FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Ithaca Ice Works Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 997
TRADE PRACTICES – restrictive trade practices – enforcement and remedies – agreement between parties as to appropriate remedy – substantial weight to be given to agreement – need for proportionality to be maintained in various penalties imposed
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), subpars 45(2)(a)(i), 45(2)(a)(ii), 45(2)(b)(i), 45(2)(b)(ii)
Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills(No 4) (1981) 37 ALR 256
AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION v ITHACA ICE WORKS PTY LIMITED, QUEENSLAND ICE SUPPLIES PTY LIMITED, ANSONGUARD PTY LIMITED, KENNETH JOHN SMITH, ANTHONY JOHN MEE, GREGORY PAUL MEE, BRIAN BRADLEY, LEO GREVIS, GARY JOHN GREVIS, RODERICK IAN MATHESON AND JACK NUMAN BERRY
Q 216 OF 1999
DOWSETT J
26 JULY 2000
BRISBANE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q 216 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
APPLICANTAND:
ITHACA ICE WORKS PTY LIMITED (ACN 009 660 306)
FIRST RESPONDENTQUEENSLAND ICE SUPPLIES PTY LIMITED (ACN 010 201 180)
SECOND RESPONDENTANSONGUARD PTY LIMITED (ACN 010 589 929)
THIRD RESPONDENTKENNETH JOHN SMITH
FOURTH RESPONDENTANTHONY JOHN MEE
FIFTH RESPONDENTGREGORY PAUL MEE
SIXTH RESPONDENTBRIAN BRADLEY
SEVENTH RESPONDENTLEO GREVIS
EIGHTH RESPONDENTGARY JOHN GREVIS
NINTH RESPONDENTRODERICK IAN MATHESON
TENTH RESPONDENTJACK NUMAN BERRY
ELEVENTH RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
DOWSETT J
DATE:
26 JULY 2000
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In these proceedings the applicant seeks pecuniary penalties and injunctive relief against various persons engaged in the market for the supply of party ice, block ice and bulk ice in the geographical area which includes Brisbane, Ipswich, the Sunshine Coast and the Gold Coast (including Tweed Heads) during the period 1993 – 1996. All of the respondents were either suppliers of ice within that market area or were employed by one or other of those suppliers. In 1993 the annual turnover in the market was of the order of $2.5 - $3 million, rising to about $5.5 million by September 1996. The following table gives particulars of relevant market shares:
Supplier Market Share 1993 1996 Presently 1st Respondent 50 – 60 % 60 – 70 % > 75 % 2nd Respondent 20 – 25 % 20 – 25 % 15% 3rd Respondent < 5 % < 5 % < 5 % 4th Respondent < 1 % < 1 % Sold Business 10th Respondent < 5 % < 5 % 5 % 11th Respondent < 5 % < 5 % < 5 %
There are relatively low barriers to entry into the market, apart from the cost of plant and equipment. However economies of scale achieved by large operators would render it difficult for a smaller operator to enter it.
The allegations centre on two meetings held on 13 August 1993 and 5 October 1993 (the “1993 meetings”). The meeting on 13 August 1993 was attended by the fifth and sixth respondents, (representing the first respondent), the seventh respondent, (representing the second respondent), the eighth and ninth respondents, (representing the…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 997
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to decide on the appropriate penalties for the parties who admitted to their involvement in the illegal agreements. The legal issues included determining the extent of each party's involvement, the seriousness of the breaches, and the appropriate level of penalty considering factors such as deterrence, proportionality, and the parties' capacity to pay. The court also had to consider the submissions made jointly by the ACCC and the respondents regarding the appropriate penalties.
The court found that the second and seventh respondents, representing Queensland Ice Supplies Pty Ltd, were significantly involved in the price-fixing agreement and their conduct was deliberate and extended over several years. Given their substantial market share and the serious nature of their breaches, the court agreed to the proposed penalty of $25,000 for the second respondent, while deeming it unfair to impose any penalty on the seventh respondent due to his limited personal assets. For the tenth respondent, who was involved to a lesser extent, the court imposed a penalty of $7,500 and ordered him to pay costs of $2,500. The fourth respondent, who played a more facilitative role in the meetings but had a minimal market share, was ordered to pay a penalty of $15,000 and costs of $12,500, reflecting his greater involvement in fostering the agreements despite his limited direct benefit.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was brought before the Federal Court of Australia as a proceeding under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The ACCC sought pecuniary penalties and injunctive relief against various respondents, including corporate entities and individuals, for their involvement in the restrictive trade practices. Several respondents admitted to their complicity in the alleged misconduct and made joint submissions with the ACCC regarding the appropriate penalties. The court considered these submissions and the respective roles and market shares of the respondents in determining the penalties.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What is the appropriate pecuniary penalty for the second and seventh respondents, given their admitted involvement in the restrictive trade practices?
2. What is the appropriate pecuniary penalty for the tenth respondent, considering his limited involvement and market share?
3. What is the appropriate pecuniary penalty for the fourth respondent, given his role in convening and chairing the meetings and his limited market share?
Held
1. The court held that the appropriate pecuniary penalty for the second and seventh respondents, given their admitted involvement in the restrictive trade practices, is $25,000 for the second respondent and no penalty for the seventh respondent.
2. The court held that the appropriate pecuniary penalty for the tenth respondent, considering his limited involvement and market share, is $7,500.
3. The court held that the appropriate pecuniary penalty for the fourth respondent, given his role in convening and chairing the meetings and his limited market share, is $15,000.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: DOWSETT J
The Federal Court considered the seriousness of the misconduct, the market shares of the respondents, and the degree of cooperation offered by the respondents in the investigation. In determining the appropriate penalties, the court gave substantial weight to the agreement reached by the parties. For the second and seventh respondents, the court considered the seriousness of the misconduct, the second respondent's substantial market share, and the cooperation offered by the respondents. The court decided that a penalty of $25,000 for the second respondent would serve as an adequate deterrent, while no penalty was imposed on the seventh respondent due to his limited assets and ownership of the second respondent. For the tenth respondent, the court considered his limited involvement and market share, as well as his cooperation with the applicant. The court determined that a penalty of $7,500, along with the costs of the proceedings, would be an effective deterrent. For the fourth respondent, the court considered his role in convening and chairing the meetings, as well as his limited market share and benefit derived from the misconduct. The court decided on a penalty of $15,000, attributing substantial culpability for fostering the meetings and agreement, but also recognizing his limited role in implementing the agreement and the limited benefit derived from it. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the court must consider the seriousness of the misconduct, the market shares of the respondents, and the degree of cooperation offered by the respondents when determining appropriate pecuniary penalties in cases of restrictive trade practices.