Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union v CEM International Pty Ltd
[2020] FCCA 644
•24 March 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING WORKERS' UNION & ORS v CEM INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD | [2020] FCCA 644 |
| Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Claimed applicants took industrial action not authorised or agreed to by employer – alleged contraventions of section 19(1)(c) of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) established against all applicants – applicants undertook industrial action within meaning of term under Act – insufficient evidence to infer implied authority – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss.19, 50, 474, 793(1) |
| Cases cited: Adams v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2017] FCAFC 228 |
| First Applicant: | AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING WORKERS' UNION |
| Second Applicant: | JOHN ADDAMO |
| Third Applicant: | BRETT CONLEY |
| Fourth Applicant: | STEVEN GRAY |
| Fifth Applicant: | MARK HUGHES |
| Sixth Applicant: | CHIANG LAY |
| Seventh Applicant: | CHARLES PRESTI |
| Eighth Applicant: | RONALD SMITH |
| Ninth Applicant: | JAMES SNOOKS |
| Tenth Applicant: | DARRIN STIRLING |
| Eleventh Applicant: | CHRISTOPHER WHITE |
| Respondent: | CEM INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD |
| File Number: | MLG 3065 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge McNab |
| Hearing date: | 12 February 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 20 December 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 24 March 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Terzic |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Powter |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | AI Group Workplace Lawyers |
ORDERS
The application filed on 11 October 2018 be dismissed.
Any application for costs be made within 14 days and supported by a submission of no more than 2 pages in length.
Any response to the submission be filed in 14 days thereafter, with the question of costs to be determined on the papers.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 3065 of 2018
| AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING WORKERS' UNION |
First Applicant
| JOHN ADDAMO |
Second Applicant
| BRETT CONLE |
Third Applicant
| STEVEN GRAY |
Fourth Applicant
| MARKS HUGHES |
Fifth Applicant
| CHIANG LAY |
Sixth Applicant
| CHARLES PRESTI |
Seventh Applicant
| RONALD SMITH |
Eight Applicant
| JAMES SNOOKS |
Ninth Applicant
| DARRIN STIRLING |
Tenth Applicant
| CHRISTOPHER WHITE |
Eleventh Applicant
And
| CEM INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Background
The Respondent, CEM International Pty Ltd (‘CEM’ or ‘the Employer’), operates a factory at Coolaroo manufacturing and repairing vessels used in the transportation and storage of liquefied gas.
The First Applicant, the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (‘AMWU’ or ‘the Union’) has as members the 2nd to 9th and 11th Applicants (‘Employee Applicants’).
The CEM International Pty Ltd Enterprise Agreement 2017-2020 (‘the Agreement’) applied to the Employee Applicants’ employment, as well as other CEM employees who fell within the coverage of the Agreement.
On 3 April 2018, the Respondent’s Health and Safety Representative (‘HSR’) approached Paul Mihovilovic, Fabrication Manager, and raised concerns about the presence of asbestos in the workshop of the Coolaroo site. The HSR advised that employees suspected that asbestos was present in gaskets being fitted to gas tanks which are installed on certain truck trailers manufactured by the Respondent. Work on the subject gas tanks ceased immediately and the workshop was cordoned off.
On 4 April 2018, the Respondent received confirmation that there was asbestos in the gaskets applied by the Chinese manufacturer. This was communicated to the workforce and they were directed to leave work and go home.
The next day, external consultants were engaged to clear the site of the asbestos and to make the site safe. The Respondent developed a register in relation to the incident to satisfy Occupational Health & Safety Regulations 2017 (Cth) (‘OHS Regulations’).
In April 2018, an apology was issued to employees in relation to the incident. Information was provided to employees pursuant to OHS Regulations.
Bradley Morris, who at the time was the deputy HSR (he subsequently took on the HSR role in June 2018), gave evidence by an affidavit affirmed on 12 September 2019 that in the month following the discovery of asbestos, workers were concerned for their health and wanting advice and information on a daily basis about asbestos.
Mr Morris gave evidence that in mid May 2018 he sought help from the AMWU organiser, Alesio Mulipola, and asked him to speak to CEM workers during a lunch break.
