Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Klewer (No 3) - [2010] NSWSC 9

No judgment structure available for this case.

CITATION: Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Klewer (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 9

HEARING DATE(S): 11 May 2009 to 20 May 2009, final submissions 18 December 2009

JUDGMENT DATE :
5 February 2010

JUDGMENT OF: Harrison J

DECISION: Until further order:
1. Order that the defendant shall not, without the leave of the Court, institute any legal proceedings in any Court.
2. Order that any legal proceedings instituted by the defendant before the making of order (1) shall not be continued without the leave of the Court.

CATCHWORDS: PRACTICE – Supreme Court Act 1970 s 84(1) – where defendant engaged in sixty separate proceedings or applications against manifold defendants in the Local Court, the District Court, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court and elsewhere – proceedings to restrain - whether defendant habitually and persistently and without reasonable cause instituted vexatious legal proceedings – orders made restraining the defendant from commencing or continuing any legal proceedings without the leave of the Court.

LEGISLATION CITED: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Companion Animals Act 1998
Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001
Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001
Evidence Act 1995
Impounding Act 1993
Land and Environment Court Act 1979
Mental Health Act 1990
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)
Supreme Court Act 1970
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (UK)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930 (WA)
Victims Compensation Act 1996

CATEGORY: Principal judgment

CASES CITED: Armidale City Council v Connell [1997] NSWLEC 127
Attorney General v Bar-Mordecai [2005] NSWSC 142
Attorney-General v Michael [1999] WASCA 181
Attorney-General v Van Reesema (1986) 43 SASR 170
Attorney General v Vernazza [1960] 1 QB 197
Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481
Attorney General for the State of Victoria v Horvath, Senior [2001] VSC 269
Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VSC 314
Attorney General for New South Wales v Solomon (1987) 8 NSWLR 667
Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Bhattacharya [2003] NSWSC 1150
Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Klewer (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 454
Attorney General of New South Wales v Klewer [2003] NSWCA 295
Attorney-General (NSW) v Betts [2004] NSWSC 901
Crown Solicitor for the State of Western Australia v Michael (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Wheeler J, 30 July 1998, unreported)
Donnelly v Capricornia Prospecting Pty Ltd [1999] NSWLEC 39; (1999) 102 LGERA 310
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125
Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478
Jones v Skyring [1992] HCA 39; (1992) 109 ALR 303
Lohe v Bird [2004] QSC 23
Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2004] SASC 302
Public Trustee v Gittoes aka Caldar [2005] NSWSC 373
Ramsey v Skyring [1999] FCA 0907; (1999) 164 ALR 378
Re Cameron [1996] QCA 37; [1996] 2 Qd R 218
Re Chaffers; Ex parte Attorney General (1897) 76 LT 351
Valassis v South Sydney City Council [1996] NSWLEC 232; (1996) 92 LGERA 275
Walton v Klewer [2005] FMCA 878

PARTIES: Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Lucy Patricia Klewer (Defendant)

FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2006/262000

COUNSEL: K G Oliver (Plaintiff)

SOLICITORS: I V Knight, Crown Solicitor (Plaintiff)

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION

HARRISON J

5 February 2010

2006/262000 Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Lucy Patricia Klewer
JUDGMENT

1 HIS HONOUR: The Attorney General seeks two orders pursuant to s 84 of the Supreme Court Act1970. First, that Ms Klewer not institute any legal proceedings in any court without leave and secondly, that if she does so before that order is made, the proceedings not be continued by her without leave. All of the factual material referred to below upon which the Attorney General relies in pursuit of these orders is either referred to in, or annexed or exhibited to, the affidavit of Yi Chen sworn on 5 April 2006 and the affidavit of Jessica Brown sworn on 8 May 2007. Ms Klewer required neither deponent for cross-examination and took no objection to any part of their evidence.

Some preliminary matters

2 On 25 November 2009 Ms Klewer sent a notice of motion to my chambers by fax in which she sought the following orders:

"1. That the main proceedings be permanently stayed and dismissed.

Or in the alternative;

2. The summons dismissed but the defendant gives an undertaking to the court that she notifies the plaintiff in the event she commences fresh proceedings in any NSW court or tribunal.

3 This was not the first such application made by Ms Klewer. She has made other applications in identical or cognate terms from time to time during at least the period since this matter first came before me for hearing in early 2008. As far as I can determine, the earliest such motion was actually filed as long ago as 22 November 2006. Similarly framed motions seeking either or both a stay or dismissal of the whole proceedings were also filed by Ms Klewer on 30 November 2006, 1 June 2007, 28 November 2007, 11 and 12 December 2007, 26 May 2009 and 18 August 2009. In essence, Ms Klewer has repeatedly sought what amounts to summary disposal of the Attorney General's claim for relief against her in the proceedings. Ms Klewer ultimately filed her latest motion in a regular way on 7 December 2009. In due course the application came before McDougall J on 19 January 2010 as the vacation judge, when his Honour took the view that I should hear it.

4 In making these applications, Ms Klewer has had scant, if any, regard for the rules or procedures of this Court, and even less regard for the need to present a case supported by evidence to establish it according to the law. In essence, Ms Klewer's motion appears to be predicated upon the unestablished contention that the Attorney General's case against her is hopeless, and that she can demonstrate it by simply saying so. This attitude has led Ms Klewer on numerous occasions with considerable associated indignation to berate me for having taken the not incautious approach of treating these applications as submissions in opposition to the case that is put against her. I have attempted consistently to adopt that course with respect to Ms Klewer's similar applications in the past and I intend to take the same approach in response to the latest one.

5 I am confirmed in the wisdom of that approach by what Ms Klewer has somewhat revealingly included in her supporting affidavit. The following paragraphs are instructive:

"1. On 30/10/09, his Honour, Harrison J made orders that I prepare and file submissions in response to the plaintiff's submissions by 18 December 2009.

6 It is neither convenient nor necessary presently to set out the long and troublesome history of these proceedings to date. It is sufficient to observe that Ms Klewer has never come to terms with the fact that she would ultimately have to confront the Attorney General's application for the orders that are sought. She has assiduously attempted to avoid doing so by manifold applications of every type including seeking adjournments or venue changes for no good purpose and without proper support. Earlier judgments that I have delivered, as well as those of other judges in this Court and elsewhere, bespeak recognition of this attitude in high volume. Ms Klewer's latest edition of the application is an example of this. She has had since the commencement of these proceedings more than sufficient time within which to assemble and file any relevant evidence on the substantive issues that she wished to rely on but she has not done so. Ms Klewer has instead directed the vast bulk of her not inconsiderable energies to irrelevant matters, with the apparent intention of promoting largely repetitive and unmeritorious interlocutory points at the expense of the main issue. The two-week hearing conducted before me, in Coffs Harbour in May 2009 to suit Ms Klewer's convenience, was significantly affected by just such an approach. She cannot now reasonably expect that she will be able to forestall the final determination and adjudication of the principal proceedings again in order to prepare a defence that she has ignored to date.

7 I should also record that Ms Klewer has, at least in the time of my involvement with this action, chosen regularly to engage in a stream of correspondence by fax to me directly or most usually to my Associate, and to call my chambers regularly by telephone, at almost every critical stage in the proceedings or more significantly when Ms Klewer finally appreciated that she needed to respond in some way to steps that the Attorney General was taking or contemplating to advance the matter. This has created considerable disruption and confusion to the orderly and traditional conduct of adversarial legal proceedings.

8 The latest manifestation of this trend occurred on 3 February 2010. My Associate wrote to the parties on 2 February 2010 to inform them that Ms Klewer's latest application for a permanent stay or dismissal of the proceedings, referred to at [2] above, would not be allocated any court time but would be dealt with in the course of these reasons. This resulted in a response from Ms Klewer by fax in the following terms:

always

9 One side effect of this approach is that three lever arch folders of predominantly handwritten correspondence, which for the most part has not entered the contest in an easily understood or traditional way, now augment the file. Ms Klewer has on many occasions required instantaneous responses to this material in circumstances where the attitude of the Attorney General has not always been easy to establish in a similar time frame. The most recent application for orders permanently staying the proceedings originally came to my attention in this unorthodox way. It became administratively impossible to keep track of what documents Ms Klewer intended to file as process and to rely upon in support of one or other of her many applications, and those that she intended only to be sent as correspondence. Interlocutory hearings regularly conducted by telephone hook up to Ms Klewer's home number in Coffs Harbour in order to suit her convenience became the rule rather than the exception. Documents that Ms Klewer wished to rely on or tender therefore invariably arrived in my chambers by fax on the morning of the hearing or occasionally on the previous evening and in circumstances where the Attorney General's attitude to their use in the proceedings could not always be known beforehand.

10 I have formed the view that Ms Klewer's latest application that the proceedings be summarily dismissed or permanently stayed is misconceived and that any further delay in the final disposition of this case for the purpose of considering it is unwarranted. I also consider, having regard to the history of this matter, that her reinvigoration of this application would amount to an abuse of the process of the court if it were intended by Ms Klewer that I should deal with it otherwise than as a submission by her in aid of her defence of the principal proceedings. That is how I propose to treat it.

11 I also note that on 30 October 2009 when I ordered that Ms Klewer file her final written submissions by 18 December 2009, she effectively acknowledged and accepted that the proposed date was suitable to her in all of the circumstances. The subsequent affidavit material quoted earlier, in which no complaint is raised about what was proposed, is a tacit recognition by Ms Klewer of that fact. Moreover, the transcript of 30 October 2009 contains a very instructive and compelling summary of what I intended should occur in this litigation, and by when, in order that I could be in a position to deliver my judgment today as indicated. It included the following exchanges:

"HIS HONOUR: Mrs Klewer, I am going to go back over what happened in Coffs Harbour.

