Australian Communications and Media Authority v Red Telecom Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Communications and Media Authority v Red Telecom Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 996

File number(s): NSD 2167 of 2019
Judge(s): PERRY J
Date of judgment: 15 July 2020
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for judgment in default by reason of non-compliance with Court order – self-executing orders made
Legislation:

Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)

Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards Act 1999 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline [2006] FCA 1427; (2006) 236 ALR 665

Commonwealth of Australia v Harrison [2019] FCA 937

Date of hearing: 9 July 2020
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms M Gaven
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr T Sperber of TPS&Co
16 July 2020 Orders made on 9 July 2020 have been added

ORDERS

NSD 2167 of 2019
BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY

Applicant

AND:

RED TELECOM PTY LTD (ACN 151363147) & ANOR

First Respondent

NICHOLAS KONTAXIS

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 JULY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s interlocutory application filed on 7 July 2020 is allowed in part, namely to the extent that self-executing orders have been made as set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 below.

2.Order 3 of the orders made on 10 June 2020 is varied so as to require that the first and second respondents:

(a)on before 5pm on Friday 10 July 2020, provide answers to the particulars sought at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the letter dated 4 June 2020 from the solicitors for the applicant;

(b)on or before 5pm on Tuesday 21 July 2020, provide answers to the remaining particulars sought in the letter dated 4 June 2020 from the solicitors for the applicant.

3.If the first and second respondents fail to comply with orders 2(a) or order 2(b) above, then in accordance with rule 5.21(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 judgment in respect of liability issues only with respect to KJ Real Estate and Ms Diana Canepa be entered for the applicant against them.

4.To the extent that the interlocutory application dated 7 July 2020 seeks an order for indemnity costs, the application is reserved.

5.The application is listed for a case management hearing and, if an oral hearing is required the hearing of the application for indemnity costs, at 9:30am on Thursday 23 July 2020.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

6.The respondents are to use their best endeavours to respond to all particulars by 5pm on 17 July 2020.

7.When reasons are published for the orders 1, 2 and 3 above, timetabling orders will be made for the filing of further evidence and submissions on the issue of indemnity costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


ORDERS

NSD 2167 of 2019
BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY

Applicant

AND:

RED…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 996
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) sought judgment in default against Red Telecom Pty Ltd for non-compliance with a court order. The dispute arose from Red Telecom's failure to comply with certain obligations under the Telecommunications Act 1997. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The court had to decide whether ACMA was entitled to judgment in default under Rule 5.23(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, due to Red Telecom's non-compliance with an earlier court order. Additionally, the court considered whether the power to grant judgment in default was appropriate given the circumstances of this case. Relevant principles included the discretionary nature of the court's power to grant judgment in default, the nature of the default, and the potential consequences of entering such a judgment.

The court found that Red Telecom's non-compliance with the court order justified the entry of a default judgment. The court noted that the respondents had a last opportunity to comply and had not provided any evidence to counter ACMA's claims. The court exercised its discretion to grant judgment in default, considering the relevant factors such as the nature of the default, the duration of non-compliance, and the potential consequences for Red Telecom. The orders varied previous consent orders to provide a specific timeframe for Red Telecom to make payments to beneficiaries and to list the matter for case management.

The court's final orders included specific deadlines for Red Telecom to file and serve any application to vary the consent orders and to list the matter for case management. The orders also varied previous consent orders to extend the time for making payments to beneficiaries. The court noted that Red Telecom had foreshadowed an application to vary the consent orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. On or before 12pm on 16 July 2020, the applicant is to file the submission dated 8 July 2020 relied on in support of its interlocutory application and emailed to Justice Perry’s chambers on 9 July 2020.

2. On or before 12pm on 22 July 2020, the respondents are to file and serve any application to vary the consent orders made on 10 June 2020 so as to extend the time within which the first respondent is to make payments to any of the beneficiaries of the TIO determinations the subject of the consent orders, together with any further evidence in support of that application.