Mr Morris states that on 14 May 2018 Mr Mulipola attended the workshop canteen during lunchtime and told the workers present that he knew Margaret Kent who was an expert in asbestos and queried whether they wished to hear from her.
The workers voted up this proposal and, as Mr Hughes the HSR was off-site, Mr Morris formally invited Ms Kent to speak to the workgroup at the lunch break on the following day. Ms Kent was not available and the meeting was organised for 16 May 2018, with the meeting to be held between 12.30pm and 1.00pm.
On 16 May 2018, the meeting took place at the worksite commencing during the lunch break (12.30pm – 1.00pm) and continuing on during paid work time until about 1.45pm. Margaret Kent, a solicitor employed by Slater and Gordon, attended the meeting, having arrived at the worksite at 1.05pm.
The Respondent took the view that the meeting meant the Employee Applicants were not performing work as instructed or as directed by the Employer but were participating in a ‘Stop Work meeting’. As such, they considered that the relevant employees had engaged in unprotected industrial action as defined by section 19(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘the Act’).
The Respondent says that section 474 of the Act prohibited them from making payments to employees who had engaged in industrial action as defined in section 19(1) of the Act, and CEM subsequently deducted four hours of wages from the wages of each of the Employee Applicants.
The AMWU claims that CEM has breached section 50 of the Act by failing to pay all the employees and for deducting the four hours’ worth of wages.
The AMWU claims that the conduct in conducting the meeting beyond 1.00pm into extra time (‘Conduct’) was not industrial action because it was authorised or agreed to by CEM. In particular it is said that permission was given to employees to remain at the meeting beyond the lunch break by Mr Shane Spratling who was, from 2014 to late 2018, a Workshop Supervisor and said to be in a position to authorise the Conduct on behalf of CEM.
This is disputed by CEM who say Mr Spratling had no such authority and that this is made plain by the fact that it is agreed that Mr Spratling left the meeting shortly prior to 1.00pm to seek approval from his manager, Paul Mihovilovic (the Fabrication Manager). At the time that Mr Spratling tried to speak to Paul Mihovilovic, who was on the telephone. It is not claimed that Mr Mihovilovic authorised the meeting.
Relevant law
Section 474(1) of the Act states:
(1) If an employee engaged, or engages, in industrial action that is not protected industrial action against an employer on a day, the employer must not make a payment to an employee in relation to:
(a) if the total duration of the industrial action on that day is at least 4 hours–the total duration of the industrial action on that day; or
(b) otherwise–4 hours of that day.
The Act’s definition of industrial action is reproduced below:
19. Meaning of industrial action
(1) Industrial action means action of any of the following kinds:
(a) the performance of work by an employee in a manner different from that in which it is customarily performed, or the adoption of a practice in relation to work by an employee, the result of which is a restriction or limitation on, or a delay in, the performance of the work;
(b) a ban, limitation or restriction on the performance of work by an employee or on the acceptance of or offering for work by an employee;
(c) a failure or refusal by employees to attend for work or a failure or refusal to perform any work at all by employees who attend for work;
(d) the lockout of employees from their employment by the employer of the employees.
Note: In Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v The Age Company Limited, PR946290, the Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission considered the nature of industrial action and noted that action will not be industrial in character if it stands completely outside the area of disputation and bargaining.
(2) However, industrial action does not include the following:
(a) action by employees that is authorised or agreed to by the employer of the employees;
(b) action by an employer that is authorised or agreed to by, or on behalf of, employees of the employer;
(c) action by an employee if:
(i) the action was based on a reasonable concern of the employee about an imminent risk to his or her health or safety; and
(ii) the employee did not unreasonably fail to comply with a direction of his or her employer to perform other available work, whether at the same or another workplace, that was safe and appropriate for the employee to perform.
An employer locks out employees from their employment if the employer prevents the employees from performing work under their contracts of employment without terminating those contracts.
Note: In this section, employee and employer have their ordinary meanings (see section 11).
