Australia's Residential Builder Pty Ltd v Wiederstein (No 2)
[2015] VSC 471
•7 September 2015
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
CORPORATIONS LIST
S CI 2014 03528
| AUSTRALIA’S RESIDENTIAL BUILDER PTY LTD (ACN 136 733 732) (in liquidation) | First Plaintiff |
| ‑ and ‑ | |
| RICHARD TRYGVE ROHRT in his capacity as joint and several liquidator of AUSTRALIA’S RESIDENTIAL BUILDER PTY LTD (ACN 136 733 732) (in liquidation) | Second Plaintiff |
| v | |
| ROBERT WIEDERSTEIN | First Defendant |
| ‑ and ‑ | |
| RAYMOND FRANCIS DE WEERD | Second Defendant |
| ‑ and ‑ | |
| BRONWYN WIEDERSTEIN | Third Defendant |
---
JUDGE: | McMillan J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 24 August 2015 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 7 September 2015 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Australia’s Residential Builder Pty Ltd v Wiederstein (No 2) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2015] VSC 471 |
---
Practice and Procedure— Freezing order — Application for variation of freezing order to enable third defendant to increase allowance to pay legal fees — Application by a non-party to be removed from operation of freezing order — Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Karas & Ors [2012] VSC 68 — Deputy Commissioner v Bollands [2012] FCA 1050 — Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005, O 37A
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiffs | Mr I Upjohn QC and Mr E Moon | Thomas Egan Lawyers |
| For the First and Second Defendants | No appearance | |
| For the Third Defendant | Mr D Williams QC | Champions Lawyers |
| For non-party, Wiederstein Corporation No 1 Pty Ltd | Mr D Williams QC | Champions Lawyers |
HER HONOUR:
Introduction
On 17 July 2014 , the plaintiffs sought and obtained ex parte freezing orders against the assets of the first and third defendants. These orders contained an allowance for $40,000 for legal costs.[1]
[1]Before Ginnane J in the Practice Court.
On 14 August 2014, the allowance for $40,000 for legal costs was increased to $65,000.[2]
[2]Before McMillan J in the Practice Court.
On 27 August 2014, the plaintiffs sought and obtained an increase of the amount in the freezing orders against the third defendant.[3]
[3]Australia’s Residential Builder Pty Ltd v Wiederstein [2014] VSC 430, [10] (McMillan J)
On 22 September 2014, an oral application by the third defendant to increase the allowance for legal costs to $135,000 was refused.
Application
By summons filed on 24 December 2014, the third defendant seeks to vary paragraph 10 of the freezing orders to increase the allowance for her legal costs to $240,000.
At the hearing before me on 24 August 2015, the third defendant and a non-party, Wiederstein Corporation No.1 Pty Ltd (‘WC1’),[4] a company also subject to the freezing orders, seek orders as follows:
(a) the third defendant seeks to vary paragraph 10 of the freezing orders so as to increase the allowance for her legal costs from $65,000 to $504,750 and allow her to charge her assets with payment of those costs; and
(b) WC1 seeks the freezing orders be varied so as to exclude it from the operation of those orders.
[4]WC1 is the trustee of the Wiederstein Superannuation Fund.
The allowance for legal costs of $504,750 is for costs incurred and costs anticipated to be incurred to the conclusion of the trial of four proceedings.
The plaintiffs do not take issue with the third defendant charging her assets with the payment of her legal costs but otherwise oppose the other orders sought by the third defendant and WC1.
The plaintiffs submit that if the Court were minded to increase the allowance for legal costs, any increase for the third defendant should be for a further amount of $20,000 and a further $20,000 for WC1 to be allowed from that company’s funds, up to and including the mediation scheduled for 27 October 2015. Overall, this means a total allowance of $105,000 for their legal costs. In the event that the mediation is unsuccessful, the third defendant would be free to apply to increase the allowance for legal costs up to the trial date and, thereafter, from the trial date and onwards and the plaintiffs would continue to maintain what they say has always been their reasonable and practical approach to such an application.[5]
[5]Citing Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Bollands [2012] FCA 1050, [28].
Background
Since the freezing orders were made on 17 July 2014, both parties agree that the interlocutory course of these proceedings has seen numerous developments, most of which have been contested, that have required the third defendant to incur additional legal expenses.
