Attorney-General (SA) v GS - [2025] SASC 142

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)

ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v GS
[2025] SASC 142
Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Kimber
29 August 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS - DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDER
On 13 March 2025, the respondent was made subject to an interim supervision order pursuant to s 9 of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (the Act). The respondent is also subject to an application by the Attorney-General for a detention order pursuant to s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) and the respondent is next before the Court on 15 October 2025 with respect to the applications for an extended supervision order and a detention order.
Having entered the interim supervision order on 13 March 2025, there is no dispute that the respondent breached conditions of his order by no later than 10 June 2025. The breaches were discovered when a police officer attended the home of the respondent to conduct a search pursuant to s 66M of the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA). Because of the breaches, pursuant to s 17 of the Act, the Parole Board directed that the respondent be detained in custody pending attendance before this Court for determination of whether a continuing detention order should be made.
The Attorney-General submits that the respondent poses an appreciable risk of committing a sexual offence involving a child if not detained in custody. The Attorney-General also submits that the respondent has unmet treatment needs and that if the order is made until December 2026, there will be the opportunity for the respondent to complete the SBC program while in detention. The respondent submitted that the necessary appreciable risk had not been established and, even if it has been, the discretion should not be exercised.
Held:
1.The respondent has breached his interim supervision order and poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not detained in custody.
2.The discretion to make a continuing detention order should be exercised.
3.Pursuant to section 18(2)(c) of the Act, the respondent is to be subject to a continuing detention order until 16 December 2026.

Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA) s 66M; Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) ss 7, 9, 17, 18; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57, referred to.
Attorney-General (SA) v Coaby [2019] SASC 137; Attorney-General (SA) v Drion [2020] SASC 120; Attorney General (Qld) v Francis [2007] 1 Qd R 396; Attorney-General (SA) v GS [2025] SASC 29; Attorney-General v Moyle (No 2) (2019) 134 SASR 257; Attorney-General (SA) v Sullivan (No 2) [2018] SASC 74; Garlett v Western Australia (2022) 277 CLR 1; R v Schuster (2016) SASR 388, applied.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v GS
[2025] SASC 142
Criminal: Application
KIMBER J:

GS (the respondent) is subject to an interim supervision order pursuant to the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (the Act). Pursuant to s 17 of the Act, the Parole Board found that the respondent had breached more than one condition of the supervision order and directed that the respondent be detained in custody pending attendance before this Court for determination of whether a continuing detention order should be made.
The Attorney‑General is a party to the proceedings and submits that a continuing detention order should be made until December 2026. The respondent submits that a continuing detention order should not be made.
There being no dispute that the respondent breached his supervision order in at least some of the ways found by the Parole Board, the issues for me are whether the respondent poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not detained in custody; if so, whether the discretion to make a continuing detention order should be exercised; and, if that order is made, the terms of that order.
For the reasons which follow, I find that the respondent should be detained in custody until 16 December 2026.
Continuing detention orders
Section 18(2) of the Act provides:
(2)The Supreme Court may, if satisfied that the person—
(a)     has breached a condition of the supervision order; and
(b)     poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not detained in custody,
order that the person be detained in custody (a continuing detention order)—
(c)     until the expiration of the breached supervision order; or
(d)     if a further supervision order is made in respect of the person—until the expiration of that further supervision order; or
(e)     for such lesser period as may be specified by the Court.
The matters in s 18(2)(a) and (b) are jurisdictional facts. A finding of the existence of both jurisdictional facts enlivens a discretionary power. If the discretion is exercised, s 18(2)(c)-(e) provide for the orders which may be made with respect to the duration of the order.
The supervision order which has been breached
On 13 March 2025, pursuant to s 9 of the Act, the respondent was made subject to an interim supervision order pending determination of whether an extended supervision order should be made pursuant to 7 of the Act. The respondent is also subject to an application by the Attorney‑General for a detention order pursuant to s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA). The respondent is next before the Court on 15 October 2025 with respect to the applications for an extended supervision order and a detention order.
It is only necessary to set out the conditions of the respondent’s interim supervision order which he may have breached.
Among the conditions of the order are the following:
1.The Respondent must be of good behaviour and obey the conditions of this Order.
….
