arguments. The original contract of 1909 was a schedule of rates contract. In excavation, class 2, the estimated approximate quantity of excavation, namely, 50,000 cubic yards, was in fact greatly exceeded, and by 17th April 1918 reached 210,000 cubic yards. This unexpected development, according to the contractors,
SO changed the character of the work from their standpoint, notwithstanding all counterbalancing considerations, as to make a difference to them of £69,088 5s. 7d. by the date mentioned. The contractors therefore sought from the Government an increase of 16 per cent of schedule rates to operate as from the beginning to the end of the work, if they were to complete it, or alternatively that the Government should take over the work and make compensatory payments and allowances. The Government deputed certain engineers to investigate the position and interview the respondent. The alleged representations were made to the engineers, who reported to the Government and, it may be assumed, based their recommendations upon those representations among other circumstances. That is a considerable concession to the appellant, because as to the most important of the alleged representations, namely, an absolute loss of £60,000, the recommendations of the engineers not only did not expressly rest upon it, but were, on the contrary, expressly stated not to be based on any definite amount of loss. Passing that by, however, it appears that the Cabinet, after Ministers had individually received copies of the engineers' recommendations, appointed a sub-committee of its members to finally decide what should be done with respect to those recommendations. The sub-committee consisted of Mr. Hall, Attorney-General, Mr. Garland, Minister of Justice, and Mr. Grahame, Minister of Agriculture. These gentlemen decided to accept the recommendations, and deputed Mr. Grahame to sign the contract.
Learned counsel for the Crown contended that, inasmuch as, upon the assumptions SO far made, the false representations were made to the Crown officials to procure a favourable recommendation, the respondent knowing the recommendations would have weight with the Ministry and those recommendations having in fact been adopted by the Government, the misrepresentations must be held to vitiate the ultimate bargain contemplated by the respondent. That might