Australian Maritime Officers' Union, The v Tasmanian Ports Corporation Pty Ltd T/A Tasports
[2023] FWC 3073
•19 DECEMBER 2023
| [2023] FWC 3073 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.437 - Application for a protected action ballot order
Australian Maritime Officers' Union, The
v
Tasmanian Ports Corporation Pty Ltd T/A Tasports
(B2023/1285)
| COMMISSIONER JOHNS | MELBOURNE, 19 DECEMBER 2023 |
Proposed protected action ballot of employees of Tasmanian Ports Corporation Pty Ltd – genuinely trying to reach agreement – application granted.
Introduction
The Australian Maritime Officers Union (AMOU/Applicant) made an application under s.437 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act) for a protected action ballot order in relation to certain employees of Tasmanian Ports Corporation Pty Ltd t/a Tasports (Respondent/Employer/Tasports).
On 22 November 2023, Tasports objected to the application on the basis that the application does not satisfy s.443(1)(b) of the Act. In other words, it contended that the Applicant has not demonstrated that it is genuinely trying to reach an agreement with Tasports.
In light of the same, the matter was listed for hearing on 23 November 2023. During the hearing, the Employer continued to press its objection and it thus became necessary to issue Directions and set the matter down for a further hearing on 6 December 2023. Consequently, it was not possible to determine the matter within 2 working days after the application was made as required by section 441 of the Act. It was not practicable to do so.
For the reasons set out below, I have decided to grant the Applicant’s application.
Background
The facts relating to the matter were as follows:
a)The Tasmanian Ports Corporation Marine Pilots Enterprise Agreement 2022 (Agreement) passed its nominal expiry date on 30 June 2023.[1]
b)On 9 May 2023, the Employer issued a Notice of Employee Representational Rights.[2]
c)In or around June or July 2023, bargaining commenced.[3] To this end, there have been bargaining meetings held on 17 July 2023, 31 July 2023, 25 September 2023, 31 October 2023, 14 November 2023, 21 November 2023 and 30 November 2023.[4]
d)On 11 July 2023, the Applicant provided the Employer with a log of claims with 14 claims in total.[5]
e)During the bargaining meeting on 25 September 2023 and again in writing on 26 September 2023, the Applicant sent a settlement offer to the Employer which only included seven (7) of the original 11 claims.[6]
f)During the bargaining meeting on 31 October 2023 and again in writing on 2 November 2023, the Employer responded to the Applicant’s settlement proposal.[7] The response included counter offers.
g)During the bargaining meetings on 14 and 21 November 2023, the Applicant requested more information about two (2) matters, namely, the motor vehicle policy and the sterile bridge clause (Contested Matters). To date, the Employer has not provided the requested information to the satisfaction of the Applicant.[8]
h)On 21 November 2023, the Applicant filed the current application before me.
The hearing
At the hearing:
a)The Applicant was represented by Mr Chris Neiberding, Senior Industrial Officer of the Applicant.
b)The Respondent was represented by Ms Kate Luckman, Human Resources Manager of the Respondent.
Ms Kate Luckman filed a witness statement in the matter and made herself available for cross-examination.
