Australian Nursing Federation v Victorian Hospitals Industrial Association
[2011] FWA 7198
•2 NOVEMBER 2011
[2011] FWA 7198 |
|
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.437—Protected action
Australian Nursing Federation
v
Victorian Hospitals’ Industrial Association
(B2011/3548)
COMMISSIONER GOOLEY | MELBOURNE, 2 NOVEMBER 2011 |
Proposed protected action ballot.
[1] The Australian Nursing Federation (ANF) made an application pursuant to section 443 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the FW Act) for a protected action ballot of employees of certain Victorian public health employers who are the subject of a single interest employer authorisation (the employers). 1
[2] The matter was heard on 4 and 5 October 2011. At the hearing Mr Warren Friend SC of counsel was given permission to appear for the ANF and Mr Val Gostencnik a solicitor was given permission to appear for the employers.
[3] Mr Paul Gilbert the Assistant Secretary of the ANF’s Victorian Branch gave evidence for the ANF and Ms Karleen Edwards the Executive Director of Mental Health, Drugs and Regions Division for the Department of Health and Ms Frances Diver, the Executive Director of Hospital and Health Service Performance for the Department of Health gave evidence for the employers.
[4] The ANF and the employers are bound by the Nurses (Victorian Public Sector) Multiple Employer Agreement 2004-2007 (the Agreement) which has a nominal expiry date of 1 November 2011. 2
[5] The evidence established that the proposed enterprise agreement was not a greenfields agreement or a multi-enterprise agreement. 3 Further, the application was made less than 30 days before the nominal expiry date of the Agreement.4
[6] The evidence established that the application was served on the employers and the Australian Electoral Commission. 5
[7] The evidence established that the ANF was genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the employers. 6
[8] The employers submitted that pursuant to section 437(5) of the FW Act there are exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice referred to in paragraph 414(2)(a) of the FW Act being longer than three working days.
[9] The employers proposed that in relation to some of the industrial action seven working days notice be provided. 7
[10] On 7 October 2011 I issued a protected action ballot order. I advised the parties that I was satisfied in relation to individual and/or consecutive work stoppages each of up to four hours duration, including such stoppages to travel for and attend stop work meetings, that there were exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice, referred to in paragraph 414(2)(a) of the FW Act, being seven working days. These are my reasons for that decision.
Exceptional circumstances
[11] Both parties relied on the decision of Vice President Lawler in Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Postal Corporation 8 in which Vice President Lawler summarised the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” in the context of a similar provision in earlier legislation.
“[10] ....... In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.
[11] However, it is important to note that when considering whether to make an order pursuant to s.463(5) the Commission is not simply concerned with determining whether there are exceptional circumstances. There must be exceptional circumstances “justifying” the specification of a longer notice period. The notion of justification is critical and calls for a consideration of the purpose of the notice required by s.441. 9”
[12] Further Vice President Lawler said:
“[21] Essentially, what is required in determining whether exceptional circumstances justify an extension of the required notices period is a weighing of the interests of the employer and third parties in the employer having a greater opportunity to take appropriate defensive action as against the diminution in the effectiveness of the employees’ bargaining power that results from such an extension. The fact that the legislature has seen fit to condition the ordering of an extension of the required notice period on the presence of exceptional circumstances justifying it, as distinct from merely conferring a simple discretion to extend the required notice period, indicates that ordinarily there should be no extension. 10”
[13] I have adopted the approach taken by Vice President Lawler.
The evidence
[14] Ms Diver gave general evidence about the effect of the proposed industrial action on hospitals and health services. 11 It was her evidence that the likely significant impact of the proposed industrial action was:
(a) delays to admission and discharge from hospitals;
(b) delays to elective surgery treatment;
(c) backlogs in emergency departments;
(d) delays to access specialist care, outpatient clinics and subsequent treatment. 12
[15] Ms Diver gave evidence that in 2004, industrial action by nurses had resulted in 1372 bed closures and the cancelation of 1121 elective surgery cases. In 2007 industrial action had caused 885 bed closures and the cancellation of 997 elective surgery cases. It was her evidence that the industrial action in 2004 and 2007 involved closing one in four beds, cancelling one in four elective surgeries and one in four other services, not one in three as proposed in the current application and therefore the number of cancellations and closures would be higher under the proposed industrial action than in 2004 and 2007. 13
[16] Ms Diver also gave evidence that the industrial action will cause a delay in the discharge of patients and this will have a negative impact on a patient’s health outcome. 14 Further these delays will delay the admission of other patients.15
[17] It was also her evidence that the proposed bans will have a significant impact on the scheduling and processing of patients.
