Attorney-General for Victoria v O'Sullivan

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION
PRACTICE COURT

S CI 2008 09891

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF VICTORIA Plaintiff
v 
DALE GARY O’SULLIVAN Defendant

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JUDGE:

Richards J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

On the papers

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

7 May 2021

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Attorney-General for Victoria v O’Sullivan

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2021] VSC 237

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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Vexatious litigant order made under previous legislation – Effect of order as general litigation restraint order under new legislation – Application by defendant for leave to commence proceeding in Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal – Direction to give notice to Attorney-General and Chief Commissioner of Police under s 60, Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic) – Whether general litigation restraint order should be varied to allow defendant to apply for leave to the court or tribunal in which the proceeding is to be commenced –Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic), ss 29, 54, 55, 60.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff No appearance
For the Defendant No appearance

HER HONOUR:

  1. On 2 December 2009, Pagone J made an order in this proceeding under s 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), declaring Dale Gary O’Sullivan to be a vexatious litigant. His Honour ordered that Mr O’Sullivan must not, without leave of the Court, commence any legal proceedings (whether civil or criminal) in the Court, an inferior court or any tribunal constituted or presided over by a person who is an Australian lawyer of the Court.

  1. Section 21 of the Supreme Court Act was repealed on 31 October 2014, on the commencement of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic). Since then, the order declaring Mr O’Sullivan to be a vexatious litigant has been taken to be a general litigation restraint order made under s 29 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, in the same terms.[1] This means that Mr O’Sullivan requires leave of the Supreme Court of Victoria to commence a proceeding in any Victorian court or tribunal, although s 54 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act contemplates leave being a matter for the court or tribunal in which the proposed proceeding is to be brought.

    [1]Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic), s 91.

  1. Since Pagone J first declared Mr O’Sullivan to be a vexatious litigant, he has made a number of successful applications to this Court for leave to proceed, as follows:

(a)   On 16 July 2012, Ferguson J granted leave to commence proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria seeking intervention orders against two named individuals (Person 1 and Person 2);

(b)  On 16 August 2012, Cavanough J granted leave to commence proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria seeking an intervention order against a third person, under the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (Vic);

(c)   On 26 October 2012, Garde J granted Mr O’Sullivan leave to apply for a rehearing in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Bendigo of a personal safety application seeking intervention orders…

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Details
Case
[2021] VSC 237
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Attorney-General for Victoria v O’Sullivan involved a defendant subject to a vexatious litigant order issued under the previous legislation, the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic). The defendant sought leave to commence proceedings in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. The court was required to determine whether the vexatious litigant order should be varied to allow the defendant to apply for leave to the relevant court or tribunal, and whether the defendant was required to provide notice to the Attorney-General and Chief Commissioner of Police under section 60 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic).

The primary legal issues were the effect of the vexatious litigant order under the new legislation and the defendant's entitlement to apply for leave to commence proceedings in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal without first obtaining the leave of the court. The court considered whether the vexatious litigant order should be treated as a general litigation restraint order under the new legislation and whether the order should be varied to allow the defendant to apply directly to the relevant court or tribunal.

The court found that the vexatious litigant order was a general litigation restraint order under the new legislation. It held that the order should be varied to allow the defendant to apply for leave to the relevant court or tribunal, without first obtaining the leave of the Supreme Court. However, the court held that the defendant was still required to give notice to the Attorney-General and Chief Commissioner of Police under section 60 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic). The court reasoned that the notice requirement was a procedural safeguard to ensure that the court or tribunal could assess the merits of the application and prevent the defendant from abusing the legal process.

The court made a direction that the defendant was required to give notice to the Attorney-General and Chief Commissioner of Police under section 60 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic) before applying for leave to commence proceedings in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. The court also varied the vexatious litigant order to allow the defendant to apply for leave to the relevant court or tribunal without first obtaining the leave of the Supreme Court.

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