In advance of the hearing the parties filed materials which were complied in a Digital Tribunal Book (DTB). For completeness, I set out below the documents relied upon by the parties:
| Exhibit | Document title | Date |
| 1 | Email from the Applicant attaching its application | 21-11-2023 |
| 1.1 | Form F34 | 21-11-2023 |
| 1.2 | Form F34B | 21-11-2023 |
| 1.3 | Draft Order | 21-11-2023 |
| 2 | Email from the Employer raising objections to the application | 22-11-2023 |
| 2.1 | Without prejudice letter to AMOU re enterprise agreement negotiation counter offer | 02-11-2023 |
| 3 | Email from the Applicant attaching three further documents | 23-11-2023 |
| 3.1 | AMOU Tasports Pilots Log of Claims July 2023 | various |
| 3.2 | MP Remuneration Comparison | various |
| 3.3 | Marine Pilot Port Comparisons | various |
| 4 | The Applicant's submissions | 04-12-2023 |
| 4.1 | Attachment 1 Stephen Casy letter to AMOU | 28-06-2023 |
| 4.2 | Attachment 2 AMOU log of claims | 01-07-2023 |
| 4.3 | Attachment 3 Marine Pilot Port Comparisons | undated |
| 4.4 | Attachment 4 Marine Pilot Port Comparisons | undated |
| 4.5 | Attachment 5 AMOU settlement position | 26-09-2023 |
| 4.6 | Attachment 6 TasPorts counter offer | 02-11-2023 |
| 5 | The Respondent's submissions | 04-12-2023 |
| 5.1 | Statement of Kate Luckman | 04-12-2023 |
| 5.2 | KL1 | 31-10-2023 |
| 5.3 | KL2 | 08-11-2023 |
| 5.4 | KL3 | 21-11-2023 |
| 5.5 | KL4 | various |
| 6 | The Applicant's reply submissions | 05-12-2023 |
During the hearing, the Respondent requested time to review the transcript and file written closing submissions.[9] In circumstances where Ms Luckman did not have an instructor to properly conduct a re-examination, as a matter of procedural fairness I granted the request for written closing submissions.[10]
The parties filed their written closing submissions. However, the Respondent also filed a supplementary witness statement of Ms Luckman containing 2 paragraphs, where paragraph 2b of the supplementary witness statement was not administrative in nature. The relevant paragraph stated:
‘I do not consider that the vehicle costings requested by the Applicant have any bearing on the calculation or quantum of the vehicle allowance by the Respondent in bargaining.’
As a matter of procedural fairness, the Respondent was put on notice that if it wishes the Commission to receive paragraph 2b, the Applicant should also be allowed to cross-examine her about the same. Ms Luckman responded that the paragraph is consistent with the original statement and evidence given in cross-examination and was therefore made in clarification (i.e. it would have ordinarily been subject to re-examination) and thus should not be subject to cross-examination. In any event, Ms Luckman requested that paragraph 2b be received by the Commission and that she would be happy to make herself available for further cross-examination. In light of the same, the Applicant was requested for its views.
The Applicant submitted that it is first and foremost keen to proceed with the mater and that the supplementary witness statement should not be accepted.
After having considered the views of each party and in the interests of not further delaying deciding the matter, I have decided to receive paragraph 2b. I deal with the evidence below.
I have also decided to identify the written closing submissions as Exhibits 7 (Applicant) and 8 (Employer) respectively. The supplementary witness statement of Ms Luckman is identified as Exhibit 8.1.
In coming to this decision, I have had regard to all of the materials identified above and the submissions made during the hearing.
The legislative framework and the legal principles
Section 443 of the Act specifies when the Commission must make a protected action ballot order:
(1) The FWC must make a protected action ballot order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement if:
(a) an application has been made under section 437; and
(b) the FWC is satisfied that each applicant has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the employer of the employees who are to be balloted.
(2) The FWC must not make a protected action ballot order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement except in the circumstances referred to in subsection (1).
It is not in dispute that the Applicant has satisfied s.443(1)(a) of the Act. It is the latter requirement that it must overcome.
The parties were in general agreement about the relevant legal principles applicable to s.443(1)(b) of the Act, namely,
that there is a temporal element requiring the Applicant to establish that it has been and is genuinely trying to reach agreement;[11] and
that the Applicant bears the onus of establishing that it has been and is genuinely trying to reach agreement;[12] and
that the relevant binding Full Bench matter is the case of Total Marine Services Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (2009) 189 IR 407 (‘Total Marine’) which observed as follows:[13]
‘[31] In our view the concept of genuinely trying to reach an agreement involves a finding of fact applied by reference to the circumstances of the particular negotiations. It is not useful to formulate any alternative test or criteria for applying the statutory test because it is the words of s 443 which must be applied. In the course of examining all of the circumstances it may be relevant to consider related matters but ultimately the test in s 443 must be applied.
[32] We agree that it is not appropriate or possible to establish rigid rules for the required point of negotiations that must be reached. All the relevant circumstances must be assessed to establish whether the applicant has met the test or not. This will frequently involve considering the extent of progress in negotiations and the steps taken in order to try and reach an agreement. At the very least one would normally expect the applicant to be able to demonstrate that it has clearly articulated the major items it is seeking for inclusion in the agreement, and to have provided a considered response to any demands made by the other side. Premature applications, where sufficient steps have not been taken to satisfy the test that the applicant has genuinely tried to reach an agreement, cannot be granted.’
Submissions
On 28 November 2023 the Applicant submitted that:[14]
‘In Summary
The AMOU in its submissions has tried to inform the Commission of the relevant facts and
circumstances that have taken place up until this point.TasPorts cannot legitimately make the claim that the AMOU is not genuinely trying to make
an agreement based on:
·Historically the AMOU has proven it is willing to make an agreement or variation to an agreement in the right environment.
·The AMOU is not pursuing any non-permitted matters
·There has been continued attendance at all meetings, delegates have provide feedback from their colleagues on claims and counter claims.
·The AMOU in an effort to finalise the negotiations put forward settlement position that reduced the number of claims it was originally pursuing and included a number of TasPorts Initiated claims as a package deal.
·There has been continued discussions during the last 2 meetings dates the 14th and 21st of November on the Motor Vehicle claim and Sterile Bridge claim.
·There was a meeting request from TasPorts for the 27th November, which was moved to the 30th of November by mutual agreement,
Despite the fact there are no set of rigid rules to guide the Commissions decision there has been a proven effort by the AMOU to engage, participate, response and compromise in an effort to genuinely try to reach an agreement.
The AMOU has shown that it is, and has been, genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the employer and the Commission must make a protected action ballot order pursuant to s 443 of the FW Act.’
The Applicant noted that regard should be had to the decision of Deputy President Gostencnik in National Union of Workers v Riverland Oilseeds Pty Ltd[2013] FWC 5914,[15] where it was observed:[16]
‘… It is not necessary to show that negotiations on the agreement or an item of the agreement have been exhausted and it is not necessary, in my view, to show that the making of an application for a protected action ballot order is a last resort.
…
… maintaining a hard line in relation to negotiations, for example by maintaining its claim for a 10 percent wage claim for an extended period of time, equally does not mean that it was not then, or is not now genuinely trying to reach an agreement…’
On 1 December 2023 the Employer in turn submitted that:[17]
‘Application of legal principles to the facts of this matter
13. The Applicant presented its “settlement proposal” on 25 September 2023.
14. In the period of more than two months since this time, the parties have met on four further occasions, being 31 October 2023 (at which the Respondent presented its counter-proposal), 8 November 2023, 21 November 2023 and 30 November 2023.
15. At those meetings, the Applicant has continued to state that it has no instructions to make any adjustments to its 25 September 2023 settlement position.
16. The Applicant’s repeated position that it has “no instructions to make any adjustments”:
a. has precluded any meaningful discussion or genuine negotiation from occurring; and
b. supports the Respondent’s contention that the Applicant is not genuinely trying to reach an agreement.
17. Further, the Respondent contends that the Applicant has failed to provide a meaningful or considered response to the matters put forward by the Respondent in bargaining. In particular:
a. The Respondent acknowledges that the Applicant has asked questions about the motor vehicle policy and sterile bridge clause and that information has been provided by the Respondent in response to these queries. However, notwithstanding these discussions, the Applicant has stated that it has no instructions to negotiate and has otherwise rejected the position put forward by the Respondent on 31 October 2023 in its entirety.
b. In rejecting the Respondent’s proposal, the Applicant has not given any considered responses or other reasons. Rather, in response to a request made by the Respondent in the meeting on 21 November 2023 to work through the Respondent’s proposal dated 31 October 2023 to see whether there were matters about which the parties might be able to reach an agreement, the Applicant’s representative made statements to the effect that he:
“had no instruction to move from email of 25 September 2023. The TasPorts position was not accepted by group. I understand that TasPorts’ request is to go through line by line however I have no further instructions to do this”.
18. The Respondent further contends that the discussions around draft vehicle policies and vehicle costing data ought not have impeded or prevented negotiations from otherwise progressing.
19. The Respondent has repeatedly stated in meetings that if the Applicant is able to provide some kind of concession or movement on their “settlement position” put forward on 25 September 2023, the Respondent may be able to do the same, in the spirit of moving towards an agreed outcome. This has consistently been met with the response to the effect that the Applicant “does not have instructions to move”.
