Attorney General for NSW v Singh - [2024] NSWSC 449

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Attorney General for NSW v Singh [2024] NSWSC 449
Hearing dates: 8 December 2023
Decision date: 26 April 2024
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Ierace J
Decision:
(1) Pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) Gurjit Singh is prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales other than with leave of an appropriate court under that Act.
(2) No order is made as to costs.

Catchwords:
CIVIL PROCEDURE — whether defendant’s prior claims constitute “vexatious proceedings” pursuant to s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) — whether the defendant has “frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia” pursuant to s 8(1)(a) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW)

Legislation Cited:
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40, 60
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) ss 78, 80
Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW) s 9B
Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) ss 70, 71
Property and Stock Agents Act 2002 (NSW)
Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) ss 4, 6, 8

Cases Cited:
Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria [2008] FCAFC 29
Khan v Singh [2021] FCCA 950
Lekhwar v Singh [2022] NSWCATCD 108
Singh v Carroll & Ors [2023] NSWSC 245
Singh v Charles [2022] NSWSC 743
Singh v Charles [2023] NSWSC 623
Singh v Fobubu Pty Ltd; Singh v Khan [2018] NSWSC 1817
Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 127
Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 182
Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCATAP 111
Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCATAP 34
Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2020] FCA 886
Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2021] FCAFC 14
Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd; Singh v Khan [2020] NSWCATAP 11
Singh v Gleeson [2023] NSWSC 629
Singh v Harrowell & Ors [2023] NSWSC 420
Singh v Khan (No 2) [2021] FCA 463
Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCA 196
Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCAT, 20 May 2019
Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCATAP 2
Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCATAP 45
Singh v Khan [2019] NSWSC 211
Singh v Khan; Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 485
Singh v Khan [2021] FCA 140
Singh v Khan [2021] NSWSC 1093
Singh v Khan [2023] FCA 76
Singh v Lekhwar [2022] NSWCATAP 158
Singh v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2022] NSWSC 78
Singh v Sharma; Singh v Energy Services Management Pty Ltd t/as Glow Power; Singh v Harrowell; Singh v Cavanagh; Singh v Tidball; Singh v Street [2023] NSWSC 551
Singh v Singh; Singh v RCMO Pty Limited; Singh v Sharma; Singh v Murphy; Singh v Armstrong; Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 280
Singh v State of NSW; Singh v Lekhwar [2021] NSWCA 260
Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 613
Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 614
Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 96
Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125
Viavattene v Attorney General (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 44
Vito Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; Nina Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited [2018] NSWCA 317

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Attorney General for the State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Gurjit Singh (Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:
Mr H Atkin (Plaintiff)
In person (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)

File Number(s): 2023/171969

JUDGMENT

HIS HONOUR: By a summons filed on 30 May 2023, the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales (the plaintiff), sought orders against Gurjit Singh (the defendant, or Mr Singh), pursuant to s 8(7) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) (the Act), “in such terms as the Court considers appropriate”.
The defendant appeared without legal representation at the hearing, which was on 8 December 2023. At its conclusion, he was directed to file any closing written submissions by 12 January 2024, and the plaintiff to file any reply by 29 January 2024. The defendant did not file any submissions, and when contacted by the plaintiff on 24 January 2024, said that he had not received a copy of the transcript of the hearing. The copy of the transcript was then provided to the defendant by the plaintiff on 21 February 2024 and a new timetable fixed, which required the defendant to file any submissions by 15 March 2024 and the plaintiff to file any reply by 29 March 2024.
By 21 March 2024, the defendant had not filed any material. I caused the parties to be notified by email that I would proceed to judgment. Forty-five minutes later, the defendant emailed back a one-sentence reply, “I am actually completing my submissions, I need more time”. On 25 March 2024, the defendant filed a five-page document entitled “Further submissions of the defendant”. The matter was listed for judgment on 26 April 2024 and the parties were notified of the listing by email from my chambers on 24 April. Mr Singh did not appear for judgment. The following are my reasons for the orders made.

Legislative provisions and principles

Section 8 of the Act relevantly provides:

“8   Making of vexatious proceedings order
(1)   When orders may be made An authorised court may make an order under this section (a vexatious proceedings order) in relation to a person if the court is satisfied that:
(a)   the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, or

…
(2)   For the purposes of subsection (1), an authorised court may have regard to:
(a)   proceedings instituted or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including proceedings instituted or conducted before the commencement of this section), and
(b)   orders made by any Australian court or tribunal (including orders made before the commencement of this section), and
(c) evidence of the decision, or a finding of fact, of any Australian court or tribunal hearing such proceedings or making such orders, even if that evidence would otherwise not be admissible by virtue of section 91 of the Evidence Act 1995.

(3) An authorised court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.
…

(7)   Orders that may be made by Supreme Court The Supreme Court may make any one or more of the following vexatious proceedings orders in relation to a person:
(a)   an order staying all or part of any proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by the person,
(b)   an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings in New South Wales,
(c)   any other order that the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.

“Proceedings” is defined broadly, in s 4 of the Act, as follows:

“4   Meaning of ‘proceedings’
In this Act, proceedings includes:
(a)   any civil proceedings, criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal, and
(b)   any cause, matter, action, suit, proceedings, trial, complaint or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal, and
(c)   any proceedings taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court or tribunal, and
(d)   any interlocutory proceedings or applications, or procedural applications, taken in connection with or incidental to civil proceedings, criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal, and
(e)   any calling into question of a decision, whether or not a final decision, of a court or tribunal, and whether by appeal, challenge, review or in another way.”

“Vexatious proceedings” is also defined in s 6:

“6   Meaning of ‘vexatious proceedings’
In this Act, vexatious proceedings includes:
(a)   proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal, and
(b)   proceedings instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose, and
(c)   proceedings instituted or pursued without reasonable ground, and
(d)   proceedings that are conducted to achieve a wrongful purpose, or in a way that harasses, or causes unreasonable annoyance, delay or detriment, regardless of the subjective intention or motive of the person who instituted the proceedings.”

In Viavattene v Attorney General (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 44 at [14], Basten JA said, with respect to s 6 of the Act:

“Although the definition is not expressed to be exclusive, for reasons considered under the next heading, one might expect it to be rare for a court to treat proceedings as vexatious proceedings unless they could fairly be characterised as falling under one of the descriptions in s 6. Secondly, as has been remarked in a number of cases, the separate paragraphs are not to be construed as independent and self-contained categories. For example, most proceeding which would fall within pars (b)-(d) would constitute an abuse of process for the purposes of par (a).”

In Vito Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; Nina Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited [2018] NSWCA 317 (“Zepinic”), Simpson AJA, McColl and Macfarlan JJA agreeing, identified the necessary steps in order for the Court to determine such an application:

“13   The task assigned to a judge asked to make orders under the VP Act is not simple. The first step is to identify the ‘proceedings’ the subject of the application, and said to be ‘vexatious’. The second step is to determine (applying s 6) which, if any, of those proceedings is:
(a)   an abuse of the process of the court or tribunal in which it is brought; or
(b)   instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; or
(c)   instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; or
(d)   conducted in such a way as to achieve a wrongful purpose, or in a way that harasses, or causes unreasonable annoyance, delay or detriment, and therefore ‘vexatious’.

…
14 The third step is to determine whether the person has ‘frequently’ instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, or has acted in concert with such a person (whether or not subject to a vexatious proceedings order) or who is the subject of a vexatious proceedings order (s 8(1)). (The requirement for frequency does not apply if the court is satisfied that the person has acted in concert with a person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order, or who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia (see s 8(1)(b)).
15 The power conferred by s 8(7) being discretionary, the final step is to determine the manner in which the discretion is to be exercised, bearing in mind the wide scope of the power, particularly as stated in s 8(7)(c).”

Simpson AJA, at [17] of Zepinic, noted that the Court has repeatedly emphasised that a judge determining an application for a vexatious proceedings order must deal individually with each proceeding that is alleged to come within the s 6 definition. In Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125, the Court (Beazley P; Emmett JA; Sackville AJA) explained at [56] that the purpose of a vexatious proceedings order is not punitive, but rather “to shield other litigants from harassment and to protect the Court itself from the expense, burden and inconvenience of baseless and repetitious suits”.

