Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association v O'Brien, M.K. & N.J.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

)

PUEENSLAND

DISTRICT

REGISTRY

)

QLD Q1 of 1986

DIVISION

GENERAL

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN LICENSD AIRCRAFT ENGINEERS

ASSOCIATION	1. '
I
. .>
I .

Applicant

AND:

MALINDA KATHLENE O'BRIEN and

NEIL	J O H N O'BRIEN

First Respondents

AND:

CODDAIR AIRLINES PTY.LTD.

(In Liquidation)

Second Respondent

SPENDER

J .

12 JUNE, 1986

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application by the

Australian

Licensed

Aircraft Engineers Association which claims against the flrst respondent or, in the alternative, against the second respondent,

the

imposition of a

penalty for breaches

the

Aircraft

Engineers'	(General	Aviation)	Award	1982,	("the award")	. ,
_.

concerning one Peter Cawley between	1 April 1984 and 30 October
1984.

The alternative formulation of the application arises

because of doubts as

to whether it was the first or second

respondent who engaged the services of Mr. Cawley. If the second respondent is found to have engaged Mr. Cawley's services, then

an issue arises whether the basis of the engagement was that of

employer-employee

or as an independent

contractor.

In addition, the applicant association seeks to recover

any penalty that the court imposes and also seeks

an order that

the respondents pay to Peter Cawley the sum of

$4,535.52, being

the amount said to have been underpaid to him pursuant to his

entitlement under the Aircraft Engineers' (General Aviation)

I	Award 1982.

Mr. Cawley filed

affidavit in this application and

gave brief oral evidence.

He was not cross-examined by either

respondent as to the factual matters deposed

to in his affidavit

and I accept them. Between 1 April 1984 and 31 October 1984, Mr.

Cawley was

a financial member of the Australian Licensed Aircraft

Englneers' Association,

an organisation of employees which is a

respondent to the Aircraft Engineers (General Aviation) Award

1982.

Mr. Cawley remains a financial member

of that association.

On 2 April 1984, Mr. Truan, the Chief Engineer of Coddair

r .

Airlines Pty.Ltd. ("Coddair")

asked Mr. Cawley

to perform certain

engineering work in relation to

Cessna aircraft operated by

that company. Mr. Cawley

had

previously sought employment from

the chief engineer with that company.

3 .

Mr. Cawley deposes that

he commenced employment the

following day and remained in employment with Coddair in the

capacity of

a licensed aircraft engineer until 19 October 1984,

after which

he performed no further duties with Coddair.

From 3

April 1984 until 19 October,

he worked each normal working day

and frequently worked overtime shifts.

He initially worked under

the direction of the Chief Engineer of Coddair until that person

resigned and, for the balance of his employment, he worked under

the direction of a Mr. Woodley, who became Chief Engineer of

Coddalr. During the period of his employment

he performed the

I ,'

duties of a licensed aircraft engineer, including the inspection

of	work performed by other englneers and the certification of

such work.

He from time to time requested that

be paid in

9 .

accordance

with

the

award

but

was

informed

Mrs.

Hovorka, a

L _

I	Manager of	Coddair, that his rate	of remuneration would be that
I

of a casual employee fixed at $7.50 per hour. Over the perlod of

I I

hls employment, his remuneration increased to

$8.00 per hour and

then

to $10.00 per

hour

but

his

remuneration

was

not

accordance with the award. Mrs. Hovorka is the daughter

of Kevin

Codd, the Managing Director

f Coddair.

I I

Mr.	Cawley sags that often he was paid by a cheque

enclosed in a letter with "Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd." and a logo

printed on

it,

although on two occasions, when he received a

printed pay envelope issued by the National Australia Bank, and

on other occasions, his pay was in a plain envelope.	I I _ .
I.

I I

1 .

The source of the difficulty is that each pay envelope

which he received weekly contained a cheque drawn on the account

of NJM Resources. He swears in his affidavit that

he attached no

significance to that fact and was not aware of the relationship,

I I

if any, between NJM Resources and Coddair. During the period

I I

worked, he always performed his work on the premises of Coddair.

He used his

own

tools and equipment but also used tools and

equipment supplied to him by Coddair.

