FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED v DAHER | [2014] FCCA 365 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application for review of sequestration order made by Registrar – principles governing review of Registrar’s order for the sequestration of estate – whether creditor has established right to a sequestration order – whether debtor has shown he is able to pay his debts – whether debtor has shown there is some other sufficient cause for dismissing petition – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.5, 52 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.131 |
| Cain v Whyte (1933) 48 CLR 494 Conlan v Mladenis [2007] FCA 1129 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Caporale [2013] FMCA 5 Ex parte Fewings (1883) 25 Ch. D. 338 Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 143 ALR 396 Macintosh v Shashoua (1931) 46 CLR 494 Re Sarina; Ex parte Wollondilly Shire Council (1980) 32 ALR 596 Re Svir; Ex parte Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 83 FCR 314 Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666 Totev v Sfar (2008) 167 FCR 193 |
| Applicant: | AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED (ACN 005 357 522) |
| Respondent: | SPIRO GEORGES DAHER |
| File Number: | SYG 564 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing dates: | 2 September 2013 and 13 February 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 28 February 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitor for the Applicant: | Mr Foley |
| The Respondent in person. |
ORDERS
The application for review of the sequestration order against the estate of the applicant made by the Registrar on 18 July 2013 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
The respondent’s costs be paid out of the estate of the applicant, and have the same priority as the costs of the petition.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 564 of 2013
| AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED (ACN 005 357 522) |
Applicant
And
| SPIRO GEORGES DAHER |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By an application filed on 18 July 2013, Mr Daher seeks a review of a sequestration order made by a Registrar of this Court on 28 June 2013. The sequestration order was made on the petition of Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (Bank). The relevant act of bankruptcy was Mr Daher’s failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice demanding payment of $214,985.96. That is the amount of a judgment the Bank recovered against Mr Daher in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 17 August 2009.
The procedural history of this application has not been straightforward, largely because I had difficulty understanding the grounds on which Mr Daher relied for the review of the sequestration order. I do not, however, attribute these difficulties to the manner in which Mr Daher, who was not legally represented, conducted his application. At any rate, by the conclusion of the hearing on 13 February 2014, I satisfied myself I understood the substance of the grounds…
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- Case
- [2014] FCCA 365
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining the grounds on which Mr Daher sought the review of the sequestration order. These grounds included the availability of funds from a third party (his mother) to satisfy the debt, the Bank's alleged role in delaying the availability of these funds, and the legal implications of Mr Daher's bankruptcy on his mother's power of attorney, which he argued prevented the proposed payment. The court also had to consider the principles governing its jurisdiction to review a Registrar's decision, which involves a hearing de novo where the judge must be satisfied of the matters required by section 52 of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth) and exercise discretions afresh.
The court dismissed Mr Daher's application for review. It found that the grounds relied upon by Mr Daher were not a sufficient answer to the making of the sequestration order. Specifically, the court noted that the offer of $290,000 from Mr Daher's mother was contingent on the Bank discharging its mortgage over the Newport Property, and that the termination of Mr Daher's authority as attorney under his mother's power of attorney due to his bankruptcy meant that his mother was not in a position to obtain and pay the funds as proposed. The court ordered that Mr Daher pay the Bank's costs, with those costs to be paid out of Mr Daher's estate and have the same priority as the costs of the petition.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The application for review of the sequestration order against the estate of the applicant made by the Registrar on 18 July 2013 is dismissed.
2.
The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
3.
The respondent’s costs be paid out of the estate of the applicant, and have the same priority as the costs of the petition.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY
SYG 564 of 2013
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED (ACN 005 357 522)
Applicant
And
SPIRO GEORGES DAHER
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
1.
By an application filed on 18 July 2013, Mr Daher seeks a review of a sequestration order made by a Registrar of this Court on 28 June 2013. The sequestration order was made on the petition of Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (Bank). The relevant act of bankruptcy was Mr Daher’s failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice demanding payment of $214,985.96. That is the amount of a judgment the Bank recovered against Mr Daher in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 17 August 2009.