These developments include an amendment by the plaintiffs in September 2014 to their statement of claim to add a claim for knowing assistance of breach of fiduciary duty.[6] In December 2014, the third defendant applied to strike out the ‘knowing assistance’ parts of the statement of claim. Numerous drafts of the further amended statement of claim by the plaintiffs were then provided and there were several contested hearings on the issue of the amendments.[7] Ultimately, on 1 May 2015, the plaintiffs filed a further amended statement of claim. The third defendant also obtained an order that the first plaintiff provide security for costs of its claim in the sum of $50,500, an amount that included costs for discovery and mediation. On 20 July 2015, the third defendant filed her defence to the further amended statement of claim. Discovery has not yet taken place but a mediation is now scheduled for 27 October 2015.
[6]Amended statement of claim filed on 26 September 2014, [42]-[49].
[7]Affidavit of Michael John Champion sworn 2 August 2015, [3]–[4].
There are additional proceedings in which the third defendant and/or entities associated with her are defendants to proceedings issued by the plaintiffs.[8] One of these is a proceeding brought by ARB Developments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (‘the ARBD proceeding’) against the third defendant. The secondnamed plaintiff in this proceeding is the liquidator of ARBD. The ARBD proceeding was not anticipated at the time the allowance for legal costs was made and varied to its present amount of $65,000. The third defendant’s estimate of the costs in respect of the ARBD proceeding is $72,500.
[8]Affidavit of Michael John Champion sworn 24 December 2014, [16]–[26].
In addition, the plaintiffs registered a caveat on the title of the third defendant’s property in Williamstown. The plaintiffs have never objected to the third defendant realising that property, subject to certain conditions as set out in the primary judgment.[9] The third defendant signed a contract of sale for the sale of the property and she applied for the removal of the plaintiff’s caveat. The parties took a long time to reach agreement as to the mechanism for a substitute proprietary interest and caveat over the third defendant’s remaining property at Ocean Grove, which also secured the debt of the first-ranking mortgagee, National Australia Bank.
[9]Australia’s Residential Builder Pty Ltd v Wiederstein [2014] VSC 430, [14]-[15].
The third defendant says it was necessary to commence the removal proceedings against the plaintiffs and another entity for removal of two caveats to enable settlement of the sale of the Williamstown property.[10] The plaintiffs dispute this saying it was unnecessary for the third defendant to issue the removal proceeding in light of an offer from the plaintiff’s solicitor by letter of 18 June 2015. The third defendant points out that this letter was sent nine days after the caveat removal proceedings were issued.
[10]Affidavit of Michael John Champion sworn 2 August 2015, [6].
The third defendant says there was a dispute, and properly advised, she brought proceedings and did incur costs that were wholly unanticipated at the time that the freezing orders were made. Aside from the removal proceeding, there has been a great deal of ‘toing and froing’ about the settlement of the sale which has not yet occurred.
The plaintiffs have now removed their caveat and they say it is not their caveat that is holding up the settlement. The plaintiffs also contend that although the letter of 18 June 2014 was sent nine days after the removal proceeding was issued, it would have been reasonable for the third defendant to accept the plaintiffs’ proposal. The plaintiffs object to the subsequent prosecution of the removal proceeding to this date and contend that it is not a reasonable cost in the circumstances.
The plaintiffs also contend that prima facie the third defendant may have contravened paragraph 10(e) of the freezing orders. Pursuant to that paragraph, the third defendant was required to provide two working days’ written notice before dealing with any of her assets. The plaintiffs contend a contravention may have occurred when, on 19 August 2014, the third defendant charged her interest in her Williamstown property in favour of her solicitor without providing the plaintiffs with any notice of her doing so.[11]
[11]Affidavit of Bronwyn Wiederstein sworn in proceeding SCI 2015 02946, exhibit ‘BW2’.
The third defendant does not dispute that her solicitor has taken a charge for $65,000 but contends that the charge contained a specific provision that should be read as meaning that the freezing orders take priority and that if it were to be found to be in breach of the freezing orders, then it would not be effective.
