Australian Maritime Officers' Union, the and Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers, the andMaritime Union of Australia, The v Curtis Island Services Pty Ltd

[2015] FWC 1836

[2015] FWC 1836 [Note: Appeals pursuant to s.604 (C2015/726 and C2015/743) were lodged against this decision and the order arising from this decision - refer to Full Bench decision dated 9 September 2015 [[2015] FWCFB 6093] for result of appeal.]

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.739 - Application to deal with a dispute

Australian Maritime Officers' Union, The

and

Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers, The

and

Maritime Union of Australia, The
v
Curtis Island Services Pty Ltd
(C2014/884, C2014/853, C2014/863)

COMMISSIONER CAMBRIDGE SYDNEY, 20 MARCH 2015

Dispute settlement procedure - dispute as to entitlement to payment and preservation of leave when recalled to work - contest as to obligation arising from terms of industrial instrument - even time roster arrangements - whether non-duty or off-roster period should be treated as a period of leave - voluntary recall arrangements - practical and contextual considerations - principles for construction of terms of an enterprise agreement - further claims in respect to meaning of "a day" and entitlement to accommodation allowance - applications dismissed.

[1] This Decision is made in respect to three applications taken under section 739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) for the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) to deal with a dispute in accordance with a Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP).

[2] The applications were lodged at Brisbane on 21, 22 and 26 May 2014. The applications were made by, respectively, the Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers (the AIMPE) in matter C2014/853, the Maritime Union of Australia (the MUA) in matter C2014/863, and the Australian Maritime Officers' Union (the AMOU) in matter C2014/884. Each of the applications was taken against Curtis Island Services Pty Ltd (the employer).

[3] The Commission is empowered to deal with these matters by virtue of a DSP found at Clause 9 of the Curtis Island Services Pty Ltd Enterprise Agreement 2014 (the Agreement). The primary question in dispute has involved a claim contained in each of the applications which asserted that employees who are recalled to work when they would otherwise not be rostered to work, have not been paid and/or credited entitlements arising under the Agreement. In addition, the application made by the AMOU included claims that; (a) employees were entitled to overtime payments when rostered work periods extended onto a day after a 21 day period; and (b) employees who were recalled to work when they would otherwise not be rostered to work were entitled to an accommodation allowance.

[4] The various issues arising from the three applications were sufficiently connected so as to have the matters joined and they have been dealt with together. The matters were the subject of unsuccessful conciliation and the arbitration of the matters in dispute has involved a Hearing conducted in Gladstone, Queensland, on 11 December 2014.

[5] Shortly after the commencement of the Hearing the Parties advised the Commission that they had reached agreement upon the particular material which would be provided as the basis for the Commission’s determination of the applications. Consequently, evidence was confined to paragraphs 5 to 10 inclusive, 14 to 21 inclusive, and paragraphs 40, 41 and 62 of a witness statement of Michael Gerard Kent dated 5 November 2014 1. Each of the Parties then made their respective verbal submissions in amplification of various documentary materials.

Background

[6] The employer provides passenger and vehicular ferry services which transport workers and equipment between the mainland and the liquefied natural gas processing facilities on Curtis Island, near Gladstone. There are approximately 106 employees covered by the Agreement.

[7] The Agreement was made in February 2014, following negotiations which had commenced in about October 2013, and which included an earlier unsuccessful attempt to have employees vote to approve an agreement in December 2013. The Agreement was approved on 6 March 2014, in a Decision issued by Simpson C which noted that the MUA, the AMOU and the AIMPE had been bargaining representatives for the Agreement and that the Agreement covered each of those organisations. The nominal expiry date of the Agreement is 2 July 2017.

[8] At the outset it is important to note that the Agreement provides for engagement of employees on an “even time roster” whereby work is performed on 21 consecutive days “on-duty” followed by 21 consecutive days “off-duty”. Further, it is relevant to note that one of the stated aims of the Agreement (clause 5.2) involves a commitment by the employer to offer full time employment.

[9] A short time after the Agreement commenced operation, a dispute arose regarding payments made to employees who perform work on days when they would otherwise not be rostered to work. Further, in respect to the AMOU, dispute has also emerged regarding payment for periods when rostered engagements extend onto a day after the 21^st day of a roster period, and for payment of an accommodation allowance when employees perform work on days when they would otherwise not be rostered to work.

