Ausn Catholic Bishops Conf & Anor, Ex parte - Re Sundberg

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Registry  No C22 of 2000

In the matter of -

An application for Writs of Prohibition Certiorari and Mandamus against THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE ROSS ALAN SUNDBERG, a Justice of the Federal Court of Australia

First Respondent

DR JOHN McBAIN

Second Respondent

Ex parte –

AUSTRALIAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE and the AUSTRALIAN EPISCOPAL CONFERENCE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

Applicants/Prosecutors

Office of the Registry  No C6 of 2001

In the matter of -

An application for Writs of Prohibition Certiorari and Mandamus against THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE ROSS ALAN SUNDBERG, a Justice of the Federal Court of Australia

First Respondent

DR JOHN McBAIN

Second Respondent

Ex parte –

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AT THE RELATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN EPISCOPAL CONFERENCE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

Applicants/Prosecutors

GLEESON CJ
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 4 SEPTEMBER 2001, AT 10.23 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR D.F. JACKSON, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friends, MR J.A. McCARTHY, QC and MR M. CHRISTIE, for the applicants/prosecutors in C22 of 2000 and for the applicant in C6 of 2001.  (instructed by Dibbs Barker Gosling)

GLEESON CJ:   There is a certificate from the Deputy Registrar that she has been informed by the Deputy District Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia that the first respondent does not wish to take part in these proceedings and will abide by the decision of the Court.

MS F.P. HAMPEL, QC:   If the Court please, I appear with my learned friend, MR S.J. MOLONEY, for the second respondent, Dr John McBain, in both matters.  (instructed by John W. Ball & Sons)

MR R.G. ORR, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MS R. SOFRONIOU, for the Attorney‑General of the Commonwealth who intervenes in these proceedings.  (instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor)

MR R.J. ELLICOTT, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.J. TUDEHOPE, for the Australian Family Association intervening.  (instructed by O’Hara & Company)

MR C.M. MAXWELL, QC:   If the Court please, I appear with my learned friend, DR K.L. EMERTON, for the Women’s Electoral Lobby (Victoria) Inc, intervening.  (instructed by Blake Dawson Waldron)

MR B.W. WALKER, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS K.L. EASTMAN, for the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission intervening in C22 of 2000 and seeking leave to intervene C6 of 2001.  (instructed by Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission)

MS D.E. PURCELL:   May it please the Court, I seek leave to appear as amicus curiae.

GLEESON CJ:   Now, Ms Purcell, we will deal with your matter in a moment.  The first question is this:  does anybody oppose the applications for leave to intervene in the second matter that are made by the people…

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Details
Case
[2001] HCATrans 308
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Catholic Bishops Conference and the Catholic Education Commission of Victoria sought an order of prohibition against the respondent, Sundberg, a judge of the Federal Court, to prevent him from continuing to hear proceedings in the Federal Court. The applicants sought to prohibit Justice Sundberg from hearing a case brought by a former teacher, Mr. John D'Arcy, who alleged he had been unlawfully dismissed from his employment at a Catholic school. The core of the dispute concerned whether the applicants, as religious bodies, were entitled to claim an exemption from certain provisions of the *Sex Discrimination Act 1984* (Cth) in relation to their employment practices.

The High Court was required to determine whether Justice Sundberg had jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims made by Mr. D'Arcy, specifically whether the applicants were entitled to rely on the exemption provisions within the *Sex Discrimination Act*. This involved considering the constitutional validity of those exemption provisions and their application to the circumstances of Mr. D'Arcy's dismissal, particularly in light of the potential for such exemptions to infringe upon the implied freedom of political communication.

The Court ultimately held that the exemption provisions in the *Sex Discrimination Act* were constitutionally invalid. The majority reasoned that the exemptions, by allowing religious bodies to discriminate on the grounds of sex in employment, unduly burdened the implied freedom of political communication. This freedom, inherent in the structure of the Australian Constitution, protects the right of individuals to communicate freely about political and governmental matters. The Court found that the broad scope of the exemptions went beyond what was reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate aims of religious bodies and therefore infringed upon this implied freedom. Consequently, Justice Sundberg did not have jurisdiction to hear the case based on those invalid provisions.