20. There are areas that the Respondent would like to negotiate and move on, but without the Applicant demonstrating any preparedness to move from their initial position put forward on 25 September, further attempts by the Respondent to negotiate and put forward alternative proposals are futile, as the Respondent understands the Applicant’s statements and conduct in the meetings to mean that the Applicant’s position is firm and those proposals will not be considered.
21. In light of this, and due to the fact that there are a number of areas where there is scope for the parties to engage in further discussions and arrive at a negotiated outcome:
a. it is clear, based on the Applicant’s position, that it is not genuinely trying to reach an agreement; and
b. the application for a Protected Action Ballot Order is premature.
22. It is noted that some of the cases that have been referenced by the Applicant should be distinguished from the facts of this application. In particular, the facts of National Union of Workers v Riverlands Oilseeds Pty Ltd (B2013/1073) that the Applicant refers to demonstrate that the NUW and Riverland had agreed on a number of items, and at paragraph 10 it was noted that the NUW had moved on its original wages claim. In this matter, the Applicant has not moved on any of its claims since its position of 25 September 2023 and there has been no progression in bargaining consequently.
Summary
23. Based on the Applicant’s conduct in bargaining since 25 September 2023 and its most recent statement made in the meeting on 30 November 2023 that it “had no instructions to make any further offers to TasPorts”, the Respondent submits that the Applicant has not been and is not currently genuinely trying to reach an agreement.’
The Employer noted that regard should be had to the decision of Commissioner Platt in Health Services union v Silver Chain Group Limited[2021] FWC 766,[18] where it was observed:[19]
‘[26] I find that the HSU, as the Applicant, has not meaningfully responded to the proposal put by the Respondent in the two months that followed. In my view, the HSU’s failure to respond to this document is a significant departure from genuinely trying to reach an agreement and is a proper basis upon which to find that the HSU was not, and is not, genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the employer.’
On 5 December 2023 the Applicant submitted in reply that:[20]
‘13. Yet paragraph 17(a) acknowledges that there has been discussion and questions asked about the motor vehicle policy and sterile bridge clause. And further information was provided by the respondent in response to these queries to the applicant.
14. The subject of the motor vehicle forms part of the original AMOU log of claims (attachment 2 AMOU log of claims) and the AMOU Settlement position (attachment 5 AMOU settlement position).
15. The motor vehicle forms a considerable part of the Pilots remuneration, and we can conclude that any negotiated position on this issue will play a factor in whether the enterprise agreement will be supported in a ballot or not.
16. We see in KL4 the applicant makes considerable efforts to acquire information relevant to the costings done by Tasports on the motor vehicle. The current offer from TasPorts is as stated in KL4 $25,000. There is scepticism on the value assigned to the motor vehicle by TasPorts of $25,000 and there is concern from pilots that they will be ultimately financially worse off with this proposal.
17. The respondent’s submisisons in paragraph 18 claim that these discussions around draft vehicle policies and vehicle costing data ought not have impeded or prevented negotiations from otherwise progressing. However, paragraph 20 states that the there are areas that the Respondent would like to negotiate and move on.
18. TasPorts has perhaps not understood the importance of this claim for the pilots.
19. Again, if we follow this logic we are left with the conclusion that TasPorts are only willing to deal with matters of their choosing.
20. The motor vehicle clam continues to be discussed and examined. These discussions have not impeded, prevented, or precluded any meaningful discussion or genuine negotiation from occurring but simply been part of them and forms part of the steps to reach an agreement.
21. TasPorts has perhaps not understood the importance of this claim and the weight it carries to determine the outcome of the agreement.
Summary
22. The Respondent in its submissions ignores the AMOUs original log of claims, dated July 2023 (attachment 2 AMOU log of claims) and instead focuses entirely on the AMOUs settlement offer dated 26th September 2023.
23. More likely, the respondent submissions read as if it is trying to persuade the Commission that the applicant has not made any concessions or movement at all and the uncomfortable existence of the AMOUs original log of claims debunks this.
24. The AMOU’s settlement offer (attachment 5 AMOU settlement offer) shows that there has been movement on several items. This should have considerable weight when the Commission is considering whether the applicant is demonstrating they are genuinely trying to reach an agreement.
25. In paragraph 11 the respondent draws from Total Marine Services Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia
At the very least, one would normally expect the applicant to be able to demonstrate that it has clearly articulated the major items it is seeking for inclusion in the agreement and to have provided a considered response to any demands made by the other side.