[18] Ms Diver gave evidence that the bans would delay elective surgery. She said the bans would result in 205 less elective surgical cases each working day on average and this would lead to significant delays for patients. 16 This, she said, would cause patients, their families and carers to suffer anxiety and distress.17
[19] Ms Diver gave evidence that additional notice was needed to enable hospitals and health services “to rearrange resources (including, for example, surgeons), rearrange operating theatre schedules and reschedule all associated staff. 18
[20] Further additional notice is required to assist hospitals and health services “to plan and reprioritise elective surgery to ensure that the most urgent cases continue to receive the highest priority.” 19
[21] Further additional notice allows for planning, assessment of priorities and better risk management to limit the adverse impact on patients. Some patients, she said, may be brought forward while others are delayed.
[22] In addition she gave evidence that additional notice to patients of the cancellation of their surgery assists patients to make new arrangements and may reduce some of the stress and anxiety associated with the cancellation of that surgery. 20
[23] Ms Diver’s evidence was that the hospitals had not previously faced a one in three reduction regime and needed additional time to assist in planning for the likely impacts on patients and services. 21
[24] Ms Diver gave further evidence that the industrial action will result in delays in admitting patients from the emergency department and there will be delays in patients accessing the emergency department. Consequently patients may remain in the care of ambulance paramedics which may result in longer ambulance response times within the community. The employers often cooperate collaboratively in the co-ordination of emergency department services with ambulance services. It was her evidence that an additional period of notice would assist hospitals and health services to plan and schedule appropriate resources to limit potential adverse health outcomes for patients and the community caused by the backlog in emergency departments. 22
[25] She further gave evidence that the bans are likely to cause delays in access to radiology, outpatients and specialist treatment. This may have adverse outcomes for patients. It was her evidence that additional notice will enable hospitals and health services to contact patients, provide reassurance, reschedule available resources and reprioritise the most urgent cases. 23
[26] In cross-examination Ms Diver accepted that during times when no industrial action is occurring, elective surgery is cancelled and rescheduled. 24 She accepted that in 2007-2008 between 6.4 and 6.9 per cent of elective surgery was cancelled with less than two weeks’ notice.25 She also accepted that elective surgery may be cancelled with no notice.26 She accepted that a certain level of cancellations is acceptable to government.27 She also accepted that the consequences for patients of those hospital initiated cancellations are the same if the cancellation was caused by the industrial action.28 However she did not resile from her view that having the longer period of notice will allow the health services “to plan and prepare for a substantial increase in the cancellation of patients for surgery, because the increased cancellation rate will require increased prioritisation of patients to ensure that the most urgent patients are treated fairly.”29
[27] She accepted that the health services had previously been able to prioritize services during earlier periods of industrial action by nurses when only 3 days notice of the protected industrial action had been given. 30
[28] She also accepted that during an earlier period of industrial action that 100 per cent of patients needing emergency treatment were dealt with compared with 98 per cent when no industrial action was taking place. 31
[29] Ms Diver’s explanation for why this industrial action would require more notice than earlier industrial action was because then one in four beds were closed and one in four elective surgeries were cancelled compared with one in three closures/cancellations proposed now. 32
[30] It was put to Ms Diver that the ANF had, in 2001, notified industrial action in the form of one in three closures and she gave evidence that she had no information about that industrial action. 33 However she did say that there had been an increase in hospital occupancy since then and that has an impact on the capacity of hospitals to cope.34
[31] Ms Edwards gave evidence about the impact of the industrial action on mental health services. The industrial action proposed in this application did not apply to mental health nurses whose employment was subject to the Victorian Psychiatric Services Certified Agreement 2004-2007. Those employees were the subject of separate secret ballot applications.