2.
The procedural history of this application has not been straightforward, largely because I had difficulty understanding the grounds on which Mr Daher relied for the review of the sequestration order. I do not, however, attribute these difficulties to the manner in which Mr Daher, who was not legally represented, conducted his application. At any rate, by the conclusion of the hearing on 13 February 2014, I satisfied myself I understood the substance of the grounds on which Mr Daher seeks the review of the sequestration order. Those grounds may be stated as follows:
a) A third party, Mr Daher’s mother, is in a position to pay up to $290,000 towards the amount Mr Daher accepts he owes the Bank.
b) The $290,000 is more than sufficient to pay what Mr Daher says is the amount he owes the Bank and that, upon payment of that amount, the sequestration order made against him should be set aside.
c) To the extent the Bank claims Mr Daher owes the Bank more than $290,000, Mr Daher says that he does not owe the Bank the amount the Bank claims he owes.
d) If, contrary to (c), Mr Daher owes the Bank the amount the Bank claims he owes it:
i) the amount in excess of $290,000 the Bank claims Mr Daher owes consists of interest that has accrued on the judgment debt since 17 August 2009;
ii) the Bank, through its conduct, delayed Mr Daher’s mother’s ability to procure the $290,000 to pay to the Bank;
iii) therefore, the Bank should not be entitled to claim interest for the period of the delay for which the Bank was responsible.
e) In any event, the sequestration order should be set aside at least temporarily. That is so because Mr Daher’s mother is not competent to enter into legal transactions; in 2004 she appointed Mr Daher and his brother joint attorneys under an enduring power of attorney; the sequestration order against Mr Daher had the effect of terminating both Mr Daher’s and his brother’s authority to be attorneys; accordingly, Mr Daher’s mother is not in a position to obtain and pay the $290,000.
3.
These reasons are arranged as follows. First, I set out the facts as revealed by the documents Mr Daher tendered into evidence. Second, I identify the principles that govern the Court’s jurisdiction to review a decision of a Registrar of the Court. Third, I consider whether the Bank has made out a case for a sequestration order. And fourth, assuming the Bank has made out such a case, I consider whether Mr Daher has established the grounds on which he relies and, if so, whether those grounds are an answer to the making of a sequestration order against his estate.
Facts
4.
Until November 2003 Mr Daher’s mother (Georgette) lived in a house at Marrickville. In November 2003 Georgette sold that house and used $691,104 of the proceeds of sale to purchase from Mr Daher’s former wife, Ms Doulaveras (Helen), a 66% interest in a property at 26 Ocean Avenue, Newport (Newport Property). Georgette then moved into the Newport Property, where she currently lives.
5.
In July 2005 Georgette executed two transfers. That resulted in Georgette transferring to Helen a 16% interest in the Newport Property, and Georgette and Helen consequently holding the Newport Property in equal shares as joint tenants.
6.
In November 2007 Mr Daher and Helen purchased a property at St Ives for $1,060,000 (St Ives Property). Mr Daher later transferred his interest in the St Ives property to Helen. Except for the 10% deposit, the purchase money was provided by a loan Mr Daher and Helen obtained from the Bank. The loan was secured by mortgages over the St Ives Property and the Newport Property.
7.
In a judgment delivered on 19 June 2008, Windeyer J, sitting in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, held that Georgette transferred to Helen the 16% interest in the Newport Property as a result of unconscionable conduct by Helen. Helen was ordered to re-transfer a 16% interest in the Newport Property to Georgette.
8.
In August 2008, Mr Daher and Helen defaulted on their loan from the Bank. On 17 August 2009 the Bank obtained a judgment against Mr Daher and Helen for possession of the St Ives Property, and a judgment for $1,288,617.70. The Bank caused to sell the St Ives Property and used the proceeds of sale to reduce the judgment debt.
9.
