Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v British Airways PLC

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v British Airways PLC [2008] FCA 1977

TRADE PRACTICES – contravention of Pt IV of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 45(2) – arriving at and giving effect to understanding having purpose or likely effect of substantially lessening competition – understanding between respondent (British Airways) and other international airlines as to surcharge to be imposed on international carriage of freight in consequence of increases in price of fuel – Fuel Surcharge Understanding – agreed statement of facts and joint submissions – penalty of $5 million and injunction for five years sought by both parties – consideration of relevant factors and of role of Court – relevant considerations – appropriateness of injunction of limited duration.

Held:  pecuniary penalty and injunction in terms as agreed.

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 4E, 5, 45(2), 45A, 76, 80

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
v BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC (ARBN 002 747 597)

NSD 1695 of 2008

LINDGREN J
23 DECEMBER 2008
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1695 of 2008

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
Applicant

AND:

BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC (ARBN 002 747 597)
Respondent

JUDGE:

LINDGREN J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 NOVEMBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Leave be granted to any person to inspect the affidavit of Paul Malcolm Taylor affirmed on 28 October 2008 including its annexures.

2. Judgment is reserved.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1695 of 2008

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
Applicant

AND:

BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC (ARBN 002 747 597)
Respondent

JUDGE:

LINDGREN J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 DECEMBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent pay the Commonwealth of Australia within 14 days of this order a pecuniary penalty in the total sum of $5,000,000 in respect of the contraventions of s 45(2)(b)(ii) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (“the Act”) in that:

in or around March 2002, the respondent arrived at an understanding with Lufthansa Cargo Aktiengesellschaft (“Lufthansa”), a competitor of the respondent for the supply of services for the international carriage of air cargo, which understanding contained a provision which had the purpose and likely effect of fixing or maintaining a component of the price charged by each of them for the said services, called a fuel surcharge, and is thereby deemed, pursuant to s 45A of the Act, to substantially lessen competition within the meaning of s 45(2)(a)(ii) of the Act,

the respondent gave effect to the said provision of the understanding between March 2002 and February 2006 by, inter alia:

increasing or decreasing in that period the amount of the fuel surcharge it imposed per kilogram of cargo in accordance with the said understanding; and

applying the fuel surcharge on…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1977
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v British Airways PLC, the central issue was whether British Airways engaged in anti-competitive conduct by entering into a fuel surcharge understanding with Lufthansa, a competitor, which led to price fixing in the international air cargo market, including routes to and from Australia. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) alleged that British Airways deliberately implemented and maintained this understanding with Lufthansa from March 2002 until February 2006, thereby contravening section 45(2)(b)(ii) of the Trade Practices Act 1974.

The court considered various factors in determining the appropriate penalty, including the deliberateness of the conduct, the extent of the revenue generated from the understanding, British Airways' market power, and the duration of the conduct. British Airways admitted its involvement, cooperated extensively with the ACCC's investigation, and upgraded its compliance program. The court also took into account British Airways' substantial cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of other participants, which significantly reduced the cost and burden of the proceedings for the ACCC and the court. These factors led the court to decide that a penalty of $5 million was appropriate, subject to a 40% discount for British Airways' cooperation.

In addition to the penalty, the court granted an injunction limiting British Airways to five years from the date of the order, prohibiting it from entering into similar contracts with competitors unless specific exceptions applied. The court also ordered British Airways to pay the ACCC $200,000 towards its costs of the proceedings. The decision reflects the court's consideration of the severity of the anti-competitive conduct and the mitigating factors presented by British Airways' cooperation and compliance efforts.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to any person to inspect the affidavit of Paul Malcolm Taylor affirmed on 28 October 2008 including its annexures.