The evidence of the parties

Directions were made on 24 August 2023 by Senior Deputy Registrar Hedge as to the filing of material by the parties. In compliance with those directions, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of John McDonnell, who is an Assistant Crown Solicitor, affirmed 29 May 2023 and of Andrew Bell, who is a solicitor in the employment of the Crown Solicitor’s Office, affirmed 21 August 2023. Both affidavits attached copies of the material, which were read without objection and relied upon in the application. The plaintiff filed written submissions on 5 October 2023.
The defendant was directed to file and serve his evidence by 5 October 2023, although he informed Senior Deputy Registrar Hedge that he did not intend to rely upon any evidence. He was to file any written submissions by 16 November 2023. The defendant did not file any material or submissions pursuant to the timetable, but on the day of the hearing, at 5.10am and at 6.53am, he electronically filed with the registry two bundles of documents and forwarded them by email to my Chambers, together with a letter, and another bundle of documents which, he wrote by email, was too large to file electronically. The three bundles of documents were marked Exhibit A (filed at 5.10am), Exhibit B (filed at 6.53am) and Exhibit C (the bundle emailed to chambers). The letter, dated 15 October 2021, which was from the defendant to Bromwich J of the Federal Court of Australia, was marked Exhibit D. Exhibits B and C both had a cover sheet titled “written submissions” and a note by the defendant stating that the registrar allowed him insufficient time to prepare written submissions and he would refer to the documents in the course of his oral submissions. There was no apparent order to the documents in the bundles, which included a mix of Federal Court and Supreme Court filings, judgments, affidavits and correspondence.

The plaintiff’s submissions

In written submissions, the plaintiff submitted:

“2   The application is made on the grounds that Mr Singh has frequently instituted and conducted vexatious proceedings in this Court, in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal), and in the Federal Court of Australia. Many of these proceedings have the following characteristics:
(a)   first, the pursuit of multiple overlapping proceedings in relation to the same disputes and/or proceedings which seek to relitigate disputes which have already been determined;
(b)   second, the pursuit of applications lacking reasonable grounds and/or with no utility, including appealing or seeking judicial review of interlocutory directions which have been subsequently varied or superseded;
(c)   third, the inappropriate joinder of defendants against whom no relief is sought, who are immune from the relief sought (e.g. judicial officers) or against whom no arguable cause of action is pleaded (e.g. legal representatives who have acted in other proceedings to which Mr Singh was party);
(d)   fourth, the making of unfounded, scandalous and/or irrelevant allegations of bias, fraud, malice and misfeasance against judicial officers, legal representatives and other parties;
(e)   fifth, the institution or continuation of proceedings which he is incapable of instituting or continuing, by reason of his status as an undischarged bankrupt; and
(f)   sixth, the making of statements suggestive of threats of violence against lawyers and decision-makers.
3.   In the last two years, Mr Singh has commenced several vexatious proceedings in this Court against (a) judges and registrars of this Court; (b) judges of the Federal Court and Federal Circuit Court; (c) members and registrars of the Tribunal; (d) members of the Commonwealth and State governments, including the Prime Minister and the former Premier. Each of those proceedings was vexatious.
4.   Given the number and variety of vexatious proceedings commenced by Mr Singh and the egregiousness of Mr Singh’s conduct, the Attorney submits that the Court would be justified in exercising its discretion to make a general order indefinitely prohibiting Mr Singh from instituting proceedings in New South Wales, whether in his own name or in the name of another person.” (emphases original)

Proceedings commenced by the defendant

Background to the defendant’s litigation

In 2006, the defendant was the director and shareholder of Anmol Holdings Pty Ltd (Anmol). In 2006, Anmol leased premises in Kingswood (the Kingswood retail premises) for use as a restaurant from Fobupu Pty Ltd (Fobupu) for a period of three years, commencing on 1 November 2006 with two options for renewal, each for a period of five years. The maximum period of tenancy under the lease was 13 years. The directors of Fobupu were Ghulam Khan and Samina Khan. The defendant was involved in the operation of an Indian restaurant on the premises and guaranteed Anmol’s obligations under the lease.
The defendant was typically unrepresented in his appearances in the proceedings outlined and relied upon by the plaintiff, although on some occasions, he said that he had the benefit of legal advice.

The structure of this part of the judgment

The outline of the litigation history, which is based (although not exclusively) on the summary contained in the plaintiff’s submissions, is grouped according to the proceedings in question.

Supreme Court proceedings 2018/278850

On 18 December 2017, Mr Singh filed two applications in the Tribunal:

(a) Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53291, on which he sought interim orders preventing Fobupu from forfeiting the lease; and

(b) Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53297, in which he sought final relief, including an order for relief against forfeiture against Fobupu.

On 23 January 2018, Senior Member Charles made orders in Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53291 (the 23 January 2018 Interim Order) which included an order for interlocutory relief:

“Provided the applicant pays an amount of $6,500.00 (inclusive of GST) on account of rent by monthly instalments commencing 1 February 2018, the respondent is restrained from attempting to terminate the retail lease the subject of this application … until the Tribunal has made a decision pursuant to the application in File No COM 17/53297.”

On 28 February 2018, Fobupu lodged an application against Mr Singh in the Tribunal for back rent and a termination order in respect of a residential unit (the Kingswood residential premises) on the first floor of the Kingswood retail premises, above the restaurant (Tribunal Proceedings RT 18/10018).
On 6 March 2018, Tribunal Member Simon made timetabling orders for the preparation of Mr Singh’s application for hearing in Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53297.
On 18 April 2018, Principal Member Harrowell heard and determined an internal appeal by Mr Singh from Tribunal Member Simon’s orders of 6 March 2018. Principal Member Harrowell concluded that the decision of Tribunal Member Simon was an interlocutory decision, that leave was therefore required under s 80(2)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (the CAT Act) and that leave should be refused. Principal Member Harrowell said, at p 15 of his reasons:

“It seems to me in those circumstances there is no basis which has been established that would warrant leave in the present case. I might add to those comments that that is particularly so having regard to the fact that the orders which have been appealed were made on 6 March 2018, and it is clear from the information that has been provided to the Appeal Panel that those orders were in fact varied to extend time on 29 March 2018 and were subject to the further review on 17 April 2018. There is no material before the Appeal Panel that would suggest that those extensions of time were inappropriate or not sufficient. More particularly, however, no appeal has been lodged in relation to those orders, and even if an appeal had been lodged, those orders seem somewhat to have been taken over by the orders on 17 April 2018 made by the Deputy President.
In those circumstances the Appeal Panel is not satisfied that leave to appeal should be granted.”

On 19 April 2018, Fobupu’s application in Tribunal Proceedings RT 18/10018 in relation to the Kingswood residential premises was heard by General Member Levingston. Mr Singh, who alleged that he was ill, did not attend. General Member Levingston refused to adjourn the proceedings and, after hearing from the landlord, ordered Mr Singh to pay Fobupu the amount of $3,700 for back rent and ordered that the tenancy agreement was terminated on 13 May 2018: see Singh v Fobubu Pty Ltd; Singh v Khan [2018] NSWSC 1817 at [7] (“[2018] NSWSC 1817”).
On 27 April 2018, Deputy President Westgarth made an order lifting the 23 January 2018 Interim Order: see Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCATAP 2 at [3].
On 25 May 2018, Principal Member Harrowell ordered Mr Singh to pay the respondents’ costs of the application for leave to appeal from Tribunal Member Simon’s directions of 6 March 2018: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 127.
On 28 May 2018, Mr Singh commenced an internal appeal (Tribunal Proceedings AP 18/25082) from the order of Deputy President Westgarth lifting the 23 January 2018 Interim Order: see Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCATAP 2 at [5].

On 26 July 2018, an Appeal Panel granted Mr Singh leave to appeal from General Member Levingston’s decision of 19 April 2018 in relation to the Kingswood residential premises and dismissed the appeal: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 182.
On 17 August 2018, Mr Singh filed a summons in the Supreme Court, commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850. The summons sought leave to appeal Principal Member Harrowell’s decision of 18 April 2018 to refuse leave to appeal from the timetabling orders made by Tribunal Member Simon on 6 March 2018.
On 7 November 2018, Fobupu commenced fresh proceedings in the Tribunal (Tribunal Proceedings RT 18/47679) seeking an order for possession of the Kingswood residential premises: see [2018] NSWSC 1817 at [9].
On 13 November 2018, Mr Singh filed a further summons in the Supreme Court, commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/348479: see [2018] NSWSC 1817 at [10]. The summons sought leave to appeal from the Appeal Panel’s decision of 26 July 2018 in relation to the Kingswood residential premises.
On 21 November 2018, Mr Singh filed notices of motion in the Supreme Court in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 and 2018/348479. By his notices of motion, Mr Singh sought an interim stay of Tribunal Proceedings RT 18/47679 and COM 17/53297 and a stay of those proceedings pending determination of the Supreme Court proceedings. On 27 November 2018, Adamson J (as her Honour then was) heard and dismissed Mr Singh’s applications for interim stays: [2018] NSWSC 1817. Her Honour recounted the history:

“17   On 18 April 2018 Principal Member Harrowell refused leave to appeal against Senior Member Simon's decision. However, because of the time taken to have the matter brought before the Appeal Panel, Mr Singh obtained an extension to file material. Ultimately, in April 2018, Deputy President Westgarth granted a further extension for material to be filed.
18   Subsequently, the plaintiff's substantive application was heard by Senior Member Goldstein. The evidence was adduced over a period of four days: 19, 20 and 23 July and 26 October 2018.
19   On 17 August 2018, after the first three days of evidence, Mr Singh filed a summons in this Court for leave to appeal against the decision of Principal Member Harrowell refusing leave to appeal against the direction made by Senior Member Simon.
20   On 26 October 2018 the hearing resumed before Senior Member Goldstein and the evidence concluded. The matter was stood over for submissions which I understand will take place later this year or early in 2019.”