[10] Subsequently,the AIMPE, the MUA and the AMOU (collectively “the Unions”) have activated the DSP provisions of the Agreement which has culminated in the Commission being required to interpret the particular terms of the Agreement which are the subject of unresolved contest.

The MUA Case

[11] At the Hearing Mr D Quinn, solicitor, was granted permission to appear on behalf of the MUA. Mr Quinn made submissions which elaborated upon a written outline of submissions filed on behalf of the MUA.

[12] The MUA submissions focused upon the competing interpretations of two particular clauses in the Agreement which he said dealt with entitlements that arose for an employee who was recalled to work on a day during their non-duty period. Mr Quinn referred to this as work on a “recall day”.

[13] In summary, Mr Quinn submitted that the ordinary and plain meaning that should be attributed to the words contained within two particular clauses in the Agreement namely, clause 12.16.5 and clause 22.2, established that work on a recall day entitled an employee to double time payment for that day and also preservation of that day as a day of leave.

[14] Mr Quinn acknowledged that the employer recognised the payment of double time for work on a recall day. This acknowledgement accepted that as payment for ordinary time would be made in respect of all days during a non-duty period, an additional payment equivalent to ordinary time satisfied the requirement for payment of double time for a recall day. However, Mr Quinn strongly disputed the practice of the employer whereby it had treated the payment of double time as what he described to be the cashing out of the leave entitlement for what had become a recall day and which was a day of leave during the non-duty or off-roster period.

[15] The submissions made by the MUA stressed that the terms of clause 22 of the Agreement did not permit the cashing out of what was asserted to be a leave entitlement in respect to a day during the 21 day non-duty period created by the even time roster. Mr Quinn submitted that once an employee had accrued a day of leave by working a day of duty, then that employee was entitled to retain that accrued leave day until he or she took that day as a leave day. Mr Quinn said that the payment of double time for a recall day did not remove the entitlement to leave for that day.

[16] In response to questioning from the Commission, Mr Quinn acknowledged that the interpretation of the terms contained in clauses 12.16.5 and 22 as was advocated by the MUA, would amount to the equivalent of triple time payment for a recall day. The triple time payment would be derived from a recall day comprising; (a), the existing payment of 12 hours duration as one day of non-duty or off-roster; plus (b), payment of an additional 12 hours to recognise the double time prescribed by clause 12.16.5; plus (c), an additional leave day of 12 hours payment arising from clause 22.2. Thus, on the basis of the submissions which were advanced by the MUA, a recall day involving work on a 12 hour shift, would establish an entitlement to the equivalent of 36 hours ordinary time payment.

[17] In conclusion, Mr Quinn submitted that the Commission should accept that the plain and ordinary meaning that should be given to the words in the Agreement and which reflected what the Parties had negotiated, established an entitlement for an employee who worked a recall day to be paid double time for that day worked and in addition, preservation of that day as a day of paid leave.

The AIMPE Case

[18] Mr B Matthey appeared for the AIMPE at the Hearing. Mr Matthey referred to the written submissions which had been filed by the AIMPE.

[19] Mr Matthey submitted that the terms of the Agreement established an entitlement for payment when an employee was recalled to work during their non-duty or off-roster period which amounted to double time in addition to any payment made in respect of that non-duty or off-roster day. According to the submissions made by Mr Matthey, the employer had only been paying single time in respect of a recall day worked.

[20] The submissions made by Mr Matthey broadly supported the position as was advanced by the MUA but varied slightly in respect to the basis upon which a recall day worked would also provide for an additional day of accrued leave. Mr Matthey confirmed that the position of the AIMPE was that the terms of the Agreement established that a recall day would in aggregate, require payment of the equivalent of 48 hours ordinary time.

The AMOU Case

[21] At the Hearing Ms J Thompson appeared for the AMOU. Ms Thompson made verbal submissions which referred to documentary material that had been filed on behalf of the AMOU.

[22] The submissions of the AMOU broadly supported the submissions made by the AIMPE concerning the payment that should apply to employees who were recalled to duty while on a non-duty period. The AMOU submitted that in particular, clause 12.16.5 of the Agreement stipulated that a recall day involved payment at double time which was clearly separate from paid leave which had already been accrued. In addition, the AMOU also supported the propositions as had been advanced by the MUA and the AIMPE, which asserted that work on a recall day did not disturb or extinguish the accrued leave entitlement and therefore such work provided for a leave credit entitlement.