3. The orders made on 9 July 2020 are varied so as to list the matter for case management only at 9:30am on 23 July 2020.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

4. On 14 July 2020, the respondents filed an affidavit sworn by the second respondent in which an application of the kind referred to in order 2 above was foreshadowed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I set out below my reasons for making these orders. Among other things, I considered that orders in these terms:(1)afforded an appropriate means of addressing the valid concerns raised by ACMA as to non-compliance by the respondents with Order 3, on the one hand; and(2)afforded the respondents a last opportunity for compliance in circumstances where at the hearing the respondents for the first time gave a short timeframe within which they would comply with the request for particulars, on the other hand.2. EVIDENCE ACMA relied upon the affidavit of Adam Ian Zwi, solicitor, affirmed on 7 July 2020 in support of the application for default judgment. The respondents did not take issue with any of the facts alleged in Mr Zwi’s affidavit, stating that “there is no material in the affidavit which is incorrect” (T2.35). Nor, despite being offered the opportunity to file evidence in opposition to the interlocutory application, did the respondents wish to do so (T2.34-35). 3. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES Rule 5.23(2) relevantly provides that:If a respondent is in default, an applicant may apply to the Court for:…(c) if the proceeding was started by an originating application supported by a statement of claim … – an order giving judgment against the respondent for the relief claimed in the statement of claim… to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled; or...Note 1: The Court may make any order that the Court considers appropriate in the interests of justice – see rule 1.32.Note 2: An order or judgment under this Division may be set aside or varied. Rule 5.22 sets out the circumstances in which a party is in default, namely: A party is in default if the party fails to: (a) do an act required to be done, or to do an act in the time required, by these Rules; or (b) comply with an order of the Court; or (c) attend a hearing in the proceeding; or (d) prosecute or defend the proceeding with due diligence. Thus, as ACMA submitted:Default orders need not be applied to circumstances where there is a failure to file a defence, but have been applied in numerous circumstances of default.The “formal trigger of application for default judgment under r 5.23(2)(c) in reliance on r 5.22 requires no more than any of a failure to do an act…, a failure to comply with an order, a failure to attend a hearing, or a failure to prosecute or defend with due diligence”: Geneva Laboratories Ltd v Prestige Premium Deals Pty Ltd (No 4) [2016] FCA 867 (Geneva Laboratories) at [50]. The power is “conditioned on one circumstance only: the failure of a party to comply with an order of the Court directing that party to take a step in the proceeding: Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Limited (1990) 27 FCR 388 (Lenijamar) at 395 (Wilcox and Gummow JJ).(Applicants submissions dated 8 July 2020 (AS) at [5]-[6]) As to the exercise of discretion under r 5.23, by analogy I recently held in Commonwealth of Australia v Harrison [2019] FCA 937 with respect to the question of whether judgment in default should be entered against an applicant:22. … even where the elements of the cause of action have been properly and discretely pleaded and the cause of action would entitle the applicant to relief, the Court has a discretion as to whether to grant the relief claimed by way of a default judgment under r 5.23(2): Speedo Holdings at [20] (Flick J); Hipages at [19] and [25]. In this regard, there are no requirements of intentional default or contumelious conduct, inordinate or inexcusable delay, or prejudice to the respondent although these factors, if present, are likely to be significant: Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Limited (1990) 27 FCR 388 at 395-396 (Wilcox and Gummow JJ). Furthermore, as the Commonwealth points out, the discretion must be exercised with caution, given the serious implications which the giving of a judgment in default may have for a respondent: Speedo Holdings at [20] (Flick J); Hipages at [25]. 23. While it would be undesirable to endeavour to set out an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which the power to give judgment in default might appropriately be exercised, the Full Court set out a non-exhaustive list of relevant considerations bearing upon the exercise of discretion to dismiss an applicant’s claim under r 5.23(1)(a) in Professional Administration Service Centres Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 180; (2012) 295 ALR 52 (PAS Centres) at [44]. Those considerations, falling “[u]nder the umbrella of [the] overriding consideration” as to whether injustice would flow from the orders, were as follows:(i) the nature of the default involved;(ii) the duration of the default and whether it is continuing;(iii) the circumstances in which the orders, in respect of which default has occurred, were made including whether the orders made accorded with the practice of the court in making orders of that kind;(iv) the circumstances which occurred between the time of making the orders and the order for the dismissal of the proceeding, including whether any attempt was made by the defaulting party to amend or set aside the orders to accommodate or deal with these intervening circumstances;(v) whether the continuing default is occasioning unnecessary delay, expense or other prejudice or unacceptable burden on the respondent;(vi) the attitude of the applicant to the default and the court’s judgment as to whether or not the applicant genuinely wishes the matter to go to trial within a reasonable period;(vii) the stage that the proceeding has reached – whether they have only recently been commenced; whether it has been commenced for some time but not advanced due, in whole or in part, to the default; or whether the proceeding is in an advanced state ready or nearly ready for hearing;(viii) the likely disruption to hearing dates or, if not fixed, to setting the matter down for hearing at an early date;(ix) the consequences to the applicant of dismissing the proceeding.(emphasis added)4. REASONS FOR ORDERS MADE ON THE INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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