Adamson J refused the application, finding, at [23]:

“In my view, it would be inappropriate for this Court to grant an interim stay and thereby disrupt the orderly conduct of the proceedings before the Tribunal. It is, in my view, appropriate that the Tribunal be permitted to conclude the hearing in respect of which all the evidence has been given. I accept [the defendants’ solicitor’s] submission that there is no identifiable prejudice to Mr Singh and substantial prejudice to the landlord if a stay were granted.”

In relation to the appeal in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 from Principal Member Harrowell’s decision of 18 April 2018 to refuse leave to appeal from timetabling orders, her Honour noted, at [24]:

“It is difficult, in any event, to see how this Court would grant leave to appeal against a decision made by Principal Member Harrowell to refuse leave to appeal against a procedural direction. The original direction would appear to have been entirely overtaken by events in circumstances where Senior Member Goldstein has spent four days hearing evidence. However, that question is a matter for another day and does not need to be determined by this Court now.”

On 21 January 2019, Mr Singh sought to file a notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking to institute an appeal from the decision of the Appeal Panel in Tribunal Proceedings AP 18/25082 (in relation to the lifting of the 23 January 2018 Interim Order).
On 8 February 2019, Mr Singh sought to file a further notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking similar orders to those sought by the notice of motion of 21 January 2019.
On 12 February 2019, Registrar Bradford rejected the notices of motion of 21 January 2019 and 8 February 2019 for filing on the basis that the appeals should be commenced by way of summons: see Singh v Khan [2019] NSWSC 211 at [1] (“[2019] NSWSC 211”).
On 22 February 2019, the Appeal Panel in Tribunal Proceedings AP 18/25082 ordered Mr Singh to pay the respondents’ costs of the application for leave to appeal from Deputy President Westgarth’s order lifting the 23 January 2018 Interim Order and delivered reasons: Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCATAP 45. In its reasons, the Appeal Panel found that there were special circumstances warranting an award of costs:

“19 We accept the respondents’ submission that the appellant’s manifest failure to identify any sensible basis for his appeal and his failure to provide written submissions in support of his appeal do constitute special circumstances.
20 We consider that the factors referred to in s 60(3)(e) and (f) of the NCAT Act [1] are present in this case in that the appeal was misconceived and lacking in substance and the appellant failed to comply with the duty imposed by s 36(3) of the NCAT Act which, inter alia, requires parties to comply with directions of the Tribunal.”
1. The Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW).

On 25 February 2019, Mr Singh filed a notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking a review of Registrar Bradford’s decision.
On 5 March 2019, Schmidt J delivered judgment dismissing Mr Singh’s notice of motion seeking to review Registrar Bradford’s decision to reject notices of motion for filing: [2019] NSWSC 211. Her Honour could not “see any basis for the conclusion that the Registrar was wrong”: [2019] NSWSC 211 at [2].
On 26 April 2019, in Singh v Khan; Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 485 (“[2019] NSWSC 485”) Harrison AsJ delivered judgment in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 and 2018/348479 dismissing the balance of the two notices of motion of 21 November 2018, noting, at [18], that:

“There is, in my view, no change in circumstances. The matters are still continuing and are on foot in the Tribunal. There is no utility in granting such a stay, and I refuse it in both matters. That means both notices of motion filed by the plaintiff on 21 November 2018 are dismissed.”

Harrison AsJ also dismissed two other notices of motion, which sought a consolidation of proceedings and a joinder of a party, that had been filed by Mr Singh in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850: [2019] NSWSC 485.
On 3 June 2019, Mr Singh filed a notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking to appeal from the orders made by Harrison AsJ on 26 April 2019.
On 8 August 2019, an order was made dismissing Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850. This appears to have been in error. The circumstances in which this came to occur were subsequently described by Adamson J in Singh v Khan [2021] NSWSC 1093: ("[2021] NSWSC 1093”)

“The plaintiff's notice of motion filed 3 June 2019
10 On 3 June 2019, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion, which was made returnable on 13 June 2019. In his motion, the plaintiff sought to challenge orders and directions made by Harrison AsJ on 26 April 2019.
11 The defendants did not appear on 13 June 2019 (it is not clear whether they had been served with the notice of motion). The matter was stood over for directions on 25 July 2019. On that date, the defendants appeared but the plaintiff did not. The matter was stood over to 8 August 2019. Registrar Brown noted that a letter pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), r 13.6, would be sent to the plaintiff informing him that his notice of motion filed on 3 June 2019 would be dismissed if there was no appearance on that occasion.
The order dismissing the proceedings
12 On 8 August 2019, the matter came before the Registrar who noted that a medical certificate had been sent by the plaintiff who did not appear. An order was made dismissing the proceedings (not merely the plaintiff's notice of motion filed on 3 June 2019) pursuant to UCPR, r 13.6. The Registrar ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs. The order dismissing the proceedings would appear to have been an error since the plaintiff had been notified only that his notice of motion would be dismissed if he did not appear on 8 August 2019.…”

On 13 July 2021, Mr Singh filed a notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking to have the order of 8 August 2019 dismissing the proceedings set aside. The same day, he filed an affidavit in support dated 12 July 2021. The affidavit included the following allegations:

(a) a lawyer who is the daughter of the defendants works in a firm which “is the choice of the most terrorists, drug importers, rapists etc”;

(b) the Attorney General had attended an event hosted by the daughter and that, Mr Singh, therefore believed “that there is the likelihood that the respondents have sought influence from the Department of Justice to influence the decision of the registrar of 20 Feb 2020” and that the respondents had “political influence” over the Department of Justice;

(c) Mr Singh believed there was possible corrupt conduct involved in relation to the refusal of a fee waiver application he had made;

(d) Mr Singh believed that he had been targeted by the NSW Department of Communities and Justice because he belongs to a minority; and

(e) Mr Singh alleged that the secretary of the NSW Department of Communities and Justice was personally responsible for his application for a waiver of filing fees being refused and made irrelevant observations concerning him.

On 23 July 2021, the defendants in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 filed a notice of motion seeking that the proceedings be stayed under s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and, second, an order dismissing the notice of motion of 13 July 2021, on the grounds that Mr Singh did not have standing to bring the motion or continue the proceedings: [2021] NSWSC 1093 at [1].
On 29 July 2021, Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 came before Registrar Jones for directions. Registrar Jones listed the defendants’ notice of motion of 23 July 2021 before the Common Law Duty Judge on 26 August 2021.
On 12 August 2021, Mr Singh filed a further notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2018/278850 seeking various orders, including an order setting aside the decision to refer the notice of motion of 23 July 2021 to the Duty Judge. The notice of motion purported to name various non-parties as respondents to the motion, including: the person who had appeared as counsel for the defendants on 28 July 2021; the defendants’ solicitor; the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice; a Registrar of this Court; and the State Crown Solicitor.
On the same date, Mr Singh filed an affidavit made by him on 9 August 2021, which contains various serious allegations, including:

(a) that the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice was “interfering in the process of administration to Justice”;

(b) that on 28 July 2021, Registrar Jones had “exercised Judicial Discretion arbitrarily” and her conduct had been “highly dishonest”, that she had interrupted Mr Singh “to favour the side she prefers” and acted “in a manner that appears to be corrupt conduct”;

(d) a general allegation that “this level of dishonesty in courts, registrars, lawyers is vicious among those who take pride in the administration of justice”.