18.The Respondent must not directly or indirectly contact, attempt to contact, associate with, go near or stay near a child or person under the age of 18 years unless they are with a person approved by the Supervising Officer. The Respondent must sign all required forms and obey the directions of the Supervising Officer about the choice and approval of the approved person. For the avoidance of doubt, this condition does not prohibit contact where it is necessary and incidental to the Respondent performing essential activities of daily living, for example, shopping at a supermarket.
…
21.The Respondent must take all necessary steps to comply with the requirements of the Australian National Child Offender Register (ANCOR).
…
26.The Respondent must not access or use the internet or a carriage service for the purpose of communicating with any person under 18 years or age, or to produce, possess, disseminate, or view child exploitation material, including such material within naturism/ nudism websites.
27.The Respondent must not access the internet, except for the reason of:
·       Banking
·       Navigation
·       Accessing electronic mail
·       Employment
·       Medical emergencies
·       Accessing Commonwealth or State Government services
·       For activities for daily living (such as online shopping)
·       For a purpose approved in advance in writing by his Supervising Officer.
28.The Respondent must declare and produce to the Supervising Officer any computer, tablet, mobile phone, photographic equipment or other electronic equipment that the Respondent purchases, borrows or otherwise obtains within 48 hours of it coming into their possession.
….
30.The Respondent must declare to the Supervising Officer any existing internet user details, including:
a.     email addresses;
b.    internet usernames;
c.     social network usernames;
d.    streaming account details;
e.     online identities, and
f.     any passwords for those services.
31.The Respondent must not create or change any internet user details and passwords unless the Respondent has first obtained the approval of the Supervising Officer.
32.The Respondent must declare any approved new or changed internet user details and passwords to the Supervising Officer as soon as possible, and at the latest within 48 hours of having created or changed those internet user details or passwords.
The breaches
As mentioned, there is no dispute that the respondent has breached the conditions of his order. Having entered the order on 13 March 2025, the respondent did so by no later than 10 June 2025.
The breaches were discovered on 10 June 2025 when a police officer attended the home of the respondent to conduct a search pursuant to s 66M of the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA).
The police officer inspected the phone of the respondent.
The police officer found that the respondent had a Pinterest account. Within the Pinterest search function were past search terms such as ‘mommy baby’, ‘Underwear’, ‘Little niece’, ‘making a baby couple’, ‘beach poses Instagram bikinis’, ‘cute swimsuits for teens bikinis’, ‘modest bikinis”, ‘childrens swimwear’, ‘girls in underwear’, ‘kids in underwear’ and ‘Asian kids’. In addition, activity on the phone reflects that the respondent had visited various browser pages that included ‘young nude girls’, ‘see through undershirt’, ‘young girls in underwear’, ‘young girls in see through underwear’, ‘4+ thousand teen girls in underwear’ and ‘Best 100+ young girl pictures’. The Google search history reflected that the respondent had searched for ‘18+ girls nude’ and ‘young girls nude’ and visited pages such as ‘Best 100+ Young Girl Pictures’, ‘Young Girl Nude by Milton Avery – National Gallery’ and ‘18 Girls & Young Nude Sexy Beauty Pics’. I find that the activity and searches by the respondent breached at least condition 27.
It is not suggested that I can find it established that any child exploitation material was accessed by the respondent because of the use of the search terms above.
Further, the respondent also had images of children on his phone. Those children were clothed and so it is not suggested that I might find those images were child exploitation material.
Examination of the respondent’s Gmail notifications showed that the respondent had created online profiles for Telegram, Tinder, Sex Tinder and Reddit. On the evidence, such notifications are only received when someone has created an account and linked their email address to that account. The respondent also created five adult dating network accounts and, through those accounts, contacted two adults. The respondent also accessed the PornHub website. The conduct just summarised breached at least conditions 27, 30 and 32.
In addition to the above breaches, there are two others.
The respondent had also exchanged text messages with an unknown person. The respondent admits that he received a text message from an unknown number attaching a photograph of a child of about 11 years holding a baby. Both children were clothed. The respondent conducted a search to ascertain the sender and ascertained it was a person in Australia and that the image had been obtained in the USA. To his apparent credit, the respondent reported this to his supervising officer but also said that he had continued communicating with the sender, not knowing if they were a child or an adult. The conduct just summarised was a breach of condition 27.