[23] Ms Thompson made further submissions regarding two further claims which were advanced solely by the AMOU. The first of these claims sought payment of overtime if any part of a (21^st) rostered engagement involved work on the 22^nd calendar day of the even time roster on-duty period. The AMOU also advanced claim that any work on a recall day should attract payment of the accommodation allowance under clause 38.2 of the Agreement.

[24] Ms Thompson submitted that the meaning of “a day” had been established as being the period between “midnight to midnight”. Therefore, according to the submissions of Ms Thompson, if any of a 21^st shift worked under the even time roster completed after midnight, that period of time then extended beyond the day as was contemplated to be part of the on-duty period. Ms Thompson submitted that time worked after midnight on the 21^st day had been an extension of the shift and therefore should attract double time payment in accordance with clause 12.3 of the Agreement.

[25] Ms Thompson also made submissions in support of the proposition that any work on a recall day should attract the accommodation allowance as stipulated in clause 38.2 of the Agreement. Ms Thompson acknowledged that the Agreement was silent in respect to the application of the accommodation allowance for a recall day. However, Ms Thompson submitted that if an employee was recalled to work they were also rostered to work and therefore the accommodation allowance should be paid.

The Employer’s Case

[26] Mr A Herbert, barrister, was granted permission to appear on behalf of the employer at the Hearing. Mr Herbert commenced his submissions by referring to various Authorities which he said provided important guidance on the correct approach to the interpretation of contested terms contained in an enterprise agreement. Mr Herbert submitted that although there were hundreds, if not thousands of cases which had dealt with the correct approach to interpretation of terms of industrial instruments, the essential principle involved a contextual consideration upon which to establish the meaning intended by those that constructed the document.

[27] The submissions made by Mr Herbert were directed at contextual considerations which he said were relevant to the correct interpretation to be given to the particular terms in the Agreement which gave rise to the disputation in this instance. In this regard Mr Herbert mentioned that all of the relevant employees, who became covered by the Agreement, had previously been engaged as casuals. Mr Herbert said that the terms of clause 5.2 of the Agreement reflected that the move from casual to full-time employment was a significant issue surrounding the negotiations which culminated with the making of the Agreement.

[28] As a further contextual consideration, Mr Herbert stated that the engagement of full-time employees on the even time roster arrangement was an important aspect which had contributed to misunderstandings that underpinned the disputed provisions of the Agreement. In this regard Mr Herbert submitted that it was important to properly understand the concepts of “on-duty” and “off-duty” as provided for by reference to the 21 day even time roster.

[29] Mr Herbert submitted that the Unions had mistakenly considered that the off-duty or non-duty period could be equated with a period of leave. Mr Herbert acknowledged that it was understandable that the off-duty period might be wrongly equated with leave because the provision of that period of paid absence from work was deemed to have satisfied entitlements to annual leave arising from the National Employment Standards (NES). However, according to Mr Herbert, when the Agreement was properly considered in context and in totality, work performed on a day of a non-duty period, which was also described as a recall day, could not be considered as might be ordinarily understood as a recall to duty on a day of leave.

[30] The submissions made by Mr Herbert strongly emphasised that any work performed on a recall day was entirely voluntary. According to the submissions made by Mr Herbert, an employee who was offered work on a recall day was presented with an option to either reject the work in which case they would continue to be paid at ordinary time for that day, or to except the work and then get another day's pay for going into work. Mr Herbert said that each employee was at liberty to say, “Not enough money for me to give up my day off, or my non-duty day.” Alternatively they could accept the work and receive, in total, double time for working on that day.

[31] Mr Herbert also submitted that any plain reading of the terms contained in clauses 12.16.5 and 22 of the Agreement supported the very simple optional proposition given to an employee who was offered a recall day. Further, it was submitted by Mr Herbert that the terms of these clauses did not contain words which provided for the additional payments and/or the leave accrual as had been submitted by the Unions.

[32] Mr Herbert submitted that to interpret the provisions of clauses 12.16.5 and 22 as was urged by the Unions would require words to be added such that these clauses would indicate that in addition to any other entitlement, payment would be made at double time. Mr Herbert said that words to that effect simply did not appear in the relevant clauses of the Agreement. Further, he said such an interpretation was not only unavailable upon a reading of the words contained in the clauses, but it would construct a term that the employer would have agreed to pay a full time employee who voluntarily worked a recall day, three times his ordinary day’s pay on one version, and on the other version, four times his day's pay. According to Mr Herbert, such a proposition would operate as an economic barrier for the engagement of full-time employees as opposed to casuals.

[33] Mr Herbert made further submissions regarding the proper interpretation of the terms contained in clause 22 of the Agreement. Mr Herbert stressed that the off-roster period was not a period that could be treated as leave, as might be ordinarily understood by the word “leave”. In particular, Mr Herbert submitted that a recall day which involved work on a non-duty day, was not a leave day in the NES sense, and did not attract some preserved entitlement to have another day off. Further, the terms of clause 22.2 of the Agreement provided for an off-duty day for each day of duty as opposed to work on a recall day which was not a day of duty.

[34] In respect to the additional claims advance by the AMOU, it was submitted by Mr Herbert that neither of these claims were supported by the relevant terminology contained in the Agreement. Mr Herbert submitted that reference in the Agreement to time on roster working 21 days and having 21 days off, could not in any practical sense, be confined to periods between midnight to midnight. It was submitted by Mr Herbert that the practical intention of the Parties when constructing the terms of the Agreement involved 21 notional shifts each of 12 hours duration and given start and finish time variances this would logically involve the prospect of work extending onto the 22^nd day in the roster. Mr Herbert also dismissed the AMOU claim for accommodation allowance to be paid in respect to work on a recall day when the terms of clause 38.2 specified the payment would be made for the 21 days when the employee was on roster.

[35] In conclusion, Mr Herbert submitted that the dispute which had arisen over the contested terms contained in the Agreement involved the Unions advancing an interpretation of the terms of the Agreement which could not be supported when considered in context and having regard for the relevant words under examination. Mr Herbert said that the terms of the Agreement provided for payment of double time for an employee who voluntarily accepted work on a recall day. The terms of the Agreement did not provide for any other entitlement in respect of work on a recall day other than payment of double time. Mr Herbert urged that the Commission reject the interpretation of the Agreement as had been advanced by the Unions.

Consideration

[36] The dispute in these matters has involved a contest about the meaning that should be given to particular words which appear in an enterprise agreement. The approach to interpretation of industrial instruments is not a matter of strict statutory interpretation. Although the words in an industrial instrument may be given their plain literal meaning, it is well established that often it is appropriate to adopt a contextual and purposive approach broadly based upon Authority established by a body of decision-making which is well summarised in a Decision of a Full Bench of Fair Work Australia in,Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union” known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU) v Silcar Pty Ltd  2(Silcar).

[37] The correct approach to interpretation of the terms contained in an enterprise agreement has been the subject of a more recent Decision of a Full Bench of this Commission in the matter of The Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Golden Cockrell Pty Limited  3 (Golden Cockerel). At paragraph 41 of the Golden Cockerel Decision the Full Bench set out the following principles that apply to the approach to interpretation of enterprise agreements:

“[41] From the foregoing, the following principles may be distilled:

1. The AI Act does not apply to the construction of an enterprise agreement made under the Act.

2. In construing an enterprise agreement it is first necessary to determine whether an agreement has a plain meaning or contains an ambiguity.

3. Regard may be had to evidence of surrounding circumstances to assist in determining whether an ambiguity exists.

4. If the agreement has a plain meaning, evidence of the surrounding circumstances will not be admitted to contradict the plain language of the agreement.

5. If the language of the agreement is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one meaning then evidence of the surrounding circumstance will be admissible to aide the interpretation of the agreement.

6. Admissible evidence of the surrounding circumstances is evidence of the objective framework of fact and will include:

(a) evidence of prior negotiations to the extent that the negotiations tend to establish objective background facts known to all parties and the subject matter of the agreement;

(b) notorious facts of which knowledge is to be presumed;

(c) evidence of matters in common contemplation and constituting a common assumption.

7. The resolution of a disputed construction of an agreement will turn on the language of the Agreement understood having regard to its context and purpose.

8. Context might appear from:

(a) the text of the agreement viewed as a whole;

(b) the disputed provision’s place and arrangement in the agreement;

(c) the legislative context under which the agreement was made and in which it operates.

9. Where the common intention of the parties is sought to be identified, regard is not to be had to the subjective intentions or expectations of the parties. A common intention is identified objectively, that is by reference to that which a reasonable person would understand by the language the parties have used to express their agreement.

