SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCR 2019 0051
| AUSTIN HARRISON (a pseudonym)[1] | Applicant |
| v | |
| THE QUEEN | Respondent |
[1]To ensure that there is no possibility of identification of the victim of the sexual offending, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the applicant.
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| JUDGES: | MAXWELL P, McLEISH and T FORREST JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 1 May 2020 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 16 June 2020 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VSCA 157 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2019] VCC 146 (Judge M Bourke) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Conviction – Incest – Whether verdict unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence – Whether open to jury to conclude there had been penetration of complainant’s vagina – Complainant described penetration of external genitalia – Sufficient to satisfy statutory definition – Complainant’s understanding of ‘penetration’ not relevant – Leave to appeal refused – Crimes Act1958 s 35.
WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘vagina’, ‘penetration’.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr N J Goodfellow | Tyler Tipping & Woods |
| For the Respondent | Mr J C J McWilliams | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
MAXWELL P
McLEISH JA
T FORREST JA:
Summary
The applicant was tried before a County Court jury on four charges of incest and two charges of indecent assault. The complainant was his natural daughter, who was aged about 14 at the time of the alleged offending. Following successful no case submissions in respect of a number of the charges, the jury were left to consider two charges of incest. The applicant was convicted on both charges.
He now seeks leave to appeal against conviction on a single ground, namely, that the jury verdict was unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence. Specifically, he contends that it was not open to the jury on the whole of the evidence to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there had been penetration of the complainant’s vagina on either of the alleged occasions.
For reasons which follow, we would refuse leave to appeal. In short, the descriptions given by the complainant in her evidence clearly established that, on both occasions, there had been penetration of what is referred to (in the definition of ‘vagina’ in s 35 of the Crimes Act 1958) as the ‘external genitalia’. The fact that the complainant herself did not regard what had occurred as ‘penetration’ does not affect the safety of the verdicts.
Was the element of penetration proved beyond reasonable doubt?
Commendably, counsel for the applicant (who was also defence counsel at trial) acknowledged at the outset that even ‘slight or fleeting’ penetration would suffice to establish this element of the offence of incest. Counsel cited the following passage from Anderson v The Queen,[2] where Weinberg JA (with whom Mandie and Bongiorno JJA agreed) said:
As soon as there is any penetration by a finger into any part of the vagina as defined, no matter how slight, and no matter how…
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- Case
- [2020] VSCA 157
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court centred on the statutory definition of 'penetration' and whether the complainant's limited understanding of the term was pertinent to the jury's decision. The court had to assess if the jury could reasonably conclude that there was penetration of the vagina as defined by the Act, based on the complainant's testimony. It was also necessary to consider whether the jury's decision was open to them, given the statutory definition and the complainant's description of the incident.
The court, in examining the statutory language and the jury's role in interpreting evidence, determined that the statutory definition of 'penetration' was satisfied by the complainant's account of events. It was held that the complainant's understanding of the term 'penetration' was not a relevant factor in the jury's decision-making process. The court found that the jury was entitled to conclude that there had been penetration of the vagina, even though the complainant had only described the penetration of her external genitalia. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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