Australian Communications and Media Authority v JER Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Communications and Media Authority v JER Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1198

Citation: Australian Communications and Media Authority v JER Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1198
Parties: AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY v JER PTY LTD ACN 107 555 475
File number: NSD 1108 of 2012
Judge: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 30 October 2012
Catchwords: COMMUNICATIONS LAW – Commercial electronic messages – enforcement of undertakings made by nightclub promoter to regulator – application for enforcement orders to be made by consent
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 191
Spam Act 2003 (Cth) ss 5, 6, 7, 17, 18, 38, 39
Cases cited: Australian Communications and Media Authority v Atkinson [2009] FCA 1565 followed
Date of hearing: Heard on the papers
Date of last submissions: 16 October 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Solicitor for the Applicant: M Garey of Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Respondent: W Ahmed of Buttar, Caldwell & Co

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1108 of 2012

BETWEEN:

THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY
Applicant

AND:

JER PTY LTD ACN 107 555 475
Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 OCTOBER 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to section 39(2)(d) of the Spam Act 2003 (Cth), JER Pty Ltd (JER) comply with clause 5.2.2 of the Undertaking given by JER and accepted by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) on 19 October 2011, by:

1.1providing to ACMA the following quarterly reports required under clause 5.2.2 of the Undertaking that are outstanding as at the date of these orders:

1.1.1for reporting period 19 October 2011 to 19 January 2012 inclusive, by 5 November 2012;

1.1.2for reporting period 20 January 2012 to 19 April 2012 inclusive, by 19 November 2012;

1.1.3for reporting period 20 April 2012 to 19 July 2012 inclusive, by 3 December 2012; and

1.2providing to ACMA all quarterly reports required under clause 5.2.2 of the Undertaking as follows:

1.2.1for reporting period 20 July 2012 to 19 October 2012 inclusive, by 17 December 2012;

1.2.2for reporting period 20 October 2012 to 19 January 2013, by 4 February 2013;

1.2.3for reporting period 20 January 2013 to 19 April 2013, by 3 May 2013;

1.2.4for reporting period 20 April 2013 to 19 July 2013, by 2 August 2013;

1.2.5for reporting period 20 July 2013 to 19 October 2013, by 4 November 2013.

2.JER pay a contribution to ACMA's costs of the proceeding as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1108 of 2012

BETWEEN:

THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY
Applicant

AND:

JER PTY LTD ACN 107 555 475
Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE:

30 OCTOBER 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant (‘ACMA’) is a federal regulator of communications and media.  The respondent (‘JER’) is a…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 1198
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) sought enforcement orders against JER Pty Ltd, a nightclub promoter trading as Urban Agent, for breaches of the Spam Act 2003 (Cth). The dispute centred on the SMS messages JER sent to prospective patrons, which ACMA suspected were sent without proper consent and lacked the required identification and unsubscribe facilities. The parties agreed on the facts, and ACMA believed JER had contravened sections 17 and 18 of the Spam Act. Section 17 mandates that commercial electronic messages must identify the sender and provide contact details, while section 18 requires an opportunity for recipients to opt out of receiving such messages.

The court had to determine whether JER had breached the terms of an undertaking given to ACMA and whether the proposed orders were appropriate. The court found that JER had not complied with the reporting requirements set out in the undertaking and had consented to being ordered to comply with future reporting requirements. The court noted that many of the original time requirements had passed, making some of the proposed orders redundant. However, the court found that an order under section 39(2)(d) of the Spam Act to enforce the reporting requirements was appropriate.

The court ordered JER to provide outstanding quarterly reports by specific dates and to submit future reports by set deadlines. JER was also required to contribute to ACMA's costs of the proceeding. The court's decision enforced the reporting requirements of the undertaking while allowing JER some leeway to catch up on missed reports.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to section 39(2)(d) of the Spam Act 2003 (Cth), JER Pty Ltd (JER) comply with clause 5.2.2 of the Undertaking given by JER and accepted by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) on 19 October 2011, by:

1.1 providing to ACMA the following quarterly reports required under clause 5.2.2 of the Undertaking that are outstanding as at the date of these orders:

1.1.1 for reporting period 19 October 2011 to 19 January 2012 inclusive, by 5 November 2012;

1.1.2 for reporting period 20 January 2012 to 19 April 2012 inclusive, by 19 November 2012;

1.1.3 for reporting period 20 April 2012 to 19 July 2012 inclusive, by 3 December 2012; and

1.2 providing to ACMA all quarterly reports required under clause 5.2.2 of the Undertaking as follows:

1.2.1 for reporting period 20 July 2012 to 19 October 2012 inclusive, by 17 December 2012;

1.2.2 for reporting period 20 October 2012 to 19 January 2013, by 4 February 2013;

1.2.3 for reporting period 20 January 2013 to 19 April 2013, by 3 May 2013;

1.2.4 for reporting period 20 April 2013 to 19 July 2013, by 2 August 2013;

1.2.5 for reporting period 20 July 2013 to 19 October 2013, by 4 November 2013.