On 31 October 1984, Mr. Cawley received a letter on the

letterhead of Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd., the body of which read:-

"It is with regret we have to advise

you that your

services with our company are no longer required.

We thank you

for your support over the last months

and request that at your earliest convenience

you

return your company issue overalls.

Yours faithfully,

CODDAIR MAINTENANCE DIVISION"

Then a signature appears, the surname

which is Horvorka, and

underneath is typed "Leanne Horvorka, Manaser." That letter also

shows various addresses in Queensland and one in Adelaide. One

of significance as will later appear is the address	at Roma, Post
Office Box 2 2 6 , Roma, 4455.

On 3 1 January 1985, a Mr.

Collins,

the

Industrial

i	Manager	of	the applicant, wrote a letter addressed to the
l
l

i	Manager, Coddair Maintenance Division Pty.Ltd. at Eagle	Farm
l
I
I
I
Airport. That letter said in part:-
i

"I am forwarding this correspondence on behalf of

our member, Mr. Peter Cawley, who has informed me

that	he was an employee of Coddair Maintenance

Division Pty.Ltd. from 2 April 1984 until 19

October 1984, a total of 29 weeks.

Initially I should point out that, as your Company

is a member

the

Metal

Trades

Industry

Association, you are therefore

a respondent to the

Aircraft Engineers (General Aviation) Award 1982.

As you are now very much aware, there is no

provision (and there never has been) for part-time

casual

employees

employed

this

industry, and consequently I am making this claim

for Mr. Cawley as a

40 hour per week employee with

all the provisions, conditlons, and payments of

the abovementioned Award."

With that letter was a detailed claim for underpayment of salary

I..

and other allowances for Mr. Cawley in the sum of $4,535.52.

By letter of 27 February 1985, under the letterhead of

Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd., a Mr. Gough, who described himself as the Engineering Manager, replied to Mr. Collins. In that letter,

Mr. Gough said:-

"Reference your letter dated

31 January regarding a

claim by a disgruntled ex-subcontractor to Coddair

Airlines, namely

Mr. Peter Cawley."

This statement cannot constitute an admission of the assertion in

Mr. Collins' letter that Peter Cawley

had been an employee of

Coddair Maintenance Division Pty.Ltd. Equally,

in my opinion, it

does not establish that Coddair Maintenance Division Pty.Ltd. is

a misdescription of Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd.

Later in his letter, Mr. Gough says:-

"As I see it, Mr. Cawley wanted the job. Obviously he needed the income and it was his decision to

operate as

sub-contractor (sic). When

he was no

longer required, he has decided to deny this and

claim he

was employed part-time casual. He has

then perjured himself and gone to your Association

making various unsubstantiated claims.

He was

obviously

quite

happy

to receive

his

payment

for

hours

worked,

without

paying

the

penalty

income

tax,

the

costs

establishing himself as a self employed person.

We do not acknowledge Mr. Cawley's claim. We

claim

that

Mr.

Cawley

was

employed

subcontractor at an agreed rate on an as required

basis.

Both the letter of 31

October and that of

27 February

1985 strongly

suggest

that,

whatever

the

basis

the

relationship, the relationship so far as Mr. Cawley's work was concerned was between Mr. Cawley and Coddair Alrlines Pty.Ltd.

Towards the end of April

1985, Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd.

went into llquldation and

Mr. Harris of Messrs. Cooper & Lybrand

was appointed liquidator. On

19 July, solicitors for

Mr. Cawley

enclosed a form of proof of debt in the sum of the amount of

$4,535.52.

This was acknowledged by a letter of

13 August 1985,

which says in part:-

"We acknowledge receipt of the Proof of Debt but

are concerned

as to why it was forwarded to us.

Our information is that

Mr. Cawley was employed by

NJM Resources,

a business name registered to Mr.

N.J. O'Brien. Whilst

he worked on aircraft owned

by Codd Enterprises Pty.Ltd., which were being

utilised by Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd. he worked

directly for Mr. O'Brien who was retained

contractor

Coddair

A lines

Pty.Ltd..

Accordingly, it would appear that

the first

Instance the claim for wages

submitted by Mr.