By no later than June 2010 the Bank demanded payment of the balance of the debt from Georgette. Georgette disputed the demand. On 17 March 2011 the Bank’s solicitor wrote to Georgette’s tutor confirming that the matter had been settled, and set out the terms of the settlement. Under that proposed settlement, Georgette was to pay the Bank $310,000 in return for the Bank’s discharging the mortgage it held over the Newport Property. For reasons not apparent on the evidence, the settlement did not proceed.
10.
On 7 November 2011 Georgette lodged a dispute with the Financial Ombudsman Service. The dispute was settled on or about 8 June 2012. The Bank agreed it would only look to the 34% interest that Helen had in the Newport Property to recover the outstanding amount of the loan Mr Daher and Helen owed the Bank. The Bank also agreed it would make available to the Land and Property Information office the certificate of title for the Newport Property, and to provide an endorsement to the stamped transfer of land to amend the property ownership from 50/50 to 66/34 “between Ms Georgette Daher and Helen respectively".
11.
In the meantime, on or before 21 October 2011, Helen went into bankruptcy. By letter dated 21 October 2011, her trustee enquired of Georgette’s lawyer whether Georgette would be able to raise the required money to acquire Helen’s interest in the Newport Property and whether Georgette would be prepared to pay for a valuation.
12.
On 4 November 2012, Mr Daher was served with a bankruptcy notice demanding payment of $214,985.96. On 25 November 2012 Mr Daher sent an email to the Bank’s lawyers in which he noted that he had received ambiguous information from the Bank and its lawyers about the amount he owed the Bank. He noted there “is expectation [sic] that [Helen’s] disposal of her 34% share of the Newport home will more than cover the debt amount claimed”.
13.
By 18 December 2012, two valuations of the Newport Property had been obtained, one by Helen’s trustee, and one by Georgette. The trustee’s valuation valued the Newport Property at $980,000 and Georgette’s valued it at $855,000.
14.
By letter dated 14 January 2013, the solicitors for the Bank wrote to the solicitor for Georgette noting that Georgette’s solicitor had informed the Bank that Georgette was finalising a proposal regarding the purchase of Helen’s interest in the Newport Property, but that the Bank had received no proposal. The Bank’s solicitor said that if the Bank did not receive a satisfactory proposal by 28 January 2013, the solicitor anticipated that the Bank would proceed with further enforcement.
15.
Georgette’s solicitor responded by letter dated 23 January 2013 in which he stated:
With reference to your letter of 14 January, 2013 our client will not be in a position to make a formal offer until such time as the title deed for the Newport property has been amended to show Georgette Daher’s interest as 66/100th. The transfer of the 16/100th share from Helen Doulaveras to Georgette Daher was lodged with the Office of State Revenue in early December with an application for stamping under Section 65(24) of the Duties Act. To date we have not received any response.
As soon as the Transfer issues, we will be requesting that you produce the title deed so that the transfer can be registered at which time our client will be in a position to seek lending to acquire the remaining interest of Helen Doulaveras.
16.
The transfer from Helen to Georgette of the 16% interest in the Newport Property was registered by the Land and Property Information office on 17 April 2013.
17.
On 21 March 2013 the Bank filed a creditor’s petition seeking a sequestration order against the estate of Mr Daher. After a number of adjournments, the petition came before a Registrar of this Court on 13 June 2013. Mr Daher, in his affidavit of 24 July 2013, claimed as follows:[1]
A few days prior to the sequestration judgment date of 28 June 2013, there was an offer of $290,000 made (received by Gadens solicitors acting as a conduit to ANZ) by a potential vendor for the purchase of the 34% of [the Property]
Gadens cannot verify that on or prior to 28 June 2013, they passed on to ANZ the offer made for [the Property] and that ANZ accordingly responded to Gadens and asked them to nevertheless press ahead with the sequestration judgment of 28 June 2013.
During the 28 June 2013 judgment, Mr Foley (Gadens) stated to the Registrar that ANZ maintained their position to press ahead with my being made bankrupt.
Aside from the Judgment outcome of $214,000 and without presenting any independently assessed financial liability documents, Mr Foley remarked to the Registrar that the offer made for [the Property] might not be enough to cover the debt sought by the ANZ bank and “the bank should not be forced to accept the offer made”.