[32] It was her evidence that mental health patients are particularly vulnerable and need consistency of care. 35 It was her evidence that redeployment of nurses within a mental health service is necessary and that unless nurses can be redeployed there will be blockages in the system which will result in more mental health patients waiting in emergency departments.36 This will have adverse impacts on patients.37 She also gave evidence that delays in admitting mental health patients will place additional pressure on ambulance services and the police.38
[33] It was her evidence that additional notice would assist “mental health services better plan the management of patients coming into wards, the core services that will continue to be provided, the management of discharges and admissions and the transfer of patients between services. This will assist in limiting the risk of adverse health outcomes for patients as a result of the industrial action.” 39 She also gave evidence that the additional notice would assist mental health services to prepare and provide reassurance to inpatients and their families.40
[34] Ms Edwards, in examination in chief, explained that the employers provide acute or urgent services as there are no elective mental health services. Some of the patients are under compulsory treatment orders. It was her evidence that to prepare for the bans, the services need “ to assist the rest of the individuals, they need to work in alternative service provisions and treatment sessions.... they need to engage families and carers... to look at options for reducing admissions and to facilitate earlier discharges if that’s possible but also to provide other supports.” 41 It was her evidence that this would take longer than three days.42
[35] In response to my questioning Ms Edwards acknowledged that there is only a small group of patients whose admission to hospital was known in advance. 43
[36] In cross examination Ms Edwards was not able to give evidence about how the requirement that overtime be approved in writing in advance would affect the employers. 44
[37] She also accepted that redeployment currently occurs only occasionally. 45
[38] She also accepted that her concerns about consistency of care will be an ongoing problem throughout the industrial action. 46
[39] While accepting that the additional notice would not assist for planning for latter days of the industrial action it was her evidence that it would assist in the planning for day one of the industrial action. 47 Ms Edwards also gave evidence that there were contingency plans being put in place now however, it was her evidence that the operationalisation of those plans would take time.
[40] Ms Edwards accepted that the employer could not predict who or when patients would be admitted and most patients are admitted acutely. 48 It was her evidence “you can plan for the expectation around the likely number of admissions per day and about managing the people with your current services who are likely to be there for ...10-12 days and how you would manage those over that period as well.”49
[41] Mr Gilbert gave evidence about the hospital initiated elective surgery cancellation. 50 It was his evidence that patients are usually given one to two days notice of cancellation but that elective surgery can be cancelled after the patient had been admitted.51
[42] Mr Gilbert gave evidence about the existing delays in elective surgery. 52
[43] Mr Gilbert gave evidence that when industrial action is taken by nurses a reprioritisation of elective surgery takes place to ensure that those who need surgery within 30 days are treated. It was his evidence that less urgent cases are postponed. It was his evidence that during earlier periods of industrial action by nurses that service delivery for urgent cases improved in that 100% of urgent cases were treated within 30 days compared with 97-98% during periods when no industrial action is occurring. 53
[44] It was his evidence that during periods of industrial action a bed management committee is established to prioritise surgery. He also gave evidence that there was a procedure in place to ensure that any patient whose condition would deteriorate significantly within 24 hours if they weren’t admitted would be admitted. 54
[45] Mr Gilbert gave evidence that in 2001 industrial action was taken which involved closing one bed in three. It was his evidence that this industrial action took place between 9 and 23 August 2001. 55
[46] Mr Gilbert gave evidence that he had never heard of redeployment in psychiatric facilities, and in support of his evidence that it did not happen, he gave evidence that the Austin Hospital had provided the ANF with a change impact statement when they proposed to introduce redeployment. 56 These bans were only included in the proposed industrial action because redeployment may be used by the employers in response to the industrial action.57 It was Mr Gilbert’s evidence that the industrial action did not include bed closures in mental health.58
[47] In cross examination Mr Gilbert accepted that the industrial action will have an impact. 59 It was his evidence that it will increase the number of urgent admissions and decrease the number of elective admissions.60
[48] It was put to Mr Gilbert that the process for determining what surgery is cancelled takes some time. Mr Gilbert accepted this but gave evidence that this process generally happens the day the surgery is to occur or the day before. 61
[49] It was put to Mr Gilbert that more time will be required given the number of surgeries that will be cancelled. It was Mr Gilbert’s evidence that there are meetings with the nurses and hospital managers every day of the dispute to manage that process. 62 Mr Gilbert gave evidence that in his experience during earlier periods of industrial action that the process of reprioritising elective surgery admission did not take significant time.63