On 26 August 2021, Adamson J heard the notices of motion filed by the defendant on 13 July 2021 and 12 August 2021, and by the defendants on 23 July 2021, delivering judgment on 30 August 2021. Adamson J found for the defendants, declaring that proceedings 2018/278850 were stayed by operation of s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act and that the plaintiff had no standing to file and move on the notices of motion of 13 July 2021 and 12 August 2021, and dismissed them: [2021] NSWSC 1093. Her Honour reviewed the history of Mr Singh’s obligation to pay costs, which culminated in bankruptcy proceedings:

“The assessment of costs
16   The defendants applied for the costs of the proceedings in NCAT [2] to be assessed. On 30 September 2019, the Manager, Costs Assessment, issued two certificates: a Certificate of Determination of Costs specifying the sum of $24,453.85, which was payable by the plaintiff to the defendants; and a Certificate of Determination of Manager’s Assessment Costs, which certified an amount of $1,907.13, which was to be paid by the plaintiff in respect of the costs assessor's costs.
2. the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal.
17 Pursuant to UCPR, r 36.10, a costs assessment certificate may be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The effect of filing such a certificate is that it is taken to be a judgment of the court (ss 70(5) and 71(3) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW)) for the amount of costs which have not yet been paid. In the present case, the defendants filed the costs certificates in the Local Court, as a result of which two judgments in the Local Court were entered, first, on 16 October 2019 for $1,591 (which related to the lump sum costs order made on 24 September 2019) and, second, on 17 October 2019 for $26,551.98 (being the sum of the two costs certificates issued by the Manager, Costs Assessment).
18   By notice of motion filed on 16 March 2020 in the Local Court, the plaintiff sought to have the judgments entered in the Local Court set aside. On 9 April 2020, his notice of motion was dismissed by Tsavdaridis LCM.
19   The plaintiff subsequently challenged the costs assessments, by application filed on 4 May 2021, to the Manager, Costs Assessment for review of the costs certificates. However, before the matter proceeded further, on 6 May 2021, a sequestration order was made against the plaintiff's estate in the Federal Circuit Court on the basis of the Local Court judgments referred to above.
The bankruptcy proceedings in the Federal Court
20 On 9 December 2019, the defendants served on the plaintiff a bankruptcy notice which required him to pay the creditors the sum of $28,142.98 (being the total of the two judgments entered in the Local Court), or otherwise to make arrangements to their satisfaction for settlement of the judgment debts, in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. The plaintiff sought to challenge the bankruptcy notice in the Federal Court. His application was dismissed by Gleeson J on 25 June 2020: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2020] FCA 886.
21   On 6 July 2020, the defendants filed a creditors’ petition in the Federal Court, seeking a sequestration order against the plaintiff's estate based on his non-compliance with the bankruptcy notice.
22   The plaintiff appealed against Gleeson J's decision to the Full Federal Court (Rares, Farrell and Stewart JJ), which, on 3 February 2021, dismissed the appeal: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2021] FCAFC 14.
23   The defendants’ application for a sequestration order was heard by the Federal Circuit Court (Judge Street) on 6 May 2021. The Court found that the act of bankruptcy occurred on 25 June 2020. His Honour made the following orders:
‘1.   Leave to file the application in a case dated 6 May 2021 is refused.
2.   Leave is granted to the applicants to amend the Creditor’s Petition in respect of the date of the act of bankruptcy, being 25 June 2020, and the Court dispenses with the need for the filing of an amended Creditor's Petition.
3.   A sequestration order is made against the estate of [the plaintiff].
4.   The Petitioning Creditors’ costs be paid out of the bankrupt estate in accordance with the priority to which they are entitled, in such amount as is agreed with the trustees and/or as assessed.’

24   The Court noted the following:
‘1.   A consent to act as joint trustees has been filed by Innis Anthony Cull and Gess Michael Rambaldi.
2.   The act of bankruptcy occurred on 25 June 2020.’

25 On 23 May 2021, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in the Federal Court from the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 6 May 2021. The evidence does not disclose when that matter is to be determined.
Post-bankruptcy events
The application for review of the costs assessment
26 On 7 May 2021, the Manager, Costs Assessment, made directions for the progress of the plaintiff's application for review (which had been filed on 4 May 2021). On 11 May 2021, the defendants’ solicitor wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment, informing him of the plaintiff's bankruptcy and seeking that the matter be adjourned for 28 days to permit the plaintiff’s trustees in bankruptcy to decide whether to prosecute the application for review. On 13 May 2021, Innis Cull, one of the plaintiff’s trustees in bankruptcy, wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment to inform him that he was considering whether to press the application for review and informed him that he would let him know of his decision by 4 June 2021. On 8 June 2021, Mr Cull wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment, informing him that he had not made an election to continue the application, which was therefore taken to have been abandoned by him, by reason of s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act.
27 On 9 June 2021, the plaintiff wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment, and to the parties disputing the effect of s 60(3), as asserted by Mr Cull. He opposed the closing of the file relating to his application filed on 4 May 2021.
28 On 10 June 2021, the Manager, Costs Assessment, wrote to the plaintiff and the other parties to the review application (as listed above) and informed them of the correspondence from the plaintiff's trustees in bankruptcy. He said, in part:
‘With that in mind, it would appear that the [Manager, Costs Assessment] cannot proceed with [the plaintiff’s] review application, given [the plaintiff] does not seem to have standing to pursue it himself and, as it has been abandoned under the Bankruptcy Act.
Having said that, steps have been taken to close the file.’

Proceedings 2021/227850 in this Court
29   By summons filed on 10 August 2021, the plaintiff commenced proceedings in this Court for judicial review, 2021/227850, seeking an order that the decision of the Manager, Costs Assessment be set aside (the 2021 proceedings). The defendants to the 2021 proceedings are the Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (the Secretary), Anthony Dicembre (the solicitor for the defendant in these proceedings), Mr Cull and Gess Rambaldi (the plaintiff’s trustees in bankruptcy); and the defendants (in these proceedings).
The plaintiff’s application for review of decisions of Registrars on 8 August 2019 and 20 February 2020
30   On 13 July 2021, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion (in the present proceedings) seeking an order that the following orders be set aside and that the summons be listed for further directions:
(1)   The order made on 8 August 2019 dismissing the proceedings; and
(2)   The orders made on 20 February 2020 that there be no further listings and that the matter be closed.

31 This notice of motion was made returnable on 20 July 2021. On that day, there was no appearance by the plaintiff. Mr Brown appeared for the defendants. Mr Frommer appeared for the Secretary, as a person affected. Although the plaintiff did not appear on that day, he filed written submissions at 7.39am that morning. In his submissions, he informed the Court that when he woke up, he was sneezing and had a sore throat and a cough. He said that he was available by telephone. He sought directions for the further conduct of the matter, which included that the defendants would have a week to put on further evidence and he would have a further two weeks after that to put on evidence in reply.

32   On 20 July 2021, the Registrar made directions (presumably on Mr Brown’s application) that the defendants file and serve any notice of motion by 23 July 2021 to be made returnable on 28 July 2021. I apprehend that Mr Brown informed the Court of the plaintiff’s bankruptcy and the effect that this would have on the whole of the proceedings. The matter was stood over to 28 July 2021. As referred to above, on 23 July 2021, the defendants filed a notice of motion for a stay of proceedings and dismissal of the plaintiff’s notice of motion filed 13 June 2021^[3] on the grounds of the plaintiff’s bankruptcy.
3. This is likely a misprint for 13 July 2021.
The directions hearing on 28 July 2021
33   On 28 July 2021, the matter came before the Registrar for directions. The plaintiff appeared on his own behalf; Mr Brown appeared for the defendants; and Mr Frommer appeared for the Secretary. At the commencement of the directions hearing, Mr Brown informed the Registrar that the proceedings were required to be stayed because a sequestration order had been made against the plaintiff’s estate pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act. Mr Brown submitted that it would be ‘prudent’ for the Court to determine the defendants’ motion of 23 July 2021 before determining the plaintiff’s motion of 13 July 2021 because of the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff (by reason of his bankruptcy) did not have standing to contest the Registrars’ decisions which he sought, by his motion of 13 July 2021, to challenge. Mr Frommer supported this course and submitted that the proceedings had been automatically stayed by reason of the Bankruptcy Act and that the Court “should so declare if necessary.”
34 In response, the plaintiff relied on the express terms of s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act (see further below). The Registrar told him, in substance, that it was not necessary to talk about the ‘legalities’ since she wanted to make directions about the further conduct of the matter and the hearing of the notices of motion. The plaintiff continued to read out s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act and make submissions about the effect of ss 60(2) and (3). Once again, the Registrar informed the plaintiff that she was not going to be ‘getting into the technicalities of what’s going on’ and ‘really wanted to move the matter forward with some directions timetabling orders.’
35   The plaintiff took great exception to the circumstance that his notice of motion, which had been filed on 13 July 2021, was not to be listed for hearing, although the defendants’ notice of motion, which had been filed on 23 July 2021 was to be listed for hearing. The Registrar consulted the plaintiff about a timetable for the defendants’ notice of motion and made directions accordingly. The Registrar also directed the defendants to file an outline of submissions to be served on the plaintiff as to the basis of their notice of motion. Before the conclusion of the directions hearing, the plaintiff’s connection to the Court was lost. The matter was stood down in the list. The plaintiff was not able to be contacted before the matter concluded.
36   At the conclusion of the directions hearing on 28 July 2021, the Registrar made the following directions (as recorded in JusticeLink):
‘This matter is listed for Directions (Common Law Registrar) on 3 August 2021 9:00 AM before the Supreme Court - Civil at Supreme Court Sydney.
Estimated duration: 5 Minutes
This matter is listed for Duty (Common Law) on 26 August 2021 10:00 AM before the Supreme Court - Civil at Supreme Court Sydney.
Estimated duration: 90 Minutes
ORDERS OR DIRECTIONS
1.   The Plaintiff is to file and serve all evidence in answer to the NOM [notice of motion] filed 23 July 2021, by 18 August 2021.
2.   The Defendant is to file and serve an outline of written submissions by 6 August 2021.
3.   The Plaintiff is to file and serve any written submissions by 20 August 2021.
4.   Stood over for Directions Hearing on 3 August 2021 (in relation to the NOM filed 13 July 2021).
5.   The Court is to send a Notice of Orders Made to the Plaintiff.’

