Australian Education Union v General Manager of Fair Work Australia

The Australian Education Union (AEU) sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia following a decision of the Full Federal Court. The dispute concerned the validity of the registration of the Australian Principals Federation (APF) under the *Workplace Relations Act 1996* (Cth) (the WR Act). The Full Federal Court had previously held that the APF's registration was invalid due to the absence of a "purging rule" in its rules, which would terminate the membership of persons no longer entitled to be members. Subsequently, the WR Act was renamed the *Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009* (Cth), and section 26A was inserted, which purported to validate registrations made invalid by the absence of such a rule. The AEU argued that section 26A did not operate retrospectively to validate the APF's registration.

The High Court was required to determine two primary legal issues. First, it had to consider the proper construction of section 26A of the *Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009* (Cth) and whether it operated retrospectively to validate the APF's registration, which had been declared invalid by the Full Federal Court. Second, the Court had to consider a constitutional argument that, if section 26A did apply to the APF's registration, it would constitute an impermissible usurpation or interference with the judicial power of the Commonwealth, contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution.

The High Court dismissed the AEU's appeal, upholding the decision of the Full Federal Court. The Court reasoned that section 26A was intended to operate retrospectively to cure defects in registrations arising from the absence of a purging rule, including those registrations that had been purportedly made before the commencement of the section. The Court found that the Full Federal Court's prior order, which declared the APF's registration invalid, did not prevent Parliament from legislating retrospectively to validate such registrations. The constitutional argument regarding the usurpation of judicial power was also rejected, with the Court agreeing that section 26A merely removed a criterion for valid registration and did not interfere with the exercise of judicial power.

Special leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was treated as instituted and heard instanter, and the appeal was dismissed.