When the police officer attended the home of the respondent on 10 June 2025, it was discovered that the respondent had installed a doorbell with a camera device. That was a breach of condition 28 as he did not report it to his supervising officer within 48 hours. However, in evaluating whether a continuing detention order should be made, I put that breach aside as there is no suggestion that it had been used to photograph a child and, given that the doorbell had been installed, I am not prepared to find that it had been obtained with that intention.
The respondent’s personal circumstances and criminal history
The respondent is 44 years of age. The respondent has several convictions, the majority of which are for relatively minor offending. However, not all the past offending of the respondent can be characterised in that way. Particularly relevant to whether a continuing detention order should be made are convictions for offending in 2009 and 2015 involving children.
In 2009, the respondent had unlawful sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old girl. The respondent was 28. The respondent and the victim had met by chance and developed a friendship. On 12 January 2009, the respondent phoned the victim and met her at the shops. They walked toward the victim’s house, and, on the way, the respondent had vaginal intercourse with the victim. The respondent then ceased contact with the victim.
Having entered a guilty plea, the respondent was sentenced in the District Court in April 2010. The respondent was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 18 months.
The respondent was released on parole in 2011. However, parole was later cancelled when the respondent failed to comply with reporting obligations under the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA). The respondent had failed to report that he had access to the internet, his internet access details and that he had grown a beard.
In 2015, the respondent committed offences of unlawful sexual intercourse, two counts of gross indecency and attempting to pervert the course of justice. The victim of the sexual offences in 2015 was the respondent’s intellectually disabled daughter. She was 15 at the time of the offences but had been assessed as having the mental age of an average six-year-old. The unlawful sexual intercourse offence was an act of vaginal sexual intercourse. One of the gross indecency counts was committed immediately after that act when the respondent ejaculated on the victim’s leg. The other count of gross indecency was committed when the respondent gave the victim a vibrator. After his arrest, the respondent was subject to a bail condition prohibiting contact with the victim. Just over one year later, the victim retracted her earlier allegations. About four months after doing so, the victim was re-interviewed and alleged that the respondent had made her retract her allegations. That conduct was the subject of the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice. The respondent was found guilty at trial but continues to maintain that he did not commit at least the sexual offences.
For the above offences, in September 2017, the respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for nine years with a non-parole period of seven years. That sentence commenced on 14 March 2016.
Past assessment and participation in treatment programs
As mentioned, an application has been made for a detention order pursuant to s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA). On 13 March 2025, Stein J declined to make an interim detention order pending determination of that application. In her judgment, Stein J summarised past assessments of the respondent and aspects of his participation in treatment. I respectfully adopt significant aspects of her Honour’s summary and supplement it with some additional matters.[1]
[1] Attorney-General (SA) v GS [2025] SASC 29, [13]-[19].
In 2011, a psychologist, Ms Bruggemann, assessed GS for suitability for the Sexual Behaviour Clinic (SBC) program at Owenia House. The psychologist undertook a risk assessment examining both static and dynamic factors. Ms Bruggemann considered GS was an appropriate candidate for treatment at Owenia House with dynamic needs that could benefit from treatment. The SBC program is an approximately 10-month program designed for men who are assessed at above average (moderate-high) and well above average (high) risk of sexual reoffending. The program is administered by the Rehabilitation Programs Branch and has core modules which include program orientation, thinking, emotion management, substance use and addictive behaviours, deviant arousal and fantasy, relationships, victim empathy, offence mapping and self-management. The program is run in a group format, with regular individual sessions for participants alongside this content.
On 29 June 2018, a Department for Correctional Services (DCS) assessment report recommended GS again undertake the SBC program. The report noted that, based on a screener risk assessment conducted via phone link, GS was estimated to be at moderate-high risk of sexual re-offending without treatment and therefore was considered suitable for the SBC.
GS was again assessed for suitability for the SBC program by Ms Feliciotto, senior clinician of the Rehabilitation Program Branch of DCS, on 6 November 2023. The assessment combining static and dynamic variables assessed GS's risk of sexual re-offending to be above average range and equivalent to a moderate-high risk of sexual re-offending without treatment.
