Australian Executor Trustees Ltd v Ceduna District Health Services Inc

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

AUSTRALIAN EXECUTOR TRUSTEES LTD v CEDUNA DISTRICT HEALTH SERVICES INC & ORS

[2006] SASC 286

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone

18 September 2006

CHARITIES - CHARITABLE GIFTS AND TRUSTS - VALIDITY AND PRACTICABILITY

Testator made gift of residuary estate to charitable Village providing care for elderly, indigent persons - Village dissolved by proclamation prior to testator's death - new incorporated hospital created by proclamation to take over functions of Village and other bodies - whether gift of residuary estate took effect in favour of the hospital - whether gift lapsed due to dissolution of beneficiary Village - whether Village had relevantly ceased to exist - whether incorporated hospital was a successor institution of Village - whether general charitable intention disclosed by testator's will - gift found to have lapsed - residuary estate to be divided according to principles of intestacy.

Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA); South Australian Health Commission Act 1976 (SA), referred to.
Re Tyrie, deceased (No 1) [1972] VR 168, applied.
In re Servers of the Blind League [1960] 1 WLR 564; In re Rowell, deceased (1982) 31 SASR 361; In the Estate of Liebelt, deceased (1983) 32 SASR 138; Re Estate of Pitt, deceased (2002) 84 SASR 109; Public Trustee v Cerebral Palsy Association of Western Australia Ltd (2004) 28 WAR 496; In re Faraker [1912] 2 Ch 488; In re Stemson's Will Trusts [1970] 1 Ch 16; In re Vernon's Will Trusts [1972] Ch 300; Sir Moses Montefiore Jewish Home v Howell & Co (No 7) Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 406; In re Lucas [1948] Ch 424; Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 209; Sydney Homeopathic Hospital v Turner (1959) 102 CLR 188, considered.

AUSTRALIAN EXECUTOR TRUSTEES LTD v CEDUNA DISTRICT HEALTH SERVICES INC & ORS
[2006] SASC 286

Civil

VANSTONE J:

Introduction

  1. In October 1998 the testator executed a will leaving his residuary estate to Far West Senior Citizens Village Incorporated (“the Village”) at Ceduna.  In 2000 the Village was dissolved by proclamation, along with the Ceduna Hospital Inc and the Ceduna & District Health & Aged Service Inc.  By the same proclamation a new incorporated hospital was established, taking over the functions of all three dissolved bodies. This new incorporated body was named Ceduna District Health Services Incorporated (“Health Services”).

  2. The testator died in 2005, leaving an estate of some $273,000.  The Village was named as the sole beneficiary.

  3. The question for decision is who takes the testator’s residuary estate.

    Background

  4. Clause 4 of the testator’s will provides:

    I GIVE my estate to my Trustee UPON TRUST TO PAY my debts funeral and testamentary expenses and any duties payable in respect of my estate without any adjustment or apportionment of such duties AND TO HOLD the balance then remaining (“my residuary estate”) for FAR WEST SENIOR CITIZENS VILLAGE INCORPORATED.

  5. The plaintiff is the executor of the will.  It…

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Details
Case
[2006] SASC 286
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Australian Executor Trustees Ltd v Ceduna District Health Services Inc involved a dispute over the distribution of the testator's residuary estate. The testator had made a gift of their residuary estate to the Far West Senior Citizens Village Incorporated, a charitable organisation providing care for elderly, indigent persons. However, the Village was dissolved by proclamation prior to the testator's death. A new incorporated hospital was created by proclamation to take over the functions of the Village and other bodies. The primary question for the court was whether the gift of the residuary estate took effect in favour of the new hospital, or whether the gift lapsed due to the dissolution of the Village. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the Village had effectively ceased to exist and whether the hospital was a successor institution of the Village.

The legal issues in the case revolved around the validity and practicability of charitable gifts and trusts, particularly in the context of the dissolution of the beneficiary institution. The court needed to examine the testator's intention and whether a general charitable intention could be inferred from the terms of the will or the objects of the named beneficiary. Furthermore, the court had to consider the exceptions to the lapse rule, as outlined in the case of Re Tyrie, to determine if any of them applied to the present situation.

The court found that the gift in the testator's will lapsed as the Village was a charitable institution that no longer existed. The court was unconvinced that a general charitable intention could be inferred from the terms of the will or from an examination of the objects of the named beneficiary. Consequently, exception C to the lapse rule did not apply. As a result, the gift lapsed, and the residuary estate of the testator fell to be divided under the principles of intestacy.

The court declared that the gift in the testator's will lapses, and the residuary estate is to be divided according to the principles of intestacy. The court would hear the parties as to the form of the declarations and other orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The question for decision is who takes the testator’s residuary estate.Background Clause 4 of the testator’s will provides:I GIVE my estate to my Trustee UPON TRUST TO PAY my debts funeral and testamentary expenses and any duties payable in respect of my estate without any adjustment or apportionment of such duties AND TO HOLD the balance then remaining (“my residuary estate”) for FAR WEST SENIOR CITIZENS VILLAGE INCORPORATED. The plaintiff is the executor of the will. It seeks a declaration as to whether the residuary estate is to be paid to Health Services in place of the Village (and if so upon what terms and conditions), or whether the will creates a valid and effective charitable trust, or whether the gift has failed. Whilst making submissions as to the relevant principles, the plaintiff has taken a neutral stance on the issues. The first defendant, Health Services, and the fifth defendant, the Attorney-General for South Australia, contend that upon proper construction the gift takes effect in favour of Health Services. The second, third and fourth defendants are the next of kin of the deceased. Only the fourth defendant has participated in these proceedings. It is her contention that the gift fails, and that the estate is to be divided according to the principles of intestacy.Analysis Where a gift by will is made to an institution which ceases to exist prior to the testator’s death, the general rule is that the gift lapses: In re Servers of the Blind League [1960] 1 WLR 564. This is referred to as the “lapse rule”. The principle extends to gifts to charitable institutions: Re Tyrie, deceased (No 1) [1972] VR 168, 177; In re Rowell, deceased (1982) 31 SASR 361, 371. It was accepted by all parties that the Village was a charitable institution. In Re Tyrie, at 177, Newton J set out the lapse rule as it applies to charitable institutions, along with three exceptions to it which he labelled A, B and C. The circumstances in which the exceptions were said to apply may be summarised as follows:AWhere, at the testator’s death, there is another institution which has taken over the work previously carried on by the named institution and which can properly be regarded as its successor, and where the dominant charitable intention of the testator was wide enough to allow the gift to take effect in favour of that successor;Bwhere the testator intended that the gift should operate as an accretion to the assets of the named institution and thereby became subject to other charitable trusts;Cwhere, in cases outside A and B, the testator is found to have had a dominant intention to benefit work or purposes of the kind which the named institution carried out, and it is practicable to apply the gift to work or purposes of that kind, in which case the gift will be applied by means of a cy-près scheme. There seems to be general acceptance in this jurisdiction of such a classification: see, for example, In Re Rowell (1982) 31 SASR 361 per Wells J, In the Estate of Liebelt (1983) 32 SASR 138 per Sangster J and Re Estate of Pitt (2002) 84 SASR 109 per Duggan J.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

I remain unconvinced that a general charitable intention can be inferred either from the terms of the will or from an examination of the objects of the named beneficiary. Exception C to the lapse rule has not been made out.Conclusion The gift in the testator’s will is made to an institution which no longer exists. No exception to the lapse rule applies. Accordingly I hold and declare that the gift lapses, and the residuary estate of the testator falls to be divided under the principles of intestacy. I shall hear the parties as to the form of the declarations and as to other orders.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.