The plaintiffs also contend that a second contravention may have occurred when the third defendant did not disclose a 3.32 per cent entitlement of Wiederstein Corporation Pty Ltd[12] (‘WC’) in a venture called the Coomera Joint Venture in her affidavit of financial position sworn 1 August 2014. Despite this, on 11 September 2014, the third defendant informed the Coomera Joint Venture that she proposed to become the new guarantor for WC’s entitlement, to make the required call and remedy any existing defaults under the joint venture agreement.[13]
[12]As trustee of the Wiederstein Trust.
[13]Affidavit of Richard Trygve Rohrt sworn 6 February 2015, exhibit ‘RTR-26’.
The plaintiffs contend that the Coomera Joint Venture was covered by paragraph 7(a)(ii) of the freezing orders as the venture was an asset of Patpel Pty Ltd, a company of which the third defendant was the sole director and shareholder and that by offering to give a guarantee the third defendant was in breach of paragraph 6(a) of the freezing orders providing that the third defendant ‘must not … in any way dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of any of your assets’.
Subsequently, in August 2015, Coomera Joint Venture Pty Ltd applied for a variation of the freezing order to enable the sale of the interest of WC in the Coomera Joint Venture. This resulted in orders being made on 14 August 2015 by consent between the plaintiffs and WC, with the consent orders not being opposed by the third defendant.
The third defendant contends that the freezing orders required the third defendant to disclose all of her assets only to the extent that it extended to WC. The orders were subsequently extended to include units or interests in trusts of which WC was a trustee as part of her assets but did not require her to disclose all of the assets of WC. They required her to disclose those interests insofar as they were held on trust for her, specifically interests in trusts of which WC was a trustee. In such circumstances, she contends there has been no breach of the freezing orders by the third defendant.
As to the plaintiffs’ complaint that the third defendant proposed giving a guarantee, the third defendant says that a guarantee is not a charge and it did not involve her charging any of her assets, disposing of them, dealing with them or diminishing their value. She was simply just incurring a liability that would not have been a breach of the freezing orders.
The plaintiffs are also concerned that the third defendant’s solicitor, who is also the solicitor for ARBD, has received an amount of $165,514.54 apparently for legal costs in acting for ARBD and that these costs may be substantively duplicated in this proceeding.[14] Despite requests, the plaintiffs have not been provided with any details of these costs and have now issued a proceeding in the Legal Practice List of the Victorian and Civil Administrative Tribunal to obtain a full and proper accounting for this amount. The third defendant says that the allegation is simply inadmissible and speculative. The plaintiffs deny this and say that it is a matter that the liquidator needs to understand and without ARBD’s solicitor providing the information, it is a matter of concern in respect of the costs issues.
[14]Affidavit of the Second Plaintiff sworn 14 August 2015, [8]-[10].
Quantum of allowance for legal costs
The parties have filed affidavits as to the quantum of the claimed increase for the allowance of legal costs. The third defendant relies on the affidavits of her solicitor who provides updated estimates of the costs that have been and will continue to be incurred. The amount of $504,750 now sought by the third defendant is quantified as follows:[15]
[15]Affidavits of Michael John Champion sworn 24 December 2015 and 2 August 2015 respectively.
This proceeding Up to 24 December 2014 In excess of $85,000.00 From 24 December 2014 to conclusion of trial $175,000.00 Additional costs – strike out/amend statement of claim $35,000.00 Amended claim for inducing breach $27,500.00 Accountant’s fees $10,000.00 Total $332,500.00 Proceeding by ARB Developments Pty Ltd From 24 December 2014 to conclusion of trial $91,000.00 Less common costs $18,500.00 Total $72,500.00 Proceeding against Wiederstein Corporation No 1 Pty Ltd From 24 December 2014 to conclusion of trial $96,250.00 Less common costs $18,500.00 Total $77,750.00 Sale of Victoria Street property, including application for removal of caveat Fees associated with sale of property $32,000.00 Total
$32,000.00
The plaintiffs rely on the affidavit of their costs consultant, Mr John David White, who deposes in his affidavit sworn 12 August 2015 that the information contained in the affidavits provided by the solicitor for the third defendant is wanting in detail and that the quantum of the costs sought is meaningless, imprecise, broad ‘guesstimates’ and apparently excessive. The third defendant says that the generality of the estimates is an inevitable consequence of the fact that the work has not yet been performed, much less costed in a bill of costs and that the process is one of estimation, not taxation.
