FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Roach (The Melbourne Quarter Case) (Ruling No 2) [2021] FCA 1210
File number(s): VID 23 of 2021 Judgment of: WHEELAHAN J Date of judgment: 4 October 2021 Catchwords: EVIDENCE – conditional exclusion of evidence by the tendency rule – whether proposed evidence is tendency evidence and therefore prima facie inadmissible under s 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) - whether the evidence is evidence of a system or practice and therefore outside s 97 – whether the court thinks that the evidence will have significant probative value per s 97(1)(b) – where no notice was given of intention to adduce tendency evidence as required by s 97(1)(a) – application made to dispense of notice requirement under s 100 – held that the evidence was tendency evidence – held that the evidence would not have significant probative value – held that in any event, the requirement of notice would not be dispensed with – objection upheld. Legislation: Evidence Act1995 (Cth) ss 55, 97 and 100
Evidence Regulations 2018 (Cth) s 7
Cases cited: Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20; 263 CLR 338
Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd [2000] FCA 1886; 106 FCR 51
R v Gordon (No 4) [2016] NSWSC 312
R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457
Division: Fair Work Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Number of paragraphs: 19 Date of hearing: 21-23 September and 4-7 October 2021 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Follett Solicitor for the Applicant: Lander & Rogers Counsel for the Respondents: Mr P Boncardo with Ms E Beljic Solicitor for the Respondents: CFMEU – Construction and General Division REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Ex tempore, revised)
BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER
Applicant
AND: JASON ROACH
First Respondent
CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MARITIME, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
Second RespondentWHEELAHAN J:
Introduction
Counsel for the respondents has called the first respondent, Mr Roach, as a witness. So far, Mr Roach has given evidence that he was employed as a labourer by Lendlease at its site at 2 Melbourne Quarter and was so employed on 20 April 2020.
Mr Roach has given evidence that he was the elected health and safety representative of the relevant work group under the Victorian Occupational Health and Safety Act, and was also a delegate of the second respondent union. An outline of evidence filed and served on behalf of the respondents foreshadows that Mr Roach proposes to give evidence as to the relevant events of 20 April 2020 which are the subject of the applicant’s claims in this proceeding.
Counsel for the respondents has asked Mr Roach what his practices were in relation to new workers at the site. Counsel for the applicant has objected on the ground that the question is calculated to adduce tendency evidence which is prima facie inadmissible unless the conditions in s 97 of the Evidence Act1995 (Cth) are satisfied. Section 97…
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 1210
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the evidence in question was tendency evidence, as it demonstrated a propensity or pattern of conduct. It concluded that the evidence did not have significant probative value for the issues at hand. Even if it had, the court held that the notice requirement under the Act could not be dispensed with, as the application for exemption failed to meet the necessary criteria. The court thus upheld the objection to the admission of the evidence.
The court's ruling ensured that the evidence in question was excluded from the proceedings, adhering to the provisions of the Evidence Act. The final orders of the court reflected this decision, preventing the admission of the contested evidence in the case.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case came before the court following an application by the ABCC to admit certain evidence that it intended to use to demonstrate a pattern of conduct by Roach. The ABCC sought to adduce this evidence under the "tendency rule" outlined in section 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Roach opposed the ABCC's application, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible tendency evidence and that the ABCC had failed to provide the requisite notice of its intention to adduce such evidence. The court heard arguments from both parties on the admissibility of the proposed evidence, including whether it was indeed tendency evidence, whether it related to a system or practice, and whether it would have significant probative value as required by section 97(1)(b) of the Evidence Act. The ABCC also made an application under section 100 of the Evidence Act to dispense with the notice requirement. The court then made its ruling on these issues.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the proposed evidence "tendency evidence" within the meaning of section 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)?
2. If the evidence is "tendency evidence," does it relate to a "system" or "practice" and therefore fall outside the operation of section 97 of the Evidence Act?
3. Does the proposed evidence have significant probative value as required by section 97(1)(b) of the Evidence Act?
4. Should the requirement to give notice of intention to adduce tendency evidence be dispensed with under section 100 of the Evidence Act?
Held
1. The court held that the proposed evidence is "tendency evidence" within the meaning of section 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
2. The court held that the evidence does not relate to a "system" or "practice" and therefore does not fall outside the operation of section 97 of the Evidence Act.
3. The court held that the proposed evidence does not have significant probative value as required by section 97(1)(b) of the Evidence Act.
4. The court held that the requirement to give notice of intention to adduce tendency evidence under section 100 of the Evidence Act should not be dispensed with.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Court, in assessing the admissibility of the proposed evidence, first determined whether it constituted "tendence evidence" as defined in section 97 of the Evidence Act. The court concluded that the evidence was indeed tendency evidence because it sought to establish a propensity of the respondent to engage in corrupt conduct. Next, the court examined whether the evidence pertained to a "system" or "practice," which could exempt it from section 97. However, the court found that the evidence did not relate to a broader system or practice but rather to specific instances of misconduct by the respondent. Consequently, it remained subject to the exclusionary rule of section 97. The court further assessed the probative value of the evidence under section 97(1)(b) and found it lacking in significant probative value because it did not directly pertain to the facts in issue and could unfairly prejudice the respondent. Finally, regarding the notice requirement under section 100, the court considered the application to dispense with it but decided that the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the legal process outweighed the inconvenience caused by the requirement. Therefore, the objection to the evidence was upheld. The ratio decidendi of this case is that evidence of specific instances of misconduct, which is tendency evidence, must meet the significant probative value test under section 97(1)(b) of the Evidence Act, and the notice requirement under section 100 cannot be dispensed with without compelling reasons.