DEFENDANT: But, it does have to happen.

HIS HONOUR: It does not have to happen. This is adversary litigation and it came to an end in Coffs Harbour and I should have delivered my judgment by now but for a series of applications faxed to my chambers, which I have taken account of, having regard to the fact that you have been unrepresented. But the time has come now for the matter to be determined once and for all.

DEFENDANT: I know your Honour wants to get rid of it, but unfortunately my health was an issue--

HIS HONOUR: Ma'am, I am not going to talk about your health any more. You made an application about that and you know what the outcome of that was. You did not appeal against my decision. My hands are tied on that issue, do you understand?

*****

HIS HONOUR: Just hold on. I have indicated that I will be proposing to deliver my judgment in this matter, subject to whatever happens otherwise today, on 5 February next year. Are you now applying to, or indicating that you would like to, put on some written submissions before then?

DEFENDANT: I have to.

HIS HONOUR: It is not a question of whether you have to, want to, or need to. Is it your contention that you would like to do so?
DEFENDANT: All right. Yes.

HIS HONOUR: You would?

DEFENDANT: Yes. Thank you.

HIS HONOUR: By when would you want to put those submissions on?

DEFENDANT: When is the latest you would allow me to, only because I've got commitments to family, so I can only do them in dribs and drabs, and hopefully--

HIS HONOUR: I do not want dribs and drabs.

DEFENDANT: No. Here.

HIS HONOUR: I see. I would want them by no later, assuming I come to the view that you should do that, by no later than the last day of term this year, which will be 18 December. So, they would have to be on by 18 December.

12 It was in these circumstances that I formed the view I should proceed to formulate and finally deliver my reasons for judgment on the substantive issues without further delay beyond 18 December 2009.

Proceedings commenced by Ms Klewer relied upon by the Attorney General

13 Ms Klewer instituted twenty-two separate proceedings in the Local Court. Twelve were dismissed, three were withdrawn, six were withdrawn and dismissed and one was stayed. None of these proceedings resulted in a decision in her favour.

14 Ms Klewer instituted seventeen proceedings in the District Court. One only out of seven resulted in the quashing of a criminal conviction. One was withdrawn on the basis of undertakings given without admission. The remaining fifteen were either dismissed or resulted in judgments for the opposing parties.

15 Ms Klewer instituted eleven separate proceedings in the Supreme Court. None resulted in a decision in her favour. Eight were determined adversely to her and three were discontinued.

16 Ms Klewer instituted ten proceedings in the Court of Appeal. None resulted in a decision in her favour. Six were dismissed, three were discontinued or were deemed to have been discontinued, and one appears currently to remain inactive.

17 Accordingly, of the sixty separate proceedings instituted by Ms Klewer, she was partially successful in one, and obtained a compromise in another. In the remaining fifty-eight proceedings relied on by the Attorney General, Ms Klewer was unsuccessful, either because the proceedings were decided against her, dismissed, struck out as incompetent, discontinued, or never served. In most instances the proceedings were dismissed with costs.

18 In addition to these proceedings, Ms Klewer has also filed thirteen notices of motion, which can be considered as coming within the definition of proceedings for the purposes of s 84. In this respect in Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478 Yeldham J said the following at 488:

"Section 84 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 is clearly directed to the removal of abuses of the processes of the Court and of hardship to persons against whom vexatious proceedings are taken. While it is probably correct to say that interlocutory proceedings taken in the course of an action instituted by another person which is still current are not within the section, I think, without endeavouring to supply an exhaustive definition, that, where a final decision has been given, any attempt, whether by way of appeal or application to set it aside, or to set aside proceedings taken to enforce such decision, which is in substance an attempt to re-litigate what has already been decided, is the institution of legal proceedings. It is to the substance of the matter that regard must be had and not to its form."

19 Whealy J approved that statement in Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Bhattacharya [2003] NSWSC 1150 at [7].

20 These are the very many proceedings that have been commenced by Ms Klewer upon which the Attorney General relies in support of his claim for orders against her pursuant to s 84(1). The extensive written submissions filed by the Attorney General refer to these numerous proceedings in minute detail. They draw upon the equally extensive affidavit material filed by him that annexes or exhibits what appears to be every, or almost every, significant and relevant document that has been produced, or describes or refers to every, or almost every, significant and relevant event that has occurred, in the course of these numerous sets of proceedings.

21 Ms Klewer has been in possession of these submissions and the supporting affidavits for some considerable time. They were in her possession well before the hearing in Coffs Harbour in May 2009. She has chosen neither to file evidence to contradict the material tendered by the Attorney General nor has she taken any valid objection to it. It seems to me therefore to be an appropriate course to adopt that I incorporate the Attorney General's submissions and extracted evidentiary material, with appropriate but limited modification, in these reasons in order to facilitate Ms Klewer's understanding of the way that I have approached consideration of the case. Unfortunately that has meant that more, rather than less, detail of the various proceedings under consideration has had to be included in these reasons. That has inevitably and regrettably meant that this judgment is longer than it might ideally have been in different circumstances. For example, a judgment could have been produced more efficiently if Ms Klewer had filed her own evidence and written submissions, or at least responsive oral submissions, which refined or identified the real issues in dispute.

22 The relevant proceedings are hereafter considered in jurisdictional categories. Because there is a degree of overlap between a number of the various sets of proceedings, including appeals to higher courts, some inevitable repetition and duplication arises in what follows. It is also convenient to refer to these proceedings simply by plaint number alone, as the reference to the substance of the matters sufficiently identifies them.

Proceedings instituted in the Local Court

Proceedings 165 of 1994

23 On 1 June 1994 Ms Klewer laid an information charging Mark Wertz with entering enclosed lands. Ms Klewer prosecuted the charge on 12 July 1994 and in the course of the hearing it transpired that the correct defendant should have been John Wertz, the father of Mark Wertz. Ms Klewer declined to withdraw the three charges and they were subsequently dismissed. Ms Klewer was ordered to pay Mark Wertz's costs.

Proceedings 105 of 1995

24 On 22 June 1995 Ms Klewer prosecuted Andrew Martin, a police officer, for assault. Ms Klewer failed to convince Magistrate Doring beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Martin used excessive force in the course of arresting her for traffic offences, and the information was dismissed with costs. Ms Klewer's legal representative submitted that she was in receipt of social security payments and the Magistrate gave Ms Klewer three months to pay those costs. The Magistrate said, in the course of dismissing the proceedings, that:

"It is clear from [Ms Klewer's] own evidence that she didn't fully co-operate with the Constable or comply with her obligations under [section] 5 of the Motor Traffic Act. In cross-examination she agreed Martin had asked her for her full name and place of abode and that she refused to give such. . . Obviously even on [Ms Klewer's] own evidence [she was] not complying with the obligation placed upon a driver under [section] 5 of the Motor Traffic Act . . .

*****

It was then after some further conversation that [Ms Klewer] made the unilateral decision to drive off which she did. . . . So it's open to suggest it was not unreasonable for the Constable to seek there and then to continue with the matter by, in fact, following Ms Klewer as he did.

*****

25 A subsequent appeal to the District Court against the Local Court costs order was dismissed with costs. A further appeal from the decision of the District Court to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed with costs.

Proceedings 17/96 of 1994

26 This was an application by Ms Klewer for an apprehended domestic/personal violence order against Mark Wertz. In the information and summons dated 26 July 1994 signed by Ms Klewer she alleged that Mr Wertz had:

"... on numerous occasions damaged the nature strip in front of [her] property. [He] has thrown excess timber, cement and soil onto [her] property in the course of his constructing a retaining wall. [He] interferes with [her] privacy by asking questions of persons on [her] property. [He] also has taken a photo of [her] whilst on her property."

27 Ms Klewer also prosecuted Mr Wertz for entering enclosed lands and both matters were heard together. At the conclusion of the evidence called by Ms Klewer, Mr Wertz submitted that no prima facie case had been established. In relation to both matters Magistrate Doring was not satisfied that the evidence before him reached the standard required and dismissed them. In relation to the charge of entering enclosed lands Magistrate Doring noted as follows:

"With respect [to] the authorities, as I understand the authorities, and on that definition of what is required to be shown so far as enclosed lands, there is [no] evidence that the lands were enclosed. Ms Klewer has got to fail on that basis."

28 In relation to the AVO Magistrate Doring observed:

"... she has not seen Mr Wertz in fact do any damage to the nature strip. I can understand her belief, but belief is not evidence. So there is no evidence that I can utilise relative to damage to [the] nature strip because she has not seen Mr Wertz do anything. . . . She did seem to suggest that it was Mr Wertz, it was not spelt out and it was not specifically tested in cross-examination that she actually physically saw him do this..."

Proceedings 4 of 1996

29 This was a prosecution by Ms Klewer of Pauline Brown-Paul for offensive language. Ms Brown-Paul was a nurse at Coffs Harbour Base Hospital. The information and summons signed by Ms Klewer are each dated 26 April 1995. This was the day immediately following an incident at the hospital that resulted in a police prosecution pursuant to which Ms Klewer was herself convicted at Grafton Local Court on 12 March 1996 of using offensive language towards Ms Brown-Paul. Ms Klewer's subsequent appeal to the District Court against her own conviction was dismissed. Ms Klewer alleged that Ms Brown-Paul:

"… did use offensive language in a public place, to wit, the Treatment room of the accident emergency unit, at Coffs Harbour Base Hospital, 'why are you being such a paranoid about all this; yes you are paranoid about all of this'."