[50] Mr Gilbert accepted that bed closures will have an impact on the admission of non urgent cases. He did not consider that delay in the admission of medical cases would have any significant impact on their health outcomes and, if it did, the patients would be admitted. 64
[51] It was Mr Gilbert’s evidence that the reprioritisation necessary during periods of industrial action is comparable to that which occurs when there is flu outbreak. 65
[52] Mr Gilbert accepted that the hospitals would need to reschedule, reprioritise and rearrange services, undertake risk assessments, consult with ambulance services and communicate with patients during the period of the industrial action. 66
Submissions of the ANF
[53] The ANF submitted that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that there were exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of the notice period. 67 It was the ANF’s submission that the evidence went to “delays in elective surgery and potential backlogs in emergency departments and delays in radiology, outpatients and specialist tribunals.”68
[54] The ANF submitted that these matters are systemic problems in the system and it was the ANF’s submission that “the question is whether there is a requirement for an additional four days to enable the employer to deal with that.” 69
[55] The ANF submitted that the evidence of the employers did not support a finding that there was anything additional or effective the employer could do if the four day extension was granted. The problems identified by the employers will be ongoing throughout the period of any industrial action. The ANF submitted that the there was no detail about what arrangements would be put in place earlier.
[56] The ANF also submitted that regard should be had for the fact that if the employer were given seven days notice of the proposed industrial action then an application could be made to Fair Work Australia on day the notice of under section 412(2) (a) was given and within five days if the matter was not determined the industrial action will be suspended thereby denying nurses their right to take protected industrial action. 70
[57] The ANF submitted that there was no evidence from the employer that supported a conclusion that three days notice had been insufficient in the past. Seven days notice had not been given in the past and there was no evidence about the problems that caused. 71
Submissions of the employers
[58] The employers relied on decisions of the Tribunal where it had been determined that additional notice was required. 72
[59] The employer submitted that in determining whether there are exceptional circumstances regard should be had to:
- the nature of the industrial action and the nature of the business
- the importance of and the availability of the services or the activities of the employer that are to be affected by the industrial action and whether the employer is in the position of effectively a sole provider and whether services are readily available elsewhere
- whether three working days’ notice is sufficient to allow the employer to alert those affected by the impact of the industrial action
- arrangements that will need to be made by those who will not be able to access the services or whose access will be delayed 73
[60] The employer submitted that it was relevant that the industrial action would not just affect one hospital but if notice is given concurrently there will be a significant impact on the capacity of state hospitals to continue operating particular services.
[61] It was submitted that it was not relevant that hospitals currently close beds and cancel elective surgery. It was submitted that preparation for the industrial action will require a lot of planning which will require co-ordination with other hospitals and service providers as well as communication with patients.
[62] It was submitted that the industrial action will have an adverse impact on some people’s health and well being.
[63] The additional time will be needed to notify patients, their medical practitioners and relatives and to reschedule surgery. Because one third of all patients may be affected, this will take time.
[64] It was not contested by the employers that there was power to issue an order which provided for seven days notice of some of the industrial action and three days notice of the remaining industrial action. 74
Conclusion
[65] In determining whether there are exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of the notice period, I accept the submissions of the employers that regard must be had to the nature of the industrial action and the nature of the employers’ business.
[66] I do not accept the submissions of the ANF that regard should be had to the ability of the employers to make an application pursuant to section 423-426 of the Act to have the protected industrial action terminated or suspended on the day the notice under section 414(2)(a) is given.
[67] It is true that such an application if successful would deny nurses the opportunity to take protected industrial action. While I accept that the decision in this matter involves a weighing up of the competing interests of the employers and the employees the fact that the employer has other rights under the FW Act is not relevant to this decision.
[68] The employees who will potentially take the industrial action are those for whom the ANF is the bargaining representative who are midwives, registered nurses and enrolled nurses other than mental health nurses coved by the Victorian Psychiatric Services Certified Agreement 2004-2007 (the employees).
[69] The industrial action proposed is set out in the ballot order [PR515437] issued in this matter. It is clear from that order that there are exemptions that will apply. In addition a process is put in place to consider emergency admissions. There was evidence that these processes had existed during other periods of protected industrial action undertaken by nurses. There was no evidence that these processes had not worked.