GS began the SBC program in custody in January 2024. Concerns were identified with GS's participation, including that GS maintained he was innocent of the offences involving his daughter. Another concern was that GS was having another participant complete materials on his behalf. On 4 March 2024, GS signed a behaviour contract agreement to the effect that he would engage meaningfully in the program, including completing his own work. Notwithstanding that agreement, in later sessions, GS refused to contribute to the group and continued to have another prisoner not involved in the program complete his work. In April 2024, GS withdrew from the SBC without completing the program.
On 9 May 2024, Ms Feliciotto, prepared a report. During the interview for that report, GS said he was unwilling to accept responsibility for his index offending as he would risk being labelled as a ‘sexual predator’. A number of treatment needs were identified.
On 13 August 2024, the Rehabilitation Programs Branch prepared a minute to the Sentencing Management Unit of the Parole Board. The report referred to GS's denial of his index offending. The report noted that should GS be released into the community, the level of input from support services would need to match his high level of need given that his risk of sexual re-offending remained unaddressed. The report contained recommendations, including referral to Owenia House, community-based referrals and close monitoring of GS's domestic relationships post-release with notification to SAPOL of any concerns regarding the safety of his former partners and children. The report stated that consideration had been given to applications for an extended supervision and under s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA). It stated that his index offences made him eligible for extended supervision and s 57 consideration and, if extended supervision was ordered, the focus for supervision should include emphasis on sexual deviance, sexual compulsivity, emotional control and interpersonal aggression, cognitive distortions and his lack of insight into his offending.
On 9 October 2024, a DCS high risk offender review report was completed. The report noted:
[GS] was estimated to be at Moderate-High risk of sexually reoffending and commenced the SBC program in January 2024 however withdrew himself from the program after two months. It was reported that he continued to maintain his innocence throughout the program and refused to contribute as he believed it was irrelevant. [GS] had insufficient time remaining on his sentence to be placed in a future SBC program and as such, had outstanding treatment needs in relation to his risk of sexual reoffending. [GS] was assessed by Owenia House in August 2011 and commenced the program in February 2012. [GS] was incarcerated in May 2012 on a Parole Board Warrant. [GS] did not believe that he needed treatment and that he would never sexually reoffend. [GS] also had treatment needs in relation to his use of domestic and family violence and completed the DFVIP … The post-treatment report noted that [GS] minimised responsibility around his use of violence and viewed himself as a non-violent person. … [H]e had minimal insight into his sexual offending and denied the index offending.
If an ESO were made in relation to [GS], his compliance in the community would be overseen by an experienced Community Corrections Officer (CCO). [GS's] CCO could support him in engaging in psychological intervention to address his outstanding treatment needs in relation to his risk of sexual reoffending and his use of domestic violence. [GS's] CCO could also support him to abide by the conditions of his intervention order and comply with his ANCOR reporting obligations addressing any issues as they arise. The CCO could also encourage the formation of pro-social relationships and encourage [GS] to engage with social supports.
(citations omitted)
Aspects of the approach of the respondent before the Parole Board

Having been arrested following the search on 10 June 2025, the respondent, appeared before the Parole Board on 8 July 2025. Some aspects of the approach of the respondent at that hearing are relevant to the issues before me.
To the Parole Board, as he has consistently done, the respondent denied the offending relating to his daughter. Apparently on the basis that the victim of the 2009 offence was a teenager, the respondent accepted that he was a ‘sex offender’ but denied being a ‘child sex offender’. It is difficult to treat the respondent’s characterisation of himself as anything other than a refusal to accept the gravity of his past offending.
As mentioned, the respondent had images of children who were clothed on his phone. Although that material is not alleged to be child exploitation material, considered in the context of the searches conducted and the respondent’s history of sexual offending involving teenaged girls, that the respondent had such images gives rise to the inference that his sexual interest in teenage girls persists. When asked what his interest was in viewing the images on his phone, the respondent gave a response that does not reassure me that his interest was not sexual. The response was merely:[2]
Nothing. There wasn't any interest at all. It's exactly the same as me walking down the beach, and you're going to say, oh, I'm looking at kids because they're in bathers. Whoopie doo.
[2] Affidavit of Hannah Leahey dated 18 August 2025, page 185.