10. The task of interpreting an agreement does not involve rewriting the agreement to achieve what might be regarded as a fair or just outcome. The task is always one of interpreting the agreement produced by parties.

[38] Accordingly, the principles as established by the Full Bench Decision in Golden Cockerel have been adopted and relevantly applied in this instance to the contested interpretation of the terms contained in the Agreement.

Work on a Recall Day in the Even Time Roster

[39] The primary contest in this instance has concerned the payment or other entitlement to apply to an employee working a recall day. A recall day involves work on a day that an employee would have not been rostered to work in accordance with the even time roster arrangements established by, in particular, clause 12 of the Agreement. The even time roster arrangements are an unusual prescription when compared with the vast majority of day work and rotating shift work roster arrangements which usually provide for either Monday to Friday work, or a rotating roster which would ordinarily include a number of regularly re-occurring days of rostered absence “off-shift”.

[40] The particular terms of the Agreement which establish the even time roster are set out in clause 12.2 as follows:

“12.2 Employees shall be engaged on an even time roster, working 21 days on (“on duty period”) and having 21 days off (“non-duty period”). This roster may be varied using the Clause 10 Consultation process.”

[41] Consequently, the even time roster establishes a pattern of engagement which provides for considerably more time absent from duty than would be the case for the vast majority of what may be described as the ordinary day work or rotating shift work rostering arrangements. As a logical consequence of the significant periods of absence from duty which are generated by the even time rostering arrangement, other periods of leave which would usually apply, are deemed to be included in the non-duty or off-roster periods of the even time rostering.

[42] Clause 22.2 of the Agreement provides terms which are clearly intended to deem that the non-duty or off-roster periods satisfy the taking of all leave that would otherwise apply. Clause 22.2 is in the following terms:

“22.2 Full-time or part-time Employees shall be entitled to a period of leave at the rate of one (1) day’s leave for each day of duty, such leave to be taken in lieu of five weeks annual leave, public holidays and weekends worked (while working the roster defined in clause 11.2, [sic] all Employees are deemed shiftworkers for the purposes of the NES), with the first 5 weeks of non-duty period in any 12 month period being deemed to have satisfied and [sic] Employees’ entitlement to annual leave in accordance with the NES.”
(Note: The reference in this clause to clause 11.2 should be 12.2)

[43] In abbreviated summary, the work arrangements created by the even time roster involve 21 days on followed by 21 days off, with all leave being included in the non-duty or off-roster periods.

Double Time for a Recall Day

[44] In the context of these work arrangements, the dispute in this instance has focused upon what entitlements are provided by the Agreement when an employee works on a non-duty or off-roster day. Such work has also been described as a recall day. Clause 12.16.5 of the Agreement includes terms which deal with entitlements for work on a recall day. Clause 12.16.5 is in the following terms:

“12.16.5 Where a Full-time Permanent Employee on leave is recalled to work in [sic] as provided in the roster to cover a vacancy, the Employee shall be paid double time for that day(s) worked.”

[45] It is abundantly clear from the words contained in clause 12.16.5 that an employee who works on a recall day will be paid double time for such work. The employer has observed this requirement by making an ordinary time payment in addition to the ordinary time payment that would otherwise apply on a non-duty or off-roster day. Consequently, an employee who works a recall day involving a 12 hour shift, has been paid an additional 12 hours pay for that shift which amounts in aggregate, to payment of double time.

[46] The MUA did not contest that this payment of the additional ordinary time amount satisfied the terms of clause 12.16.5 of the Agreement as representing payment, in total, of double time for a recall day. However, the AIMPE and the AMOU asserted that work on a recall day should attract a double time payment in addition to the ordinary time payment that applied to each day of the non-duty or off-roster period.

[47] This proposition, as was advanced by the AIMPE and the AMOU, must be rejected as it would require the terms of clause 12.16.5 to be construed to include words such as “in addition to any other entitlement”. The clause does not include such words and it cannot be properly interpreted as if it did include such terminology.

A Preserved Day of Leave

[48] The Unions also claimed that work on a recall day and any additional payment for work on that day, could not operate to extinguish the entitlement to that day as a day of paid leave. Thus, it was asserted that a recall day involved the retention of a day of leave credit in addition to the double time, or in the case of the AIMPE and the AMOU triple time, paid in respect to the work performed.