30 At a directions hearing on 16 May 1995 Ms Klewer wrote to the court indicating that she would be late. On 24 October 1995 Ms Klewer requested that the matter be listed

". . . for consideration by Magistrate Doring on the question of disqualification".

31 On 17 November 1995 a court information sheet records that Ms Klewer was "unable to attend – car trouble", and that she sought a hearing date in January or February 1996. On 20 November 1995, prior to a directions hearing on 21 November 1995, Ms Klewer wrote to the court indicating that she had "transport problems". On 12 February 1996 Ms Klewer withdrew the information, which was accordingly dismissed.

Proceedings 591167 of 1997

32 This was an application by Ms Klewer for an AVO against David Malcolm, her former solicitor. It was filed at Lismore Local Court. In a complaint and summons signed by her and dated 21 February 1997 Ms Klewer stated:

"2. In May 1994 the defendant said to the complainant 'If I wasn't a solicitor I'd have you hit for non-payment of the debt' or 'I'll send the police to get you'. By this remark the [complainant] believed the defendant may resort to violence to recover the debt."

3. In March 1996 the defendant approached the [complainant] within Grafton Court and behaved in an aggressive manner in the presence of the daughter of the [complainant] causing her to become frightened and concerned . . .

33 On 23 June 1997 Ms Klewer sent a facsimile to Lismore Local Court stating that she was unable to attend court on 27 June 1997. She said:

"The reasons include that my motor car has to undergo certain repairs before I can travel to Lismore and back. Another reason is that even if I did travel the distance and by some chance I happen to be late getting there even by a few minutes, you may dismiss the matter, as you are well aware madam this was the case on the 8-2-97 at Casino."

34 The following day Mr Malcolm sent a facsimile to the court stating he had received a copy of Ms Klewer's facsimile and that he opposed what appeared to be Ms Klewer's adjournment application. Magistrate Barkell heard the application on 27 June 1997. In Ms Klewer's absence the application was dismissed with costs.

Proceedings 43 of 1997

35 This was another application by Ms Klewer for an AVO against David Malcolm. This time the complaint was filed at Bellingen and made returnable at Kempsey Local Court. In a complaint and summons signed by her and dated 4 September 1997 Ms Klewer stated:

"2. In May 1994 the defendant in a phone conversation … said 'I'll have to hit you for not paying the debt'. When asked to repeat the threat the defendant did so.

3. In 1996 the defendant approached the [complainant] in Grafton and behaved in an intimidating manner in front of her daughter…

4. In Coffs Harbour in [early] 1997 the defendant again approached the [complainant] in an aggressive manner causing her fear and apprehension.

5. In January 1997 the defendant telephoned the [complainant] at home in the early hours of the morning, spoke in an aggressive manner…

36 On 17 November 1997 Magistrate Evans dismissed the application, with costs. In his ex tempore judgment the Magistrate found that Ms Klewer had not been harassed. He said the following:

"Now I ask rhetorically what chance would a judgment debtor have in many cases if Courts brought about the sanctions of violence orders prohibiting them contacting in any way directly or indirectly or in a case like this it would mean that a solicitor would have to have another solicitor write his letters, or even another firm write his letters of demand and I would think defeat the law …

37 The court allowed Ms Klewer three months to pay those costs. These proceedings appear to be an attempt to re-agitate the grounds of a similar application that had been dismissed by Magistrate Barkell at Lismore Local Court on 27 June 1997.

Proceedings 2775 of 1997

38 These were proceedings commenced by Ms Klewer against Constable Andrew Martin. They raised precisely the same issue in relation to precisely the same facts as proceedings 105 of 1995, which had been dismissed on 22 June 1995. On 5 December 1997 the Local Court granted a stay of proceedings and ordered Ms Klewer to pay the respondent's costs. Ms Klewer then filed a motion asking the court to revoke the stay. On 16 January 1998 that motion was dismissed with costs.

Proceedings 129 of 2001

39 Ms Klewer commenced proceedings 155 of 2001 on 2 February 2001 against Wayne Benson and Ray Benson Motors Pty Ltd. Mr Benson had sold Ms Klewer a car in March 1999. The statement of liquidated claim signed by Ms Klewer stated that she claimed $8,180 in respect of the following cause of action:

"Breach by Ray Benson Motors of section 52 of the Trade Practices Act.

40 On or about 6 July 2001 proceedings 155 of 2001 at Coffs Harbour Local Court were transferred to the Ballina Local Court and given the plaint number 129 of 2001. On 30 July 2001 the proceedings were dismissed in chambers, the court deciding, as had Hulme J previously in the Supreme Court, that it had no jurisdiction to consider on its merits a claim that had already been determined by the Fair Trading Tribunal.

Proceedings 675 of 2001

41 Ms Klewer commenced proceedings 675 of 2001 on 8 October 2001 against Wayne Benson and Ray Benson Motors Pty Ltd. The statement of liquidated claim, signed by Ms Klewer, stated that she claimed $10,635 in respect of the following cause of action:

4. In October 99 the second defendant by its servant or agent engaged in conduct which was misleading and deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive.

5 . [The defendants] contravened Part V of the Trade Practices Act.

*****

7. As a result of the conduct by the first and/or second defendant the plaintiff sustained loss in the sum of $2,200 which she was ordered by the Tribunal to pay the second defendant. Such $2,200 has increased by various orders of the Local Court Coffs Harbour to approximately $4,500 to date.

42 On or about 24 January 2002 the statement of claim was summarily dismissed with costs. In these proceedings Ms Klewer sought to re-agitate virtually the same issues dealt with in proceedings 129 of 2001 and, like proceedings 129 of 2001, they sought to re-agitate some of the same issues that had been determined by the Fair Trading Tribunal in proceedings MO99/648 in respect of which Ms Klewer had previously sought to appeal, unsuccessfully, to the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

43 On 8 February 2002 Ms Klewer sought a stay of the court's orders, together with an order that:

"The above claim be allowed to proceed upon the grounds that:

1. such a claim is valid.

44 In an "affidavit" made by Ms Klewer that accompanied her notice of motion seeking a stay, she stated:

"1. I could not attend the Notice of Motion hearing by the defendants on the 24/01/02 where they sought orders to stay or strike out my claim against them.

2. Reason being (a) I am greatly intimidated by Magistrate Rheimer (who was to hear the motion) because as far as I am concerned he does not follow the rule of law, this is evidence on 3 occasions in recent months in an AVO matter involving a young person called Shane West and myself. (b) The Local Court magistrates at Coffs Harbour have been prevented by the Deputy Chief Magistrate at the Downing Centre Local Court to hear my matters. (c) Mr Rheinberger LCM chose to move a civil case to the Downing Centre on his own volition as a result of problems I have with the Registrar at Coffs Harbour, as well as the presiding magistrates in the area.

45 It would appear that the motion was ultimately abandoned. When it was listed for hearing on 5 March 2002 Ms Klewer filed an application for its re-listing on a later date on the stated grounds that "the applicant attends school each Tuesday". Annotations on the application for re-listing indicate that the request for re-listing was refused. The matter was thereafter twice adjourned, apparently on each occasion by reason of Ms Klewer's non-attendance. On the second adjourned date of 1 May 2002 it does not appear to have been adjudicated.

Proceedings 46535 of 2001

46 These proceedings originated in two informations sought to be issued by Ms Klewer against Ian Walton (the principal of John Paul II College at Coffs Harbour) and Jamie Skinner. In relation to Mr Walton Ms Klewer alleged that he grabbed her by the left arm and moved her from the end of the administration desk at the John Paul II College. She said that at the time she was attempting to call the police to attend the college in relation to an incident in which her son had sustained a head injury. In relation to Jamie Skinner (apparently a child) Ms Klewer alleged that he pinched and injured her son Robert on the head. She alleged that Jamie Skinner said to her son, "I am going to get you, I will kill you", and that her son had not been able to attend school since that time.

47 Informations and draft summonses were apparently presented on 16 March 2001. The court refused to issue either summons. In a letter to Ms Klewer dated 22 March 2001 the Office Manager of the Coffs Harbour Local Court stated:

"The reasons for refusing to issue Summonses…are because in the matter against Jamie Skinner another authorised Justice and senior staff member from this office… had previously considered and dealt with that matter. I am not prepared to entertain this matter further as I consider it to be "Justice shopping".

In relation to the matter against Ian Walton I am not satisfied on the information supplied that the actions of Ian Walton were of such a nature as to cause immediate fear of violence and therefore prima facie no assault has occurred.

48 It seems that, on the day immediately following Mr Walton's notification to Ms Klewer that her son Robert would not be readmitted to the school, Ms Klewer sought to re-enliven her assault charge against him by means of a complaint to the police, as a result of which she was herself charged (and ultimately acquitted) of laying a false complaint. It would appear that, in order to commence her prosecution of Mr Walton for assault, Ms Klewer resorted to laying an information before a Justice of the Peace in Sydney at or about the time of laying additional criminal informations against Mr Walton in August 2001. All three informations were ultimately adjourned to the Downing Centre where Magistrate O'Keefe heard them on 10 December 2001. Counsel's cross-examination of Ms Klewer as to the precise means whereby she had caused the summons to issue against Mr Walton on the assault charge elicited what the Attorney General characterised as "evasive and obfuscatory replies", and the questioning was disallowed before a conclusive answer was obtained.

49 The charge was dismissed, and Ms Klewer was ordered to pay Mr Walton's costs of $10,504. In dismissing the charges, Magistrate O'Keefe said of Mrs Klewer:

*****

50 This Court dismissed Ms Klewer's application for orders setting aside the decision of Magistrate O'Keefe with costs. Her subsequent application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against that decision was also dismissed with costs, as was her application for special leave to appeal to the High Court.

