JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: AUSTRALIAN FOODS COMPANY PTY LTD -v- O'DONNELL [2002] WASC 129
CORAM: MASTER BREDMEYER
HEARD: 23 MAY 2002
DELIVERED : 29 MAY 2002
FILE NO/S: COR 128 of 2002
BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN FOODS COMPANY PTY LTD (ACN 081 404 686)
Applicant
AND
OWEN O'DONNELL
Respondent
Catchwords:
Application to set aside a statutory demand - Application filed within time but served out of time - Court's failure to return a completed copy to the applicant for service - Completed copy of application needs to be served
Legislation:
Corporations Act, s 459G, s 459S
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr C A Grasso
Respondent: Ms M L Lee
Solicitors:
Applicant: Millsteed Grasso
Respondent: Summers Partners
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Benonyx Pty Ltd v Fetrona Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1181
David Grant Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
MASTER BREDMEYER: This is an application to set aside a statutory demand. The application is dated 1 May and relates to a statutory demand served by the respondent on the applicant on 10 April 2002. The application was filed on the 21st day, together with the supporting affidavit and two copies. According to the filing clerk, Ms Ebony Bostock, who has sworn an affidavit, she lodged the documents at the court and said she was waiting to have them given back. She was told that the documents would have to go in for checking and that she would be given a date later. She then asked for copies which were stamped with the court's stamp and given back to her, but with no hearing date on them. The applicant's solicitor considered that he could not serve a copy of the application on the respondent unless it showed a hearing date. I consider he was right in that view. That was the view taken by Santo J in Benonyx Pty Ltd v Fetrona Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1181. A completed copy of the application showing the hearing date and the affidavit in support was served on 8 May.
Sections 459G of the Corporations Act requires both the application and the supporting affidavit to be filed and served on the person who made the demand within 21 days of the receipt of the demand. Those time limits are not capable of extension: see David Grant Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265.
The application will be dismissed because the applicant failed to serve the application on the respondent within the 21‑day limit. The mistake was caused by the court staff, which I regret. I have spoken to the Officer‑in‑Charge of the Registry and he assured me that proper procedures were in place for the handling of s 459G applications, but, in this case, those proper procedures were not observed. I hope that the mistake will not happen again. In the circumstances, I will order a refund of the filing fee paid.
I will also say what Santo J said in Benonyx. The law on s 459G is absolutely rigid and that can produce hardship. However, if the applicant proposes to oppose a winding‑up application based on the demand and seeks leave to challenge the demand under s 459S, the applicant may very well get a sympathetic hearing. Santo J put it this way:
"While this result appears productive of hardship and unduly technical, it is in my view regrettably unavoidable. No doubt if the matter reaches the stage of an application under section 459S, to the extent that the court is satisfied as to the matters there set out, then winding‑up can be reviewed in the overall context of what the court may then taken into account."
The orders will be (1) application dismissed; (2) applicant to pay the respondent's costs of the application to be taxed, if not agreed and (3) filing fee to be refunded to the applicant.
- AGLC
- Australian Foods Company Pty Ltd v O'Donnell [2002] WASC 129
- Case
- [2002] WASC 129
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court needed to determine whether the failure to serve the application within the statutory period could be excused due to the court's mistake. The Applicant argued that the court's error should be grounds for excusing the late service, while the Respondent contended that the statutory time limits were mandatory and could not be extended. The court had to consider the strict requirements of section 459G of the Corporations Act and whether the law could be interpreted to allow for the court's mistake.
The court found that the statutory period for filing and serving the application could not be extended, as confirmed by the High Court in David Grant Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation. The court acknowledged the error made by its staff but held that the statutory requirements were absolute and could not be excused. The court ordered the application dismissed and the filing fee refunded to the Applicant. The court also noted that if the Applicant opposed a winding-up application based on the demand and sought leave to challenge the demand under section 459S, it may receive a sympathetic hearing. The final orders were that the application be dismissed, the Applicant to pay the Respondent's costs of the application, and the filing fee to be refunded to the Applicant.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Sections 459G of the Corporations Act requires both the application and the supporting affidavit to be filed and served on the person who made the demand within 21 days of the receipt of the demand. Those time limits are not capable of extension: see David Grant Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265. The application will be dismissed because the applicant failed to serve the application on the respondent within the 21‑day limit. The mistake was caused by the court staff, which I regret. I have spoken to the Officer‑in‑Charge of the Registry and he assured me that proper procedures were in place for the handling of s 459G applications, but, in this case, those proper procedures were not observed. I hope that the mistake will not happen again. In the circumstances, I will order a refund of the filing fee paid. I will also say what Santo J said in Benonyx. The law on s 459G is absolutely rigid and that can produce hardship. However, if the applicant proposes to oppose a winding‑up application based on the demand and seeks leave to challenge the demand under s 459S, the applicant may very well get a sympathetic hearing. Santo J put it this way:"While this result appears productive of hardship and unduly technical, it is in my view regrettably unavoidable. No doubt if the matter reaches the stage of an application under section 459S, to the extent that the court is satisfied as to the matters there set out, then winding‑up can be reviewed in the overall context of what the court may then taken into account." The orders will be (1) application dismissed; (2) applicant to pay the respondent's costs of the application to be taxed, if not agreed and (3) filing fee to be refunded to the applicant.