskeletal and pain medicine)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

As noted in [1] above, the Tribunal set aside Australia Post’s decision and remitted the matter to Australia Post with a direction that Mrs Chalkley ‘remains entitled to payments pursuant to sections 16 and 19 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988’.THE TRIBUNAL’S CONCLUSION At [48] of its reasons, the Tribunal concluded:‘Whatever may be the state of [Mrs Chalkley’s] neck at present, I am satisfied that she continues to suffer pain as a result of a chronic pain syndrome and that the cause of that pain syndrome is the motorcycle accident on 21 May 2001.’ It reiterated this at [50] of its reasons, as follows:‘For the reasons given above I am satisfied that [Mrs Chalkley] does have an ongoing pain syndrome which was caused by the 21 May 2001 injury.’THE APPEAL This conclusion is assailed by Australia Post as being infected with legal error on a number of grounds set out in its notice of appeal.Ground (a) This ground provides:‘The Tribunal purported to diagnose [Mrs Chalkley] as suffering from “chronic pain disorder”. The Tribunal did not possess the expertise to make that purported diagnosis, and there was no evidence before the Tribunal to support that purported diagnosis.’ In its written submissions at [19], Australia Post contended:‘In its [r]easons at [47] the Tribunal attributed a diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome to the psychiatrist Dr Lovric (who was not a treating practitioner), and also said that the syndrome had been “alluded to” by the psychologist Dr Newton-John. The Tribunal was wrong, in both instances. Both Dr Lovric and Dr Newton-John used the expression “chronic pain” in their respective reports, but they did so in the course of describing symptoms, and not by way of a diagnosis. Dr Lovric’s diagnosis was “adjustment disorder with depressed mood”. Dr Newton-John said that the respondent would not currently meet the criteria for a diagnosis of depression; he made no alternative diagnosis in his report.’ In its oral submissions, Australia Post conceded:‘[A]s my learned friend has pointed out, that the words “chronic pain” do appear in certain reports which were before the tribunal … But we do not concede that one can equate chronic pain, which is a description of a symptom of a disorder, [as] an indication that a particular condition called “chronic pain syndrome” is actually being debated before the tribunal.’ Reading [48] and [50] of the Tribunal’s reasons, in context that is, from [42] onwards and, in particular [47], I am not persuaded that the Tribunal purported to diagnose Mrs Chalkley as suffering from ‘chronic pain disorder’. There is no doubt that in [48] the Tribunal’s wording is perhaps unhelpful in that it seems to conflate the symptom ‘chronic pain’ with a particular condition ‘chronic pain syndrome’ which has not been diagnosed as the injury or illness, but that has more to do with the Tribunal’s misdescription of Dr Lovric’s diagnosis in [47] than with the Tribunal understanding its own diagnosis. And a misdescription of Dr Lovric’s diagnosis is not an error of law. Moreover, as was said by a Full Court in Commonwealth Banking Corporation v Percival (1988) 20 FCR 176 at 179 – 180:‘No doubt, for many medical purposes, it is useful and often necessary to distinguish between the underlying pathology of a disease and mere symptoms of the disease. For some legal purposes, for example s 104(2) of the Act, the distinction is also pertinent: see Johnston v Commonwealth (1982) 150 CLR 331 at 341–3. But that is not to say that the symptoms of a disease are not a part of the disease. It is indeed fundamental to compensation law that a symptom of an injury or disease is a part of the condition in respect of which compensation for incapacity is granted. Pain is probably the most common symptom of injury or disease. It is equally the most common factor leading to compensable incapacity.’A passage which was quoted by the Tribunal in its reasons at [39].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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