Attorney-General (Qld) v Australian Industrial Relations Commission

The High Court of Australia considered appeals by the Attorney-General (Qld) and the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations against decisions of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The dispute concerned the effect of a statutory amendment, specifically section 111AAA of the *Workplace Relations Act 1996* (Cth), on pending proceedings before the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. This amendment obliged the Commission to cease dealing with an industrial dispute if it was satisfied that a State award or employment agreement governed the relevant wages and conditions, unless doing so would be contrary to the public interest.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondent unions had acquired or accrued a "right" under the previous legislation, specifically section 104 of the *Industrial Relations Act 1988* (Cth), to have their pending industrial disputes arbitrated by the Commission, notwithstanding the introduction of section 111AAA. This question involved the construction of the *Acts Interpretation Act 1901* (Cth), particularly section 8(c), which presumes that a repeal or partial repeal does not affect acquired or accrued rights unless a contrary intention appears. The Court had to determine if the presumption applied and, if so, whether the amending statute displaced it.

The High Court reasoned that the "right" accrued by the respondent unions was not a right to a particular award, but rather a public law right to have their disputes dealt with by the Commission in accordance with the law as it stood at the time. Drawing on the principles established in *R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd*, the Court held that the words "the Commission shall proceed" in section 104(1) of the 1988 Act imposed an imperative requirement. This duty, the Court found, was susceptible to mandamus under section 75(v) of the Constitution, compelling the Commission to hear and determine matters according to law, rather than to decide them in a particular manner. The Court concluded that the accrued right was the susceptibility to such a writ, and that the new section 111AAA did not displace this accrued right.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the orders of the Federal Court. In their place, the High Court ordered that writs of prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus issue to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. These writs were directed at quashing the Commission's previous decisions and compelling it to hear and determine the relevant appeals according to law, effectively preserving the unions' right to have their disputes arbitrated under the pre-amendment regime.