Attorney-general (NT) v Maurice

The Attorney-General of the Northern Territory (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory concerning the validity of certain provisions of the *Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976* (Cth) (the Act). The respondent, Maurice, a traditional Aboriginal owner, had sought a declaration that these provisions were invalid and beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament. The core of the dispute revolved around the Commonwealth's power to legislate with respect to Aboriginal land rights in the Northern Territory, particularly in light of the Northern Territory's impending self-government.

The High Court was required to determine whether the Commonwealth Parliament had the constitutional power to enact legislation that would grant Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory inalienable title to traditional lands, and to establish a framework for the protection and management of those lands, even after the Northern Territory achieved self-government. A key issue was whether such legislation was supported by the external affairs power (s 51(xxix) of the *Constitution*) by reason of international conventions relating to human rights and the protection of indigenous peoples. The Court also considered the scope of the Commonwealth's legislative power in relation to territories.

The Court held that the *Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976* was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's legislative power. Gibbs C.J., Mason, Brennan, and Deane JJ found that the Act was supported by the external affairs power, as it gave effect to obligations undertaken by Australia under international conventions, specifically the International Labour Organisation Convention (No 107) concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries. They reasoned that the Commonwealth had a legitimate interest in ensuring that the rights of Aboriginal people, as recognised by international law, were protected, even within a self-governing territory. Dawson J, while agreeing with the outcome, based his reasoning primarily on the Commonwealth's power to make laws with respect to territories (s 122 of the *Constitution*). The Court emphasised that the Commonwealth's legislative responsibility for territories extended to ensuring justice and the protection of the rights of their inhabitants.

The appeal was dismissed.