2. JER pay a contribution to ACMA's costs of the proceeding as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant (‘ACMA’) is a federal regulator of communications and media. The respondent (‘JER’) is a nightclub promoter that has traded, at least since March 2010, under the name ‘Urban Agent’. This case concerns the SMS messages that JER sent to prospective partygoers in an attempt to coax them into attending its parties (or those of its clients).The facts Pursuant to a statement of agreed facts filed on 16 October 2012, the parties have agreed the salient details of what happened. This statement is expressed to have been agreed to ‘for the purposes of s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)’, meaning that the facts therein are not disputed between the parties for the purposes of this proceeding.ACMA’s investigation Part of JER’s promotion strategy includes the sending of SMS messages to various members of the public. It appears that ACMA became suspicious in late 2010 or early 2011 that some of the recipients of these SMS messages did not consent to being sent JER’s nightclub promotion material. ACMA also suspected that JER had neglected properly to identify itself in the SMS messages and had failed to provide what was described as a ‘functional unsubscribe facility’. Following ACMA’s investigation, which included the provision by JER of responses to ACMA’s enquiries, ACMA formed a ‘preliminary view’ that ss 17 and 18 of the Spam Act 2003 (Cth) (‘the Act’) had been breached. It is necessary to make some brief comments about these provisions.Sections 17 and 18 of the Spam Act These sections are rather dense (perhaps overly so) but, for present purposes, they provide that:(a)a person must not send ‘commercial electronic messages’ that have an ‘Australian link’ unless the sender identifies themselves and provides their contact details: s 17(1);(b)a person must not send non-designated ‘commercial electronic messages’ that have an ‘Australian link’ unless those messages provide the recipient with an opportunity to request that they no longer be sent such messages: s 18(1); and(c)a person must not engage in certain conduct ancillary to (a) and (b) above: ss 17(5) and 18(6). There are also a number of defences set out in ss 17 and 18 which are not presently relevant. The definition of ‘commercial electronic message’, which is contained in s 6, is somewhat lengthy. It is almost two pages in length and, if one includes the definition of ‘electronic message’ (s 5), which it incorporates, the length extends to almost three pages. It is no small irony that the self-described ‘basic definition’ of ‘commercial electronic message’ takes up 45 lines of text. For present purposes, however, it suffices to say that an SMS message sent by a nightclub promoter to a prospective patron that seeks to promote a particular nightclub or event is a ‘commercial electronic message’: s 6(1)(e). The topic of ‘designated commercial messages’ is the subject of Schedule 1 to the Act. That category of communication includes (a) messages that consist only of factual information and some specified additional information and (b) certain types of messages sent by certain types of institutions (such as government bodies, charities and educational institutions). Although the phrase ‘factual information’ is not defined, Greenwood J held in Australian Communications and Media Authority v Atkinson [2009] FCA 1565 at [13] that promotional messages are not factual information and it seems to me, with respect, that this conclusion must be correct. It should come as no surprise that nightclub promotion companies do not fall into any of the types of institution specified in Schedule 1.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

This is not, however, a complete capitulation by JER. The orders submitted to the Court by consent set out a timetable for the provision of the outstanding reports that is considerably more lenient than the 14 days sought by ACMA in its originating application. JER has also been given some leniency in providing the report for the fourth quarterly period; that is, it has been given longer than the 10 days specified in the undertaking. It seems that this leniency has been granted to give JER time to ‘catch up’.Consideration Although a statement of agreed facts pursuant to s 191 of the Evidence Act and a form of orders that have been agreed between the parties have been provided to the Court, I must still be satisfied that the relevant contravention has been established: s 39(2) (‘If the Federal Court is satisfied that the person has breached a term of the undertaking…’). Has the relevant contravention been established? It should be noted that s 39(2) does not require me to be to be satisfied that JER has contravened the requirements of ss 17 and 18 of the Act. I need only be satisfied that JER has breached a term of the undertaking. Given that the time for providing the first three reports has come and gone and given that the parties have agreed that no reports have been provided, I am so satisfied. Since I am satisfied that the undertaking has not been complied with, ACMA is entitled by s 39(2)(a) to orders directing JER to comply with the term of the undertaking that has been breached. Many of the time requirements of the original undertaking have now passed and, as a matter of strictness, may no longer be enforced. As noted above at [21], JER has been granted some leniency beyond the 10 days contemplated by cl 5.2.3 (set out above at [16]). Some of the orders sought are not, therefore, orders directing JER to comply with cl 5.2.3 and are not, consequently, orders which may be made under s 39(2)(a) (which is how the parties have described them). Another issue with the proposed orders is that they purport to direct compliance with cl 5.2.3 of the undertaking. As can be seen above at [16], cl 5.2.3 is not a provision with which it is possible to comply. Instead, it merely imposes a time limit on the substantive obligation in cl 5.2.2. I do not see how, when many of the time limits have been changed, this proposed order can be viewed as an enforcement of the original time limit. In reality, the proposed orders seek to enforce cl 5.2.2 in relation to the past and to modify the timetable for its operation into the future. The proposed orders are, therefore, orders neither pursuant to s 39(2)(a) nor, as the parties have formulated them, orders enforcing cl 5.2.3. It is possible, however, to achieve the end sought by the parties. Section 39(2)(d) confers a power to make ‘any other order that the Court considers appropriate’. In that context, it is relevant to observe that: (a) JER has, to this point, failed completely to comply with the reporting requirements of the undertaking; and, (b) has consented to being ordered to comply with the future reporting requirements. An order under s 39(2)(d) to enforce cl 5.2.2 within some time limit is, therefore, warranted.