18.
On 6 December 2013, Mr Daher’s brother (Basil) sent an email to a loans officer from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) in which he stated that the Bank had agreed to accept $290,000 to release the mortgage it held over the Newport Property, and to provide Georgette the certificate of title for that property. Basil’s reference to the Bank’s agreement appears to be a reference to a “without prejudice” letter dated 6 November 2013 from the Bank’s solicitors to Basil,[2] in which the Bank’s solicitors indicated the Bank was prepared to discharge its mortgage over the Newport Property upon receipt of $290,000 and subject to the satisfaction of the conditions set out in the letter.
19.
On 6 December 2013, the loan officer from CBA responded to Basil’s email as follows:
The loan is approved for $300,000 subject to:
1. Receipt of the title.
2. All loan documents being signed, accepted and certified by the CBA.
3. I will need a copy only before, of the signed discharge and transfer to image to the application.
4. Insurance can be set either monthly or yearly (there is no additional cost either way). I suggest maybe monthly could work, but please confirm and I get this set up.
20.
Sometime before 7 January 2014, Basil provided to the Bank’s solicitors the power of attorney Georgette had executed appointing him and Mr Daher joint attorneys. That resulted in the Bank’s solicitors writing a letter to Basil dated 7 January 2014 stating, among other things, as follows:
Given the appointment under the power of attorney is a joint appointment, upon Spiro Daher’s bankruptcy, the power of attorney was terminated pursuant to section 46 of the Powers of Attorney Act 2003 (NSW).
21.
By separate letter dated 7 January 2014, the Bank, through its solicitors, made another without prejudice offer to Basil.[3] That offer was in substance the same as the offer contained in the Bank’s solicitor’s letter of 6 November 2013, but instead offered that the Bank would accept payment of the $290,000 from Basil in his personal capacity. Basil responded with an email sent on 11 January 2014. In that email, Basil rejected the offer because, if accepted by Basil, that would “complicate estate matters and contravene Mum’s desire and security to be 100% owner of her home” and that another reason was that “Mum has already secured her financier’s funding for the 34% purchase”. Basil continued:
However, without prejudice and as a gesture of Mum’s goodwill to honour our response of 13 Nov 2013 to the ANZ Bank’s requisite terms for the Deed of Settlement to be drawn up and following your suggestion in your telephone conversation with the writer on 11 December 2013, on the 17 Dec 2013 an application for the urgent review of Mum’s Power of Attorney has been lodged with the Guardianship Tribunal in order that I continue to serve as Mum’s attorney.
We’ve received a verbal date for the review of mid February 2014 and are confident my appointment to continue as her sole Power of Attorney and that your client can continue to deal with me in relation to Mum’s financial affairs and execution of your client’s agreed terms of 13 Nov 2013 and the associated drawing up of the Deed of Settlement.
Principles of review
22.
Having set out the relevant facts, I next identify some of the principles that should guide me when considering Mr Daher’s application for review.
23.
Mr Daher’s application is made pursuant to s.104(2) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (FCCA). A review under s.104(2) of the FCCA is a hearing de novo. That means that an “applicant for review under s.104(2) is under no obligation to demonstrate error on the part of the Registrar, and does not need to establish that the Registrar’s exercise of discretion miscarried in the sense described in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505”.[4]
24.
Where the decision sought to be reviewed is a sequestration order made under s.52 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act), the judge who hears the application for review:[5]
must hear the petition afresh and must be satisfied as to the matters referred to in s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act. Thus, the reviewing judge must herself or himself be satisfied with the proof of:
· the matters stated in the petition;
· the service of the petition; and
· the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing.
The reviewing judge must also exercise afresh the discretions conferred by s 52(2).
In particular, unless the Bankruptcy Rules are waived, the judge must have the affidavits referred to in r.4.06 of the Bankruptcy Rules, which must be sworn shortly before the hearing. Except in the case of a review on the same day as the sequestration order was made, affidavits relied upon before the registrar would not satisfy r 4.06 [of the
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi