Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union v Global Tele Sales Pty Ltd

[2011] FWA 3916

[2011] FWA 3916

FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.229 - Application for a bargaining order

Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union
v
Global Tele Sales Pty Ltd
(B2011/120)

VICE PRESIDENT WATSON SYDNEY, 22 JUNE 2011

Global Tele Sales Pty Ltd – application for a bargaining order – good faith bargaining requirements.

Introduction

[1] This decision relates to an application by the Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union (ASU) for orders under section 229 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) arising from a proposed agreement between Global Tele Sales Pty Limited (GTS) and its employees engaged in its call centre at 600 Collins Street Melbourne.

[2] The application was made on 20 June 2011 and heard expeditiously at the request of the ASU on 21 June 2011. Ms McCutcheon represented the ASU. Mr Jacobs, of counsel, represented GTS.

Background

[3] Approximately 100 employees are employed at the call centre. Employment is currently governed by a collective agreement entitled the GTS Employee Collective Agreement 1 which has operated for approximately two and a half years and has a nominal expiry date of 10 October 2011. The ASU is not a party to the agreement.

[4] The GTS Human Resources Director, Mr David Turen, gave evidence that he had not had any dealings with the ASU either in his current role or in his previous position of Human Resources Manager which he commenced in May 2008.

[5] In late May 2011, GTS initiated a bargaining process to replace its existing agreement. On 31 May 2011 and 1 June 2011 all employees who would be covered by the proposed agreement were provided with a Notice of Employee Representational Rights containing information regarding bargaining agents as required by the Act. At the same time as this notice was provided, GTS provided its employees with an explanation of the proposed agreement and a copy of the agreement.

[6] At briefing sessions with employees on 31 May and 1 June, the current Managing Director, Ms Kaim-Schoby, and another GTS Manager, Ms Krcsmar, made a presentation by PowerPoint concerning the proposed agreement. The PowerPoint presentation contained 14 slides and detailed the proposed classification structure, the benefits that would flow from a translation into the new structure, increases in rates of pay and the clauses which were proposed to be updated to reflect the Fair Work Act. Employees were advised of opportunities which would be available from 6 to 13 June to clarify questions regarding the proposed agreement.

[7] The proposed agreement contained changes to the existing classification structure, increases in rates of pay and changes in consequence of the enactment of the National Employment Standards. Mr Turen gave evidence that the hours of work and penalty provisions were proposed to remain the same as those in the current agreement.

[8] Mr Turen gave evidence that GTS undertook the process to replace the current agreement at this time because  Ms Kaim-Schoby is being transferred overseas in August and it was considered unfair to place the responsibility of overseeing the negotiation of  a new enterprise agreement on a new Managing Director.

[9] The communication and question sessions with employees proceeded from 6 to 13 June and were attended by Ms Kaim-Schoby and Ms Krcsmar. Mr Turen gave evidence that he considered that the sessions were open and productive and were well received by employees. He said that he was advised by Ms Kaim-Schoby and Ms Krcsmar that employees provided positive feedback on the proposed changes to the classification structure.

[10] On 15 June GTS advised its employees of its intention to conduct a formal vote on the proposed agreement on Thursday 23 June.

[11] The following day, 16 June, Ms Dickie of the ASU left a telephone message for Ms Kaim-Schoby seeking a discussion about the proposed agreement. Shortly thereafter Ms Dickie of the ASU sent an email to Ms Kaim-Schoby. The email requested that GTS withdraw its proposed agreement and meet with the ASU the following day to bargain in good faith for a new agreement.

[12] Ms Kaim-Schoby returned the call to Ms Dickie on the afternoon of 16 May. During the telephone conversation Ms Dickie declined an offer from Ms Kaim-Schoby to meet earlier than the 2pm time proposed by the ASU. From the record of the conversation provided to Mr Turen by Ms Kaim-Schoby the the ASU made a demand that the vote on the agreement be abandoned in strong terms.

[13] At approximately 3.10pm on that afternoon, Mr Turen responded by email to Ms Dickie’s email. In that email GTS agreed to meet with the union the following day at the time and place proposed by the ASU, requested the ASU proposals concerning the agreement in advance of the meeting and declined to cancel the arrangements for a vote.