Proceedings 46560 of 2001

51 The summons in this proceeding was issued pursuant to one of at least two (and probably three) informations laid by Ms Klewer on 14 August 2001 against Ian Walton, the principal of John Paul II College at Coffs Harbour. The relevant information alleged that Mr Walton had made a false representation in breach of s 547B of the Crimes Act 1900. Ms Klewer's information alleged that on 19 April 2001 Mr Walton:

"... did by means of a signed statement knowingly make to a member of the Police Force, a false representation that an act had been done that is to say, no assault was committed on the informant on the 7th March 01 as she had earlier alleged to Police, which said act had been done was so represented in such statement called for an investigation by a member of the Police Force."

52 Prior to laying this information, on 5 April 2001, Ms Klewer had signed a police statement alleging that Mr Walton had assaulted her on 7 March 2001. As a consequence of that statement, on 15 May 2001 Ms Klewer had herself been charged with knowingly making a false representation to a member of the Police Force contrary to s 547B(1) of the Crimes Act. This charge against Ms Klewer was subsequently dismissed. The charge against Mr Walton was one of three charges against him that were heard by Magistrate O'Keefe at Coffs Harbour Local Court on 10 December 2001. At the close of the informant's evidence, the charge was dismissed on the basis of Magistrate O'Keefe's finding that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the court beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the offence.

53 An appeal to this Court against the decision of Magistrate O'Keefe was dismissed by Master Harrison (as her Honour then was), as was an application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against her decision.

Proceedings 44193 of 2001

54 This was another of at least two (and probably three) informations laid by Ms Klewer on 14 August 2001 against Ian Walton, the principal of John Paul II College at Coffs Harbour. In it Ms Klewer stated that, in breach of s 314 of the Crimes Act Mr Walton:

". . .did make an accusation intending [her] to be the subject of an investigation of an offence, knowing [her] to be innocent of the offence."

55 This charge was dismissed on the same basis as the charge under s 547B of the Crimes Act.

Proceedings 59037 of 2001

56 This was an application by Ms Klewer for an AVO against "the NSW Police Service Coffs Harbour". In her complaint and summons sworn 9 November 2001 Ms Klewer stated that she was in need of protection because she feared "harassment, intimidation, abuse and property damage and total disrespect for the families [sic] welfare". She also stated:

"I fear that unless prohibitions and restrictions are not [sic] placed on the behaviour of the police at Coffs Harbour then further conduct amounting to assault, intimidation, harassment and threatening behaviour may occur."

57 In particular, Ms Klewer stated that:

"On 5/11/01 I faxed S/c Walter at the police station and requested all dealing with us to be by fax and not bang on my glass door and break it."

58 Ms Klewer further stated in her information that:

"Darren Murphy caused bruising to my arm, despite me in February this year officer advising the police I had an injured arm."

59 Although this alleged incident involving Officer Murphy had taken place some eleven months prior to Ms Klewer's AVO application, at the time when she swore this information, Officer Murphy was one of two police officers whom she had named as a defendant in assault proceedings 96 of 2001 filed in Coffs Harbour District Court only six weeks before on 25 September 2002. On 9 November 2001 the Authorised Justice at Macksville, Carmel Gleeson, exercised her discretion to refuse to issue the AVO on grounds that the complaint was frivolous, vexatious, without substance and that it had no reasonable prospect of success. The details of that decision were given as follows:

"The complainant wished to take out 71 complaints, the complainant could not supply dates and details. I believe that the complainant had no reasonable prospect of success and may be vexatious and frivolous."

60 On 27 November 2001 the matter was listed before the Local Court at Coffs Harbour for the Magistrate to determine whether the process should be issued or the complaint dismissed. On 27 November 2001 the complaint was dismissed. It appears, however, that at some time after Ms Klewer filed her unsuccessful complaint, Senior Constable Walter, one of the police officers named in it, was himself successful in obtaining an AVO against her, and that her subsequent appeal to the District Court against this order was dismissed.

Proceedings 12415, 12423, 12431, 12440 of 2002

61 On 22 February 2002 at Bellingen Ms Klewer swore four informations pursuant to which summonses were issued to her tenants, Casey Carter and Michael Carter, to appear in Coffs Harbour Local Court. The charges against each person were for stealing and malicious damage. A month after the informations in these proceedings were sworn, the Residential Tribunal upheld an application by the Carters that their rental bond be set-off against arrears of rent payable to Ms Klewer. It appears that in the course of the hearing of that application the Tribunal also considered Ms Klewer's cross application for relief in respect of property damage.

62 On 25 July 2002 the Coffs Harbour Local Court issued a subpoena in proceedings 12440 of 2002 at Ms Klewer's request to the Coffs Harbour Health Campus for production of all medical and psychiatric records relating to Casey Carter in the preceding five years. On 16 June 2003 all four summonses were withdrawn and dismissed on the basis of orders made by the Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal.

Proceedings 17961 and 17970 of 2002

63 These were applications by Ms Klewer, for herself and on behalf of her children Lisa, Laura, Robert and Ryan, for AVOs against Casey Carter and Michael Carter. In her complaint and summons against Casey Carter dated 28 March 2002 Ms Klewer stated that:

"1. [Ms Carter] maliciously damaged the [property] of [Ms Klewer] whilst her tenant.

2. On several occasions [Ms Carter] has behaved in a hysterical and [uncontrolled] manner causing [Ms Klewer] to fear for her safety and that of her children.

64 Ms Klewer's complaint and summons against Michael Carter stated that:

"1. [Mr Carter] maliciously damaged the property of [Ms Klewer] whilst her tenant.

2. When [Ms Klewer] served the termination of tenancy [Mr Carter] displayed a bul[l]ying attitude causing [Ms Klewer] to fear for her safety and that of her children as [Mr Carter] knows where she lives.

65 These two complaints were made within a week of notification to Ms Klewer that the Residential Tribunal had upheld an application by the Carters for return of their rental bond upon termination of their tenancy. It appears that an application by Ms Klewer for a telephone interim order pursuant to Division 4 of Part 15A of the Crimes Act was refused by Magistrate O'Keefe on or about 9 July 2002. The court file includes what appears to be Ms Klewer's draft notice of appeal to the District Court against such refusal dated 10 July 2002 in which Ms Klewer alleged that:

"Me and my children have good grounds to obtain an interim order to protect us from Michael and Casey Carter".

66 On 17 July 2002 an officer of the court telephoned Ms Klewer and notified her that an appeal to the District Court was not competent. It would appear that on 12 March 2003 Ms Klewer withdrew both complaints.

Proceedings 28337 and 28345 of 2002

67 These were a further two summonses brought in the Local Court by Ms Klewer against the Carters. The informations were sworn by Ms Klewer at Bellingen on 7 June 2002. Each information alleged that on 12 December 2000 the relevant defendant:

"… did dishonestly obtain for the said defendant a valuable thing to wit a quantity of goods ordered to be retained by the Residential Tribunal, by deception, namely that the said defendant was landlord of premises and entitled to the benefit of an order by the said Tribunal."

68 Together with the four charges of 22 February 2002, these two summonses were ultimately withdrawn and dismissed on 16 June 2003 on the basis of orders made by the Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal.

Proceedings 5116 of 2005

69 These were applications by Ms Klewer, on behalf of herself and her children Robert, Ryan and Lisa, for AVOs against Andrew Dykes and Alison Dykes. In her complaint and summons apparently filed on or about 24 January 2005 Ms Klewer stated that:

"1. On 23 January 2005, [she] and her son were shopping… [Andrew Dykes] appeared cranky. [She] then watched as [Andrew Dykes] walked at the same fast pace straight into [her son] Robert who suffers from hemiplegia and loss of vision. Robert appeared startled. [Andrew Dykes] came into contact with [her son's] right side of his head. [Andrew Dykes] appeared indifferent with the apparent assault on Robert. [Andrew Dykes] never apologised and kept going… Police confirmed the arrogant nature of [Andrew Dykes] whilst being interviewed.

2. In late 2002 [Andrew Dykes] made a scene at [her] residence where he accused her 2 sons of throwing rocks at his car whilst driving past. Police later dealt with his complaint and took no action after speaking to (2) adult witnesses who confirmed the wild outburst by [Andrew Dykes] at the time . . .

70 It appears that the application to issue an AVO against Andrew Dykes was initially refused by the court Registrar, Aldo Loprete, on 1 February 2005. The matters thereafter came before Magistrate Lyon on 19 April 2005.

71 In terms Ms Klewer's complaint sought to re-agitate a number of factual and legal issues that had previously been determined against her in earlier Supreme Court proceedings arising from the seizure and impounding of her dogs in 2003. This is referred to below. In the course of the hearing, Magistrate Lyon noted "a perception by [Ms Klewer]" that perjury had occurred in another court". There was no appearance for either Andrew Dykes or Alison Dykes at the hearing. In the course of the hearing Ms Klewer withdrew the complaint against Alison Dykes. The application against Andrew Dykes was refused.

72 Ms Klewer appealed to the District Court from this decision. The appeal was dismissed with costs, as being "frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court's process".

Proceedings instituted in the District Court

Proceedings 22/0308 of 1991

73 This was an appeal to the District Court from a decision of Magistrate Cullen. On 20 February 1991, at the Local Court at Windsor, Ms Klewer was prosecuted for three offences of using offensive language, resisting an officer in the execution of duty and assaulting an officer in the execution of duty. Each information was dismissed pursuant to the provisions of s 556A of the Crimes Act. At the conclusion of the hearing in the Local Court before Magistrate Cullen, he delivered an ex tempore judgment. Among other things he said the following:

"In relation to critical and relevant matters the evidence of Constable Higgins is that [Ms Klewer] was pulled over in relation to an unrestrained seatbelt charge of a child, there being six children plus [Ms Klewer] in the car. The allegation is that there was a boy aged eleven in the front seat and in the rear seat two boys aged ten and two and three girls aged eight, six and four. The boy aged two and the girl aged four were not restrained.

This clearly was a minor traffic infringement that has snowballed to substantial proportions. It certainly was unusual behaviour for [Ms Klewer] to drive from the scene whilst the constable was writing out a ticket, to pull into what she says was a quieter street. I have no doubt that she intended to drive home at that stage and only stopped when the police followed her.

I FIND EACH OF THOSE OFFENCES PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT .

I must clearly say that I don't accept your evidence in relation to police misconduct…

74 Despite the fact that no convictions were recorded, on 15 April 1992 Ms Klewer appealed to the District Court. Judge Karpin dismissed the appeal and confirmed the orders of the Magistrate.

Proceedings 52/0196 of 1994

75 This was an appeal to the District Court from the costs order of Magistrate Doring in proceedings No 165 of 1995. Judge Bell dismissed the appeal, with costs.

Proceedings 52/0218 of 1994

76 This was an appeal to the District Court from Ms Klewer's conviction at Coffs Harbour Local Court on 1 August 1994 on eight charges, namely:

77 Judge Bell heard the appeals at the Coffs Harbour District Court on 13 August 1996. The appeal in relation to driving while licence cancelled was withdrawn and dismissed, and the findings and orders of the Local Court confirmed in all respects. The appeal in relation to using a telecommunications service in an offensive manner was upheld and the conviction quashed. It is to be noted however that his Honour said:

"I think that on the sole basis of resemblance of voice I would not be justified in finding beyond reasonable doubt that it was she who made the call. I do think, as I said, it is very probable that it was made by her but I'm not prepared to make such a finding."

78 However all other appeals were dismissed. In relation to the no child restraint conviction, his Honour noted that "when pressed [Ms Klewer] did not deny that she was indeed guilty".

79 In relation to driving the unregistered vehicle, his Honour said:

"There was a lot of evidence in chief and cross-examination on this point but it can be summarised in two sentences, she claims not to have known whether the vehicle was registered or not and made no inquires. The s 12 certificate indicates that it was not registered in this State and a similar certificate from Queensland is evidence that it was not registered there. The offence must therefore be found proved and that appeal is dismissed and the finding confirmed."

80 In relation to driving whilst licence suspended charge, his Honour said:

"Again there has been a great deal of evidence on this point but it is clear that she did not have a licence."

81 In relation to the conviction for refusing to produce a licence and state place of abode, his Honour found that:

"She also failed, when required to do so at that time, to state her name and address. She concedes that and this is the essence of the offence charged. That appeal is also dismissed."

82 In relation to the charge of resisting an officer in the execution of duty, his Honour held that he did not accept Ms Klewer's explanation of events. Whilst his Honour was delivering his judgment, an exchange occurred between him and Ms Klewer. In the course of that exchange his Honour asked Ms Klewer whether she wanted to be heard in opposition to the penalties that had been imposed in the Local Court. Ms Klewer responded in the following terms:

"My submission would be that you wouldn't impose anything because I mean this guy's guilty as hell and you know, finally I will get justice, if it's not through this Court I will get it through the Supreme Court, but he's not going to get away with what he's done . . .I will not pay them because I'm not guilty…"

83 In his judgment on penalty delivered on 13 August 1994 his Honour said the following:

"The matter did not conclude until approximately 4.30 and [Ms Klewer] at that stage, was in a rush to depart, so before she did so, I adjourned the matter until this morning at 9.30. She announced then and there that she had no intention of attending but I have nevertheless had her name called a number of times … and she has still not appeared. I therefore propose to deal with her in her absence…

Proceedings 52/0157 of 1995

84 This was an appeal by Ms Klewer against an order for costs made at the Coffs Harbour Local Court on 22 June 1995 in consequence of a failure to succeed in a prosecution for assault against police officer Andrew Martin. Judge Johnston dismissed the appeal with costs. His Honour said:

"In cross–examination [Ms Klewer] was cross-examined as to an affidavit sworn by her in examination proceedings here where she listed her assets. I found her evidence on this aspect somewhat evasive and I was not impressed by the calibre of her evidence. However, that is not the be all and end all.

Proceedings 52/0312 of 1995

85 This was an appeal by Ms Klewer from the conviction made and imposed by Magistrate Doring on 20 October 1995 on a charge of assault. The appeal was heard and determined by Judge Wall at the Coffs Harbour District Court on 23 May 1996. His Honour found the offence proved, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conviction.

86 The background to the matter is as follows. The complainant, Sandra Luxford, was an employee of the Department of Community Services. On 7 June 1995 Ms Klewer attended the offices of the Department in Coffs Harbour, with the expectation that she would be attended to by a particular officer. However, she was attended to by Ms Luxford, who informed her that the particular officer that Ms Klewer wished to see would not be attending her that day and that she would be attended by another officer who was the case officer. This led to a confrontation between Ms Klewer and Ms Luxford, in which Ms Klewer picked up a "counter bell" from the counter and threw it, striking Ms Luxford (according to her) on the nose. In his judgment his Honour found:

"In relation to the credibility of the two witnesses who are the critical witnesses in this case, namely Mrs Luxford and Mrs Klewer. Mrs Luxford impressed me as a credible witness. Mrs Klewer did not impress me in a number of respects as a credible witness. Where there was a conflict in relation to their evidence as to where the two of them were standing respectively at the time the bell was thrown I prefer the evidence of Mrs Luxford. I accept Mrs Luxford's evidence that there was abusive language directed towards her by [Ms Klewer] before the bell was thrown. I accept Mrs Luxford's evidence that the appellant showed signs of being very angry at the time the bell was thrown …

In relation to the question of whether or not this conduct which I find on the evidence to be proved to my satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt amounts to an assault I find that the throwing of the bell was intentional. I find that the throwing of the bell was without lawful excuse. I find that it was without the consent of Mrs Luxford and I find that it was thrown out of anger and in circumstances of intending that the bell be thrown in the direction of Mrs Luxford.

Proceedings 52/0086 of 1996

87 This was an appeal in respect of Ms Klewer's conviction on 12 March 1996 for using offensive language on 25 April 1994. The appeal was heard and determined by Judge Freeman at the Grafton District Court on 4 December 1996. It seems that Ms Klewer left the court during the course of his Honour's judgment saying "Oh you can settle it … I'm going". His Honour found the offence proved by the sworn testimony of the witnesses. The appeal was dismissed with costs and the conviction confirmed.

Proceedings 52/0319 of 1996

88 This was an appeal in respect of Ms Klewer's conviction on 11 October 1996 for driving a vehicle in which a child was travelling on a public street, the child not being restrained by a suitable child restraint. Ms Klewer had given evidence that she had ensured that all her children were wearing seatbelts and stated, "when I'm driving I want to make sure they're wearing seatbelts". Exhibit D at the trial was a document in Ms Klewer's handwriting which stated:

"The incompetent officer who issued this infringement on 17 December 1996 [sic] is also a rotten liar, typical police officer, was trained to be corrupt by his superiors, all corrupt police should be sacked".

89 Constable Stimpson had given evidence at the trial and gave evidence that Ms Klewer had said:

"You are just very unprofessional, you are corrupt, what is your name, I'm going to report you, you corrupt cop, I'm reporting you to the Ombudsman . . . you are a crooked cop, you are unprofessional and I'm going to have your job, I have my witnesses, you are going to be liable for this you know, you're a corrupt cop and I'm taking you to the Royal Commission."

90 Judge Garling dismissed the appeal with costs and confirmed the penalty imposed by the Magistrate. During the course of his judgment, his Honour said:

"During addresses it became apparent the Court had not been told the full story…I do not believe [Ms Klewer]. I do not accept her evidence. It is clear that one of her children was not restrained. She gave the impression that she was very careful to ensure that all the children were restrained. She did that when giving evidence and I have just read that evidence out… What she said on page 5 of the transcript was simply not true. The fact that one child was unrestrained and that the officer saw an unrestrained child totally supports his evidence, his version was quite clear.

91 His Honour said that he would consider whether the transcript of the trial should be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions in relation to whether proceedings for perjury should be brought.

Related contempt proceedings

92 At this point his Honour's judgment was interrupted by an "outburst" from Ms Klewer. An extract of transcript titled "Appellant's Outburst" is part of the evidence before me. During the course of this "outburst" Ms Klewer said a number of things to his Honour including the following:

"I don't have to listen to you – you're not even looking at the law."
"I think there's something wrong with you."

"You're supporting lying of an officer because you're on their side."

"We'll see what a Supreme Court Judge will have to say – and what you are doing this for, what's your problem. Trying to be smart."

"I think if anyone is in contempt it's yourself."

93 His Honour then had the Correctional Services Officers remove Ms Klewer from court into custody. His Honour on his own motion subsequently charged Ms Klewer with contempt of court. Ms Klewer was released on bail in the sum of $500, without surety. The contempt proceedings were heard on 5 June 1997. Ms Klewer asked Judge Garling to disqualify himself from hearing the matter. The application was refused. His Honour found Ms Klewer guilty of contempt of court. He deferred passing sentence upon Ms Klewer upon her entering into a recognizance in the sum of $500 to be of good behaviour for two years. However Ms Klewer subsequently refused to sign the recognizance so his Honour revoked the order deferring sentence and instead fined Ms Klewer $1,000 allowing six months to pay. A subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal by Ms Klewer in relation to the contempt proceedings was successful.

Proceedings 11 of 1997

94 This was an appeal by Ms Klewer against a determination of the Victims Compensation Tribunal of 28 January 1997 (Tribunal reference G 96/20131). The notice of appeal filed 25 February 1997 stated as the grounds of the appeal that:

"The appellant was subjected to an act of violence.

95 At all relevant times s 39 of the Victims Compensation Act 1996 was in the following terms:

" 39 Appeals to the District Court on questions of law

(1) An applicant for statutory compensation may, with the leave of the District Court, appeal to the District Court on a question of law arising in any determination of the application by the Tribunal.

(a) within the period of 3 months after the day on which the relevant notice of the determination made by the Tribunal was duly served on the person, or

(a) a determination of whether an injury for which compensation has been claimed is an injury specified in the schedule of compensable injuries or whether it is a compensable injury of a particular description specified in that schedule,

(4) An appeal does not lie to the District Court against a decision of the Tribunal to refuse leave for a late application for statutory compensation.

(5) On an appeal, the District Court may only:

(a) affirm the determination of the Tribunal, or

96 In her affidavit dated 21 April 1998 Ms Klewer sought to re-agitate questions of fact that had been determined adversely to her not only by the Victims Compensation Tribunal but also previously by Magistrate Doring in her Local Court prosecution of Constable Andrew Martin, which she had been stayed from further prosecuting in civil proceedings. The hearing commenced and concluded on 5 May 1998. Ms Klewer's appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs being sought or made.

Proceedings 37 of 1997

97 This was an appeal by Ms Klewer against a determination of the Victims Compensation Tribunal of 10 March 1997. In her application for compensation Ms Klewer had stated:

"On 8 April 1994 [I] was treated at Coffs Harbour Hospital, having lost consciousness in a taxi. Without [my] consent [I] was removed to the Jordan Centre, an annex to the hospital which treats the mentally ill. There [I] was unlawfully assaulted. [I] was assaulted when my clothing was removed in the presence of male staff and male police officers and [I] was forcibly injected with drugs. [I] was then unlawfully detained until the following Monday 11 April when [I] was released."

98 In a statutory declaration dated 24 November 1994 Ms Klewer stated that the police took her to the psychiatric unit after an altercation at a solicitor's office relating to the seizure of her car by the local Sheriff. In its published reasons for the decision appealed from the Tribunal stated:

"I am of the opinion based on the medical record received from Messrs Fisburn, Watson and O'Brien, Solicitors, for the victim, that the detention of the victim was not unlawful. In this respect, I note that Ms Charmaine Redding, Psychologist, who has provided a report on the victim, shares the professional view that the action taken by the medical practitioners as to the detention of the victim 'was warranted'.

Following the victim being dealt with under the Mental Health Act, the provision of appropriate medical treatment would not be unlawful. I also find nothing in the conduct of the police that was unlawful.

The victim's solicitors were invited by letter of 5th December, 1996, to place before the Tribunal any submissions as to how the subject conduct of the doctors and the police constituted an act of violence as defined under section 3(1) of the Victims Compensation Act, 1987. A further follow up request to the same effect was made on this date. However, no such submissions have been forwarded.

99 The notice of appeal stated as the grounds of the appeal from this decision that:

"The appellant was subjected to an act of violence.

100 Judge Kirkham dismissed the appeal on 6 October 1998, and directed each party to pay its own costs. At all material times s 39 of the Victims Compensation Act permitted appeals to the District Court on questions of law only.

Proceedings 52/0316 of 1997

101 This was an application by Ms Klewer for leave to appeal against the dismissal by Magistrate Barkell at Lismore Local Court on 27 June 1997 of the first of two unsuccessful applications for an AVO against her former solicitor David Malcolm. Ms Klewer had sought an order against Mr Malcolm on 22 June 1997, and her application was dismissed with costs when she failed to appear at the hearing. Though not filed until 10 September 1997, the application for leave to appeal was signed on 4 September 1997. This was also the day when Ms Klewer swore a fresh information and summons at Bellingen Local Court for an AVO against Mr Malcolm. Judge Ducker recorded the following words in his judgment:

"The respondent, Mr Malcolm, a solicitor who practices in the Coffs Harbour area, travelled to the Lismore Court on that day and was therefore away from his professional practice. It was [Ms Klewer] who made that trip necessary, yet she failed to appear herself. She wrote a letter to the Magistrate, but did not appear. It seems she has had a history of failing to appear after instituting proceedings. Reference to such behaviour is contained in the documents before me. Furthermore, she failed to appear at this Court, or have anyone else here to represent her on Monday. . . .

I do not accept [Ms Klewer's ] excuse that she was waiting for confirmation of the making of those orders . . . She also gave some very hazy evidence about having sought some further legal advice, I was not impressed by that evidence either. …

There is a tradition in this Court that upon the giving of an explanation on oath by an applicant, unless there are compelling reasons not to, leave to appeal will be granted.
I believe that there are compelling reasons not to grant leave to the applicant. The appellant seems to think the courts should give her some special treatment and allow her to proceed or not proceed according to her whim. . . . I see no reason to be sympathetic to a person who was well aware of the hearing date of a matter, failed to turn up, and then seek to have this Court assist her, long after the time for an appeal has expired. The appellant well knew that the hearing was on. She gives an attempted explanation, which I do not accept for failing to lodge the appeal on time.

The application for leave is itself over two months after the proper date for the filing of the appeal – two months after the order was made and well past the time for the filing of the Notice of Appeal.

102 On 17 March 1998 Judge Ducker dismissed the application for leave to appeal with costs.

Proceedings 52/0434 of 1997

103 This was Ms Klewer's fourth unsuccessful attempt to obtain an AVO against Mr Malcolm. On 21 November 1997 Ms Klewer filed a complaint in the District Court in its criminal jurisdiction pursuant to (now repealed) s 562GA of the Crimes Act. The complaint annexed, and expressly relied upon, Ms Klewer's second Local Court application for an AVO against Mr Malcolm, which had been dismissed with costs. The transcript evidences that Ms Klewer also sought to re-agitate questions that had been decided adversely to her by Judge Ducker in the course of her prior attempt to appeal against the dismissal of her first AVO application in the Local Court.

104 At all material times, s 562GA and s 562GB of the Crimes Act provided as follows:

" 562GA Making of orders by District Court

(1) A complaint by or on behalf of a person for whose protection an order is sought from the District Court must be made within 28 days after the date a Local Court or the Children's Court dismissed the earlier complaint.

(2) The District Court may, without further hearing, admit in evidence any evidence that was admitted in the proceedings before the Local Court or Children's Court.

(3) Further evidence may be given, but only with the leave of the District Court.

562GB Jurisdiction of District Court under this Part

105 In the course of the hearing the transcript records that the following exchange took place:

"APPLICANT: I've got the documents.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you. I'll have a look at it please.

APPLICANT: Sorry, this is not the sealed one.

HIS HONOUR: It doesn't matter, it doesn't matter.

APPLICANT: I've got the sealed one at home. What had happened when I was before Judge Ducker, I failed to look at two documents which support the fact that I did appeal in time.

HIS HONOUR: You see you mention an appeal, there is no right of appeal.

APPLICANT: I didn't know that Sir.

HIS HONOUR: No.

APPLICANT: And it was only because there was cost orders made against me.

106 The complaint was withdrawn upon Mr Malcolm giving certain undertakings (without admission).

Proceedings 52/0530 of 1999

107 This was Ms Klewer's appeal to the District Court in relation to a conviction in the Local Court at Ballina for exceeding the speed limit. The original information and the police statement in the Ballina proceedings established that the relevant speed-reading was taken by lidar instrument that was in correct working order. The police evidence and the original infringement notice issued to Ms Klewer established that on Ms Klewer's own admission she was travelling at 65 km/h or higher in a 60 km/h zone.

Judge McGuire heard the appeal on 9 August 2000. His Honour dismissed the appeal with costs. The appeal papers record:

"In short, the magistrate's orders are confirmed in all respects".

Proceedings 96 of 2001

108 These were proceedings commenced by Ms Klewer against Darrin Murphy, Gavin Brown and the State of New South Wales. The proceedings were commenced by statement of claim issued 25 September 2001. At the relevant time Mr Murphy and Mr Brown were serving officers in the New South Wales Police Force.

109 Ms Klewer alleged that the two defendants attended her residence on 15 February 2001 and assaulted her, aggravating a pre-existing bilateral epicondylitis during what was alleged to be an unwarranted arrest. She alleged that they acted negligently and proceeded knowingly to breach their duty of care thereby causing her injury. She alleged that she suffered nervous shock and permanent injury to her arms, as well as pain and suffering, loss of employment and property damage. She sought compensatory, aggravated and exemplary damages.

110 On 7 November 2002, at the conclusion of a four-day hearing, Judge Rolfe gave a verdict and judgment for the defendants, and ordered Ms Klewer to pay the defendants' costs. In the course of his judgment his Honour said:

"It is apparent from all of the evidence in the case and from my own observations of [Ms Klewer], that she is obsessed about the way in which she has been treated by the police…

There was further evidence before the Court that in 1990 [Ms Klewer] claimed to have suffered problems arising out of an arrest. In 1994 she claimed to have been assaulted by a crazed police officer and again in 1995 claimed to have been assaulted by the police. In 1994 she claimed the Sheriff in this State seized some cars and caused stress. She has also been involved in legal proceedings with the Department of Community Services.

111 As to the evidence of Ms Klewer's then 16-year-old daughter Laura, his Honour found that the language used in her affidavit (which Laura conceded her mother typed) was not the language of a person of her age at the time. His Honour found that the words in the statement "were put into her mouth by her mother and I do not accept her evidence as reliable".

112 As to Ms Klewer's evidence his Honour said:

"I have had a good opportunity to observe all of the witnesses give their evidence in this case. I have already indicated that I do not regard [Ms Klewer's] daughter as a reliable witness. I also do not regard [Ms Klewer] as a reliable witness. I do not accept her version of events. I had a good chance to – I should just interpolate here during the course of giving this judgment, that [Ms Klewer], without the leave of the Court, has simply walked out of Court. This is the second time that this has occurred. On the previous occasion [she] walked out after the evidence was complete and it was necessary for me to adjourn this matter in order to give [her] the opportunity to present submissions, which she did, in lengthy detail, both in writing and orally to the Court today.

Going on where I left off, I regard [her] as an unreliable witness. It is unfortunate, to say the very least, that she appears to have this obsession with members of the New South Wales Police Force. . . .The officers had no cause to mistreat [her] in the way in which she has alleged. I completely accept the evidence that they gave about what occurred when they attended at her residence…

326 The complaint against Alison Dykes was withdrawn. It is not apparent what the substance of the complaint was. Ms Dykes was not apparently involved with the events in the shopping centre that formed the basis of the application for an AVO against Andrew Dykes. In the absence of any explanation from any source for the commencement of the proceedings against Alison Dykes, they would appear to have been obviously untenable and manifestly groundless from their inception.

327 Ms Klewer's summons naming as the defendants Magistrate Pugsen and the defendant that she sued in the Local Court in the proceedings over which he presided were patently doomed to fail. The so-called evidence upon which she purported to rely was expressed in terms of dissatisfaction with the result but did not bring forward any basis of legitimate challenge to it. Ms Klewer would appear ultimately to have appreciated that fact when she determined to withdraw the proceedings. These proceedings were also hopeless from their inception.

328 Ms Klewer's proceedings against Coffs Harbour City Council, with respect to Magistrate Stoddart's decision, were discontinued by her. No reason for this appears in the evidence before me.

329 With respect to the balance of the proceedings commenced by Ms Klewer it is apparent, with a few minor exceptions, that she was unsuccessful in all of them. Lack of success cannot by itself be any reliable measure of the issue of whether or not proceedings are vexatious. However, the loss of proceedings may provide some support for a conclusion otherwise arrived at about whether or not, applying the "so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless" approach to the issue, the particular proceedings are vexatious in fact. This must also necessarily be so having regard to the fact that the relevant inquiry is directed to the subject matter of the proceedings and not to whether they have been instituted vexatiously or to the manner in which they have been conducted.

330 In the judgment of Acting Judge Murray in proceedings 8622 and 8633 of 2002, his Honour remarked, referring to Ms Klewer:

"10. The Plaintiff also has had a long history of litigation."

331 The Attorney General made the following submission concerning Ms Klewer's approach to litigation in general, in the light of this remark:

"11. A striking feature of that 'long history of litigation' is the number and variety of the disputes that have brought Ms Klewer to law, and the corresponding number and variety of persons who have been made parties to litigation at her suit. The evidence upon which the plaintiff relies in these proceedings does not, it is submitted, present the defendant as someone who has pursued a litigious vendetta against just one or a very few persons in the obsessive pursuit of vindication in respect in respect of a single discrete grievance. It is submitted that what the evidence rather establishes is that the defendant is a person who has come to regard litigation, not as a last resort, but as a routine response to conflict."

332 The Attorney General's submissions continued in the following terms:

"12. The earliest proceeding that is relied upon by the plaintiff in these proceedings is a District Court appeal, determined in 1992, that arose from Ms Klewer's prosecution on charges of offensive language, and resisting and assaulting a police officer in the execution of duty. In finding the charges proved, but dismissing the informations pursuant to s 556A of the Crimes Act 1900 , Cullen LCM was moved to remark upon the fact that a '...minor traffic infringement has snowballed to substantial proportions' and that '[t]hese are matters which have of course, as I've said earlier, been blown out of all proportion.'

13. The leniency of Cullen LCM did not arrest from further amplification the snowball that he had identified. In spite of the fact that the decision of the Court had been to dismiss the informations against her, Ms Klewer instituted an appeal. This may perhaps be viewed as one of several manifestations in the evidence relied upon by the plaintiff of an enduring antagonism and sense of grievance on the part of the defendant towards the police. In 2002, Judge Rolfe observed that Ms Klewer was '...obsessed about the way in which she has been treated by the police' and that it was '...unfortunate, to say the least, that she appears to have this obsession with members of the New South Wales Police Service' .

In addition to instituting appeals, which almost invariably have been wholly unsuccessful, against convictions for various offences, Ms Klewer has instituted a number of criminal and civil proceedings in which she has sought, without success, to agitate allegations of misconduct against particular police officers and her local police command generally.

14. In addition to the police, however, the persons against whom Ms Klewer has sought relief by initiating criminal and/or civil proceedings – and in most cases multiple proceedings – include:

(a) her former solicitor, Mr David Malcolm;

(b) a car dealership, Ray Benson Motors Pty Limited, from which she purchased two cars;

(c) the principal of her son's school, Mr Ian Walton, and later the diocesan authorities responsible for the school;

(d) a nurse at the Coffs Harbour Hospital, Ms Pauline Brown-Paul;

(e) the State of New South Wales, acting through its officers of the Department of Community Services;

(f) her former tenants, Michael and Casey Carter;

(g) Local Court Magistrate Rheinberger; and

(h) the Coffs Harbour City Council.

15. The above list, while not exhaustive, gives some indication of the number and variety of independent "streams" of litigation, each arising from a more or less discrete conflict into which the defendant has fallen, and which she has litigated, often through several courts and stages of appeal, with the determination and dogmatism that was observed in 1996 by Judge Freeman, and with occasional success in applications for interlocutory or interim relief, but rarely (and in none of the cases relied upon by the plaintiff) with ultimate vindication. "

16. Ms Klewer's prosecution of Constable Martin for assault is one such case. The circumstances of her arrest by Constable Martin in March 1994, and her consequent conviction on a number of charges, are briefly outlined in the judgment of Acting Judge Murray. These events gave rise to an unsuccessful appeal to the District Court against the finding of the Victims Compensation Tribunal that no act of violence had taken place in the course of the arrest, and also to a stream of criminal and civil proceedings against Constable Martin, none of which was successful.

17. The defendant's involuntary detention at Coffs Harbour Base Hospital in April 1994 also gave rise to a claim by the defendant that she had been subjected to an act of violence. When the Victims Compensation Tribunal found to the contrary, the defendant again sought unsuccessfully to re-agitate her claim in the District Court.

18. The background and circumstances to a protective intervention in June 1995 by officers of the Department of Community Services are outlined in the judgment of Acting Judge Murray … As a consequence of these events, the defendant initiated actions on behalf of herself and her children for trespass and personal injury … that were subsequently litigated, at every stage unsuccessfully, through all levels of the Court hierarchy from the Local Court to the High Court of Australia.

19. A side stream of the 1995 DOCS proceedings was the defendant's unsuccessful appeal against her conviction for an assault on a particular employee of DOCS , Ms Sandra Luxford. The events that led to that conviction are summarized in context in the judgment of Acting Judge Murray …

20. Demands by the defendant's former solicitor, Mr Malcolm, for payment of an outstanding debt, prompted, from 1997, a series of applications for apprehended violence orders, none of which was granted, and one of which was specifically found by Judge Ducker not to have been made bona fide.

21. On 15 February 2001 an altercation occurred between the defendant and a neighbouring couple, Mr & Mrs Gintowt, at a nearby beach. It appears that the cause of the altercation was a dispute concerning the Gintowts' management and control of their dog and that in the course of it the defendant brandished a knife. As a consequence of this incident the defendant was arrested at her home later that day and ultimately convicted of a number of offences. A summary of the conflicting evidence concerning these events can be found in the judgment of Justice Adams dismissing proceedings that were instituted by the defendant with a view to overturning her conviction of those offences. The defendant's further application for leave to appeal [against] that decision appears currently to be dormant.

22.The stream of litigation that arose from the events of 15 February 2001 also included a civil action whereby the defendant sought unsuccessfully to obtain compensation for personal injuries alleged by her to have been sustained as a consequence of an assault alleged to have taken place during the course of her arrest. The conflicting evidence concerning the events of 15 February 2001 was consequently also examined by Judge Rolfe in his Honour's reasons for judgment in the civil proceeding. Judge Rolfe gave judgment for the defendants, and Ms Klewer's subsequent application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

23. On 7 March 2001 there occurred an altercation between the defendant and the principal of her son's school, Mr Walton. The defendant's first response to this altercation was to attempt to initiate private criminal proceedings for assault. Some time after the court registry had refused to issue a summons on the basis of her information, the defendant made a complaint of assault to the police. The police declined to prosecute Mr Walton, and instead prosecuted the defendant on charges (of which she was ultimately acquitted) of making a false complaint. From these events emerged a further stream of unsuccessful criminal prosecutions of Mr Walton in which the defendant added to the original charge of assault, two charges of making false complaints to the police. All three charges were dismissed, but the dismissal of the latter two charges was the subject further unsuccessful applications by the defendant to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal.

24. A side-stream of consequential litigation arose in the federal bankruptcy jurisdiction as a consequence of the defendant's incapacity, or possibly her recalcitrant refusal to satisfy costs orders that had been made in favour of Mr Walton as a result of the defendant's unsuccessful criminal prosecutions. A brief summary of the background of both the criminal prosecutions and the bankruptcy proceedings is consequently to be found in the reasons published by Federal Magistrate Driver when his Honour made a sequestration order against the defendant's estate on 20 September 2005. The defendant currently remains an undischarged bankrupt.