The question of authority in companies is touched on in sub-section 793(1) of the Act reproduced below:
Conduct of a body corporate
(1) Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate:
(a) by an officer, employee or agent (an official ) of the body within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority; or
(b) by any other person at the direction or with the consent or agreement (whether express or implied) of an official of the body, if the giving of the direction, consent or agreement is within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the official;
is taken, for the purposes of this Act and the procedural rules, to have been engaged in also by the body.
Mr Spratling
Central to this matter was the evidence of Mr Spratling on the evidence given about his duties by witnesses for both the Applicant and the Respondent.
The AMWU submit that:
a)Mr Spratling was the Employee Applicant’s supervisor from 2014 to late 2018;
b)most of the Employee Applicant witnesses gave evidence making reference to Mr Spratling giving permission for the presentation to continue past 1.00pm; and
c)while Mr Spratling did not have express actual authority, he had implied actual authority incidental authority, usual and apparent authority.
The Applicants submit that for Mr Spratling to have exercised implied actual authority, CEM’s formal consent was not required; consent can be implied from CEM’s conduct.
Mr Spratling deposed that he had a wide range of powers and responsibilities in the running of the factory: from controlling and supervising the Agreement covered employees of CEM, to running toolbox meetings and training. Moreover, Mr Spratling was, from time to time, left to deal with Union official visits as the face of CEM.
The Applicants submit that, in all the circumstances, for Mr Spratling to allow the employees he supervised to hear what was described as an informative presentation on asbestos beyond the lunch break was within the orbit of what he was charged to do, even though he was never given express permission to do such a thing.
In order to make good these propositions the evidence of Mr Spratling must be examined carefully. Mr Spratling gave evidence by an affidavit affirmed on 12 September 2019 in relation to the following matters:
a)he qualified as a Boilermaker in 1991 and then followed the trade into general fabrication;
b)he commenced working with the Respondent in about 2014 at its Coolaroo workshop as a Supervisor. He was responsible for operations in the workshop and that, under his charge, there were about 20 to 25 employees who were mostly Boilermakers with some store workers, labourers and maintenance fitters;
c)some of his duties were: setting the employees rosters; rostering subcontractors; allocating duties; allocating overtime; giving technical direction; inspecting work; signing off leave applications; administering discipline, including dismissal; giving appraisals on employees’ performance skills; computerisation of the workplace; planning and ordering; running toolbox meetings; safety; and training;
d)he was based in a small office in the workshop floor, and spent half his time in the office and the rest on the shop floor or in the administration office liaising with engineers or senior managers; and
e)his immediate boss was the Fabrication Manager, Paul Mihovilovic.
The written job description which was provided to Mr Spratling and which was tendered in evidence provided, amongst other things, that the major functions of the position were:
a)to take responsibility for the efficient and effective supervision of the factory in accordance with government procedures, government regulations and strategic government objectives;
b)to take responsibility for the manufacturing of fabricated products in accordance with good quality and delivery objectives, and in a manner that is safe and environmentally responsible; and
c)to adopt and work within CEM’s Occupational Health & Safety policy.
The detailed requirements of the position included:
a)to ensure that all workshop personnel have current training/knowledge of applicable Occupational Health and Safety procedures prior to being assigned work tasks;
b)to effectively plan factory resources (including people, equipment, skill-sets, qualifications) to ensure maximum workshop efficiency;
c)to establish and maintain good industrial relations with the workshop floor employees;
d)to oversee the performance of workshop employees and subcontractors; and
e)to ensure activities are conducted within the job objectives and formal procedures.
Listed amongst “authority limits/procedural requirements” in the written job description was the authority to determine an action appropriate of overtime of workshop employees and subcontractors; and authority to sign off subcontract timesheets and/or equipment service reports.
As noted above, it was not submitted by the Applicant that Mr Spratling had actual authority to authorise the meeting continuing beyond the ordinary lunchbreak.
In relation to the circumstances surrounding the meeting being held, Mr Spratling gave the following evidence:
9. In about April 2018, asbestos was discovered in the Workshop. This caused the Workshop to close for about 3 or 4 days while the asbestos was cleaned up. Among the employees, I detected that there was a lot of concern about their exposure to the asbestos.