A brief outline of the submissions
The Attorney‑General submits that the respondent poses an appreciable risk of committing a sexual offence involving a child if not detained in custody. For that reason, and bearing in mind the breaches I have found, the Attorney‑General submits that the jurisdiction to make the order is enlivened and the discretion to make the order should be exercised.
The Attorney‑General accepts that it is not established that the respondent has accessed child exploitation material and that it is not established that the respondent has contacted or attempted to contact a child. Nevertheless, the Attorney-General submits that, contrary to the conditions of his interim supervision order, the respondent has used social networking sites; has accessed images of children; and has accessed websites for the purposes of viewing pornography. While the images found on the phone of the respondent are not child exploitation material, there is no adequate explanation for accessing images of children. Further, the Attorney-General submits that at least some of the searches of the internet set out in [13] above are suggestive of an interest in viewing images of teenagers for a sexual purpose and an inability or unwillingness to control that interest.
In effect, the Attorney-General submits that the interest in teenaged girls revealed by some of the search terms is not limited to those who are 18 or 19 (i.e. – adults).
The Attorney‑General submits that the respondent has unmet treatment needs and that if the order is made until December 2026, there will be the opportunity for the respondent to complete the SBC program. The Attorney-General submits that if the respondent is detained, that program will be available to the respondent commencing in about October 2025 and, if the respondent engages in it, that program will take about 12 months to complete.
The respondent submits that the necessary appreciable risk had not been established and, even if it has been, the discretion should not be exercised. As mentioned, the respondent does not deny that he has breached his interim supervision order. However, the respondent emphasises that he has not accessed child exploitation material; has not contacted any child; and says that the images of children in his possession were, at least in part, related to an interest in purchasing clothing for his niece. The respondent does not accept that he entered any search term which might have provided access to images of children and says that at least some of those search terms were because of his use of a pornographic website in search of adult material.
In the context of his past offending, and what I am satisfied is the respondent’s obvious sexual interest in teenaged female children, I cannot accept the explanation for the photos of children on the phone of the respondent. Given at least some of the search terms, I also cannot accept the respondent’s claim that all the search terms on his phone were because of the use of a website in search of adult pornography.
The respondent emphasised that he had made a substantial effort to complete the SBC program at Owenia House in 2015 while in the community. The respondent submitted that he had completed all but one or two sessions before being remanded in custody. The respondent emphasised that the Attorney-General had submitted that it could be made available to him in the community at about the end of January 2026, a commencement date not substantially later than October 2025.
Participation of the respondent in the SBC program at Owenia House
As earlier outlined, it has been recommended more than once that the respondent complete the SBC program.
It is necessary to say something about the participation of the respondent in the SBC program at Owenia House in the community. It appears that has occurred in 2012 and 2015. In 2012, it seems that participation was frustrated by the respondent being returned to custody for a breach of parole. The Attorney-General does not dispute that the respondent completed 26 of 28 modules of the program in 2015.
While it is to the credit of the respondent that he completed a substantial portion of the SBC program in 2015, more relevant is that, in 2024, the respondent did not engage in the same program and, in 2025, the respondent used the search terms set out in [13] above. Also relevant is that, despite the participation in the SBC program in 2015, the respondent has more recently been assessed to be at moderate-high risk of sexual reoffending.
Consideration
In Attorney-General (SA) v Sullivan (No 2),[3] Hinton J stated:[4]
The power to make a continuing detention order is not a power to punish a person for breaching a supervision order. It is a power to be exercised for protective not punitive purposes. The question is whether the drastic step of incarcerating the high risk offender for the duration of the extended supervision order or some lesser period is necessary to protect the community from an appreciable risk to its safety as posed by the high risk offender. That question is to be answered in the knowledge that the alternative is the continuation of the supervision order, possibly varied. Obviously the risk posed by the offender subject of the breached supervision order must be reassessed in the light of the nature and circumstances of the breach.
[3] Attorney-General (SA) v Sullivan (No 2) [2018] SASC 74.
[4] Ibid, [9].