[49] The retention of the day of leave credit was said to arise from the impermissible action of what was described as the cashing out of the leave by way of payment in circumstances which contravened particular provisions of the NES. There was also an alternative proposition advanced by the AIMPE and the AMOU that suggested that the work performed on a recall day itself was a day of duty and therefore generated an additional day of leave.

[50] There is an underlying fallacy upon which the Unions’ have advanced their claims for preservation of the leave entitlement lost when a recall day is worked. The even time roster arrangement needs to be considered in totality and it should be acknowledged to represent engagement on a distinctly different basis than that which applies to ordinary day work or rotational shift work. Consequently, the ordinarily understood concepts for leave such as annual leave, do not easily translate into the circumstances of engagement under the even time roster. In particular, a mistake is made if non-duty periods or days-off on the even time roster are equated with paid leave such as annual leave.

[51] The mistake that has emerged is understandable because of the use of the word “leave” to describe the non-duty periods or days-off on the even time roster. These days-off cannot be properly construed as days of leave, as would be ordinarily understood, even though these periods are deemed to satisfy requirements in respect to the provision of leave, particularly annual leave.

[52] Consequently, the terms of clause 22.2 when properly considered in the context of the Agreement in totality, do not provide for an entitlement that a day of a non-duty period when worked as a recall day, is a day of paid leave which is preserved or otherwise incapable of being extinguished by virtue of payment being made for the time worked.

[53] Further, the terms of clause 12.16.5 appropriately provide for the entire entitlement in respect to work on a recall day. Particularly in circumstances where work on a recall day is entirely voluntary, the absence of any other words providing for any entitlement other than payment at double time, represents the plain and unambiguous intention of these provisions to prescribe and encompass the totality of the entitlement that applies when a recall day is worked.

The Further Claims of the AMOU

[54] The claim made by the AMOU regarding the interpretation to be given to the word “day” as it would apply to clause 12.2 of the Agreement, when considered in terms of the practical operation of shifts that extend beyond midnight on the 21^st day, must be rejected on the basis that such an interpretation would represent a narrow, pedantic and inconvenient approach as was warned against by Madgwick J in Kucks v CSR  4.

[55] The AMOU also made claim that an accommodation allowance was payable in respect to a recall day. This claim must be rejected on the basis that the terms contained in clause 38.2 of the Agreement specifically express that the payment of an accommodation allowance is to apply “... for the 21 days when the Employee is on roster.” A recall day must self evidently be a day other than one of the 21 days when an employee was on roster.

Conclusion

[56] The determination of the issues which have arisen in these disputes has involved the interpretation of particular words in various clauses of the Agreement. In particular, the words contained in clauses 12.16.5 and 22 of the Agreement, should be interpreted having regard for the contextual and practical implications which are connected with engagement under an even time rostering arrangement.

[57] In summary, my consideration has led me to conclude that clause 12.16.5 of the Agreement prescribes that, as the totality of the entitlement arising in respect to work on a recall day, that being a day of a non-duty period as established under clause 12.2, an employee is to be paid double time, which is a payment of single time being in addition to the single time payment that applies for each day of a non-duty period. The Agreement does not provided for any further entitlement in respect to a recall day and specifically no paid leave entitlement is preserved or created when a recall day is worked.

[58] Further, the interpretation of “a day” or “days” for the purposes of clause 12.2 of the Agreement is not confined to a period from midnight to midnight but instead encompasses a period of time until the completion of a shift engagement. In addition, clause 38.3 of the Agreement has no application to any work performed on a recall day.

[59] In view of the conclusions that I have reached each of the applications made on behalf of the Unions must be dismissed. An Order dismissing the applications shall be issued separately and the proceedings are concluded accordingly.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

Mr D Quinn for the Maritime Union of Australia.

Mr B Matthey for the Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers.

Ms J Thompson for the Australian Maritime Officers’ Union.

Mr A Herbert of Counsel, together with Ms E McCarthy, for Curtis Island Services Pty Ltd.

Hearing details:

2014.

Gladstone:

December 11.

 1   Exhibit 1.

 2   Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union” known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU) v Silcar Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 2555.

 3   The Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Golden Cockrell Pty Limited [2014] FWCFB 7447.

 4 Kucks v CSR Limited [1996] IRCA 166 (19 April 1996), 66IR182.

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