Cawley should be directed to Mr. O'Brien."

After

further

letter

from

Mr. Cawley's

solicitors,

the

liquidator in a letter of 3 September said:-

"NJM Resources was retained by verbal arrangement

between Mr. O'Brien and the Managing Director of

Coddair

Airlines

Pty.

Ltd.

This

arrangement

resulted in the

payment

NJM

Resources

amounts

described

the

records

Coddair

Airlines as consultancy

fees.

NJM

Resources

thereupon issued cheques to all employees for

wages and paid both group tax and payroll tax on

the employees retained by them.

Mr. O'Brien is not and was not

shareholder,

director, or manager of Coddair Airlines although

he was retained on a Sub-contract basis by the

company for promotional reasons."

Shortly after Coddair went into liquidation, by a letter

by Mr. O'Brien dated 30 April 1985 (which

I accept was forwarded

the

liquidators

handed

them)

the

nature

the

arrangement between Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd. and NJM Resources

appears.

In part that letter says:-

"On the 19th December, 1983

I was approached by

Mr.

John Larcombe on behalf of Coddalr Airlines with a proposition of employment with Coddair Airlines

but only if

was prepared to enter into an

L .-

agreement where a Business name be registered to

I' I:

and

O'Brien.

The purpose

of a

registered

Name

was

solely

employ

certain

persons within the Coddair Airlines structure,

thus dividing the company workforce

half and

eliminating the past necessary Payrole (sic)	Tax
...

Mr.

O'Brien

said

that

the

business

name

NJM

Resources

was

registered on

24 January 1984. He then described the procedure

that was to operate, which was that each fortnight a number

cheques were presented to Mr. O'Brien for his signature, each

cheque bearing the name of the recipients and stamped "not

negotiable". On

a very few instances. cheques of small value

were made out to cash

to pay for overtime. A cheque was raised

by Coddair Airlines payable to NJM Resources for the total nett

value of the wages paid to the persons

who had been named in

the several cheques.

Each

month a Coddair Airlines cheque was

raised payable to

NJM Resources to cover tax deducted from wages.

NJM Resources cheque was then forwarded

to the Australian

Taxation	Office.	The	same	system	applied	w rkers	to	I ,
i .

compensation.

All

bookwork

and

the

raising

cheques

was

carried out by

Mrs. Paula Codd and Mrs. Leanne Hovaka (sic).

Cheques presented on Friday

26 April drawn on Coddair

Alrlines for the credit of

NJM Resources were dishonoured.

about that time, Mr. Harris became liquidator

Coddair

Airlines

Pty.Ltd.

(In Liquidation).

The

payment

arrangements involving

NJM Resources were then discontinued.

The nature of the difference between a contract of

service and a contract for services was analysed in Australian

Mutual Provident Societv v. Chaplin (1978)

18 A.L.R. 385. Lord

Fraser of Tullybelton, delivering the judgment

of the Board,

referred at p.387 with approval to the statement by the learned

Chief Justice of

the Supreme Court of South Australia, who had

said: -

I ::

"It seems to me, then, that at the present time

there is

no magic touchstone.

The court has to

look at

a number of indicia and then make up its

mind into which category the instant case should

9 .

be put. It is a question

of balancing the indicia

pro and con ...

But the power of control over the

manner

doing

the

work

very

important,

perhaps the most important of such indicia."

A detailed examination of the circumstances of the

engagement by Mr. Cawley and in particular the power to control

the manner of doing the work, as well

as the other indicia as

whether the relationship is that of employer and employee, in my

opinion, lead inescapably to the conclusion that during the

relevant period

Mr. Cawley was an employee of Coddair Airlines

Pty.Ltd.

Whatever

the

efficacy

the

arrangement

between

Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd. and the partnership NJM Resources concerning the incidence of payroll tax, those arrangements did

not have the effect of making	Mr. Cawley in any way an employee
of NJM Resources.

Neither the partnership NJM Resources, nor Mr. and Mrs.

O'Brien, was at any relevant period a respondent to the award.

The

arrangement

between

NJM

Resources

and

Coddair

Airlines

Pty.Ltd. does not constitute NJM Resources the successor to, or

the assignee

of, or

the transmitee of

the business of Coddair

Airlines Pty.Ltd.. As

a consequence, the applicant cannot rely

on s.61(d) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act

1904.

