Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Davies (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Davies (No 2) [2015] FCA 1290

Citation: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Davies (No 2) [2015] FCA 1290
Parties: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION v ROBERT PAUL DAVIES
File number: QUD 530 of 2014
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 20 November 2015
Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – sentencing – breach of s 155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – refusing or failing to comply with a notice – aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence – plea of not guilty – considerations relevant to penalty
Legislation: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Davies [2015] FCA 1017
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Boyle [2015] FCA 1039
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v GIA Pty Ltd [2002] ATPR 41-902; [2002] FCA 1298
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Narnia Investments Pty Ltd [2009] ATPR 42-279; [2009] FCA 395
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Rana [2008] ATPR 42-223; [2008] FCA 374
Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2
Bui v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2012) 244 CLR 638; [2012] HCA 1
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Costanzo (2005) 191 FLR 45; [2005] QSC 79
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v El Karhani (1990) 21 NSWLR 370
Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45
R v Pham [2015] HCA 39
R v Rivkin (2004) 59 NSWLR 284; [2004] NSWCCA 7

R v Williams (2005) 216 ALR 113; [2005] NSWSC 315

Date of hearing: 12 November 2015
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 23
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms AJ Stoker
Solicitor for the Applicant: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
Counsel for the Respondent: The Respondent appeared in person

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 530 of 2014

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
Applicant

AND:

ROBERT PAUL DAVIES
Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 NOVEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent is convicted of the offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring Natural Food Vending Pty Ltd in failing to comply with a notice issued to it under s 155(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) contrary to s 155(5)(a) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).

2.Pursuant to s 20AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the respondent is ordered to perform 200 hours of community service on the conditions that he:

(a)not commit another offence during the period of the order;

(b)report to an authorised corrective services officer as defined in s 4A of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) at the Southport Probation and Parole District Office at 4/83 Scarborough Street, Southport in the State of Queensland by 27 November 2015;

(c)report to and receive visits from…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1290
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Davies (No 2) involved the sentencing of the respondent, Davies, for aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring Natural Food Vending Pty Ltd in failing to comply with a notice issued under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The court considered various legal issues including the relevance of the offender’s prior good character, the need to consider general deterrence, and the importance of achieving consistency in sentencing across the Commonwealth. The court highlighted that while prior good character was of lesser significance in white-collar crimes, general deterrence played a crucial role in sentencing for such offences. The court also underscored the necessity of considering current sentencing practices throughout the Commonwealth to ensure consistency in sentencing.

The court's reasoning focused on the importance of general deterrence and consistency in sentencing, particularly in light of the nature and circumstances of the offence. The court found that Mr. Davies, as the sole director and high managerial agent of NFV, had intentionally permitted and facilitated NFV's failure to comply with the notice. The court emphasized that the sentence should reflect the seriousness of the offence and its impact on the Commission's ability to carry out its investigations effectively. In this regard, the court noted that a custodial sentence might be necessary to ensure general deterrence, even if the offender had an unblemished prior record.

The court concluded that a sentence of 200 hours of community service, subject to specific conditions, was appropriate. This decision took into account the statutory requirements, the principles of general deterrence, and the need for consistency with comparable sentencing decisions across the Commonwealth. The court's final orders included a conviction of the respondent for the specified offence and a sentence requiring the respondent to perform 200 hours of community service under strict conditions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent is convicted of the offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring Natural Food Vending Pty Ltd in failing to comply with a notice issued to it under s 155(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) contrary to s 155(5)(a) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).

2. Pursuant to s 20AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the respondent is ordered to perform 200 hours of community service on the conditions that he:

(a) not commit another offence during the period of the order;

(b) report to an authorised corrective services officer as defined in s 4A of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) at the Southport Probation and Parole District Office at 4/83 Scarborough Street, Southport in the State of Queensland by 27 November 2015;

(c) report to and receive visits from such an authorised corrective services officer as directed by that officer;

(d) perform in a satisfactory way community service as directed by such an authorised corrective services officer for 200 hours at the times directed by that officer;

(e) notify such an authorised corrective services officer of every change of his place of residence or employment within two business days after that change occurs;

(f) not leave or stay out of Queensland without the permission of such an authorised corrective services officer; and

(g) comply with every reasonable direction of such an authorised corrective services officer.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