25. A further side-stream of related litigation arose when the defendant commenced unsuccessful proceedings against the diocesan school authorities seeking relief in respect of, inter alia , the cancellation of her son's school enrolment. The circumstances of the defendant's altercation with Mr Walton were consequently again judicially examined by Justice Hall as an element of the background to this claim…

Companion Animals Act 1988

333 It seems to me that these proceedings commenced by Ms Klewer were clearly commenced at least with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom they were brought. In the same context, proceedings commenced for that purpose fall within the description of proceedings that are brought for a collateral purpose and not for the purpose of having a court adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise.

334 As I have already indicated, I have not been given the benefit of any helpful submissions from Ms Klewer concerning these various proceedings about whether they or any one of them had a legitimate, as opposed to a collateral, purpose. (White J was confronted with a similar approach from the defendant in Gittoes: see [113]). It will be recalled that the Court of Appeal judgment in Ms Klewer's application for leave to appeal against the decision of Judge Rolfe included the comment that Ms Klewer was "unwilling or unable to present her case in an orderly manner to answer even the simplest of questions asked of her by the Court". This was also my experience, as the very many pages of transcript will reveal. Ms Klewer could also have given evidence about whether or not she commenced proceedings for a legitimate forensic purpose but she did not do so. This may have clarified what might otherwise appear to a detached observer to be the commencement of proceedings for no good purpose, in the sense that the inspiration for the proceedings was not the achievement of the relief claimed.

335 The proceedings commenced involving David Malcolm, Ray Benson Motors Pty Limited, Ian Walton, Ms Brown-Paul, the State of New South Wales, acting through its officers of the Department of Community Services, Michael Carter and Casey Carter, Magistrate Rheinberger, the Coffs Harbour City Council, Constable Martin, Sandra Luxford and Mr and Mrs Gintowt, and the appeal following Magistrate Cullen's dismissal of proceedings against her without recording a conviction all in my opinion fall into this latter category. I consider that these proceedings were instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom they were brought or a person associated or connected with an organisation against which they were brought. I consider that they were therefore also brought for collateral purposes and not for the purpose of having the courts adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise. They were by their very nature vexatious.

336 Moreover, the number and timing of these proceedings also satisfy me that Ms Klewer has both habitually and persistently instituted them. Ms Klewer's demonstrated preferred response to conflict has been to commence proceedings in circumstances where none is warranted. This has included proceedings in the Local Court in several locations at Grafton, Lismore, Ballina, Bellingen, Kempsey and Coffs Harbour, the District Court at some of these locations and in Sydney, this Court and the Court of Appeal. I will put to one side the prosecution of applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court and matters in various tribunals. Indeed, on one view, resort to appropriate administrative tribunals is what Ms Klewer ought to have been doing to resolve minor differences, such as claims concerning rental bonds or disputes with car sales yards, rather than the institution of full-blown litigation. Ms Klewer has habitually and persistently resorted to the technique of seeking AVOs for collateral purposes and has done so with conspicuous lack of success.

337 Ms Klewer has indicated that she is currently locked in a dispute in the Federal Court over issues arising from the sequestration of her estate. The details of that proceeding have never been announced before me in anything but the sparsest detail. It appears to be uncontested, however, that the petitioning creditor was a defendant unsuccessfully sued by Ms Klewer who became entitled to an unsatisfied judgment for costs in the proceedings. For obvious reasons I have taken no account of those proceedings in forming the views I have formed.

338 With one exception, all of Ms Klewer's sixty proceedings and appeals that were not either discontinued or withdrawn by her have been dismissed. In most cases Ms Klewer has been ordered to pay the successful party's costs. This demonstrates a significant determination and resolve on her part to continue in the face of difficulty or opposition with a degree of stubbornness.

339 In all of these circumstances I find that Ms Klewer habitually and persistently and without any reasonable cause has instituted vexatious legal proceedings.

Conclusion

340 In Gittoes at [115], White J drew attention to the following important consideration:

"[115] As the grounds for making an order under subs 84(2) are established, it is necessary to consider whether it is appropriate in the exercise of the court's discretion under that section, to make the orders sought. The making of an order under s 84(2) and the consequent restraint upon what is otherwise a person's entitlement to seek redress from a Court as a matter of right, is a serious matter."

341 These comments apply equally to the orders sought by the Attorney General pursuant to s 84(1) of the Act. Subsections 84(3) and (4) are relevant in this respect. They provide as follows:

"(3) The Court may from time to time rescind or vary any order made by it under subsection (1) or subsection (2).

342 These latter provisions provide a mechanism for a person in respect of whom an order pursuant to s 84(1) has been made to approach the Court in an approriate case for leave to institute or continue proceedings for which a prima facie case can be shown. Ms Klewer did not suggest that there were any current of contemplated proceedings currently falling within that class. It does not appear to me that these are provisions with the terms of which Ms Klewer could not readily deal given her familiarity with, and experience of, the Court's process.

343 The Attorney General made the following submission:

"There is a high cost to the defendants and an associated cost to the processes of the Court in the imposition on judicial resources of the applications repeatedly brought by Ms Klewer and the form and manner in which they are brought. The plaintiff submits that the institution of so many proceedings by Ms Klewer and, moreover, her conduct of those proceedings, should be a matter of the gravest concern to the Court in the administration of justice."

344 The Attorney General submitted further "that it is in the public interest, and the object of the present application is, that any pending or future litigious enterprises that [Ms Klewer] may intend to pursue in the courts of this State be subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." On this contention, as with all others, Ms Klewer made no specific or helpful submission in her own interest. I have not been told that there is any proper reason why the orders sought should not be made and I am not satisfied that there one exists. Ms Klewer's right to seek redress through the courts in a proper case, in the sense that the proceedings are not an abuse of process and that there is prima facie ground for the proceedings, remains unaffected.

Orders

345 In these circumstances I make the following orders:

Until further order :

1. Order that the defendant shall not, without the leave of the Court, institute any legal proceedings in any court.

346 I shall if so requested hear the parties on the question of costs.

**********

Citations

Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Klewer (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 9

Most Recent Citation

Cases Citing This Decision

18

Klewer v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (No 2) [2020] NSWCA 69

Klewer v Attorney-General (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 219

Cases Cited

18

Statutory Material Cited

15

Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Bhattacharya [2003] NSWSC 1150

Attorney General v Bar-Mordecai [2005] NSWSC 142

Attorney-General for the State of South Australia v Burke [1997] SASC 6014

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CITATION:	Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Klewer (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 9
HEARING DATE(S):	11 May 2009 to 20 May 2009, final submissions 18 December 2009
JUDGMENT DATE :	5 February 2010
JUDGMENT OF:	Harrison J
DECISION:	Until further order: 1. Order that the defendant shall not, without the leave of the Court, institute any legal proceedings in any Court. 2. Order that any legal proceedings instituted by the defendant before the making of order (1) shall not be continued without the leave of the Court.
CATCHWORDS:	PRACTICE – Supreme Court Act 1970 s 84(1) – where defendant engaged in sixty separate proceedings or applications against manifold defendants in the Local Court, the District Court, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court and elsewhere – proceedings to restrain - whether defendant habitually and persistently and without reasonable cause instituted vexatious legal proceedings – orders made restraining the defendant from commencing or continuing any legal proceedings without the leave of the Court.
LEGISLATION CITED:	Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) Companion Animals Act 1998 Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001 Crimes Act 1900 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 Evidence Act 1995 Impounding Act 1993 Land and Environment Court Act 1979 Mental Health Act 1990 Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) Supreme Court Act 1970 Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (UK) Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930 (WA) Victims Compensation Act 1996
CATEGORY:	Principal judgment
CASES CITED:	Armidale City Council v Connell [1997] NSWLEC 127 Attorney General v Bar-Mordecai [2005] NSWSC 142 Attorney-General v Michael [1999] WASCA 181 Attorney-General v Van Reesema (1986) 43 SASR 170 Attorney General v Vernazza [1960] 1 QB 197 Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 Attorney General for the State of Victoria v Horvath, Senior [2001] VSC 269 Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VSC 314 Attorney General for New South Wales v Solomon (1987) 8 NSWLR 667 Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Bhattacharya [2003] NSWSC 1150 Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales v Klewer (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 454 Attorney General of New South Wales v Klewer [2003] NSWCA 295 Attorney-General (NSW) v Betts [2004] NSWSC 901 Crown Solicitor for the State of Western Australia v Michael (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Wheeler J, 30 July 1998, unreported) Donnelly v Capricornia Prospecting Pty Ltd [1999] NSWLEC 39; (1999) 102 LGERA 310 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478 Jones v Skyring [1992] HCA 39; (1992) 109 ALR 303 Lohe v Bird [2004] QSC 23 Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2004] SASC 302 Public Trustee v Gittoes aka Caldar [2005] NSWSC 373 Ramsey v Skyring [1999] FCA 0907; (1999) 164 ALR 378 Re Cameron [1996] QCA 37; [1996] 2 Qd R 218 Re Chaffers; Ex parte Attorney General (1897) 76 LT 351 Valassis v South Sydney City Council [1996] NSWLEC 232; (1996) 92 LGERA 275 Walton v Klewer [2005] FMCA 878
PARTIES:	Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Lucy Patricia Klewer (Defendant)
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 2006/262000
COUNSEL:	K G Oliver (Plaintiff)
SOLICITORS:	I V Knight, Crown Solicitor (Plaintiff)