It follows then that the application fails against the

first respondents.

Insofar as the application against the second respondent

is concerned, on 16 December

1985, Master Weld, in the Supreme

Court of Queensland, granted leave to the applicant to commence

10.

these

proceedings

the

Federal

Court

of Australia. That

application was made, pursuant to s.371(2)(a) of the Queensland

(Companies) Code, which provides that, on the making of

winding-up order,

action or

other civil proceeding may be

commenced without the leave of the Court.

The application was

filed in the Federal Court on

9 January 1986.

It is unnecessary to consider whether an application for

the imposition of a penalty for non-observance of

an award is an

"action or other civil proceeding" because, if it is not properly

to be

so categorised, no leave was necessary; if it is properly

so categorised, leave was obtained. Further, if an application

under 5.119

which, by s.118A.

1 s made to the Federal Court

Australia

its

Industrial

Division,

comes

within

the

description of	"an action or other civil proceeding", there may
be a question	of whether the requirement of leave under the

Companies (Oueensland) Code has any valid operation in respect of

such

application,

consideration

s.109

of the

Constitution.

It was submitted by

the

solicitor for the liquidator

that, notwithstanding such leave, this Court had no jurisdiction

to entertain the application as against the second respondent.

The submission noted that 5.438 of the Companies (Queensland)

Code provides:-

(1) In every winding up, subject in the case

insolvent

companies

to the

application

accordance with the provisions

of this Code of the

Bankruptcy

Act

1966,

all

debts

payable

contingency and all claims against the company

(present

future,

certain

contingent,

11.

ascertained

sounding

only

damages)

are

admissible to proof against the company, a lust estimate being made so far as possible of the

value of such debts or claims as are

sub~ect

any contingency

or sound only in damages or for

some other reason do not bear

a certain value.

( 2 ) Subject to sections 204 and 441, in the winding up of an insolvent company the same rules shall prevail and be observed with regard to the

respective

rights

ecured

and

unsecured

creditors and debts provable and the valuation of

annuities and future and contingent liabilities as

are

force

for

the

time

being

under

the

Bankruptcv Act 1966, in relation to the estates of bankrupt persons, and all persons who in any such case would be entitled to prove for and receive

dividends out of the property of the company may

come in under the winding up and make such claims

against

the

company

they

respectively

are

entitled to by virtue of this section."

Accepting that the same rules apply with regard to debts

provable agalnst a company as are in force under the Bankruptcv

Act 1966 in relation

to the estates of bankrupt persons, one must

refer to s.82(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides:-

"Penalties or

fines imposed by a court in respect

of an offence against a law, whether a law

of the

Commonwealth	or	not, are	not	provable	in
bankruptcy.	'I

It was submitted that what was sought in paragraphs

1 and 2 of

the application was

"a penalty in respect of an offence against a

law", and was therefore not provable.

In Gapes v. Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd.(1979)

F.L.R. 431, a Full Court of the Federal Court consistlng of five

members (Smithers, A.C.J.,

J.B. Sweeney, matt, Deane and Fisher

. .

! .

I **

i	12.
I
i

JJ.), held that proceedings under s.119

of the Conciliation and

Arbitration Act

1904

for the recovery of penalties were not

i	criminal proceedings. As Deane J. said at p.458:-
!
'I

"In the absence of express statutory direction, the

question

whether

proceedings

for

a statutory

penalty

are

criminal

character

can

assimilated to the

question whether the act or

acts

respect

of which the proceedmgs are

brought constitute a criminal offence. The answer

to neither question is determined by the mere fact

that

the

consequence

the

act

acts

liability to

a penalty:

'The

recovery

of a

penalty, if that is the only consequence, does not

make the prohibited act a crime. If

it did, it

seems to me that that distinction which has been

well	know and established in law for many yeas

between a

penal statute and a criminal enactment

would fall to

the ground, for every penal statute

would involve a

crime, and would be a criminal

enactment' (per Brett M.R. Attorney-General v.

Bradlauqh (1885) 14 Q.B.D.