1o. In my view, from what I saw and heard around the Workshop, CEM was not disclosing much information about the asbestos to the employees and their concerns mounted. Regularly, employers would relate their worries to me about the asbestos, and, how they felt that CEM was not being transparent.
11. Eventually, the workers’ union offered to bring an expert to settle things down and this offer was warmly accepted by the workers.
12. On Wednesday, 16 May 2018, I was working as usual. At the lunchbreak I went to the canteen and two union officials turned up and they had a lady with them. The Workshop’s regularly union organiser, Ale Mulipola, told me that he was there to hold a safety meeting and he told me that he had brought with him a lawyer from Slater and Gordon who was an expert on asbestos. Mr Mulipola then introduced the lawyer and she took over the meeting. Her presentation was all about the asbestos problem, especially about the legal issues [...]
13. I found her presentation interesting, and it appeared to me that everyone else was listening closely.
14. At 1pm, the lunchtime siren went off indicating the end of the lunchbreak. Mr Mulipola asked me if the meeting could continue for a bit. I replied, “How much longer?” The lawyer interjected, “About 15 minutes” and I said “Yes, as this is a safety meeting”.
15. The meeting went for about another 15 minutes and when it ended everyone went back to work. The whole thing seemed unremarkable. I add that the concerns among the employees seemed to die down a lot after the lawyer’s presentation.
The majority of the Employee Applicants gave evidence that Mr Spratling was the Workshop Supervisor and that he did perform the tasks which were referred to in his evidence in relation to overseeing the production in the workshop and ensuring safety procedures were observed. He also dealt with over time and queries in relation to pay. The evidence of other Employee Applicants did not support Mr Spratling’s evidence that he had the power to terminate employment.
Importantly, other employees who gave evidence referred to Mr Spratling leaving the meeting shortly before 1.00pm and returning back to the meeting. Mr Spratling’s affidavit makes no reference to this occurring.
In his oral evidence before the Court, Mr Spratling gave evidence that he left the meeting to see Paul Mihovilovic to ask for an extension for more time. He gave evidence that Mr Mihovilovic was busy dealing with a WorkCover matter and could not recall whether he spoke to Mr Mihovilovic. He gave evidence that after that he returned to the meeting and advised that the meeting could continue as “it was a health and safety meeting”.
Mr Mihovilovic’s evidence
Mr Mihovilovic gave evidence by an affidavit affirmed on 14 November 2019 that:
a)He holds a degree in Mechanical Engineering as well as well as a Welding Supervisor qualification.
b)He holds a position of Fabrication Manager at CEM and that he was responsible for any matters regarding wages, employment conditions, approving any request for leave and any disciplinary related issues.
c)He was responsible for managing Union relationships and their entry/exit from the premises. He stated that he ordinarily did this by receiving an email notice and communicating that notice to workshop personnel via the notice board. The notice explained that the Union organiser would be on site in the canteen during the 12.30pm to 1.00pm break on the nominated day. He has held this position since 2008.
d)Mr Spratling was a Workshop Supervisor and Mr Morris was the Deputy HSR.
Mr Mihovilovic gave evidence that:
a)On the day of the meeting on 16 May 2018 he had a meeting with WorkSafe inspectors who attended at the site at 9.30am. Those inspectors left the Coolaroo site at about 12.30pm and he left the site at 12.30pm to get some lunch.
b)When he returned to the site just before 1.00pm he saw Mr Mulipolia from the AMWU standing outside the workshop canteen speaking with some of the workshop personnel. He found it odd that Mr Mulipolia would be on the site to visit workers during the lunchbreak as he had not been given advance warning that this was to happen which was the usual practice. He was aware that the AMWU must ordinarily provide a Right of Entry Notice at least 24 hours in advance to have lunchtime discussions, however he was not as strict as he would otherwise be on requiring adherence to the ‘Right of Entry Notice’ obligations given the fact that asbestos had been identified on the site.
c)Mr Spratling’s role as a Workshop Manager was to ensure that the Union organiser left when the 1.00pm siren went off signalling the end of the lunchbreak. He stated that to his knowledge, there has never been an issue with meetings going over or beyond the lunchbreak.