Notification to the plaintiff’s trustees in bankruptcy
37   On 14 July 2017, the plaintiff’s trustees in bankruptcy were notified of his application to reinstate these proceedings. On 28 July 2021 the plaintiff wrote to his trustees and, on 29 July 2021, received the following reply:
‘I refer to your below email received at 11.02 am yesterday and your email of this morning at 12.45pm.
•   The proceeding that you have referred to (2018/278850) appears to have been dismissed prior to the date of your bankruptcy.
•   You subsequently made an application to reinstate the proceeding after the date of your bankruptcy. It is my view that you did not have standing to do so.
• It is therefore my view that s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 does not apply to the proceeding.
•   Notwithstanding the above, I was notified of your application to reinstate the proceeding on 14 July 2021.’”

Mr Singh submitted that, although he was a bankrupt, the proceedings were not stayed by s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, because:

this Court has no jurisdiction to grant, or declare, a stay since bankruptcy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court;
the bankruptcy notice was invalid as the judgments in the Local Court were not final judgments and the enforcement proceedings had been brought in breach of the undertaking which the defendants gave to this Court on 26 April 2019 (referred to above); and
as the defendants had not proved that the trustee had been notified of the proceedings pursuant to s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, no stay under s 60(2) came into operation because s 60(3) qualified s 60(2).”
1. Section 60(2) and (3) of the Bankruptcy Act provided:
“60   Stay of legal proceedings
…
(2)   An action commenced by a person who subsequently becomes a bankrupt is, upon his or her becoming a bankrupt, stayed until the trustee makes election, in writing, to prosecute or discontinue the action.
(3)   If the trustee does not make such an election within 28 days after notice of the action is served upon him or her by a defendant or other party to the action, he or she shall be deemed to have abandoned the action.”
1. Her Honour rejected Mr Singh’s grounds, stating in relation to the second ground:
“51 The second basis on which the plaintiff challenged the defendants’ notice of motion was his challenge to the validity of the bankruptcy notice on the basis that the judgments in the Local Court registered as a consequence of the filing of the costs certificate were not final judgments and therefore did not qualify as a basis for a bankruptcy notice under s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act (which provides that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy if the debtor does not comply with a bankruptcy notice served on the basis of a final judgment or order). He also relied on the alleged breach by the defendants of the undertaking given to Harrison AsJ on 26 April 2019 (which breach is denied by the defendants).
52 As set out above, the plaintiff has unsuccessfully challenged the bankruptcy notice in the Federal Court (Gleeson J) and the Full Federal Court. He also challenged it in the Federal Circuit Court, when resisting the making of a sequestration order on the basis of the creditors’ petition (which is subject to appeal to the Federal Court). A challenge to a bankruptcy notice plainly falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court as it is a matter ‘in bankruptcy’. Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine it.”
1. Her Honour concluded:
“55 The proceedings in this Court were commenced before the plaintiff became bankrupt. Thus, s 60(2) of the Act applies. By operation of s 60(2), the proceedings were stayed automatically on and from the date of the sequestration order, being 6 May 2021, unless and until the trustees elected in writing to prosecute or discontinue them. The trustees were notified of the proceedings, at the latest, on 14 July 2021. By operation of s 60(3), the trustees are deemed to have abandoned them. Accordingly, the plaintiff does not have standing to prosecute the proceedings in his own name. Thus, he has no standing to prosecute his notices of motion filed on 13 July 2021 and 12 August 2021 respectively, which ought, accordingly, be dismissed. The defendants are entitled to the relief claimed in their notice of motion filed on 23 July 2021.”

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the defendant’s application made on 17 August 2018 for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from Principal Member Harrowell’s decision of 18 April 2018 refusing leave to appeal from timetabling orders made by Tribunal Member Simon, was a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, for six reasons.
First, it was pursued without reasonable grounds and lacked any utility, in circumstances where the procedural directions to which it ultimately related had been superseded by subsequent events. There was no basis for alleging appealable error on the part of Principal Member Harrowell.
Second, the attempts to institute appeals by way of notices of motion of 21 January and 8 February 2019, themselves constituted abuses of process and the institution of vexatious proceedings.
Third, the application for a review of the Registrar’s decision to reject those notices of motion for filing itself lacked reasonable grounds and constituted vexatious proceedings. There was no proper ground for challenging the correctness of the Registrar’s decision.
Fourth, the notice of motion seeking to appeal from the orders of Harrison AsJ on 26 April 2019 was conducted in a way that caused unreasonable delay. Mr Singh failed to prosecute the notice of motion at all.
Fifth, the affidavit filed on 13 July 2021 contained various scandalous and irrelevant allegations. In Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria [2008] FCAFC 29 at [10], Gyles, Stone and Buchanan JJ said:

“The processes of the Court and the Court itself are brought into disrespect if unreasonable relaxation of ordinary standards is extended to litigants in person simply for the reason that they are without legal assistance. There is no basis to think that the rights of any litigant in person are infringed or diminished by the steady insistence that proceedings in this Court are not be used as a means of sullying the reputation of other parties to the proceedings or third parties who are not directly involved in the proceedings at all.”

Sixth, Mr Singh sought to relitigate before Adamson J the validity of the bankruptcy notices, which was a matter already determined in the Federal Court.

Consideration

It is apparent from the transcript of the directions hearing on 6 March 2018^[4] that the setting of the timetable by Member Simon was a routine function. One of the directions was that Mr Singh file any material in support of his application within 14 days. Immediately after it was set, Member Simon asked: “Any comments or questions?” to which the defendant replied: “No ma’am”.
4. The title of the transcript refers to the date as 6 March 2016, but it is apparent from date references in the transcript of the hearing itself that this was an error, the actual date being 6 March 2018.
The decision by Principal Member Harrowell on 18 April 2018 to refuse leave to appeal the timetable direction was clearly reasoned and did not disclose any apparent error, as observed by Adamson J at [31] above. However, the final hearing of the matter was determined on the basis of Mr Singh’s status as a bankrupt rather than on the merits of his application before he acquired that status.
Given his relatively limited litigation history at the time of that application and his absence of legal representation, although it was ill-advised and likely had no prospects of success, I am inclined to the view that the filing does not come within any of the categories of s 6 of the Act. I am also not satisfied by the outline of the history by Adamson J in [2021] NSWSC 1093 at [6]-[15], of Mr Singh’s appeal against the determination by Harrison AsJ, that he failed to prosecute his appeal with due diligence.
I take a different view of Mr Singh’s attempt to relitigate the bankruptcy argument before her Honour, which in my view, falls within s 6(c) of the Act. Mr Singh’s notice of motion filed on 25 February 2019, seeking a review of Registrar Bradford’s decision of 12 February 2019, is also a vexatious proceeding pursuant to s 6(c) of the Act, since there was no basis for concluding that the Registrar fell into error in his determination, as noted by Schmidt J in dismissing Mr Singh’s application.

Court of Appeal proceedings 2019/142353

As noted above at [29], the evidence in Mr Singh’s substantive application in relation to Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53297 was heard over three days in July and on 26 October 2018 before Senior Member Goldstein: see [2018] NSWSC 1817 at [18]. As observed in Singh v Khan (Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NSW), 20 May 2019, unrep) at [158], on 31 October 2018, Senior Member Goldstein made an order in Tribunal Proceedings COM 18/39312 (31 October 2018 Interim Order):

“Provided the applicant pays an amount of $6,500 (plus GST) on account of rent per calendar month to Fobupu Pty Ltd on receipt of a rent invoice from Fobupu Pty Ltd as the trustee of the Khan Family Trust No 2 ABN 702 604 095 93 the respondents are restrained from repossessing the premises the subject of these proceedings or otherwise disturbing the applicant’s quiet enjoyment of those premises until the Tribunal has made a decision in application No Com 17/53297.”