2. Judgment is reserved.

Note:

1. The respondent pay the Commonwealth of Australia within 14 days of this order a pecuniary penalty in the total sum of $5,000,000 in respect of the contraventions of s 45(2)(b)(ii) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (“the Act”) in that:

in or around March 2002, the respondent arrived at an understanding with Lufthansa Cargo Aktiengesellschaft (“Lufthansa”), a competitor of the respondent for the supply of services for the international carriage of air cargo, which understanding contained a provision which had the purpose and likely effect of fixing or maintaining a component of the price charged by each of them for the said services, called a fuel surcharge, and is thereby deemed, pursuant to s 45A of the Act, to substantially lessen competition within the meaning of s 45(2)(a)(ii) of the Act,

the respondent gave effect to the said provision of the understanding between March 2002 and February 2006 by, inter alia:

increasing or decreasing in that period the amount of the fuel surcharge it imposed per kilogram of cargo in accordance with the said understanding; and

applying the fuel surcharge on its international air cargo services, including on certain international cargo routes involving Australia.

THE COURT ORDERS BY CONSENT THAT:

2. The respondent be restrained, for a period of five years from the date of this order from making, arriving at, or giving effect to, any contract, arrangement or understanding with any of its competitors for the supply of the services of the carriage of international air cargo, containing provisions which have the effect of fixing, controlling or maintaining the price or any part of the price at which it or any of them will supply those services in competition with each other unless:

the said contract, arrangement or understanding does not involve or relate to the carriage of goods to or from Australia;

the said contract, arrangement or understanding is necessary for the purpose of interlining between two or more carriers in the course of supplying services of the carriage of international air cargo; or

the respondent is specifically authorised to do so under section 88 of the Act.