Mr White then applies a ‘gross error check’ on the claimed costs and, by way of example, concludes that the third defendant’s solicitor must have spent 22 full working days from the date of service of the writ on 18 July 2014 until 24 December 2014 and counsel spent 10 full working days in the same period.
The plaintiffs submit they are entitled to a much more rigorous analysis and documentary support for the third defendant’s actual and proposed legal costs, such as is set out in paragraph 16 of Mr White’s affidavit, and there is no reason why the third defendant has not provided bills for work done and calculations of the estimated costs for work to be done.
In response, the third defendant submits that Mr White’s criticisms are easily dismissed on the basis that he was not given sufficient information by the plaintiff about these proceedings nor has he reviewed such documents as the pleadings, the affidavits, the orders and submissions that were made between July 2014 and 24 December 2014.
The third defendant says it is significant that Mr White did not express an opinion on what would be a reasonable estimate of the third defendant’s costs, did not take issue with the hourly rates charged by the solicitor or counsel for the third defendant and did not suggest that there has been an over estimate of time that will be required to conduct the various proceedings against the third defendant and WC1. Counsel for the third defendant contends therefore that an inference can be made, that if Mr White had been asked to or had given evidence on those matters, his evidence would not have assisted the party that calls him.
The third defendant submits the likely costs of the various proceedings are difficult to estimate as they involve complex commercial issues. In reality, the third defendant’s estimates are broad brush as they are for future matters that might occur. The rates claimed for both counsel and solicitor are set out with GST either included or excluded in the rates. The third defendant further submits that any suggestions by Mr White that there are inconsistencies in global amounts is explicable by him failing to understand there are different time periods being referred to in different parts, so that when he says that one amount looks like it is more than the other, the obvious answer is that one amount goes up to 24 December whereas the other only went up to 13 November.
The application by WC1
The WC1 proceeding was issued around the time that the freezing orders were made.[16] The application made by WC1 is for it to be excluded from the operation of the freezing orders as it contends that on a proper analysis of the claim, it is misconceived and doomed to failure. WC1 relies on the affidavit of its solicitor sworn 24 December 2014, by reference to paragraphs 19 to 22 and exhibits ‘MC4’ and ‘MC5’, being a copy of the terms of the Wiederstein Superannuation Fund and a copy of the debenture charges referred to in the WC1 proceeding. Essentially, it is contended that the debenture charge demonstrates that WC1 entered into the relevant transaction as trustee of another trust called the Wiederstein Land Development and Home Lending Trust, and not as trustee of the Wiederstein Superannuation Fund. WC1 also says that to charge its assets would have been a breach of its obligations as a trustee of a superannuation fund. WC1 contends that these documents demonstrate that WC1, as trustee of the Wiederstein Superannuation Fund, never lent or charged its assets.
[16]Proceeding S CI 2014 03701 filed 21 July 2014.
In these circumstances, there does not appear to be a sound basis for WC1 to remain subject to the freezing orders and they should be varied so as to remove WC1 from their operation.
The plaintiffs contend that the fact that the charge refers to another trust and not to the Wiederstein Superannuation Fund is a matter for trial. The plaintiffs do not know what the bank has been told about the assets of the company. The fact that the third defendant points to matters that might mean more than the amount presently claimed is owed is not relevant as the plaintiffs have paid only $50,000 on the guarantee, and that is all that can be claimed in the proceeding. In the event that the plaintiffs are required to pay more amounts to the National Australia Bank, then their right of subrogation will increase accordingly.
The plaintiffs accept that the third defendant needs to defend the WC1 proceeding, but says that WC1 has not provided any statement that it cannot pay its own legal costs and there is no reason is given why the third defendant should pay them.
The plaintiffs contend that the incurred costs or the costs intended to be incurred of $77,750 are quite disproportionate to the claim of around $50,000 in the proceeding and are not reasonable and proportionate, relying on section 24 of the Civil Procedure Act.
Submissions
The third defendant submits that the orders sought for her legal costs reflect the principle that a freezing order should not prevent a party from having access to sufficient funds for payment of reasonable legal expenses.[17]
[17]Referring to, by way of example, Allomak Limited & Ors v Allan & Ors [2010] VSC 187, [32].