d)At [22] of his affidavit he stated that after he returned from lunch, at some point during his meeting with the WorkSafe inspectors, he recalled Mr Spratling coming to the meeting room sometime after 1.00pm saying words to the effect of ‘I need to ask you something’. He stated that before he [Mr Spratling] could continue Mr Mihovilovic responded with words to the effect of ‘Shane, you are going to have to speak to someone else, I’m busy and I can’t help you right now.’ Mr Mihovilovic took this to mean that Mr Spratling knew that Mr Spratling did not have authority to approve the meeting going beyond the lunchbreak and that he knew he had to be authorised from management, which included Mr Mihovilovic and all those above him.
Mr Mihovilovic gave evidence at [25] of his affidavit that when one of the WorkSafe inspectors left at 1.15pm (there is a note in the entry book showing this), he went to the factory to find Mark Hughes, the HSR, and was surprised to find that no one was working and that everyone was in a meeting. Mr Mihovilovic gave further evidence that:
a)he interrupted the meeting and asked to borrow Mark Hughes for a few minutes. He saw a woman speaking to the group standing next to Mr Mulipolia and Martin Raspin, Safety Officer with the AMWU; and
b)he was not approached for permission to hold the meeting in the days prior to the meeting by Union representatives, Ms Kent or any of the people external to the business who entered onto the premises to conduct the meeting.
The Applicants’ Submissions
The Applicants submit that the presentation on 16 May 2018 was not held in a way that was contrary to the Occupational Health & Safety Act 2004 (Cth) (‘the OHS Act’) or ‘right of entry’ provisions of the Act. It is further submitted that strict compliance or reliance on the OHS Act or ‘right of entry’ provisions of the Act is not necessary for the present claim to succeed.
The Applicants say that there is no failure or refusal on the part of the Employee Applicants to perform any work, and that they attended and participated in the presentation on the direction of their supervisor, Mr Spratling.
It was said that the characterisation of the Conduct was best described as a failure to perform work by employees who attend for work, as described in section 19(1)(c) of the Act.
It is also submitted that the presentation went to a topical, work-related issue, and that a reasonable conclusion to be reached on an event like the presentation is that it was an adjunct to the Agreement-covered workforce’s ordinary duties.
It is alleged that the presentation was authorised on the basis of:
(a)Mr Spratling’s express permission for the conduct; and
(b)the acquiescence of Paul Mihovilovic, the relevant manager.
The acquiescence of Mr Mihovilovic is said to be his failure to give any directive that the meeting stop when he interrupted the meeting at about 1.15pm to ask to ‘borrow Mark Hughes’. This failure is said to amount to an implied authorisation for the presentation to continue.
It is also submitted that CEM is estopped from claiming that the presentation was industrial action on the basis that the Employer had ‘instilled in its Agreement covered employees the notion that Mr Spratling had authority enough to conduct workplace meetings over workplace issues, in this case the Asbestos concerns.’
a)The Employee Applicants state there is an estoppel by representation on the basis that CEM represented that Mr Spratling had authority to conduct workplace meetings, and that the employees acted on the basis of the truth of that representation to their detriment.
It is also alleged that the Conduct was not industrial action taken against CEM. Citing Qantas Airways Ltd v Transport Workers’ Union of Australia [2011] FCA 470 at [335]. it is put at [32] of the Applicants’ submissions that:
32. […] the Conduct fell within the orbit of lawful directions given to the Employee applicants […] and while the Employee applicants were not doing what they would have but for the Presentation, it cannot be shown that they were not ready and willing to perform their end of the wage-work bargain .
As an ancillary issue, the Applicants submitted that the attendance of Ms Kent and Union officials at the site on 16 May 2018 was entirely regular and in accordance with the provisions of the OHS Act, and that otherwise the presence of those people at the site was lawful because it was pursuant to an implied licence.
The Respondent’s submissions
The Respondent submits that the Employee Applicants engaged in unprotected industrial action as defined in section 19(1) of the Act, and that it was under a statutory obligation pursuant to section 474 (1) of the Act to make the deductions.