While the Commission informed me that Mr Davies has a criminal history, it did not submit that history was relevant to the present offence. Aside from this, there is no evidence before me to suggest that Mr Davies is not otherwise of good character. Nonetheless, in this regard, I accept the Commission’s submission that prior good character is of lesser weight in cases involving, what is referred to as, “white-collar crime”. As the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal observed in R v Rivkin (2004) 59 NSWLR 284; [2004] NSWCCA 7 (at [410]), the “relevance of good character is of lesser significance for white-collar crimes, since it is that factor which normally places the offender in a position whereby he or she is able to commit the offence”. To similar effect, in R v Williams (2005) 216 ALR 113; [2005] NSWSC 315 (at [47]), Wood CJ at CL noted that “the general deterrence factor is important in this area of criminality, and may require a custodial sentence, even though the offender has an unblemished prior record”.COMPARABLE SENTENCING DECISIONS Although Part 1B of the Crimes Act does not specifically provide for sentencing judges to take current sentencing practices into account, the High Court has recently stated that, with federal offences, it is implicit in that Part that a sentencing judge “must have regard to current sentencing practices throughout the Commonwealth”: see R v Pham [2015] HCA 39 (Pham) at [23] per French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ. Their Honours explained the justification for this approach in the following terms (at [24]):As Kirby J observed in Putland v The Queen, a federal offence is, in effect, an offence against the whole Australian community and so the offence is the same for every offender throughout the Commonwealth. Hence, in the absence of a clear statutory indication of a different purpose or other justification, the approach to the sentencing of offenders convicted of such a crime needs to be largely the same throughout the Commonwealth. Further, as Gleeson CJ stated in Wong, the administration of criminal justice functions as a system which is intended to be fair, and systematic fairness necessitates reasonable consistency. And, as was observed by the plurality in Hili, the search for consistency requires that sentencing judges have regard to what has been done in comparable cases throughout the Commonwealth.(Emphasis added and footnotes excluded) To assist in achieving the consistency mentioned immediately above, the Commission has provided me with a schedule of comparable sentencing decisions. In considering that schedule, I have borne in mind the observations in Pham that there is a twofold purpose to be served. The first is that such decisions may “provide guidance as to the identification and application of relevant sentencing principles”. The second is that the exercise may enable me to determine whether comparable decisions yield “discernible sentencing patterns and possibly a range of sentences against which to examine a proposed or impugned sentence”: see Pham at [26]. However, I also heed the Court’s warning that the range of sentences so disclosed is not necessarily the correct range, or otherwise determinative of the upper and lower limits of sentencing discretion. Rather, the sentencing task is “inherently and inevitably more complex than that”: see Pham at [27], referring to Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 at [54] and [60]; and Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2 at [24]–[28] per French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

However, the matters set out above are not exhaustive of the matters to be taken into account in this sentencing task. In particular, general deterrence must also be considered, despite there being no specific mention of it in s 16A: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Neville [2007] ATPR 42-195; [2007] FCA 1583 (Neville) at [18] per Lindgren J. Furthermore, as the High Court observed in Bui v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2012) 244 CLR 638; [2012] HCA 1 (at [18] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ, referring to Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v El Karhani (1990) 21 NSWLR 370 at 378), s 16A also accommodates a number of common law sentencing principles. The Court said:The section has been held to accommodate principles of general deterrence, proportionality, and totality. It is able to accommodate some judicially-developed sentencing principles where such principles give relevant content to the statutory expression in s 16A(1) “of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence”, as well as expressions such as “the need to ensure that the person is adequately punished for the offence”, which appears in s 16A(2)(k).(Footnotes omitted)THE RELEVANT SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS Taking into account these statutory provisions and observations, I have set out below the matters that I consider are particularly important in fixing the sentence to be imposed on Mr Davies.General deterrence In offences of this kind, general deterrence is a particularly important factor. Thus, in Neville, Lindgren J observed (at [43]) that s 155 of the TPA “serves the public interest that the [Commission] be enabled to carry out its investigations efficiently and effectively”. His Honour added that:… not only does [a contravention of the section] have the immediate effect of obstructing and delaying the particular investigation: it also has the potential to direct the [Commission] away from other sources of information and to draw human and financial resources away from its other work. The general public should know that conduct of that kind will be treated seriously by the Court. To similar effect, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Rana [2008] ATPR 42-223; [2008] FCA 374 (Rana) (at [69]), North J noted that “[t]he sentence must communicate to the community that the Court views compliance with s 155 of the [TPA] as a serious obligation and that it regards [it] as a most important tool for the protection of the public” against contraventions of Australia’s competition and consumer laws. These observations reinforce the need to include general deterrence when imposing a sentence for an offence under s 155(5) of the TPA, or similar statutory provisions.The nature and circumstances of the offence: section 16A(2)(a) In Davies, I made a number of factual findings about the nature and circumstances of Mr Davies’ offending, which are relevant to the sentence that should be imposed on him. Those findings included that:(a)Mr Davies was the sole director and “high managerial agent” of NFV, and therefore “expressly, tacitly or impliedly” permitted NFV to commit the offences under s 155(5)(a) of the TPA: see Davies at [41];(b)Mr Davies took no action to cause NFV to comply with the notice, for example he did not disclose to Mr Ngan the location of the documentation sought by the Commission, nor did he provide him with any of the information requested in the notice: see Davies at [47];(c)to the contrary, rather than taking steps to ensure NFV complied with the notice, on his own evidence, Mr Davies sought to avoid compliance with it by agreeing to pay a not insignificant sum to Mr Ngan to make the problem “go away”: see Davies at [47]; and(d)in this way, Mr Davies intentionally brought about the result, or made it more likely, that NFV would fail to comply with the notice: see Davies at [47]–[48].