The plaintiffs say that their attitude to the important question of an allowance for the third defendant’s legal costs and disbursements has always been to adopt a reasonable and practical attitude, but the amount by which the freezing order is now sought to be varied is unreasonable and excessive and disproportionate with the affidavits filed by the third defendant in support of the amount now claimed for the legal costs being inadequate.
The plaintiffs also submit that if the amount of $504,750 sought by the third defendant were allowed, that sum would substantially erode or completely exhaust her net equity in her remaining asset, being her Ocean Grove property. This was demonstrated as follows. The third defendant has deposed that her Ocean Grove property is worth about $890,000. Once the Williamstown property is sold, her Ocean Grove property will be unencumbered. The plaintiffs say that allowance must then be made for the plaintiffs’ proprietary claim of $434,500[18] and a proprietary claim made by ARB Developments Pty Ltd for an amount of approximately $170,000[19] which leaves only about $285,000 in the net equity of the property. The third defendant’s actual and proposed expenditure on legal costs well exceed this sum.
[18]Further Amended Statement of Claim, [31]-[38].
[19]Proceeding S CI 2014 5877.
The third defendant submits that, predominantly, the plaintiff’s claims are not proprietary in nature and those claims that are said to be proprietary are weak. She also says that the sum of $434,500 claimed as an equitable interest is well short of the value of the third defendant’s property to which the equitable interest is said by the plaintiffs to attach to the property. This means that even if the allowance for legal expenses is increased to $504,750 the third defendant would barely impinge, if at all, on the alleged proprietary interest of the plaintiff even if she spent the whole of that sum.
Applicable principles
The principles to be applied in an application to increase an allowance for legal costs where freezing orders have been made are succinctly set out in the judgment of Kaye J (as he then was) in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Karas & Ors,[20] as follows:
First, the purpose of a freezing order under order 37A.02 is to prevent the frustration or inhibition of the court’s processes by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or a prospective judgment of the court will not be wholly or partly satisfied.
Secondly, it is recognised that such an order constitutes a significant interference with the rights of the persons against whom the order is made. Thus, at each stage of the supervision of such an order, the court must ensure that the reach of the order is no greater than that which is necessary to protect the processes of the court. In particular, it is necessary that the court, in determining an application such as this, ensure that the freezing order does not constitute an instrument of unfair oppression to the party in respect of whose assets the freezing order has been made.
The third principle is that, ordinarily, freezing orders, as they have done in this case, allow the person, against whom the orders are made, to have reasonable access to its assets, in order to be able to pay any reasonable legal fees, particularly any fees associated with litigation in respect of the debt or transaction which is the basis of the freezing order.
Fourthly, in his reasons for judgment on 23 December, Bell J identified two other important matters. They are, first, that a freezing order is not an order for the appointment of the plaintiff as the de facto administrator of the defendants’ business or assets. Secondly, and allied to that, if there is a basis for thinking that a defendant might have access to other sources of funds within its control, nonetheless that cannot justify seeking, in an application such as this, legal discovery of documents, or making detailed requests for the provision of information, which take the matter well beyond the scope of the type of application with which I am concerned. [21]
[20][2012] VSC 68. (citations omitted). The parties also referred to Deputy Commissioner v Bollands [2012] FCA 1050 and Allomak Limited v Allen [2010] VSC 187.
[21]Ibid, [17]-[20].
Consideration
As a matter of principle, both the third defendant and WC1 are entitled to access to reasonable funds to meet their reasonable legal expenses. A person who is the subject of a freezing order should not be deprived of the opportunity of obtaining reasonable legal advice in respect of the claims that form the basis of the freezing orders. This principle must be weighed against the danger that any judgment in respect of the substantive claims against whom the orders are made may not be satisfied.
In my view, the balance between the competing considerations can be achieved by allowing an increase for an allowance for legal costs subject to certain constraints as to the quantum of the allowance and by limiting the allowance up to and including the mediation scheduled for 27 October 2015.
Application by third defendant
In respect of the application by the third defendant, there are a number of matters to be taken into account in calculating an increase for the allowance of legal costs up to and including the mediation. The balance that must be achieved is the protection of the positions of both sides to the proceedings.