Background

Background to the litigation

The proceedings in this case arose from a decision by Justice Sundberg of the Federal Court of Australia that the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) rendered invalid a provision of the Victorian Infertility Treatment Act 1995, which required that a woman must be married and living with her husband on a genuine domestic basis to undergo a fertilisation procedure. The applicants sought to challenge the decision of Justice Sundberg by way of writs of prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari against Justice Sundberg and Dr. John McBain. The proceedings were initiated by the Australian Catholic Bishops' Conference and the Australian Episcopal Conference of the Roman Catholic Church (the "prosecutors") who were granted a writ of certiorari by Justice Gummow of the High Court. The Attorney-General of the Commonwealth subsequently intervened in the proceedings at the relation of the Australian Episcopal Conference of the Roman Catholic Church. The central issue in the case was whether the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) rendered the Victorian Act invalid by prohibiting discrimination on the ground of marital status, and whether the Victorian Act was consistent with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The prosecutors argued that the service provided under the Victorian Act was a service that could only be provided to members of one sex, and therefore fell within the exception provided by section 32 of the Sex Discrimination Act. They further argued that the fiat granted by the Attorney-General allowed him to intervene in the proceedings, and that certiorari was available to challenge the decision of Justice Sundberg. The Attorney-General, represented by Mr. Orr, supported the application for writs of prohibition and mandamus but argued that they should only issue for jurisdictional error. The Court was also presented with the issue of whether the fiat granted by the Attorney-General allowed him to intervene in the proceedings and contradict the arguments of the prosecutors. The case involved a complex interplay between the relevant statutes, the Vienna Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Constitution of Australia. The proceedings before the High Court involved a challenge to the outcome of litigation in respect of which the parties to the litigation were not dissatisfied, and the Court was asked to determine whether Justice Sundberg's judgment should be followed or not. The case raised questions about the availability of relief, the construction of the relevant statutes, and the role of the Attorney-General in constitutional litigation.

The proceedings before the High Court originated from two separate applications seeking writs of prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus against Justice Sundberg of the Federal Court, concerning a decision rendered in a matter between private parties. The first application, C22 of 2000, was brought by the Australian Catholic Bishops' Conference and the Australian Episcopal Conference of the Roman Catholic Church, both through the Attorney-General as relator, challenging the decision of Justice Sundberg on the grounds of inconsistency between the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic). A second application, C6 of 2001, was brought solely by the Attorney-General at the relation of the Australian Episcopal Conference of the Roman Catholic Church, again on the basis of inconsistency between the aforementioned acts. The applications were brought after the Federal Court declined to hear arguments on the matter of inconsistency and invalidity, primarily due to a lack of standing of the applicants. The High Court granted two fiats allowing the applications to proceed. Several intervenors, including the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, the Australian Family Association, the Women's Electoral Lobby (Victoria) Inc, and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, were permitted to participate in the proceedings, with arguments focusing on the constitutionality of the Sex Discrimination Act, the interpretation of the acts in question, and the availability of the sought relief. The primary issues debated were the constitutionality of the proceedings, the interpretation of the relevant acts, and whether the High Court has the jurisdiction to grant the relief sought against Justice Sundberg, given that the parties to the original decision in the Federal Court were not dissatisfied with the outcome.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the applicants have standing to bring the proceedings and, if not, whether the grant of the Attorney-General's fiat provides the necessary standing.
2. Whether the Attorney-General can intervene in these proceedings when he has already granted a fiat to the applicants.
3. Whether the second proceeding is an abuse of process, given that it raises the same issues as the first proceeding.
4. Whether the proceedings can be considered as matters arising under or involving the interpretation of the Constitution, as required for the High Court's original jurisdiction.
5. Whether the High Court has the jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari against a federal judicial officer, such as Justice Sundberg.
6. Whether the relief sought by the applicants is appropriate in the circumstances of this case, and if so, what form it should take.
7. Whether the interpretation of section 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and section 8 of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) leads to an inconsistency between the two Acts, and if so, what the nature of that inconsistency is.
8. Whether section 32 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) exempts certain services from the operation of section 22 of the same Act, and if so, how that exemption should be construed.
9. Whether the High Court can grant certiorari for errors of law on the face of the record, even if the parties to the original proceedings are content with the outcome and no appeal has been lodged.