667,

at p.

6 8 7 , see

also per Cussen

Jones v. Lorne Saw Mills

Pty.Ltd. C19231 V.L.R.,

at p, 6 4 ) .

The answer to

both questions must be determined by reference to

the

l gislative

intent

appearing

from

the

provisions of the relevant statute."

And at p. 459:-

"In my new, the form and content of S . 119 in its contest in the Act indicate that the legislative intent was neither that breach or non-observance

of any order or award should constitute a crimlnal

offence regardless of whether it was wilful or

accidental nor that proceedings under

S . 119 for a

penalty for such a breach should be	crimmal
proceedings. "

As to whether such proceedings are proceedings for a penalty "in

respect of

an offence against

a law, whether a law of the

Commonwealth or not", reference may profitably be made

to the

observations of Dixon J., as he was then in v. Metal Trades Employers' Association; Ex parte Amalqamated Enqineerinq Union,

i	I
I
!
i	I :
I

I	13.
!
i l

Australian Section (1951) 82 C.L.R. 208 at pp. 250-251, and the

observations of Kitto

J. at p. 264. Their honours referred to the

distinction in the Act between

a breach or non-observance

of the

Act and a breach or non-observance of

an award.

In the light

of these authorities,

I do not accept that

a penalty imposed pursuant to

S .

119 is a "penalty in respect of

an offence against the law". This conclusion also follows, in my

opinion, from a comparison

of the provisions of the Conciliation

and

Arbitration

Act

1904,

found

Part

VI headed

"The

Enforcement of Orders and Awards". Section

119

provides, in

part: -

"(1)

Where any organization or person bound by

order

award

has

committed a

breach

non-observance of a term of the order or award, a

penalty may be imposed by the Court

...

( 2 ) Any such penalty may be sued

for and recovered

by -

. . .

(b) any organization which is affected, or whose

members or any

them are affected, by the

breach;

...

( 3 ) Where, in any proceedings against

an employer

before

a Court specified in sub-section

(11, it

appears to the Court that

an employee of that

employer has not been paid

an amount to whlch

is entitled under

order or award, that Court

may order that the employeer shall pay to the

employee the amount

of the underpayment but no

order shall be made in respect of

so much of the

underpayment as relates to any period more than

years

prior

commencement

the

proceedings.

1 Section 122 provides:-

14.

"No person

shall

wilfully

make

default

compliance with any order or award.

Penalty. $40"

Section 123 provides:-

"An employee entitled to the benefit of an award

may, at any time within 6 years from any payment

becoming due to him under the award, but not

later, sue €or the amount

of the payment in the

Court,

any

other

court

of competent

jurisdiction.

Even if one assumes that the solicitor for

the second

respondent is correct in contending that

a penalty imposed under

5.119 is not provable in a company's liquidation, this does not

establish

that

this

Court

lacks

jurisdiction

hear

and

determine an application for

a penalty.

The provisions upon

which the second respondent relies concern the recoverability

penalty, not the jurisdiction

this Court to impose

penalty.

In	my opinlon, the Federal Court has jurisdiction to

entertain the application for which leave was granted by the

I .'

Supreme Court

of Queensland on 16 December 1985.

The

remaining

question

relation

the

second

respondent is whether the applicant

has established that Coddair

Airlines Pty.Ltd. was

at the relevant time

a party to the award.

a correction dated

12 January 1983, the award was

corrected by, inter alia, inserting Schedule

A, which included as

15.

one of the respondents Codds Air Service, Post Office

Box 226,

Roma 4455.

Another respondent

to the award referred to in its

correction	was	the	Metal	Trades	Industry	Association	of
Australia.

The

applicant did not seek to rely on

the

fact that

Codd's Air Service was a respondent to the award as

a basis of

liability in the second respondent. It was sald, however, that

Codd's Airlines Pty.Ltd. was

member of the Metal Trades

Industry Association of Australia and was therefore bound to observe the award.

The Deputy

Industrial

Registrar,

a certificate

pursuant

to 5.155 of the

Concillation

and

Arbitration

Act

certlfled that Coddair Maintenance Dlvlsion Pty.Ltd. was in

1984

a member of the Metal Trades Industry Association of Australla. Notwithstanding this certiflcate, with the statutory consequence

of prima facie validity of

the

facts therein stated, it is

accepted that no such company, Coddair Maintenance Division

Pty.Ltd.,

ever

existed.