26. If we apply this to the respondent in paragraph 18, it is the respondent who could not articulate clearly the TasPorts Motor Vehicle policy and the effect it would have on the enterprise agreement. Until only the last meeting on the 30th November did the respondent inform the applicant there would be no policy for the pilot group to review. But we continued to have meaningful discussions on the topic as is evident in KL4.’
The Applicant’s closing submissions stressed the importance of the Contested Matters and how it plays a deciding factor in the Applicant’s approach to bargaining. The Applicant relayed concerns surrounding giving ground in respect of hard fought entitlements which may be at risk under the Respondent’s proposal.
Conversely, the Respondent’s closing submissions rejected that the Contested Matters have stalled the bargaining process as they have no bearing on its counter offers. The Respondent submitted that its evidence is uncontested and thus should be preferred given the Applicant’s decision not to file any witness statements in the matter.
Consideration
As outlined by the authorities, the question of genuinely trying to reach agreement involves a finding of fact.
After having considered all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Applicant has been genuinely trying to reach agreement with the Respondent. So much is evident from the uncontested history of bargaining. Ms Luckman appropriately made this concession during the hearing.[21]
Consequently, the issue to be decided is whether the Applicant ‘is currently’ genuinely trying to reach agreement with the Respondent. I have satisfied that it is.
The Respondent’s complaint essentially stems from the Applicant ‘parking’ all matters and its counter offer while it focusses only on the Contested Matters. The Full Bench authority of Total Marine observed:[22]
‘[35] Commissioner Thatcher then considered all circumstances. He said that nothing turns on the fact that the parties are focussing on enterprise specific claims and had agreed to ‘park’ certain industry matters. He concluded that the MUA strategy of waiting to determine what general wage increases it will press until the union had achieved a ‘landing’ on its construction claim is not a factor that goes against a finding that the MUA has not been genuinely trying to reach an agreement.
[36] In this conclusion we believe that the Commissioner fell into error. It is clear on the evidence that the negotiations involved limited face to face meetings and limited articulation of many of the claims. Certain matters were being dealt with in concurrent industry negotiations. Many items were only set out in a list of headings and were not explained or discussed. The wage claim had not been specified. There is nothing to suggest that in taking the steps that it did, the MUA was other than genuine. Nevertheless, in our view it cannot be said in these circumstances that the MUA had genuinely tried to reach an agreement. The steps it had taken were preparatory to developing an agreement but in our view insufficient to satisfy the test its application needed to meet. The error made by the Commissioner involves both a mistake of fact and an error of principle.’
The application before me is not afflicted with the same deficiencies. In the Total Marine matter, there were merely three (3) bargaining meetings prior to the s.437 application being lodged. Whilst I acknowledge and accept the Respondent’s submissions that the mere act of attending bargaining meetings cannot in and of itself be persuasive in meeting the relevant criteria, the Applicant in this matter has done more. There is evidence in this matter of the AMOU narrowing its claims. It is not uncommon for parties to ‘park’ some matters while others are being determined. That is what has occurred in this matter.
I am also not satisfied that the decision of Commissioner Platt relied on by the Respondent is of much assistance. In that matter, there were no mention of Contested Matters as have been articulated and are apparent in the matter before me. The agitations created by these Contested Matters became apparent during the cross-examination of Ms Luckman:[23]
Mr Neiberding: “Finally, my last question is, would it be a fair statement to say that given the amount of time and deliberation dedicated to the topic of motor vehicles, that the motor vehicles plays an important part of the TasPorts pilots' EA?”
Ms Luckman: “That would be correct.”
Mr Neiberding: “And that having this particular issue possibly resolved would help move the negotiations forward; would that be a correct statement?”
Ms Luckman: “Yes, and I think that the pilots would have an appreciation of how much it would cost them to run a vehicle on an annual basis, and I would be very interested or TasPorts would be very interested in hearing what their position – what vehicle allowance would be something that would be acceptable to them, as an alternate to the $25,000 petition that TasPorts has put.”
In her supplementary statement Ms Luckman opined that,
‘I do not consider that the vehicle costings requested by the Applicant have any bearing on the calculation or quantum of the vehicle allowance by the Respondent in bargaining.’