On 14 November 2018, Mr Singh applied in Tribunal Proceedings COM 18/39312 for a stay of the 31 October 2018 Interim Order until further order: see Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [5]-[6] (“[2019] NSWCATAP 34”). That application was dismissed on 27 November 2018.
Mr Singh commenced an internal appeal in the Tribunal (Tribunal Proceedings AP 18/52044) against the 31 October 2018 Interim Order and the dismissal of his application of 14 November 2018: see [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [7]. On 14 December 2018, the Appeal Panel made orders staying the 31 October 2018 Interim Orders and replacing them with an alternate interim order (14 December 2018 Orders) on condition that monies on account of rent were to be paid into the trust account of Fobupu’s solicitors: [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [12].
On 1 February 2019, the Appeal Panel, constituted by Principal Member Harrowell, made orders dissolving the 14 December 2018 Orders, which had the effect of lifting the stay of the 31 October 2018 Interim Order: [2019] NSWCATAP 34. It was common ground that Mr Singh had not paid monies on account of rent into the trust account of Fobupu’s solicitors: [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [24]. Mr Singh had raised a complaint about the form of tax invoices that had been issued which were headed “Fobupu No 2 as the trustee for the Khan Family Trust No 2 ABN 702 604 095 93”: [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [32]. Mr Singh also asserted a right of set-off in the amounts of $470,000 and $360,000: [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [37]. The $470,000 figure was said to reflect an amount which Mr Singh ought to have withheld under taxation legislation from the $1 million he had paid to Fobupu in cash on account of rent in the absence of a valid tax invoice: [2019] NSWCATAP 34 at [37]. Principal Member Harrowell rejected Mr Singh’s submissions, being the set-off submission; the submission that there was a lawful excuse for not complying with his obligation to comply with an order to pay rent; the submission that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because of the pendency of proceedings in the Supreme Court, and that the form of the invoices raised a federal matter that was outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
On 27 February 2019, Senior Member Goldstein made an order that Mr Singh surrender possession to Fobupu of two shops in the Kingswood retail premises: see Singh v Khan (Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NSW), 20 May 2019, unrep) at [159].
At 6pm on the same date, Mr Singh made an oral application to Button J as the Common Law duty judge, seeking to quash or set aside the orders made by Senior Member Goldstein that day. Button J dismissed the application: see Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCA 196 at [20].
On 1 May 2019, an Appeal Panel of the Tribunal refused Mr Singh leave to appeal from the 31 October 2018 Interim Order: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCATAP 111.
On 11 June 2019, Mr Singh filed a summons in the Court of Appeal commencing Court of Appeal Proceedings 2019/142353 seeking leave to appeal from Button J’s decision of 27 February 2019. On 22 July 2019, the Court of Appeal dismissed the summons: Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCA 196. White JA (with whom McCallum JA, as her Honour then was, agreed) said:

“22 The applicants provided the primary judge with a document head ‘Plaintiffs’ points for hearing’. They are identified as the grounds of challenge that the orders made on 27 February 2019 disregarded Australian tax law and the law of trusts. They asserted that the orders of the Tribunal required payment of rent to the Khan Family Trust (No 2), but no evidence had been provided that the trust existed. Reliance was placed on s 23C(1)(b) of the Conveyancing Act that a declaration of trust of land must be evidenced in writing, signed by the person declaring the trust, or be made by Will. The applicants contended that:
‘As a matter of law, no tax invoice from the trust can be valid and enforceable in favour of the trust until compliance with the Conveyancing Act s 23C(1)(b).’

23   For these reasons, they contended that there was no default in their not paying rent as required by the orders of the Tribunal as a condition of the orders restraining Fobupo from repossessing the land.
24 The same arguments were, in substance, advanced in the applicant’s written submissions on the application for leave to appeal. The primary judge rejected the argument shortly but sufficiently. He said that s 23C of the Conveyancing Act had nothing to do with the question and the question of whether or not the respondent was a trustee was neither here nor there. Nor did tax law have anything to do with the question.
25 The primary judge was plainly correct. The applicants’ submission seems to assume that a trust is a separate legal entity and they were excused from complying with the conditions of the order by which the respondent was restrained from interfering with their possession of the premises because they could not satisfy themselves that the trust referred to in the invoices existed. Neither contention is arguable. The misconception that a trust is a separate legal entity is common, but wrong. The rent was payable to Fobupo. Section 23C provides for requirements of writing when a person is dealing with or declaring a trust over interest in land. It in no way detracts from Fobupo's entitlements as legal owner of the land to recover rent in respect of it.
…
27   The applicants ventilated before the primary judge the same argument as had been rejected by Principal Member Harrowell, namely, that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because of the pendency of proceedings in the Supreme Court. That submission was also plainly untenable for the reasons given by Principal Member Harrowell …
28   The application raises no question of general importance. It is not even arguable that the primary judge’s order dismissing the proceedings was wrong. There is no merit in the applicants’ position.”

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff contended that Mr Singh’s application for leave to appeal from Button J’s decision of 27 February 2019 lacked reasonable grounds and was thus vexatious pursuant to s 6(c) of the Act.

Consideration

It is apparent from the judgment of White JA, McCallum JA agreeing, that Mr Singh’s application wholly lacked merit, to a point that the bases of it were unarguable. I find that it was a vexatious proceeding pursuant to s 6(c) of the Act.

Tribunal Proceedings AP19/09967 and AP19/28114

On 27 February 2019, which was the same date as the orders made by Senior Member Goldstein and Mr Singh’s oral application to Button J to quash or set aside those orders, Mr Singh commenced an internal appeal in respect of Senior Member Goldstein’s orders (Tribunal Proceedings AP 19/09967): see Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCATAP 111 at [20]-[21].
On 20 May 2019, Senior Member Goldstein dismissed Mr Singh’s application in Tribunal Proceedings COM 17/53297: Singh v Khan (Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NSW), 20 May 2019, unrep). Senior Member Goldstein also ordered Mr Singh to pay the respondents’ costs of an application that Mr Singh had made to amend his points of claim. Senior Member Goldstein found that the lease of the Kingswood retail premises came to an end upon the deregistration of Anmol and that no further lease was entered into with Mr Singh, albeit that Mr Singh (or his companies) remained in possession of the premises.
On 17 June 2019, Mr Singh commenced an internal appeal in the Tribunal in relation to Senior Member Goldstein’s decision of 20 May 2019 (Tribunal Proceedings AP 19/28114): see Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd; Singh v Khan [2020] NSWCATAP 11 at [20].
On 21 January 2020, an Appeal Panel constituted by Principal Member Harrowell and Senior Member Robertson dismissed the internal appeals from Senior Member Goldstein’s decisions of 27 February 2019 and 20 May 2019 and ordered Mr Singh to pay the respondents’ costs: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd; Singh v Khan [2020] NSWCATAP 11 (“[2020] NSWCATAP 11”). The Appeal Panel did, however, find that Mr Singh was a lessee of the premises from Fobupu, pursuant to an oral agreement formed in about October 2015: [2020] NSWCATAP 11 at [119]-[131].
Mr Singh sought to challenge the 27 February 2019 decision by relitigating the issues concerning tax invoices that had been rejected by Button J and by the Court of Appeal. The Appeal Panel found that it was bound by the Court of Appeal’s determination of those issues, and that Mr Singh was subject to an issue estoppel or Anshun estoppel: [2020] NSWCATAP 11 at [145]-[157]. The Appeal Panel also found that the “the grounds of appeal and the submissions made have no merit”: [2020] NSWCATAP 11 at [158]-[161]. The Appeal Panel was satisfied that costs should be ordered, partly because “various issues were sought to be re-litigated despite there being decisions of the Supreme Court resolving those issues”: [2020] NSWCATAP 11 at [211].

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that these proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, since they reagitated the arguments and status of Fobupu as trustee which Button J and the Court of Appeal had been found to be unmeritorious.

Consideration

There can be no doubt that by the time Mr Singh commenced these proceedings, he was aware that their bases had been rejected by the Court of Appeal. By pressing the same arguments again, in my view, the proceedings come within s 6(c) and (d) of the Act and constitute an abuse of process pursuant to s 6(a), as well.