3. The respondent have liberty to apply on 7 days notice for a variation of this injunction.

4. The respondent pay the applicant within 14 days of this order $200,000 as a contribution towards its costs of and incidental to these proceedings.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Contemporaneously with delivery of the present Reasons for Judgment, I am delivering Reasons for Judgment in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Qantas Airways Limited [2008] FCA 1976 (the Qantas Reasons for Judgment). At [16]–[27] of the Qantas Reasons for Judgment, under the heading “Legal Principles Relevant to Level of Penalty”, I have summarised such principles and will not repeat them here.THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS ON FACTS RELEVANT TO LEVEL OF PENALTY IN THE PRESENT CASE What follows under this heading is paras 45-73 of the Joint Submissions:Nature and extent of the contravening conduct, including its deliberateness45.The conduct subject to penalty was engaged in by British Airways throughout much of the world and continued for 4 years. The conduct by the responsible employees, the Global Pricing and Distribution Manager and a Senior Vice President of a division of British Airways, British Airways World Cargo (BAWC), was deliberate. 46.The Global Pricing and Distribution Manager assumed that Lufthansa had arrived at similar understandings with other airlines but did not specifically inquire of Lufthansa to confirm that.47.The conduct of British Airways ceased in February 2006, when allegations concerning the understanding were publicised following “raids” undertaken by regulatory bodies in the United States and Europe. The amount of loss or damage caused48.During the relevant period, the revenue generated by British Airways carrying cargo to Australia that it admits was produced by the Fuel Surcharge Understanding was approximately $£3.4 million. This was a subset of the wider revenue of British Airways generated by the Fuel Surcharge Understanding worldwide. 49.The revenue generated from fuel surcharges does not demonstrate the actual loss to shippers or their customers because, absent the Fuel Surcharge Understanding, some price increases would likely have occurred to cover the increased costs of fuel, which did increase substantially over the relevant period. It may have also been that some carriers would have elected to exit certain routes, allowing the remainder to impose other increases with less constraint. 50.The Fuel Surcharge Understanding did not reflect the parties’ actual costs as both parties to the Fuel Surcharge Understanding had different arrangements for the acquisition of fuel and acquired it in different places. Further, the fuel surcharge was a flat charge regardless of distance travelled, and therefore did not reflect or seek to reflect actual fuel costs on any flight or route. British Airways also had hedging arrangements. Further, a surcharge increase could stay in place even after the price increase that triggered it had gone: different trigger steps were used in the Surcharge Methodology when it was reducing from when it was increasing. 51.Neither the Commission nor British Airways are aware as to what proportion of the surcharge was ultimately borne by any particular consumer or business in Australia. The surcharge was charged, in the main, to freight forwarders who passed it on to their customers directly and without commission. As a general rule, the ultimate consumer will bear most if not all of the transport cost, in the price paid for the cargo: others in the supply chain, such as a wholesaler or retailer will absorb some part of the cost some part of the time. These others involve persons both in Australia or overseas. They will be more likely to absorb the loss if the goods comprising the cargo have been sold prior to the transport cost increase but may also have to do so if their competitors do not have the same costs. The size of the contravener52.As noted in the statement of agreed facts, British Airways has assets of £11 billion and during the relevant period was the 10th largest airline in the world in terms of freight carried. Over the relevant period Qantas Airways Limited (Qantas) carried approximately 24% of the air freight to and from Australia and its nearest competitor carried about 14%. British Airways represented about 3%. Its profits before tax for the half year ended 30 September 2007 was £593 million. It derived revenue of £618 million from the carriage of air freight for the fiscal year ending 31 March 2007. The period over which the contravening conduct extended 53.British Airways’ contravening conduct for which penalties can be imposed extended over a four year period from 2002 to 2006 inclusive.Degree of power it has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market54.British Airways does not know, and does not have access to any reliable information to allow it to assess, its share of the Air Cargo Market. 55.In the segment to and from Australia, British Airways holds about 3%. There are at least ten significant competitors which are major international carriers and which have market shares to and from Australia of between about 2% and 10%. British Airways was unable to act in the Australian segment of the Air Cargo Market without being constrained by its competitors. The circumstances in which the conduct took place56.Whilst the volatility of jet fuel prices certainly sparked the conduct, and some price adjustment would have been implemented by participants unilaterally to reflect this, the fuel surcharge timing and amount did not reflect actual cost changes of each airline or the degree to which general price rises already included movements in fuel costs. 57.British Airways was aware that the US Department of Transport had comprehensively rejected the conduct as anticompetitive. Moreover, a number of airlines, including British Airways, were specifically warned by IATA that if they coordinated pricing by reference to a common index, they were at serious risk of violating antitrust laws. Participation of senior management58.British Airways’ participation in the Fuel Surcharge Understanding was arranged by Kemp, the BAWC Global Pricing and Distribution Manager and Packer, BAWC Senior Vice President and implemented by regional managers in offices around the world. British Airways asserts, and the Commission does not dispute for the purposes of these proceedings, that the conduct was not known to the British Airways Board or its most senior managers. Culture of compliance with the Trade Practices Act59.British Airways did have a program of trade practices compliance in place during the period of the contravening conduct. However, persons responsible for monitoring and preventing such conduct only became aware of it after raids of airlines’ premises overseas were conducted by regulatory agencies.60.British Airways has upgraded the program and its new program is presently being implemented throughout the world. Co-operation and Contrition61.British Airways has co-operated with the Commission’s investigations since British Airways contacted the Commission in mid 2006. British Airways promptly provided the Commission with information about collusive understandings, including admissions of its own participation in those understandings. British Airways did so aware that immunity was not available to it in relation to its fuel surcharge conduct and knowing that it was highly likely to face substantial penalties. 