In Attorney-General (SA) v Drion,[5] Livesey J (as he then was) held:[6]
The authorities to which I have referred suggest that the following considerations (amongst others) are relevant to the determination that this Court must make under s 18(2) of the Act where continuing detention is sought:
1.The purpose of detention is not punitive but protective;
2.When assessing the risk posed by a respondent, it is relevant to re-assess the risk given the nature and circumstances of any breach;
3.It is necessary to identify with some particularity the risk that the respondent poses to the community, before turning to consider whether detention is necessary to adequately protect the community from that risk;
4.In some cases the risk to the community may be immediate and the appropriate response may need to be detention. However, in other cases the risk may be less immediate, but no less profound, and may require detention so as to facilitate different measures associated with intervention and prevention; and
5. The respondent should not be detained for any longer than is necessary to ensure adequate protection of the community.
[5] Attorney-General (SA) v Drion [2020] SASC 120.
[6] Ibid, [68].
Appreciable risk
Consistent with the above, it is necessary to identify with some particularity the risk the respondent poses to the safety of the community if not detained.
I find that there is an appreciable risk that, if not detained, the respondent will take steps to contact a child, likely a teenaged female under the age of 18, and take steps to exploit that child in a sexual way. The respondent may do that using an electronic device, such as a phone. The respondent may do it in person. The respondent may do both. It is well known that the sexual exploitation of a child can have adverse impacts upon a child which are significant and long-lasting. This is the case regardless of how the exploitation is achieved. For those reasons, the respondent poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not detained.
The offences committed in 2009 and 2015 establish that, at the time of those offences, the respondent had a sexual interest in teenaged female children and was prepared to act on that interest. Although the respondent has not accessed child exploitation material, at least some of the search terms he has used strongly suggest that the interest in teenaged female children still exists. Given the offences committed in 2009 and 2015, I reject that the interest of the respondent in utilising search terms which might lead to images of teenagers was limited to those eighteen or nineteen. While the images on the phone were not child exploitation material, the inference I draw from the search terms and the images is that the desire of the respondent to access images of children is greater than any desire not to breach the relevant conditions. I am satisfied that the sexual interest of the respondent in children is such that he is prepared to take risks, even when the possible consequences include arrest and detention. The respondent has been assessed as being at moderate to high risk of reoffending without treatment and has not completed the SBC program.
On the material before me, completion of a program of that type is an unmet treatment need and the approach of the respondent to that program in 2024 is concerning. Despite there being good reason to consider that the respondent has a sexual interest in teenaged female children and that his risk of acting on that interest is moderate to high without treatment, the respondent appears to have been resistant to engaging in a meaningful way in 2024.
It is accepted the SBC program is likely to be available in the community, could commence at a time not materially later than when it can be made available during detention and, in 2015, the respondent completed almost all modules while in the community. That is important, at least as if the respondent is not detained, there will be an opportunity for the respondent to participate in a program that might reduce his risk.
Nevertheless, also important is the current likelihood of completion of that program in the community. Relevant in this context is that in refusing to make an order for interim detention pursuant to the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), Stein J observed that the conditions of the interim supervision order meant that if a condition was breached, the Parole Board was able to return the respondent to custody. As her Honour observed, that provided the respondent with ‘an incentive to engage fully and genuinely in the full knowledge that he faces an application for indefinite detention’.[7] Subsequent events demonstrate that that incentive was not sufficient to prevent the breaches discovered in June 2025. This informs the likelihood of the respondent’s compliance with conditions in the community. I find that the risk of the respondent breaching again is very real. The respondent did so within about three months of entering the interim supervision order. The respondent did so notwithstanding the observation made by Stein J.
[7] Attorney-General (SA) v GS [2025] SASC 29, [45].
The breaches discussed in June 2025 are not the only time that the respondent has shown a disinclination to comply with conditions which might minimise the risk of contact with children in whom he may have a sexual interest and which are in place to protect the community. In 2011, the Parole Board cancelled parole as the respondent failed to comply with reporting obligations under the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA). In 2012, the respondent was convicted of failing to comply with reporting obligations under the same Act just mentioned due to failing to report access to the internet and his internet access details. It is notorious that those with a sexual interest in children commonly use the internet to connect with potential victims.
The discretion
I agree with Hinton J that the making of a continuing detention order is a ‘drastic step’.[8] It is not a discretion to be exercised lightly. I must consider whether the terms of the existing supervision order, possibly varied, are a sufficient safeguard. I must also keep in mind that the safety of the community is the paramount consideration.
[8] Attorney-General (SA) v Sullivan (No 2) [2018] SASC 74, [9].
In Garlett v Western Australia,[9] the majority of the High Court endorsed the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland's decision in Attorney‑General (Qld) v Francis (Francis).[10] In Francis, Keane and Holmes JJA and Dutney J explained, in relation to the choice to be made between a continuing detention order and a supervision order:[11]
The question is whether the protection of the community is adequately ensured. If supervision of the prisoner is apt to ensure adequate protection, having regard to the risk to the community posed by the prisoner, then an order for supervised release should, in principle, be preferred to a continuing detention order on the basis that the intrusions of the Act upon the liberty of the subject are exceptional, and the liberty of the subject should be constrained to no greater extent than is warranted by the statute which authorised such constraint.
[9] Garlett v Western Australia (2022) 277 CLR 1, 41 [105] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Steward JJ).
[10] Attorney-General (Qld) v Francis [2007] 1 Qd R 396 (Francis).
[11] Ibid, 405 [39].
Further, as Hughes J remarked in the Attorney-General (SA) v Coaby:[12]
A continuing detention order is not the only response that can be made to a breach of a supervision order. If the circumstances or nature of the breach does not indicate a failure of the supervision order to safeguard the community, or if the risk has been addressed since the breach, or if the risk can be addressed in another way such as further or different conditions on the supervision order, then a detention order should not be made.
[12] Attorney-General (SA) v Coaby [2019] SASC 137, [19].
The paramount consideration of the safety of the community must be born in mind. As the Full Court stated R v Schuster:[13]
… The effect of making public safety the paramount consideration is that, speaking generally, relatively smaller degrees of risk will outweigh considerations which, even strongly, support release. The exercise to be undertaken by the Court remains a balancing exercise between competing considerations: the difference is the weight required to be given to one of those considerations, namely public safety.
[13] R v Schuster (2016) SASR 388, 406 [80]. See also Attorney-General (SA) v Coaby [2019] SASC 137 at [18] whereby Hughes J considered that the Full Court's remarks were instructive in relation to the operation of s 18 of the Act.
The conditions of the existing supervision order are already stringent. The respondent did not submit that further conditions might be imposed.
The breaches were detected because of the search on 10 June 2025, and it is not suggested that any attempt had been made to contact a child. Those matters might support that the existing conditions are a sufficient safeguard. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that is not the case. Consistent with my earlier observation, it is common that exploitation of a child occurs using a mobile phone; a readily downloaded communication application; or a social networking site. I doubt that it is practicable for searches like that conducted on 10 June 2025 to be done with sufficient regularity to sufficiently reduce the risk of contact designed to exploit a teenaged girl who is a youth. That is particularly so when I am satisfied that the sexual interest of the respondent in such children is strong and has not been successfully treated.
Also relevant to whether the discretion should be exercised is the respondent’s unmet treatment need. As mentioned, given the past approach of the respondent to the conditions of his interim supervision order and other orders designed to protect the community, there is good reason to be pessimistic about the completion of that program in the community. While there is also reason to be pessimistic if an order for detention is made, particularly given that the engagement of the respondent in the SBC program when in custody was demonstrative of an absence of engagement and commitment, that pessimism is not as great if the respondent is in detention. If an order for detention is made, the respondent should have no doubt that engaging in, and completing, that program is vitally important. I recognise that a like warning given to the respondent by Stein J in the context of the application for an interim detention order was ignored, but if the continuing detention order is made, the respondent will be in custody and have less freedom to do as he pleases.
Even putting aside entirely the availability of the SBC program if the respondent is detained and my view that the respondent is a little more likely to complete that program if detained, it remains that the respondent has been assessed as being of moderate-high risk of sexual re-offending; the respondent has sexual interest in teenaged female children; the respondent has demonstrated while on an interim supervision order, through the use of at least some of the search terms found on his phone, that he has either an inability or an unwillingness to control that interest; and has demonstrated, through what I regard as his unsatisfactory explanations for the presence of photos of children and at least some of the search terms on his phone, a disinclination to be honest, thereby increasing the likelihood that his risk will not be successfully monitored and mitigated. For those reasons, notwithstanding it is a drastic step and there is no evidence that the respondent has attempted to contact a child, bearing in mind the paramount consideration of the protection of the community, I find that the discretion to make a continuing detention order should be exercised.
The duration of the order
As mentioned, the Attorney-General submits the order should be made until December 2026. The purpose of that period being the opportunity to complete the SBC program. While, if the respondent is detained, that program is likely to be available to the respondent in October 2025 and takes about 12 months to complete, the Attorney-General submits that an order until December 2026 is appropriate as the additional time will enable a report to be prepared at the end of that program.
In the absence of the application for an extended supervision order being adjourned, it is more likely than not that the interim supervision order to which the respondent is subject will no longer be in place in December 2026. Provided the relevant report ordered with respect to the application for an extended supervision order were available, and unless the application for extended supervision order is adjourned, it is likely a decision would be made later this year as to whether extended supervision should be ordered. While neither the content of that report nor the outcome of the application for an extended supervision order are to be prejudged, unless the application for an extended supervision order is adjourned, either an extended supervision order will be made or there will be no supervision order in place.

The Attorney-General accepted that s 18(2) of the Act did not permit the making of a continuing detention order to a date which is later than the commencement of an extended supervision order yet to be made. In the circumstances of this respondent, the Attorney-General also accepts s 18(2) does not permit the making of a continuing detention order beyond the expiration of the current interim supervision order.
Nevertheless, the Attorney-General submits, and the respondent does not dispute, that the Court is able to adjourn the application for an extended supervision order with the result that the interim supervision order remains in place and to enable the period of detention to be a lesser period than the expiration of the existing interim supervision order. In Attorney-General v Moyle (No 2)[14] (Moyle (No 2)), Hinton J held that such an approach was permitted by s 18(2) of the Act. Hinton J stated:[15]
…How an offender responds to a continuing detention order made in consequence of the breach of an interim supervision order would be highly relevant to the terms of any extended supervision order. I see nothing in the Act that obliges the Court to proceed to determine an application and no reason why the application could not be adjourned. Indeed s 7(6)(f) would support adjourning the application for an extended supervision order where a continuing detention order has been made and the term of such order correlates to the duration of a treatment or educative program that it is intended the offender undertake. I acknowledge that that introduces the possibility of an indeterminate continuing detention order and that it is unlikely that Parliament contemplated such outcome, particularly where a detention order made in relation to an extended supervision could not have a lifespan greater than the order itself. Such possibility will weigh heavily with the Court in the exercise of the powers conferred and it has troubled me in the course of undertaking the construction exercise. However, in the end I do not think it can overcome the strength of Hughes J’s construction or the additional observations I have made. I take some comfort in the fact that a continuing detention order may be varied or revoked and is subject to appeal.
[14] (2019) 134 SASR 257.
[15] Ibid, 262-3 [18].
Section 18(2) of the Act has been amended since Moyle (No 2), but not in a way which means that the approach urged by the Attorney-General cannot be taken.
A continuing detention order until December 2026 would mean that order would be in place for about 16 months from the date of the order against the background of the respondent also having been detained since June 2025. On any view, that is a long period of time. The respondent has not committed any offence while subject to the interim supervision order. As mentioned, the purpose of a continuing detention order is not punitive but protective.
It is appropriate to ask, what period of detention is necessary before the risk that the respondent poses to the community is likely to abate to the extent that his return to the community subject to the terms of a supervision order will adequately protect the community?[16]
[16] Moyle (No 2), 278-9 [72].
The material before me is consistent with the SBC program being appropriate for the respondent. It is to be inferred from that program being appropriate that it provides a meaningful opportunity for the appreciable risk that I have identified being reduced, notwithstanding less than perfect engagement by the respondent in the past. While the same program is available in the community, for the reasons given, I am of the view that it is less likely to be completed if the respondent is on a supervision order in the community.
In the circumstances, I find that the respondent should subject to a continuing detention order until 16 December 2026.
Order
Pursuant to section 18(2)(c) of the Act, I order that the respondent is to be subject to a continuing detention order until 16 December 2026.
I order that the application for an extended supervision order be adjourned to 16 December 2026 but be listed for mention on 15 October 2025.