IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B71 of 2002
B e t w e e n -
AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATION EXCHANGE LIMITED
Appellant
and
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
GLEESON CJ
McHUGH J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 6 FEBRUARY 2003, AT 10.20 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR G.C. MARTIN, SC: If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR L.F. KELLY, for the appellant in the first matter and the cross‑respondent in the other matter. (instructed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth)
MS J.J. BATROUNEY, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned junior, MS M.M. BRENNAN, for the respondent in the appeal and the cross‑appellant in the cross‑appeal. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Martin.
MR MARTIN: If it please the Court, the matter before the Court, both on the appeal and the cross‑appeal, concerns the proper construction of the Clerical Employees Award - State. For that reason, our learned friends and us have agreed that I should deal with both the appeal and cross‑appeal first. Our learned friend will then respond and then I will reply.
There are three interpretations placed before the Court. The first of course is that of the judgment under appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court. The matter that is of debate concerns whether or not casual employees actually work overtime and whether or not as a result of that their employer should be required to pay a superannuation contribution for the hours worked as overtime.
HAYNE J: Is that the issue, or is the issue whether the employer has complied with the relevant industrial instrument?
MR MARTIN: That is an issue, your Honour, but to answer that, one needs to determine what is the obligation upon the employer.
HAYNE J: Just so.
MR MARTIN: The obligation depends upon whether or not, when the employees work at certain times, they are working ordinary hours within the meaning of the award or whether they are working overtime within the meaning of the award.
GLEESON CJ: Is this an issue that affects the financial interests of the employees or the revenue obligations of your client, or both?
MR MARTIN: It affects the financial interests of the employees if the construction for which we contend is upheld in that they would not then receive a contribution for the hours that we say are overtime hours.
GLEESON CJ: And therefore would receive less superannuation in the long run?
MR MARTIN: Yes. If our learned friends are correct, then we are liable to pay and have paid the charge that arises under the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act. I will take your Honours to both the Act and the award shortly.
KIRBY J: So the employees who have an interest, are they aware of the proceedings if they would have wished to be heard in the matter?
MR MARTIN:
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- Case
- [2003] HCATrans 550
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether ACE was liable to the Commissioner of Taxation for the amount of the overpaid tax refund. Specifically, the court considered whether ACE had made a representation to the Commissioner that induced the Commissioner to pay the refund to Mr. Gavan, and if so, whether that representation was false and whether the Commissioner relied on it to its detriment. The court also examined the nature of the relationship between ACE and the Commissioner in the context of the tax refund process.
The High Court held that ACE was not liable to repay the overpaid refund to the Commissioner. The majority of the court reasoned that ACE had not made any representation to the Commissioner upon which the Commissioner relied when making the payment to Mr. Gavan. The information provided by ACE to the Commissioner was directed towards Mr. Gavan's tax affairs, not towards an instruction or representation to the Commissioner regarding the payment of a refund to Mr. Gavan. The court distinguished the present case from situations where a party might be liable for an overpayment due to their own actions or representations that directly caused the error. The court found that the error in payment was a matter between the Commissioner and Mr. Gavan, and ACE was not a party to that error in a way that created a liability to repay the funds.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi