Attorney-General (Vic) v Melbourne

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5 CLR 257

Electric Light and Power Act 1896 (Vict.) (No. 1413), secs. 13 (d), 38, 39, 52-

Charge for supply of electricity-Preference-Uniform charge-Alternative rates-Option given to customer- Flat rate"-" Maximum demand rate."

Undertakers under the Electric Light and Power Act 1896 had two scales under which they charged consumers for the supply of electricity, and all consumers had the option of which rate they would select. Under one scale, called the "flat rate," consumers were charged for the actual quantity of electricity supplied at the uniform rate of 43d. per unit. Under the other scale, called the "maximum demand rate," consumers were charged at the rate of 7d. per unit as to such portion of the electricity supplied to them as was equal to a consumption for a period of 45 hours per calendar month at the highest rate of consumption during the month, and, as to the remainder of the electricity so supplied during the month, at the rate of 2d. per unit.

Held That the words "a supply on the same terms" in sec. 38 of the Electric Light and Power Act 1896 bear their natural meaning and include price; that the "preference" prohibited by sec. 39 is a preference between customers dealing under similar circumstances, and not between customers dealing under two different systems of supply, either of which they are free to select, and therefore dealing under entirely different circumstances and that therefore the charges were lawful. Present.-The Lord Chancellor, Lord Maenaghten, Lord Atkinson, Lord Collins, Sir Arthur Wilson.

5 CLR 258

Decision of High Court (The Mayor &. of the City of Melbourne v. The Attorney-General for the State of Victoria, 3 C.L.R., 467), affirmed.

APPEAL to His Majesty in Council from the decision of the High Court: The Mayor &. of the City of Melbourne v. The Attorney- General for the State of Victoria 1.

The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by

LORD ATKINSON. The proceeding out of which the appeal in this case arose, was an information exhibited by the Attorney- General of the State of Victoria on the relation of the Metro- politan Gas Company against the Corporation of the City of Melbourne, who are by an Order of the Governor in Council, dated the 6th of September 1897, made under the authority of an Act of the Victorian legislature, entitled the Electric Light and Power Act 1896 (No. 1413), constituted undertakers for the supply of electricity within that City, to restrain them from con- tinuing to charge their consumers for electricity supplied, rates which are not uniform per unit throughout the City.

There is no dispute as to the facts. It is admitted that the Corporation supply electricity under two different systems at rates appropriate to each, but not identical. Under the first, the quantity used is charged for at the rate of 41d. per unit. It is known as the "flat rate." Under the second a rate of 7d. per unit, known as the "maximum demand rate,"…

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Details
Case
[1907] UKPCHCA 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Attorney-General (Vic) v Melbourne, the appeal was brought before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council concerning the legality of the Melbourne Corporation's practice of charging consumers for electricity supply under two different rates: a flat rate and a maximum demand rate. The plaintiff, the Attorney-General of Victoria, contended that the corporation's practice of offering a choice between these rates constituted an illegal preference between customers, in contravention of the Electric Light and Power Act 1896.

The central legal issue revolved around the interpretation of sections 38 and 39 of the Act, particularly whether the phrase "a supply on the same terms" in section 38 included the price charged for the electricity supply. Furthermore, the court needed to determine if the prohibition of preference in section 39 applied to customers choosing between two different supply systems, both of which they were free to select.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, after reviewing the arguments, concluded that the phrase "a supply on the same terms" naturally included the price and that the prohibition of preference in section 39 pertained to a preference between customers under similar circumstances, not between those choosing different supply systems. The court found that since customers were free to choose either system, they were not dealing under similar circumstances, and hence, the charges were lawful. Consequently, the decision of the High Court of Australia was affirmed, and the appeal was dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

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