62.To this end British Airways made staff and former staff available for interview by the Commission, and voluntarily searched for and produced documents from its operations throughout the world relevant to its and other airlines involvement in the contraventions. It brought to Australia at its own expense staff willing to be interviewed by the Commission even though those staff could not have been compelled under section 155 of the Act. It has undertaken to bring such staff and former staff to Australia as the Commission requires. The Commission has not needed to serve any section 155 notices on British Airways. 63.British Airways’ efforts have made available to the Commission information and documents identifying the involvement of other participants which have not been produced or made available as yet by these persons. 64.Whilst British Airways was not able to secure the co-operation of some of its former staff, the Commission is satisfied it has used, and will continue to use, its reasonable endeavours to do so. British Airways has offered to the Commission, and undertakes to the Court, to continue to provide this high level of assistance with the investigation, and possible prosecution, of cases against other participants.65.British Airways through its solicitors willingly participated in a series of discussions with the Commission to bring an agreed resolution of the matter before the Court. As a result of those discussions British Airways and the Commission have reached agreement as to the appropriate penalty to be suggested to the Court. British Airways has also assisted the Commission in the preparation of the relevant settlement documents including the admissions. 66.As already mentioned, British Airways has reviewed and upgraded its current trade practices compliance program. 67.The Commission considers that British Airways is entitled to substantial credit for having admitted contravening the Act, assisting the Commission in its investigations, upgrading its compliance program and agreeing with the Commission on the appropriate penalty to put to the Court (see Trade Practices Commission v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41 – 375). British Airways’ co-operation with the Commission has saved the Commission and the Court (and ultimately the community) the cost and burden of litigating an extremely lengthy and expensive case. 68.This investigation is likely to be one of the largest and most expensive ever conducted by the Commission, in view of:68.1the number of possible participants;68.2the number of witnesses and documents not within the jurisdiction;68.3the number of airlines which have elected not to assist the Commission’s investigations or indeed sought to restrain them;68.4the need for translations; and68.5the sheer scope and duration of the conduct. 69.It is obviously of benefit to the Commission’s investigations that respondents are encouraged to co-operate in appropriate cases. In these circumstances the parties submit British Airways is entitled to a substantial discount of approximately 40% on the penalty that otherwise would have been appropriate. Given the regularity of the contravening conduct over the four year period and the maximum applicable penalty per contravention of $10 million, that penalty absent the cooperation discount would have been much higher. This discount should reflect not only its assistance in locating witnesses and material, which has been second only to that of British Airways, but also in making certain admissions and in using its reasonable endeavours to assist in the investigation and possible prosecution of other participants. 70.Considering British Airways’ high level of cooperation in relation to its own case and as against other parties, the Commission has accepted a substantial reduction in agreeing on an appropriate penalty to recommend to the Court.Similar conduct in the past71.The Court has not previously found contraventions against British Airways in relation to the Act. Other regulators72.The Commission notes that British Airways was fined US$300 million in proceedings brought by the United States Department of Justice, in respect of fuel surcharges applied on the carriage of both cargo and passengers, including fuel surcharges on cargo shipments from the United States to Australia. British Airways is also the subject of proceedings in the European Union. The penalty in the United States was substantially discounted as a result of British Airways’ co-operation with authorities there. Conclusion on appropriate penalty73.The Commission and British Airways submit that, when all the factors and circumstances referred to above are taken fully into account, a pecuniary penalty of $5 million is appropriate, in that the parties consider that the suggested amount falls within the range that the Court, unaided by the parties’ agreement, would have considered appropriate. CONSIDERATION

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

LINDGREN J
I adopt, mutatis mutandis, what I said at [70]–[80] of the Qantas Reasons for Judgment. For the reasons I gave at those paragraphs mentioned, an injunction against British Airways limited to five years in duration is appropriate.CONCLUSION It was for the above reasons that I imposed the proposed penalty of $5 million and granted an injunction limited to five years in duration. As requested by the parties, I also ordered British Airways pay the Commission a contribution towards its costs of this proceeding in an agreed sum of $200,000.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LINDGREN J

I accept that a 40% discount is appropriate. Left to myself, I would have allowed a substantial discount of that general order in the light of the supplementary open submission and the confidential submission provided by the Commission (see [18] above and [29], [30] and [68] of the Qantas Reasons for Judgment.Limited duration of the injunction sought I adopt, mutatis mutandis, what I said at [70]–[80] of the Qantas Reasons for Judgment. For the reasons I gave at those paragraphs mentioned, an injunction against British Airways limited to five years in duration is appropriate.CONCLUSION It was for the above reasons that I imposed the proposed penalty of $5 million and granted an injunction limited to five years in duration. As requested by the parties, I also ordered British Airways pay the Commission a contribution towards its costs of this proceeding in an agreed sum of $200,000.