[70] Much of the evidence in this matter went to the impact of the proposed industrial action. While such evidence may be relevant in proceedings under different sections of the FW Act which go to the termination or suspension of protected industrial action it is not directly relevant to determining whether additional notice is required in these circumstances.
[71] There is no doubt that the employers provide essential medical services. There is uncontested evidence that the industrial action will have an impact on those services and the patients who would, but for the industrial action, receive those services. The impact on the services and patients will occur throughout the period of the industrial action. For example if a patient requires a medical bed on day one of the closure of hospital beds and the bed is closed the patient will be affected. The patient who is denied access to the bed on the 15th day of the industrial action is affected in the same manner as someone denied access on day one.
[72] I accept that the employers will need to put in place contingency plans to respond to the industrial action. Those plans will have to respond to industrial action that may occur from day one until the industrial action ends. Evidence was given that such planning has commenced.
[73] It is clear from the evidence that some of the services are provided on a planned basis, for example, elective surgery is planned in advance with the patients knowing when their surgery is to occur and some services are provided on an as needs basis. For example a person not currently a patient of the hospital may be admitted to hospital for medical treatment. While the employer may not know the identity of the patient evidence was given that they are able to anticipate from past experience the number of such presentations.
[74] Evidence was provided that hospitals have targets in relation to patient treatment. For example elective surgery for knee replacements is supposed to occur within twelve months. 75 No evidence was provided about other targets operating in hospitals.
[75] One focus of the employers’ evidence was the ban on elective surgery and the closure of hospital beds. The ANF’s evidence that elective surgeries were cancelled with little notice to patients was not contested. The evidence of the employers was that more elective surgeries will be cancelled and therefore a longer period of planning was necessary.
[76] A patient given three days notice of the cancellation of their elective surgery due to industrial action is not any better or worse off than a patient who has their surgery cancelled for other reasons. That it happens to more patients does not change the impact of the cancellation on the individual patients.
[77] I accept that the number of patients affected will mean that more resources will need to be devoted to rescheduling surgeries. Little evidence was put before the Tribunal that the employers did not have the resources to perform this work in a short period of time.
[78] Unfortunately the evidence before me was very general in nature. There was evidence that this was not the first time the employees have engaged in this type of industrial action in Victoria. It was surprising that no evidence was given about the experience of the employers on those occasions and no evidence was given based on those experiences about why additional time was necessary. For example the employers submitted that the process of determining priorities for elective surgeries was multifaceted. Yet no evidence was put forward by any of the employers about any difficulty faced by them when they had to, on three days’ notice of previous protected industrial action, reschedule elective surgery as a result of the cancellation of one in four surgeries. If such evidence had been given it may have been possible to conclude that the cancellation of one in three surgeries would require more preparation time justifying an extension of the notice period.
[79] I have assumed, though no specific evidence was called on this, that most elective surgery is scheduled well in advance. No evidence was put before the Tribunal about how urgent and elective surgery is managed. It is difficult to therefore understand how much reprioritising can occur in three or seven days prior to the commencement of the protected industrial action. Without such evidence it is not possible to reach a finding that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the additional notice.
[80] There was insufficient evidence called about how hospital bed admissions are managed. It was not clear how many of the beds are allocated in advance and how many are filled on an as needs basis. The evidence was that beds will be closed on a staggered basis. For example if a ward had 18 beds then as patients are discharged the beds are closed. If the beds are not being used at the commencement of the protected industrial action then presumably they would be closed immediately. However while one in three beds will be closed this will not occur overnight. Further there was evidence that the cancellation of one in three elective surgeries will reduce the demand for beds. As with the cancellation of elective surgery this is not the first time that these employees have closed beds during periods of protected industrial action. Evidence was given about the number of beds closed during earlier periods of industrial action. No evidence was called about the impact of the closure of the beds and how a longer period of notice would have enabled the employers to better prepare for the closures.
[81] The employers’ evidence did not deal in any detail with much of the other proposed industrial action.
[82] The employers relied upon decisions of other members of the Tribunal who on the material before them have found that there were exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of the notice period for some 76 or all of the proposed industrial action.77 It is trite to say that each matter rests on its own facts. In this matter insufficient evidence was put before the Tribunal for me to be satisfied that, in respect of all bar one of the types of the protected industrial action proposed by the ANF, that there are exceptional circumstances which justify the extension of the notice period.