[14] Prior to the meeting the following day the ASU wrote a further email to GTS requesting information it considered relevant to the negotiations including financial information concerning the company.  GTS responded to that email providing some but not all of the information requested.

[15] Two representatives of the ASU, Ms Dickie and Ms McCutcheon, met with two representatives of GTS, Ms Kaim-Schoby and Mr Turen, on the afternoon of 17 June. At the meeting the parties discussed the GTS response to the ASU request for information. GTS sought information from the ASU as to the number of employees it represented. The ASU declined to give that information but assured the company that it had at least one member employed in the business. The ASU provided claims to be included in a new agreement and again asked the company to withdraw the vote scheduled for 23 June. GTS refused to agree to a deferral of the voting date and sought an opportunity to consider and respond to the ASU claims.

[16] On 20 June the ASU issued a flyer communication to GTS employees via their “drop files” at the call centre together with an ASU membership application form. The flyer proposed that employees vote No to the GTS proposed agreement. Later that day GTS provided a written response to the ASU claims made at the meeting the previous Friday afternoon. In that email GTS proposed a further meeting with the ASU on Wednesday 22 June.

[17] On 21 June Ms Dickie entered the GTS call centre in accordance with a right of entry notice to hold discussions with employees. On the same day the application by the union under s 229 of the Act was heard by Fair Work Australia. At the hearing the parties confirmed their intention to meet the following day. The ASU did not press a condition it had made on its attendance that GTS first agree to defer the ballot.

The Application

[18] The ASU submitted that GTS is in breach of a range of good faith bargaining obligations as follows:

• In refusing to cancel the proposed vote and conduct further negotiations with the ASU GTS is failing to attend and participate in meetings at reasonable times: s228(1)(a).

• GTS breached the obligation to disclose relevant information by not responding in full to the union’s letter of 16 June: s229(1)(b).

• GTS had failed to give genuine consideration and reasons for their responses to ASU’s proposals: s229(1)(d).

• GTS has acted capriciously and unfairly in its communications to staff and this was undermining freedom of association and collective bargaining: s229(1)(e)

• GTS has failed to recognise and bargain with the ASU:s228(1)(f).

[19] The ASU sought the following orders, as amended in the proceedings:

“1. That Global Tele Sales Pty Ltd withdraws the proposed agreement from the

employee vote scheduled for 23 June 2011 because it is further action that

constitutes capricious conduct that undermines freedom of association and

collective bargaining.

2. That Global Tele Sales Pty Ltd meets with the ASU at least weekly at a mutually convenient time and that any vote on a proposed agreement not occur before 22 July 2011 unless the ASU and the employer agree otherwise.

3. That Global Tele Sales Pty Ltd gives genuine consideration to the bargaining

proposals put forward by the ASU on 17 June 2011 and provide written

responses to those proposals within 7 days of the order being made.

4. That Global Tele Sales Pty Ltd refrains from taking any further action that

constitutes capricious or unfair conduct that undermines freedom of

association or collective bargaining.

5. That Global Tele Sales Pty Ltd provides the ASU, within 7 days of the order

being made, with the relevant information the union requested on 17 June

2011.

6. (If the application cannot be heard before Thursday 23 June 2011) that an

interim order be issued to stop the proposed agreement being voted on until

FWA hears the matter.”

[20] GTS opposed the orders sought in this matter. It submitted that the ASU had not established that GTS had breached any of the good faith bargaining requirements. It also submitted that the ASU had not satisfied the requirements for an order and that the relief sought was contrary to s 255 of the Act and could not therefore be granted by FWA.

The Relevant Legislation

[21] Section 229 appears in Part 2-4 of the Act in Division 8 which deals with FWA’s role in facilitating bargaining. That Division also sets out the good faith bargaining requirements relevant to the application. The relevant provisions of Division 8 are as follows:

“228 Bargaining representatives must meet the good faith bargaining requirements

(1) The following are the good faith bargaining requirements that a bargaining representative for a proposed enterprise agreement must meet:

(a) attending, and participating in, meetings at reasonable times;

(b) disclosing relevant information (other than confidential or commercially sensitive information) in a timely manner;

(c) responding to proposals made by other bargaining representatives for the agreement in a timely manner;

(d) giving genuine consideration to the proposals of other bargaining representatives for the agreement, and giving reasons for the bargaining representative’s responses to those proposals;

(e) refraining from capricious or unfair conduct that undermines freedom of association or collective bargaining;

(f) recognising and bargaining with the other bargaining representatives for the agreement.