Federal Court Proceedings NSD 1916/2019, NSD 96/2020 and NSD 788/2020

On 31 October 2019, Mr Singh was served with a bankruptcy notice. On 20 November 2019, he filed an application in the Federal Court commencing Federal Court Proceedings NSD 1916/2019, naming Fobupu as the respondent, seeking orders setting aside the bankruptcy notice (BN246870) issued by an Official Receiver on 16 October 2019 on application by Fobupu as creditor.
On 29 January 2020, Mr Singh filed a further application in the Federal Court commencing Federal Court Proceedings (NSD 96/2020), naming Ghulam Khan, Samina Khan and Fobupu as respondents to the proceedings. By his application, Mr Singh sought orders setting aside a second bankruptcy notice (BN247914) issued by an Official Receiver on 9 December 2019. The background to that bankruptcy notice was canvassed by Adamson J in [16]-[20] of her Honour’s judgment in [2021] NSWSC 1093 extracted at [47], above.
On 5 May 2020, Federal Court Proceedings NSD 1916/2019 and NSD 96/2020 were heard together by Gleeson J. Her Honour delivered judgment on 25 June 2020: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2020] FCA 886 (“[2020] FCA 886”). At the hearing, Fobupu elected not to pursue BN246870, with the result that Proceeding NSD1916/2019 was otiose and was dismissed: [2020] FCA 886 [5]. Mr Singh challenged the validity of BN2497914 on the basis that:

(a) the Local Court judgments were not final judgments;

(b) Mr Singh had a set off or counterclaim equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debts (being the $470,000 he alleged that he had paid in error in circumstances where it should have been withheld);

(d) there was an issue as to the identity of the creditor; and

(e) the bankruptcy notice was defective.

Gleeson J addressed and rejected each of Mr Singh’s arguments, at [21]-[79]. Her Honour noted, at [71]-[73], that certain of Mr Singh’s submissions repeated the misconception that had been addressed by the Court of Appeal in Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCA 196 as to a trust not being a separate legal entity. Her Honour concluded that “Mr Singh’s set-off/counter-claim has no prospects of success”: [2020] FCA 886 at [45].
On 20 July 2020, Mr Singh filed a notice of appeal in relation to Gleeson J’s decision, commencing Federal Court Proceedings NSD 788/2020.
On 3 February 2021, the Full Court of the Federal Court heard and dismissed the appeal brought by Mr Singh from Gleeson J’s decision: Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2021] FCAFC 14. The Court noted, at [43], that Mr Singh had again sought to re-litigate an allegation as to Fobupu being a separate entity from a trust of which it was trustee:

“Mr Singh argued that her Honour erred in not finding that the trust was a legally separate and distinct entity to Fobupu as its trustee, and that only the trust could enforce payment of the first and second judgments. The flaw with that argument was exposed by her Honour and her citation of the decision in Singh [2019] NSWCA 196 at [25]-[26]. The trust of which Fobupu is trustee has no separate legal personality from Fobupu.”

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings before Gleeson J and the Full Court of the Federal Court were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, insofar as they sought to relitigate the arguments concerning the status of Fobupu as trustee which lacked merit for reasons explained by the Court of Appeal.

Consideration

I find that the proceedings before Gleeson J and before the Full Court of the Federal Court were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act for the reason advanced by the plaintiff.

Federal Court Proceedings NSD 1392/2020

On 29 December 2020, Mr Singh filed an originating application and statement of claim in the Federal Court, naming Ghulam Khan, Samina Khan and Fobupu as respondents (Federal Court Proceedings NSD 1392/2020). Mr Singh claimed the sum of $470,000, being the amount alleged to have been overpaid by Mr Singh to the respondents.
On 24 February 2021, Stewart J struck out the statement of claim: Singh v Khan [2021] FCA 140. His Honour noted, at [10], that the statement of claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action against each respondent, and at [20] that:

“It contains much irrelevant, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious material that is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding, or material that is simply inappropriate to a pleading.”.

On 29 March 2021, Mr Singh filed a further statement of claim in the same proceedings. On 3 May 2021, Mr Singh filed an outline of submissions in those proceedings, in which he referred to a submission made by the respondents’ counsel that the statement of claim did not make allegations as against the first and second respondents. Mr Singh made an allegation, at [5], that counsel’s submission “appeared to be a lie” and at [8], that there were “lots of instances [of lying] in NCAT and Supreme Court of NSW as far as [the counsel and the solicitor for the respondents] is Concerned”.
On 5 May 2021, Stewart J made orders striking out the statement of claim filed on 29 March 2021, dismissing the proceeding as against the first and second respondents, and giving Mr Singh leave to file a new statement of claim by 31 May 2021 to plead a “money had and received” claim: Singh v Khan (No 2) [2021] FCA 463. His Honour noted, at [8], that the “set-off” cause of action pleaded was untenable and, at [9]-[12], that there was no reasonable cause of action as against the first and second respondents.
On 1 June 2021, Mr Singh filed an interlocutory application in the proceedings seeking that Stewart J disqualify himself on the grounds of actual bias and perception of bias. The submissions following the application referred to various matters that did not appear to relate to the orders sought and did not otherwise make sense.

The plaintiff’s submissions

The proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act. The statements of claim filed did not disclose viable causes of action and included inappropriate material, and the submissions in support made baseless allegations of the respondents’ legal representatives having lied, which constituted an abuse of the Court’s processes.
The interlocutory application that Stewart J disqualify himself on the grounds of actual and apprehended bias itself constituted vexatious proceedings and the supporting submissions accompanying the application did not identify any sensible basis for the application and lacked any reasonable grounds.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious pursuant to s 6(c) and (d) of the Act. The statements of claim did not disclose viable causes of action despite repeated opportunities to rectify that situation and, together with the submissions in support, included inappropriate material. The application for disqualification advanced no proper or reasonable discernible basis for the propositions of apprehended or actual bias.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/255522

On 26 July 2021, Keshvanand Lekhwar and Vinita Lekhwar commenced proceedings in the Tribunal against Mr Singh and his wife, Kiranjit Kaur (Tribunal Proceedings RT 21/32134). The proceedings related to a residential tenancy agreement which had been entered by Mr Singh and Ms Kaur as tenants on 27 July 2020 in relation to a property at Jamison Rd, Kingswood (the Jamison Rd property). Mr and Mrs Lekhwar purchased the property on 7 April 2021, with the intention of living in it upon the cessation of the tenancy. On 23 June 2021, Mr and Mrs Lekhwar served a termination notice requiring Mr Singh and Ms Kaur to give vacant possession of the premises on 26 July 2021 at the conclusion of the residential tenancy agreement. Mr Singh and Ms Kaur did not give up possession and various different proceedings were subsequently commenced in the Tribunal. The history of the various proceedings in the Tribunal is set out in Lekhwar v Singh [2022] NSWCATCD 108 at [3]-[52]. Mr Singh commenced various proceedings in this Court seeking to appeal from or review decisions of the Tribunal.
On 6 September 2021, Mr Singh filed a summons commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/255522, in which he sought to set aside a decision of 24 August 2021 of General Member Pirina not to recuse herself for apprehension of bias in Tribunal proceedings in relation to the Jamison Rd property. The summons named General Member Pirina, the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice and the “President of NCAT” as the third, fourth and fifth defendants.
On 14 September 2021, Beech-Jones J, as his Honour then was, made directions that the third, fourth and fifth defendants to the summons in Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/255522 be removed and replaced by the Tribunal: see Singh v State of NSW; Singh v Lekhwar [2021] NSWCA 260 at [2].
On 1 October 2021, Rothman J dismissed Mr Singh’s summons in Supreme Court Proceedings NSW 2021/255522: Singh v Lekhwar (Supreme Court (NSW), 1 October 2021, unrep). His Honour noted that one of Mr Singh’s complaints was that the Tribunal had allowed service by post. His Honour said, at [6]:

“It is not suggested by the plaintiff in these proceedings that the plaintiff did not receive the documentation that was allowed to be served by post. As a consequence, there is no prejudice that derives from the service of the material by post.”

As to the two aspects of the proceedings which were contended to disclose bias, his Honour held, at [17], that “Neither one of those aspects comes close to the proposition of an apprehension of bias and could not arguably be associated with an apprehension of bias”. Mr Singh was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs, if any, on an indemnity basis.

The plaintiff’s submissions (Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/255522)

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(c) of the Act, as they were instituted and pursued without reasonable grounds.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(c) of the Act, because they were instituted and pursued without reasonable grounds.

Court of Appeal Proceedings 2021/271771 and 2021/282536

On 23 September 2021, Mr Singh filed a summons in the Court of Appeal commencing Court of Appeal Proceedings 2021/271771. Mr Singh sought to set aside Beech-Jones J’s decision of 14 September 2021. The grounds relied upon included “Failure to properly exercise discretion by ‘acting under the dictation’ of [the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice], [the President of NCAT], Christina Pirina”. In addition to the five respondents to Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/22522, the summons named Beech-Jones J as the sixth respondent.
On 1 October 2021, Mr Singh filed a further summons in the Court of Appeal seeking to set aside Rothman J’s decision of the same day, commencing Court of Appeal Proceedings 2021/282536.
On 10 October 2021, Mr Singh filed submissions in Court of Appeal Proceedings 2021/271771. Those submissions contained statements, including:

“13 … On 1 Oct 2021 when Justice Rothman literally placed invisibly red tape with letters ‘SHUT UP’ on my mouth …
…
16 … If courts fail to maintain the integrity of the case law/common law and continue to pollute the stream of justice with lies and falsehoods manufactured by none other than the Judges itself then Judges must be ready to hear another ground for disqualification and that will be ‘You are liar and you lied in case number XYZ’.”