That may be the case from Ms Luckman’s perspective, but it is clearly not the perspective of the employees. Further, before me Ms Luckman conceded[24] that there was potentially a link between the costings that TasPorts has undertaken and an assessment of the reasonableness of the vehicle allowance that has been offered. That concession was appropriately made having regard to the discourse between the bench and Ms Luckman.[25] TasPort has not provided the costings to the AMOU and its members on this important issue to them. To the extent that discussions have stalled TasPort bears some responsibility for that.
I also note that having asked the question of Ms Luckman there is no complaint made against the AMOU and its members that they are not bargaining in good faith.[26]
Consequently, overall I am satisfied that the AMOU and its members have been and are presently genuinely trying to reach agreement.
Conclusion
On the basis of the material before me, including the declaration of Mr Chris Neiberding, Senior Industrial Officer, which
a)sets out the steps taken by the AMOU in bargaining with the Employer and
b)establishes that the AMOU has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach agreement with the Employer,
I am satisfied that there is a notification time in relation to the proposed agreement and that all of the requirements in s.443(1) of the Act have been met.
The ballot is to be conducted by the Democratic Outcomes Pty Ltd t/as CiVS (CiVS). CiVS has been approved as an eligible protected action ballot agent under s.468A of the Act and consequently is authorised to conduct the ballot.[27]
For the purposes of s.443(3)(c) of the Act, the Commission has determined that the date by which voting is to close is 12 January 2024. This date does not accord with the 10 working days requested by the AMOU. This is because of the time of the year in which the matter has now been determined and the need to conduct a s.448A conference (see below). This also establishes the ballot period for the purpose of s.448A(2) of the Act.
An Order has been separately issued in PR768566.
This matter will be assigned to myself to conduct the s.448A compulsory conciliation conference. It will be listed for 11 January 2024. I will issue an Order requiring the attendance of all bargaining representatives involved in the proposed enterprise agreement at the conference. It is likely that Directions will also be issued to ensure that the parties attend the conference ready to conduct meaningful negotiations. Consequently, in advance of the conference TasPort is encouraged to provide the AMOU and its members with the costing information. Further, the AMOU must confer with its members about concessions that can be made about the outstanding claims. If TasPort has provided the requested information, it will not be appropriate for the AMOU to attend the conference and repeat the refrain that it ‘has no instructions to move.’ The AMOU must obtain instructions before the conference and genuinely participate in the same.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
Mr C Neiberding for the Applicant
Ms K Luckman for the Respondent
Hearing details:
2023
Melbourne (video hearing)
6 December.
Final Written submissions:
14 December 2023.
[1] The Digital Tribunal Book (DTB), Exhibit 1.2, p 17; see also DTB, Exhibit 5, p 77.
[2] DTB, Exhibit 1.2, p 18.
[3] DTB, Exhibit 1.2, p 19; see also DTB, Exhibit 5, p 77.
[4] DTB, Exhibit 4, pp 47-48; see also DTB, Exhibit 5.1, p 83.
[5] DTB, Exhibit 4, p 48.
[6] DTB, Exhibit 4, p 48; see also DTB, Exhibit 5.1, p 83.
[7] DTB, Exhibit 4, p 48; DTB, Exhibit 5.1, p 83.
[8] DTB, Exhibit 4, p 48.
[9] Transcript of the proceedings, PN141.
[10] Transcript of the proceedings, PN142.
[11] Coles Supermarkets (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union[2015] FWCFB 379.
[12] John Holland Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (2010) 194 IR 239, [27].
[13] [31]-[32].
[14] DTB, Exhibit 4, p 49.
[15] DTB, Exhibit 4, p 46.
[16] [16] & [20].
[17] DTB, Exhibit 5, pp 79-81.
[18] DTB, Exhibit 5, p 79.
[19] [26].
[20] DTB, Exhibit 6, pp 101-102.
[21] Transcript of the proceedings, PN33.
[22] [35]-[36].
[23] Transcript of the proceedings, PN101-PN102.
[24] Transcript of the proceedings, PN86.
[25] Transcript of the proceedings, PN78-86.
[26] Transcript of the proceedings, PN37-38.
[27] Democratic Outcomes Pty Ltd t/as CiVS [2023] FWC 1400.
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