FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Jutsen
[2010] FCA 961
Citation: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Jutsen [2010] FCA 961 Parties: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION v LUALHATI JUTSEN, TINA AROHA BROWNLEE and DAVID GRAEME SCANLON File number: NSD 529 of 2010 Judge: NICHOLAS J Date of judgment: 31 August 2010 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for leave to permit an unqualified advocate to appear on behalf of respondents – principles relevant to the exercise of discretion to grant such leave – application refused Legislation: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) Part V Div 1AAA, ss 6, 65AAC Cases cited: Clout (Trustee) v Anscor Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 604 cited
Melaleuca of Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Duck [2005] FCA 1481 cited
Damjanovic v Maley (2002) 55 NSWLR 149 applied
Scotts Head Developments Pty Ltd v Pallisar Pty Ltd (Court of Appeal, 6 September 1994, unreported) citedDate of hearing: 30 August 2010 Date of last submissions: 30 August 2010 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 17 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S White SC and Mr T Brennan Solicitor for the Applicant: Corrs Chambers Westgarth
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 529 of 2010
BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION
ApplicantAND: LUALHATI JUTSEN
First RespondentTINA AROHA BROWNLEE
Second RespondentDAVID GRAEME SCANLON
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 AUGUST 2010
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application by Mr Howard seeking leave to appear for the respondents is refused.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 529 of 2010
BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION
ApplicantAND: LUALHATI JUTSEN
First RespondentTINA AROHA BROWNLEE
Second RespondentDAVID GRAEME SCANLON
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE:
31 AUGUST 2010
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from Transcript)
BACKGROUND
The hearing of this proceeding commenced yesterday. Until late last week the three respondents were represented by solicitors and counsel. It was only on Friday of last week (with the hearing due to commence the following Monday) that the respondents’ solicitors contacted the Court and advised that their instructions had been withdrawn and that they had ceased to act. Counsel appeared at the commencement of the hearing yesterday for the purpose of seeking leave to file a Notice of Ceasing to Act. I granted that leave.
The matter was then called outside the Court. None of the respondents appeared. Mr Howard then made an application for leave to appear at the hearing on behalf of the three respondents. None of the respondents was present in Court at the time that application was made. It appears that they stayed away from Court on Mr Howard’s advice. I refused…
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- Case
- [2010] FCA 961
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether Mr Howard, who lacked formal legal qualifications, should be granted leave to represent the respondents. The court had to weigh the discretionary power to allow non-qualified persons to appear before it against the general rule prohibiting such appearances. This decision required consideration of the potential risks of allowing an unqualified advocate to conduct the defence and the implications for the administration of justice.
The court exercised its discretion to deny Mr Howard leave to represent the respondents. The decision was based on several factors: the complexity of the case, the risk of inadequate representation, the respondents' ability to afford proper legal representation, and the lack of a clear explanation regarding Mr Howard's prior involvement with the respondents and their alleged enterprise. The court also noted that the respondents did not appear to face language barriers or disabilities that would prevent them from conducting their own defence.
The final orders of the court denied Mr Howard leave to appear as an advocate for the respondents, reinforcing the importance of maintaining professional and ethical standards in legal proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is well established that the Court has a discretion to grant a non-qualified person leave to appear on behalf of a party. However, the general rule is that the Court will not allow an appearance by a person who has not been admitted to practice before it: see, for example, Scotts Head Developments Pty Ltd v Pallisar Pty Ltd (Court of Appeal, 6 September 1994, unreported) per Mahoney AP cited by Stein JA in Damjanovic at 159. As the authorities referred to by Stein JA make clear, the question whether an unqualified person should be given leave to appear is usually addressed by reference to the general rule and the important policy considerations underlying it. Central to these are the responsibilities owed by qualified persons who have a right of appearance. Such persons owe professional and ethical duties to both the Court and their client that are of fundamental importance to the administration of justice. Unqualified advocates are not bound by these professional and ethical duties. CONSIDERATION There are a number of matters which have guided the exercise of my discretion in this matter. First, as I have already indicated, I consider the present case is likely to be relatively complex. Allowing an unqualified advocate to conduct the respondents’ defence carries with it a substantial risk that it will be conducted inappropriately and in a manner that might cause the respondents irreparable prejudice. As I have mentioned, Mr Howard has no legal qualifications. He told me that he was an engineer by training. My review of the pleadings and the outline of opening filed on behalf of the applicant (the respondents have not filed any outline of opening) leads me to think that this professional qualification has little, if any, relevance to any issue that is likely to arise in this case. Secondly, I have considered the difficulties which Mr Howard says the respondents will suffer if they are not represented by him. I am not satisfied that the respondents are unable to afford legal representation. It appears that there may be other reasons behind their decision to withdraw the instructions which they had been providing to their solicitors and counsel in the weeks leading up to the trial. Thirdly, there is no suggestion that the respondents will experience any language difficulty or that they suffer from any disability or impairment which would prevent them from conducting their own defence. Fourthly, I am left with an uneasy concern that Mr Howard has not given me a sufficient explanation of his previous involvement with the respondents or the enterprise in which they are alleged to have participated. Fifthly, I have also had regard to how Mr Howard proposes to conduct the respondents’ defence in the event that he is given leave to do so. So far as cross-examination is concerned, Mr Howard told me that the respondents would prepare questions that he would then ask the witnesses. As to submissions, he envisaged that he would address on the respondents behalf and that each of them would follow, in his words, “in a similar way as where there is a junior and senior counsel.” I think this is unlikely to assist in the efficient and just disposition of the case.