The Respondent disputes that:
(a)the Employee Applicants were performing work for and at the direction of the Respondent when participating at the meeting; and
(b)that the participation of the employees in the ‘Stop Work meeting’ was authorised or agreed to, as that expression is used in section 19(2) of the Act.
It is also submitted that the action taken by the Applicants was not for the benefit of CEM and that the submission that the industrial action was not taken against CEM has no merit.
Consideration
The conduct of the Employee Applicants in remaining in the meeting beyond the designated lunch break constituted industrial action as defined by section 19 (1)(c) of the Act. The Applicants failed to perform any work in the period when the meeting extended beyond the end of the lunchbreak at 1.00pm.
The fact that the Employee Applicants found the meeting was interesting or of benefit to them, particularly after the asbestos had been found on the site, does not change the action into something other than industrial action.
Whether or not the attendance at the meeting was an act of defiance does not change the character of the action having regard to section 19(1)(c) of the Act.
I am bound by the decision of the full Court in Adams v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2017] FCAFC 228 at [59] where the Court stated:
We find, in the text of s 19(1)(c), no basis for limiting its operation in the way suggested by the Age decision, or in BHP Coal. Section 19(1)(c) defines the term “industrial action”. It does so by having regard to the relationship between employer and employee, and the performance of work pursuant to that relationship. It is that relationship which attracts use of the word “industrial”. We see no justification for the view that it is necessary to add some further “industrial qualification” to the express words of s 19(1)(c). Some other provision of the Fair Work Act may necessitate the adoption of a narrower meaning for some purposes, just as any statutory definition may be affected by context. We see no basis in the Fair Work Act for adopting a narrow approach to s 19 as it applies to s 417. However we are inclined to the view that provisions in the Crown enterprise agreement may affect its application where an employee does not attend for, or perform work because of illness...
As to whether the conduct of the employees was “authorised or agreed to by the employer of the employees” in accordance with section 19 (2) of the act, the evidence does not support the finding that it was so authorised or agreed to.
The evidence does not support a finding that Mr Spratling had apparent or ostensible authority to authorise industrial action. Further, there is no evidence to support a finding that the Employer agreed to the Conduct or had held Mr Spratling out as a person having authority to authorise such conduct.
The Union did not submit that Mr Spratling had actual authority. Mr Spratling’s evidence was that he left the meeting to see Mr Mihovilovic to ask for an extension for more time. The fact that the other employee witnesses noted that Mr Spratling left the meeting for that purpose was evidence that he himself did not hold out that he had authority to extend the meeting beyond the lunchbreak.
Whilst Mr Spratling was the workshop supervisor and could give directions in relation to the manner in which work was done, there is no evidence that he had any authority in relation organising the meeting. He attended the meeting as an employee. He did not organise the meeting and did not arrange for the persons external to the business to attend that meeting.
Paragraph [12] of Mr Spratling’s affidavit affirmed 12 September 2019 makes plain that he was attending as an employee not as an organiser or agent of the Employer. He left the meeting to try to get permission from his employer to extend the meeting beyond the lunchbreak. There was no holding out by the Employer that Mr Spratling had authority to approve the employees to attend the meeting beyond the lunch break.
The submission that the Employer had given permission by acquiescing in the meeting continuing must also fail. Mr Mihovilovic became aware of the meeting continuing beyond the lunchbreak after the lunchbreak had finished. An employer cannot retrospectively authorise or agree to the action being taken: Director of Fair Work Building Inspectorate v McCullough [2016] FCA 1291 at [99].
Given that the Employer became aware that the employees had engaged in industrial action, it was under an obligation pursuant to section 474 of the Act not to make payments in relation to four hours’ work on the day on which the action was taken: see section 474(1)(b) of the Act.
Whether or not Ms Kent attended the premises pursuant to an implied licence does not change the characterisation of the conduct to something other than industrial action as defined by section 19(1)(c) of the Act.
In light of that finding the Applicants’ arguments in relation to estoppel must fail. There was no holding out of authority by the Respondent such as to give rise to a reliance by the Applicants that would found an estoppel.
Conclusion
In light of my findings, the application must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge McNab
Associate:
Date: 24 March 2020
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