There

evidence

that

Coddair

Airlines Pty.Ltd. was at any time a member

the Metal Trades

Industry Association of Australia.

The applicant submits that I

should regard Coddair Maintenance Division Pty.Ltd. as a misnomer

for Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd.

There are very real difficulties in that path. There is a number of different corporate entities, the existence of which hinders any identification of Coddair Maintenance Division

Pty.Ltd. with Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd.

16.

Codd's Air Service, with the same Roma address

as on

Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd. letters, is a

specified respondent to

the award. Codd's Air Service Pty.Ltd., was incorporated

on 2

Ju ly 1976.

A company,

Coddair

Pty.Ltd.,

originally

called

Stereotype No.22 Pty.Ltd., was incorporated on

February 1980

and

on 3

September 1980

changed its name to Coddair Airlines

Pty.Ltd..

The business name, Coddair Maintenance Division was

not registered during 1984 but had previously been registered in

respect of a business which commenced on 10 March 1980 and which

ceased on 7 June 1983. The proprietor of that business name was

Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd.. It also was at all relevant times and

is	the proprietor of the registered business name "Coddair".

There is also reference In

the material to

Coddair Enterprises

Pty.Ltd. In Aprll 1986, (after the events with which

concerned), Coddair Servlces Pty.Ltd. was specifled

as a

party to

an award known

as the Aircraft Engineers (General Aviation)

(Roping-in

No.1)

Award 1986, making the award binding on the

partles to the "roplng-in" award.

In The Australian Commonwealth Shippinq Board

Federated Seamen's Union of Australia (1925)

35 C.L.R.

462, an

award

named as respondent

"Commonwealth

Government

Line

Steamers". The name

the

organisation

intended

respondent was "Australian Commonwealth Shipping

Board", a

quite

dissimilar name.

The description, however, was held sufficient,

apparently

because

everyone

knew

which

body

was

intended.

Starke J.

at p. 493, referring to the description "Commonwealth

Government Line of Steamers", said:-

17.

"Certainly, want of care

has been shown in

naming the party, but the intention to be gathered

from

the

words

f om

the

surrounding

circumstances

admissible

a question

construction and of identification leaves

no doubt

that the body owning and carrying on the Line is

the

party

bound

the

award,

namely

the

Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board."

Relying on that authority, Pincus

J. in Nicol v. Parr

(unreported, 3 May

19851, permitted extrinsic evidence to be

relied upon to establish the identity of an

employer. He held,

in the circumstances of that case, that

loose and inaccurate

designation of

an employer did not prevent the actual employer

from being bound by the award.

I	In this case, the extent of the evidence is that the

i	letter of 31 October 1984 under	the	letterhead	of	Coddair
I

Airlines

Pty.Ltd.

was

signed

under

designation

"CODDAIR

MAINTENANCE DIVISION", and a letter

addressed

Coddair

Maintenance Division Pty.Ltd. by the Industrial Manager of the

applicant

association

was

replied

to by

Mr.

Gough,

the

Engineering Manager

Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd. by a letter

bearing that company's letterhead.

the

light

the diverse

corporate

ntities

immediately earlier referred

to, I find it impossible to conclude

that Coddair Maintenance Division Pty.Ltd. was just

a misnomer

for Coddair Airlines

Pty-Ltd., and that Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd.

was at the relevant time

a member of the Metal Trades Industry

18.

Association of Australia. It

follows

then

that

I am

not

satisfied that Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd., though the employer

Mr. Cawley at the relevant time,

was bound by the Aircraft

Engineers' (General Aviation) Award

1982.

No challenge was made to the quantum of the claim and

am satisfied that there was an

underpayment by Coddair Airlines

Pty.Ltd.

the

amount

claimed.

However.

has

not

been

established by the

applicant association that at the material

time Coddair Airlines Pty.Ltd.

was bound by the award.

I therefore

dismiss

the application

against

both

respondents.

[1986] FCA 103

6 Dec 1986