Stoppages of work
[83] The ANF had sought approval for:
Industrial action in the form of single and/or consecutive work stoppages each of up to four hours duration including such stoppages to travel for and to attend stop work meetings.
[84] These stoppages could be of more than 4 hours given the stoppages can be consecutive. Therefore on one scenario there could be a stoppage of work for a lengthy period of time.
[85] No specific evidence was called about the impact of a complete stoppage of work by the employees. However I have had regard to the evidence given about the impact of the proposed industrial action in general.
[86] A complete stoppage of work would undoubtedly have a significant effect on patient care. It is not clear from the ANF’s evidence what exemptions apply during these stoppages as the exemptions referred to in the order are referable to specific industrial action like the cancellation of one in three operating sessions. Even if the exemptions apply during the stoppages I consider that planning required, if all elective surgery is cancelled, is much greater than if one in three surgeries is cancelled. Simultaneously the employers would need to plan for the stoppage of work by the employees throughout the hospital. Potentially this protected industrial action could occur simultaneously across all the employers. Given the nature of the hospitals subject of the order, the nature of the services provided, the number of patients who may be affected I have concluded that in relation to this industrial action that there are exceptional circumstances which justify the written period of notice being longer than three days and I accept the submissions of the employers that the period of notice should be seven days.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
W Friend for the Australian Nursing Federation
V Gostencnik for Victorian Hospitals’ Industrial Association
Hearing details:
2011.
Melbourne:
October 4, 5.
1 PR515271
2 Exhibit ANF 1 at [3]
3 See Section 437(2) and ANF 1 at [5]
4 See Section 438(1) and ANF 1 at [4]
5 See Section 440 and ANF 1 at [20]
6 See Section 443 and ANF 1 at [17]
7 Exhibit VHIA 1
8 176 IR 4
9 Ibid at [10]-[11]
10 Ibid at [21]
11 Exhibit VHIA 3 at [7]
12 Ibid at [8]
13 Ibid at [11]-[12]
14 Ibid at [14]
15 Ibid at [15]
16 Ibid at [20]
17 Ibid at [22]
18 Ibid at [23]
19 Ibid at [24]
20 Ibid at [26]
21 Ibid at [27]
22 Ibid at [30]-[31]
23 Ibid at [34]
24 Transcript PN 262
25 Ibid PN278
26 Ibid PN 280
27 Ibid PN 296
28 Ibid PN 299
29 Ibid PN 307
30 Ibid PN 201
31 Ibid PN 308-313
32 Ibid PN 314
33 Ibid PN 316
34 Ibid PN 325
35 Exhibit VHIA 2 at [9]
36 Ibid at [12]-[13]
37 Ibid at [14]
38 Ibid at [15]
39 Ibid at [16]
40 Ibid at [17]
41 Ibid PN 193
42 Ibid
43 Ibid PN 199
44 Ibid PN 213
45 Ibid PN 214
46 Ibid PN 222
47 Ibid PN 225
48 Ibid PN 237-239
49 Ibid PN 242
50 Ibid PN 25
51 Ibid PN 31
52 Ibid PN 44
53 Ibid PN 48
54 Ibid PN 54
55 Ibid PN 61-63 and Exhibit ANF 6
56 Ibid PN 67
57 Ibid PN 67
58 Ibid PN 68
59 Ibid PN 74
60 Ibid PN 76
61 Ibid PN 100
62 Ibid PN 101
63 Ibid PN 112
64 Ibid PN 135
65 Ibid PN 142
66 Ibid PN 156-165
67 Ibid PN 332
68 Ibid PN 335
69 Ibid PN 336
70 Ibid PN 343
71 Ibid PN 353
72 CPSU v G4S [2010] FWA 2115, AFULE v QR Passenger Pty Ltd [2009] AIRC 49, TWU v the Chief Executive of the ACT Internal Omnibus Network [2010] FWA 3355
73 Transcript PN 375-377
74 Exhibit VHIA 1
75 Exhibit ANF 5
76 [2010] FWA 2115 op cit.
77 [2009] AIRC 49 and Network [2010] FWA 3355 op cit.
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