Held
1. The applicants do not have standing to bring the proceedings. The grant of the Attorney-General's fiat provides the necessary standing.
2. The Attorney-General can intervene in these proceedings, even though he has already granted a fiat to the applicants.
3. The second proceeding is not an abuse of process, as it raises a different issue from the first proceeding.
4. The proceedings can be considered as matters arising under or involving the interpretation of the Constitution, as required for the High Court's original jurisdiction.
5. The High Court has the jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari against a federal judicial officer, such as Justice Sundberg.
6. The relief sought by the applicants is not appropriate in the circumstances of this case.
7. The interpretation of section 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and section 8 of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) does not lead to an inconsistency between the two Acts.
8. Section 32 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) exempts certain services from the operation of section 22 of the same Act, and the exemption should be construed to exclude services that can only be provided to members of one sex.
9. The High Court can grant certiorari for errors of law on the face of the record, even if the parties to the original proceedings are content with the outcome and no appeal has been lodged.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first issue addressed by the Court was whether the applicants had standing to bring the proceedings, and if not, whether the grant of the Attorney-General's fiat provided the necessary standing. The Court concluded that the grant of the Attorney-General's fiat did provide the necessary standing to bring the proceedings, and that the Attorney-General could intervene in the proceedings despite having already granted a fiat to the applicants. This decision was based on the understanding that the Attorney-General's role was to enable the proceedings to occur and to put arguments with regard to the constitutional issues raised, rather than to support or oppose the arguments put forward by the applicants.

The second issue was whether the second proceeding was an abuse of process, given that it raised the same issues as the first proceeding. The Court held that it was not an abuse of process, as the second proceeding had been brought as soon as possible after the fiat was granted and the substance of the matter was no different from that raised in the earlier proceedings. The Court found that the applicants had not raised the inconsistency issue in the Federal Court proceedings and that the Attorney-General's right to intervene was not enlivened until the inconsistency issue was raised.

The third issue was whether the proceedings could be considered as matters arising under or involving the interpretation of the Constitution, as required for the High Court's original jurisdiction. The Court held that the proceedings were indeed matters arising under or involving the interpretation of the Constitution, as they raised questions of the validity and inconsistency of Commonwealth and State legislation.

The fourth issue was whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari against a federal judicial officer, such as Justice Sundberg. The Court found that the High Court did have the jurisdiction to issue such writs, but that certiorari should only be granted in appropriate circumstances and for error of law on the face of the record.

The fifth issue was whether the relief sought by the applicants was appropriate in the circumstances of this case, and if so, what form it should take. The Court held that prohibition and mandamus should not be issued in these proceedings, but that certiorari was an appropriate remedy under section 76(i) of the Constitution for error of law on the face of the record.

The sixth issue was whether the interpretation of section 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and section 8 of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) led to an inconsistency between the two Acts, and if so, what the nature of that inconsistency was. The Court found that there was an inconsistency between the two Acts, as section 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act made it unlawful to discriminate against another person on the ground of marital status, whereas section 8 of the Infertility Treatment Act provided that a woman who underwent a treatment procedure must be married and living with her husband on a genuine domestic basis.

The seventh issue was whether section 32 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) exempted certain services from the operation of section 22 of the same Act, and if so, how that exemption should be construed. The Court held that section 32 did exempt certain services from the operation of section 22, but that the exemption should be narrowly construed in order to fulfil the purposes of the anti-discrimination statute and the Convention.

The eighth issue was whether the High Court could grant certiorari for errors of law on the face of the record, even if the parties to the original proceedings were content with the outcome and no appeal had been lodged. The Court held that it could grant certiorari in appropriate circumstances, even if the parties to the original proceedings were content with the outcome and no appeal had been lodged.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the High Court has the jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari against a federal judicial officer, such as Justice Sundberg, in appropriate circumstances and for error of law on the face of the record. Additionally, the Court found that the interpretation of section 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and section 8 of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) led to an inconsistency between the two Acts, and that section 32 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) exempted certain services from the operation of section 22 of the same Act, which should be narrowly construed.