SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
ATTORNEY-GENERAL v COLANGELO (No 2)
[2025] SASC 174
Judgment of the Honourable Justice McDonald (ex tempore)
8 October 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS
This is an application for an Extended Detention Order (EDO) pursuant to s 57(3) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) and, in the alternative, an application for an Extended Supervision Order (‘ESO’) pursuant to s 7(1) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (‘the HRO Act’). On 15 January 2025, it was ordered that the respondent be the subject of an Interim Detention Order (‘IDO’) pending the outcome of these applications.
It is the applicant’s contention that the respondent should be subject to an EDO on the basis of the expert opinions that he is unwilling to control his sexual instincts, as legislatively defined. It is the applicant’s submission that it is appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion to make an EDO having regard to the purpose and object of s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), that being to protect the community from sexual offenders where the risk posed by such a person is such that it is inappropriate for them to be released.
The respondent does not oppose the imposition of an ESO, however he opposes the making of any form of detention order. The respondent relies upon the availability of such conditions under an ESO as an argument against the making of an EDO; that is that the option of an ESO provides the community with a level of protection that makes it unnecessary to go to the length of keeping the respondent indefinitely in custody. The respondent also submits that given there is now a greater understanding of the complex issues facing the respondent, his risk is more open to management within the community.
Held:
1. The application for an EDO is refused; and
2. The application for an ESO is granted. The respondent is to be the subject of an ESO for the period of five years.
Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 63; Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) s 7(1); Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57, referred to.
R v Hoare [2017] SASC 7; R v Schuster (2016) 125 SASR 388, applied.
Thompson v Attorney-General (SA) (2019) 133 SASR 302, considered.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL v COLANGELO (No 2)
[2025] SASC 174
Criminal: Application
McDONALD J:
The Attorney-General has made an application for an Extended Detention Order (‘EDO’) pursuant to s 57(3) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) and, in the alternative, an application for an Extended Supervision Order (‘ESO’) pursuant to s 7(1) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (‘the HRO Act’).
Mr Colangelo does not oppose the imposition of an ESO.…
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- AGLC
- Attorney-General v Colangelo (No 2) [2025] SASC 174
- Case
- [2025] SASC 174
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the expert evidence provided by Dr Craig Raeside and Dr Catherine Crouch, which highlighted Mr Colangelo’s complex psychological profile, including borderline intellectual capacity, communication difficulties, and autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Despite these conditions, the experts concluded that Mr Colangelo remained at high risk of future sexual offending and was unwilling to control his sexual instincts. The Court also noted that Mr Colangelo had not committed contact offences and did not have antisocial borderline personality disorder or substance abuse issues, which typically accompany an escalation to contact offending. Counsel for Mr Colangelo argued that his risk was more manageable within the community given his unique circumstances, and that an extended supervision order (ESO) with strict conditions could effectively mitigate his risk.
The Court determined that while Mr Colangelo’s conditions provided some context for his offending, they did not mitigate his risk. The statutory framework under s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) made it clear that offences involving the dissemination of CEM were subject to the possibility of an EDO, regardless of whether contact offences were committed. The Court concluded that the risk Mr Colangelo posed to the community was unacceptable without an EDO. Consequently, the Court exercised its discretion to make an EDO in line with the purpose and object of the legislation to protect the community from sexual offenders.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
However, a factor in favour of Mr Colangelo not falling into the category of offenders who are likely to escalate to contact offending is that he does not have an antisocial borderline personality disorder or substance abuse issues, which commonly accompany an escalation of sexual offending.Consideration It is the Attorney-General’s submission that Mr Colangelo should be the subject of an EDO on the basis of the expert opinions that he is unwilling to control his sexual instincts, as legislatively defined. It is contended that it is appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion to make an EDO having regard to the purpose and object of s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), that being to protect the community from sexual offenders where the risk posed is such that it is inappropriate for them to be released. Whilst Mr Colangelo has not committed a contact offence, the number and diversity of his offences, and his failure to meaningfully respond to the extensive therapy that he has undertaken, mean that absent an EDO the risk that he poses is unacceptable. It is the Attorney-General’s submission that whilst Mr Colangelo’s chromosomal disorder, communication issues and ASD may explain the circumstances in which he now finds himself, they in no way mitigate his risk. Counsel for Mr Colangelo contends to the contrary, that is that given there is now a greater understanding of the complex issues facing Mr Colangelo, his risk is more open to management within the community. It was also submitted on behalf of Mr Colangelo that care must be taken about any assumption being made about the risk of his conduct escalating to contact offending. Whilst it was accepted that offences involving CEM are serious offences, they do not expose the community to the same immediate risk, as compared to other forms of sexual offending. Further, that the risk of Mr Colangelo engaging in these sorts of offences can be effectively ameliorated by the imposition of an ESO with strict conditions. The startling point for the determination of this application is that pursuant to s 57 of the Sentencing Act2017 (SA) a relevant offence includes an offence under s 63 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). Here, the relevant offence is disseminating CEM. It follows that it was the intention of Parliament to make those who have committed such an offence liable for the imposition of an EDO regardless of whether or not they have additionally committed a contact offence against a child. The fact that the criminal conduct in question is captured as a relevant offence does no more, however, than enliven the power of the Attorney-General to make an application for an EDO. It says nothing about whether or not the Court should, in fact, make such an order. The threshold question to be answered in the affirmative, before such an order can be made, is whether the offender who is the subject of the application is either incapable of controlling or unwilling to control his or her sexual instincts.