(2) The good faith bargaining requirements do not require:

(a) a bargaining representative to make concessions during bargaining for the agreement; or

(b) a bargaining representative to reach agreement on the terms that are to be included in the agreement.

229 Applications for bargaining orders

Persons who may apply for a bargaining order

(1) A bargaining representative for a proposed enterprise agreement may apply to FWA for an order (a bargaining order) under section 230 in relation to the agreement.

Multi-enterprise agreements

(2) An application for a bargaining order must not be made in relation to a proposed multi-enterprise agreement unless a low-paid authorisation is in operation in relation to the agreement.

Timing of applications

(3) The application may only be made at whichever of the following times applies:

(a) if one or more enterprise agreements apply to an employee, or employees, who will be covered by the proposed enterprise agreement:

(i) not more than 90 days before the nominal expiry date of the enterprise agreement, or the latest nominal expiry date of those enterprise agreements (as the case may be); or

(ii) after an employer that will be covered by the proposed enterprise agreement has requested under subsection 181(1) that employees approve the agreement, but before the agreement is so approved;

(b) otherwise—at any time.

Note: An employer cannot request employees to approve the agreement under subsection 181(1) until 21 days after the last notice of employee representational rights is given.

Prerequisites for making an application

(4) The bargaining representative may only apply for the bargaining order if the bargaining representative:

(a) has concerns that:

(i) one or more of the bargaining representatives for the agreement have not met, or are not meeting, the good faith bargaining requirements; or

(ii) the bargaining process is not proceeding efficiently or fairly because there are multiple bargaining representatives for the agreement; and

(b) has given a written notice setting out those concerns to the relevant bargaining representatives; and

(c) has given the relevant bargaining representatives a reasonable time within which to respond to those concerns; and

(d) considers that the relevant bargaining representatives have not responded appropriately to those concerns.

Non-compliance with notice requirements may be permitted

(5) FWA may consider the application even if it does not comply with paragraph (4)(b) or (c) if FWA is satisfied that it is appropriate in all the circumstances to do so.

230 When FWA may make a bargaining order

Bargaining orders

(1) FWA may make a bargaining order under this section in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement if:

(a) an application for the order has been made; and

(b) the requirements of this section are met in relation to the agreement; and

(c) FWA is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to make the order.

Agreement to bargain or certain instruments in operation

(2) FWA must be satisfied in all cases that one of the following applies:

(a) the employer or employers have agreed to bargain, or have initiated bargaining, for the agreement;

(b) a majority support determination in relation to the agreement is in operation;

(c) a scope order in relation to the agreement is in operation;

(d) all of the employers are specified in a low-paid authorisation that is in operation in relation to the agreement.

Good faith bargaining requirements not met

(3) FWA must in all cases be satisfied:

(a) that:

(i) one or more of the relevant bargaining representatives for the agreement have not met, or are not meeting, the good faith bargaining requirements; or

(ii) the bargaining process is not proceeding efficiently or fairly because there are multiple bargaining representatives for the agreement; and

(b) that the applicant has complied with the requirements of subsection 229(4) (which deals with notifying relevant bargaining representatives of concerns), unless subsection 229(5) permitted the applicant to make the application without complying with those requirements.

Bargaining order must be in accordance with section 231

(4) The bargaining order must be in accordance with section 231 (which deals with what a bargaining order must specify).

231 What a bargaining order must specify

(1) A bargaining order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement must specify all or any of the following:

(a) the actions to be taken by, and requirements imposed upon, the bargaining representatives for the agreement, for the purpose of ensuring that they meet the good faith bargaining requirements;

(b) requirements imposed upon those bargaining representatives not to take action that would constitute capricious or unfair conduct that undermines freedom of association or collective bargaining;

(c) the actions to be taken by those bargaining representatives to deal with the effects of such capricious or unfair conduct;

(d) such matters, actions or requirements as FWA considers appropriate, taking into account subparagraph 230(3)(a)(ii) (which deals with multiple bargaining representatives), for the purpose of promoting the efficient or fair conduct of bargaining for the agreement.