The mediation is imminent. Although discovery has been ordered, it has not yet occurred. Whether it will occur before the mediation is not clear. Having said that, the parties are by now well aware of the issues involved in the various proceedings.
In respect of the costs claimed for the caveat removal proceedings, I accept the submissions of the plaintiffs that it was not reasonable to continue with the prosecution of the proceeding once the letter of 18 June 2014 had been sent to the third defendant. Any allowance for the removal of caveat proceedings should be modest and, in the circumstances, an allowance of $6,500 is made.
I also accept the submissions of the plaintiffs as to the possibility of the erosion of the equity of the third defendant’s Ocean Grove property if the orders as sought by her are made. The fact that the third defendant maintains that the claims against her are weak are matters that will be determined at trial, if the mediation fails to compromise the proceedings.
In respect of the plaintiffs’ submissions as to possible contraventions of the freezing orders and the possible duplication of costs between this proceeding and the ARBD proceeding, it is not possible to express a concluded view on these issues, nor is it necessary to do so for the purposes of the applications now to be determined, other than to note the positions taken by the parties.
In respect of the quantum of any increase for the legal costs, I consider the third defendant’s estimates until the conclusion of the trial to be unreasonably high. Mr White is an experienced and highly regarded costs consultant and his opinions as to the quantum of the costs carry considerable weight. I accept that it is difficult to provide estimates in the circumstances but with the parties’ legal positions in the relevant proceedings now being much clearer, better estimates could have been provided by the third defendant.
I specifically reject the submission by the third defendant that an inference should be made against the plaintiffs because Mr White did not express an opinion as to the estimates of costs. The third defendant bears the onus on this application. Mr White has expressed his opinion as to the defects in the evidence relied upon by the third defendant. It is not his role to provide estimates on the costs that the third defendant accepts herself are broad brush.
In assessing an increase for an allowance for legal costs of the third defendant up to and including the mediation, the fact that the third defendant presently has security for her costs in the amount of $50,500 and an allowance of $65,000 for her costs must be taken into account. In the circumstances, I consider it reasonable to increase the allowance for the legal costs by a further amount of $50,000 which sum includes an allowance of $6,500 for the removal of caveat proceedings and the costs of appearing at the mediation.
Application by WC1
In respect of the application to be excluded from the operation of the freezing orders, WC1 relies on certain documents to submit the claim is misconceived and doomed for failure. Those documents will form part of, but not all, of the evidence in the proceeding. It is not appropriate to make the findings sought by WC1 based on two documents standing alone and the Court cannot and does not enter into the merits of the claims which are the subject of the application to the extent submitted by WC1. As such, WC1 should not be excluded from the operation of the freezing orders.
I accept the plaintiffs’ submission that there is no evidence before the court to substantiate why the third defendant should fund the defence of the WC1 proceeding, as opposed to WC1. Any allowance for an increase in the costs for the defence of the WC1 proceeding should be allowed from the funds of WC1.
I consider that the estimates of costs at $77,750 is unreasonable and disproportionate to the claim. I accept, however, that costs will be incurred but the allowance for the costs of WC1 up to and including mediation should be much lower that claimed by WC1 on this application.
In my view, a reasonable amount to allow WC1 for the further legal work up to and including the mediation of this proceeding should be allowed at $10,000.
Addendum
The parties will mediate the disputes on 27 October 2015. The history of the disputes between the parties highlights the need for both the parties and their legal practitioners to have particular regard to their overarching obligations under the Civil Procedure Act 2010, in particular, using their reasonable endeavours to narrow the issues in dispute, to resolve the disputes and to ensure the costs are reasonable and proportionate.
Orders
The parties are to forward minutes of proposed orders to reflect that:
(a) The allowance for the legal costs of the third defendant be increased in the amount of $50,000;
(b) The allowance for the legal costs of WC1 be allowed at $10,000 payable from the Wiederstein Superannuation Fund;
(c) Paragraph 10(b) of the orders made on 17 July 2014, as varied by further order on 14 August 2014 and 27 August 2014, be amended by providing for the execution of a charge over the assets of the third defendant to secure payment for her reasonable expenses up to the limit of $115,000.
I will hear the parties as to the costs of the application.
---
0
3
0