(2) The kinds of bargaining orders that FWA may make in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement include the following:

(a) an order excluding a bargaining representative for the agreement from bargaining;

(b) an order requiring some or all of the bargaining representatives of the employees who will be covered by the agreement to meet and appoint one of the bargaining representatives to represent the bargaining representatives in bargaining;

(c) an order that an employer not terminate the employment of an employee, if the termination would constitute, or relate to, a failure by a bargaining representative to meet the good faith bargaining requirement referred to in paragraph 228(1)(e) (which deals with capricious or unfair conduct that undermines freedom of association or collective bargaining);

(d) an order to reinstate an employee whose employment has been terminated if the termination constitutes, or relates to, a failure by a bargaining representative to meet the good faith bargaining requirement referred to in paragraph 228(1)(e) (which deals with capricious or unfair conduct that undermines freedom of association or collective bargaining).

(3) The regulations may:

(a) specify the factors FWA may or must take into account in deciding whether or not to make a bargaining order for reinstatement of an employee; and

(b) provide for FWA to take action and make orders in connection with, and to deal with matters relating to, a bargaining order of that kind.

232 Operation of a bargaining order

A bargaining order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement:

(a) comes into operation on the day on which it is made; and

(b) ceases to be in operation at the earliest of the following:

(i) if the order is revoked—the time specified in the instrument of revocation;

(ii) when the agreement is approved by FWA;

(iii) when a workplace determination that covers the employees that would have been covered by the agreement comes into operation;

(iv) when the bargaining representatives for the agreement agree that bargaining has ceased.

[22] GTS also relies on the following section which is contained in Division 11 of Part 2-4:

255 Part does not empower FWA to make certain orders

(1) This Part does not empower FWA to make an order that requires, or has the effect of requiring:

(a) particular content to be included or not included in a proposed enterprise agreement; or

(b) an employer to request under subsection 181(1) that employees approve a proposed enterprise agreement; or

(c) an employee to approve, or not approve, a proposed enterprise agreement.

(2) Despite paragraph (1)(a), FWA may make an order that particular content be included or not included in a proposed enterprise agreement if the order is made in the course of arbitration undertaken when dealing with a dispute under section 240.

Note: FWA may only arbitrate a dispute under section 240 if arbitration has been agreed to by the bargaining representatives for the agreement (see subsection 240(4)).

Jurisdictional Pre-requisites

[23] The ASU must first establish that it has complied with the pre-requisites for making an application for a bargaining order under s 229(4). I am satisfied that it has satisfied each of the requirements except for the requirements in s 229(4)(b) and (c). It is only in the course of putting their submissions in this matter that the ASU has articulated why it alleges that GTS has not complied with the good faith bargaining requirements, although in previous communications it has pushed strongly for a deferral of the planned vote and obtained a clear response from GTS that it does not agree to the deferral. I am of the view that compliance with s229(4)(b) and (c) requires more than this. However the timing of the impending vote and the late involvement of the ASU in attempting to become involved in the negotiations has made compliance with these requirements difficult. I am satisfied that it is appropriate in all the circumstances to consider the application even though the ASU has not complied with these provisions.

[24] I am satisfied that GTS has agreed to bargain for the agreement and the requirement in s 230(2) is satisfied.

Good Faith Bargaining Requirements

[25] The central issue in this matter is whether GTS has complied with the good faith bargaining requirements prescribed by s 228 of the Act. Unless the ASU establishes that one or more of the requirements have not been met, no good faith bargaining order can be made.

[26] The essence of the ASU complaint is the speed at which GTS has commenced a process with its employees and moved to propose a vote of employees in favour of making the agreement. The evidence does not disclose when the ASU became aware of the proposed agreement or the extent of its membership at GTS. However it is apparent that it made no attempt to become involved in negotiations until some 16 days after the commencement of the bargaining process on 31 May. When it did seek involvement the employer had already held extensive discussions with employees at the initiation of the process and in subsequent discussion sessions. In light of the response to its proposals, the employer had decided that it should put the agreement to a vote. It had also publicised the intention to conduct a vote in the formal manner required by the Act.

[27] It is fair to say that GTS has not delayed in conducting the agreement making process. Indeed the time period could be described as at or close to the minimum time permitted by the Act for the making of an enterprise agreement.

[28] The Act permits an employer to initiate bargaining and to make an enterprise agreement with its employees who will be covered by the Agreement: s 172. GTS initiated the process on 31 May 2011 - well before the expiry of its current Agreement in October 2011. When an employer initiates bargaining the Act requires the employer to provide a Notice of Representational Rights to all affected employees as soon as practicable thereafter: s 173(3). GTS provided this notice on 31 May and 1 June.

[29] The Act permits an employer to request its employees to approve an agreement by voting on it - at least 21 days after the last notice of Representational Rights was given. On 15 June GTS announced to its employees that the voting day would be Thursday 23 June from 8am to 8pm. The notice appears to fulfil the requirements of s 180(3). The Act provides that during the access period of 7 days immediately preceding the start of the voting process employees must be provided with certain relevant information. There is no suggestion that this is not occurring. Indeed the relevant information appears to have been made available to employees for some time.

[30] When the union first contacted GTS, its Managing Director and Human Resources Director responded by telephone and email on the same day. GTS met with the union on the following day at a time requested by the ASU and sought the ASU’s proposals for the agreement. GTS sought information on the numbers of employees represented by the ASU. The ASU sought broad financial and other information concerning the Company. The responses to these requests were not complete but this did not prevent discussions occurring over the terms of the proposed agreement.

[31] At the meeting on 17 June the ASU proposed significant changes to the agreement. GTS considered that its proposals were a modest updating of its existing agreement – those required by changed legislation and a revised classification structure which would benefit employees. The following Monday, 20 June, prior to receiving a response to its claims from GTS, the ASU distributed a flyer to employees urging them to vote No for the agreement. The GTS response on 20 June was that it did not wish to make more changes as it believed its employees were enthusiastic about the changes it had proposed and the ASU claims represented a substantial departure from the conditions that had been in place for some time. It is clear from these events that the parties had significant differences between them.

[32] The Full Bench in CFMEU v Tahmoor Coal Pty Ltd 2 stated [at paragraph 24]:

“[24] Whether a party observes or fails to observe the good faith bargaining requirements set out in s.288(1) is to be determined in light of all of the relevant circumstances. While at one level this is stating the obvious, it is appropriate in view of the submissions in the appeal to indicate that the question will rarely be decided by reference to one action or series of actions. Equally it would be undesirable to read into the legislation concepts which do not already appear in it for the purpose of explaining its operation. That approach is likely to lead to error in the construction and application of the provisions.”

[33] The first requirement alleged by the ASU to have been breached is the requirement in s228(1)(a) that GTS attend and participate in meetings at reasonable times. The ASU says that given the very preliminary stage of negotiations between it and GTS and the refusal of GTS to defer the ballot for 23 June there is minimal opportunity to engage in meaningful negotiations. GTS notes that it has met every time it has been requested to do so and it is the late involvement of the ASU that has prevented further meetings.

[34] I do not consider that the ASU has established that GTS has failed to attend and participate in meetings at reasonable times. The ASU is one bargaining agent representing an unknown number of employees. For whatever reasons, perhaps including a delay in any requests for its assistance from employees, it entered the negotiation process after GTS had commenced the access period for the Agreement. In my view GTS cannot be criticised for its level of responsiveness and availability when contacted by the ASU. The ASU may well be dissatisfied with the responses it has received to its claims for changes to the agreement and its demand that the agreement be withdrawn. However this does not mean that the employer has refused to meet with it at reasonable times. The employer has apparently complied with time limits in the Act and in my view there is nothing in the legislation which suggests that it is not entitled to do so.

[35] The next allegation by the ASU concerns a failure by GTS to disclose relevant information. The information sought by the union in its letter of 16 June was very broad and clearly included commercially sensitive information. GTS provided a written response on 17 June and discussed the matters further in its meeting with the ASU later that day. Further information was provided on 20 June. In my view much of the information sought is not of a type usually required for enterprise negotiations to occur. The responses GTS has provided have been timely and in my view reasonably responsive as to matters relevant to the negotiations. I do not therefore consider that the ASU has established a breach by GTS of this requirement.

[36] The next allegation concerns the requirement in s228(1)(d) to give genuine consideration to proposals of the ASU and reasons for its responses. The actual negotiations on terms and conditions between the ASU and GTS have been very brief. It is not clear whether the ASU has formulated its claims by reference to its members. It has not explained its claims by reference to difficulties with the operation of the current agreement. The changes it has sought appear to be significant and wide ranging.

[37] The response of GTS has been negative. It has explained that it believes that the changes it is seeking are minimal and it believes that its employees are supportive of them and have not raised other issues that could not be satisfactorily addressed. GTS has also explained that it is not aware of these matters being raised by employees and that the changes sought by the ASU represent substantial departures from long standing operational provisions. It has offered to explain its reasons further at meetings. In my view it is understandable that an employer might not be attracted by proposals for significant changes. However the parties’ stances in negotiations are matters for them.  Certainly GTS and the ASU appear to be a long way apart on bargaining issues. However I do not think that the ASU has established that the circumstances can be described as involving a failure by GTS to give genuine consideration to the proposals of the ASU.

[38] The next allegation is that GTS is engaging in capricious and unfair conduct that undermines freedom of association and collective bargaining. The ASU criticises GTS’s communications with its employees, the failure to actively involve the ASU in the process and a failure to respond meaningfully to the ASU proposals.

[39] It is important to note that GTS is seeking a collective agreement with its employees as permitted by the Act and as it has done in the past. It has complied with the procedural requirements for giving notice to employees of their rights to engage bargaining representatives. The ASU has only recently sought to become involved in negotiations. It was not a party to the previous agreement and appears not to have had an active presence at the workplace. The ASU has not indicated the extent of its membership or the connection between its claims and concerns of GTS employees.

[40] GTS has met with ASU representatives in a responsive way given the time of their involvement but failed to agree with their proposals or their desired approach. The fact that agreeing to the proposals would involve a significant departure from its current operating arrangements is an important part of the context.

[41] The ASU alleges that the circumstances represent the undermining of collective bargaining. It appears to me that the process of agreement making between an employer and its employees at a workplace in accordance with the provisions of the Act is a process of collective bargaining. The ASU appears to infer that only through its involvement can collective bargaining occur. I am unable to find any support for that notion in the Act. I do not see that the Act creates greater rights for registered organisations than other bargaining representatives or employees.

[42] I do not believe that anything in the Act or notions of freedom of association or collective bargaining created an obligation on GTS to follow the approach to bargaining contended for by the ASU. Further, an employer that complies with the provisions of the Act regarding representational rights, meets with bargaining representatives and considers the claims made to it cannot in my view be said to be undermining freedom of association. There is nothing in the circumstances that in my view amounts to any such undermining or anything capricious or unfair.

[43] Although the circumstances are quite different I reach the same conclusion as the Full Bench in the Tahmoor case. In my view the negotiations had reached a stage that the employer was entitled to put its proposal to its employees for a vote. If the majority employee view is that further negotiations should occur and further changes should be made then that no doubt will be reflected in the outcome of the ballot. I do not consider that the ASU has established that any of the circumstances of this matter amount to capricious or unfair conduct that undermines freedom of association or collective bargaining.

[44] The final matter raised by the ASU is that GTS has failed to recognise and bargain with a bargaining representative. It relies on the refusal of GTS to withdraw the ballot and negotiate with the ASU on its claims. As indicated above, GTS has met and considered the ASU claims. It has not favoured the ASU approach to negotiations or the content of the Agreement. It has communicated its response in meetings and correspondence. The ASU criticism in the light of these circumstances is essentially a criticism of the stance of GTS in response to its claims and demands. It has not established that any GTS conduct is a breach of the good faith bargaining requirement to recognise and bargain with a bargaining representative.

Conclusions

[45] As detailed above, I determine that the ASU has not established that GTS has not met the good faith bargaining requirements of the Act. For this reason the Act precludes the making of a good faith bargaining order.

[46] It is unnecessary for me to consider whether making the order sought is reasonable in the circumstances or whether the orders sought are inconsistent with s 255 of the Act. The application for bargaining orders is dismissed.

VICE PRESIDENT WATSON

Appearances:

K. McCutcheon and J. Cooney for the Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union

T. Jacobs and T. Lange, of counsel, for Global Tele Sales Pty Ltd.

Hearing details:

Sydney.

June 21.

2011.

 1 AC315564.

 2   [2010] FWAFB 3510.

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