On 18 October 2021, Leeming JA dismissed the summonses in Court of Appeal Proceedings 2021/271771 and 2021/282536: Singh v State of NSW; Singh v Lekhwar [2021] NSWCA 260. His Honour held, at [7], that the decisions, being decisions of judges of the Supreme Court exercising judicial functions, were not amenable to judicial review. Leeming JA noted, at [15], that Mr Singh had made unfounded allegations of bias and misfeasance:

“I need to add that paragraphs 18 to 20 of Mr Singh’s submissions make statements which I regard as unfounded. They suggest a predisposition by Mr Singh to perceive that the system is biased against him, and he makes serious statements concerning public misfeasance. I regard those statements to be as unfounded as similar statements that were made by Mr Singh to the tipstaff of Beech-Jones J in connection with the orders made on 14 September 2021 and also statements made from the virtual bar table concerning his suspicion that there had been some untoward communications between one of the defendants and this Court.”

His Honour referred to Mr Singh’s obstinacy:

“18 The only question today is a pure question of law. It is whether Mr Singh by way of summons filed in the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, rather than by way of summons seeking leave to appeal, can properly bring his complaints about both of those decisions. Mr Singh has made it abundantly clear that he does not wish to have the summonses that he has filed treated as applications for leave to appeal. So be it.
19 I take the view that I have no choice in the application today. As the Registrar indicated a week ago, the decision of this Court constituted by three judges in Penson v Titan holds, in a way that binds me, that Mr Singh’s processes do not validly engage this Court’s jurisdiction.”

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submits that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, as they were instituted and pursued without reasonable grounds.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act. Mr Singh unnecessarily wasted the Court’s resources with his filings and made allegations of public misfeasance with no proper basis to do so.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2021/227850

On 16 October 2019, judgment was entered in Fairfield Local Court in favour of Fobupu, Ghulam Khan and Samina Khan against Mr Singh in the amount of $1,591.00 arising out of a lump sum costs order made on 24 September 2019: see Singh v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2022] NSWSC 78 at [1] (“[2022] NSWSC 78”). That judgment was based on a certificate issued under s 78 of the CAT Act by the then Principal Registrar of the Tribunal: see Singh v Gleeson [2023] NSWSC 629 at [11].
On 17 October 2019, judgment was entered in Fairfield Local Court in the amount of $26,551.98 in favour of Fobupu, Ghulam Khan and Samina Khan, being the sum of two costs certificates issued by the Manager, Costs Assessment under ss 70 and 71 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW): see [2021] NSWSC 1093, at [16]-[17].
On 16 March 2020, Mr Singh filed a notice of motion in the Local Court seeking to have the Local Court judgments against him set aside. On 9 April 2020, that notice of motion was dismissed: see [2021] NSWSC 1093 at [18].
On 4 May 2021, Mr Singh applied to the Manager, Costs Assessment for review of the costs certificates on which the 17 October 2019 Local Court judgment was based: see Singh v Khan [2021] NSWSC 1093 at [19].
On 11 May 2021, the solicitor for Fobupu, Ghulam Khan and Samina Khan (the landlords’ solicitor) wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment, copying in Mr Singh and Mr Singh’s trustees in bankruptcy, noting the sequestration order that had been made on 6 May 2021 and the effect of s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
On 13 May 2021 (although misdated 2020), the Manager, Costs Assessment wrote to Mr Singh, the landlords’ solicitor and the trustees in bankruptcy. The letter stated that:

“… the issue of whether Mr Singh has standing to seek the review application has arisen through the appointment of the Joint Bankruptcy Trustees. With their appointment … Mr Singh cannot continue this cause of action, instead that decision rests with the Joint Bankruptcy Trustees.”

The letter requested clarification as to whether the review application was being pursued.

On 13 May 2021, one of Mr Singh’s trustees in bankruptcy wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment indicating that the application to review the costs certificates was stayed under s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act and that the trustees were considering their position in respect of the application.
On 8 June 2021, one of Mr Singh’s trustees in bankruptcy wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment to indicate that the application to review the costs certificates had been deemed to be abandoned under s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act.
On 10 June 2021, the Manager, Costs Assessment wrote to Mr Singh, the landlords’ solicitor, and Mr Singh’s trustees in bankruptcy, indicating that he could not proceed with the review application “given Mr Singh does not seem to have standing to pursue it himself and, as it has been abandoned under the Bankruptcy Act”.

On 24 April 2023, Kunc J delivered reasons in relation to Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/24794: Singh v Harrowell & Ors [2023] NSWSC 420 (“[2023] NSWSC 420”). His Honour ordered that the proceedings be permanently stayed and recommended that the Attorney General consider an application for a vexatious proceedings order against Mr Singh. Kunc J permanently stayed the proceedings on the basis that the allegations made were hopeless, and the proceedings “vexatious and oppressive”, in circumstances where:

“2   …
(1)   Mr Singh is a bankrupt. Therefore, the right to bring the various claims for which he seeks damages is vested in the trustee of his bankrupt estate.
(2)   The pleadings are either or both inadequate or seek to relitigate issues already determined in previous proceedings.
(3)   No action is maintainable against the first to eighth defendants, who each benefit from judicial immunity.”

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act. The allegations made were scandalous and baseless. Mr Singh had no right to bring the actions claimed due to his bankruptcy, the pleadings were inadequate or sought to relitigate past disputes, and many of the defendants were subject to immunity. The submissions filed by Mr Singh on 16 June 2022 were threatening and grossly inappropriate. The affidavit filed by Mr Singh on 25 July 2022 was similarly threatening and inappropriate and Mr Singh’s correspondence with the Court on 14 February 2023 included various scandalous and inappropriate allegations.

Consideration

For the reasons advanced by the plaintiff, I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/82479

On 22 March 2022, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/82479. The statement of claim named as defendants a solicitor who represented the Lekhwars in Tribunal proceedings, a solicitor said to have responsibility for supervising the Lekhwars’ solicitor, the business name of the law practice at which those two solicitors practised), Mr and Mrs Lekhwar, and Tribunal Registrar Gainsford-Holland. The statement of claim sought various relief, including declarations that the named solicitors were not fit and proper persons to practice law. Mr Singh also sought damages for “Collateral Abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, constructive fraud and unlawful interference in contractual right to possession” of the Jamison Rd property. The allegations in the statement of claim related to the conduct of proceedings before the Tribunal concerning the Jamison Rd property.
On 23 March 2023, McNaughton J summarily dismissed part of the statement of claim in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/82479 and struck out the balance of the claim: Singh v Carroll & Ors [2023] NSWSC 245. Her Honour held, at [6], that the so-called “Property Claims” should be “summarily dismissed on the basis they are incompetent and thus an abuse of process” because of Mr Singh’s bankruptcy. In relation to the balance of the claims (for infliction of emotional distress and misfeasance in public office), her Honour found, at [72], that they did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act for the reasons identified by McNaughton J. Most of the claims were incompetent and therefore an abuse of process because of Mr Singh’s bankruptcy. The balance of the claims did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

Consideration

For the reasons advanced by the plaintiff, I find that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/133947

On 2 May 2022, Mr Singh filed a summons in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/133947. The summons named various individuals, a company and the NSW Fair Trading Commissioner as defendants, and sought various relief concerning premises at Elizabeth Crescent in Kingswood (the Elizabeth Cr property). He also sought declarations that the first and second defendants were not fit and proper persons to be real estate agents, and an order that the Commissioner review their eligibility pursuant to the Property and Stock Agents Act 2002 (NSW).
On 24 March 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed the proceedings on the grounds that they were an abuse of process, and sought to re-agitate the factual merits of first-instance decisions of the Tribunal in circumstances where those decisions had been affirmed on appeal: at [23]-[32]: Singh v Singh; Singh v RCMO Pty Limited; Singh v Sharma; Singh v Murphy; Singh v Armstrong; Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 280 (“[2023] NSWSC 280”).

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a) and (d) of the Act for the reasons identified by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in [2023] NSWSC 280 at [23]-[32].

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious pursuant to s 6(a) and (d) of the Act for those reasons.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/148604

On 23 May 2022, Mr Singh filed a summons in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/148604. The summons named Mr and Mrs Lekhwar and the Tribunal as defendants. By his summons, Mr Singh sought to appeal from a decision of an Appeal Panel of the Tribunal of 16 May 2022 in relation to the Jamison Rd property: Singh v Lekhwar [2022] NSWCATAP 158. The grounds stated in the summons are incoherent.
On 7 June 2022, Mr Singh filed a notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/148604, seeking that various decisions and orders in the Tribunal be stayed and that the Tribunal be restrained from hearing specified proceedings. On 8 June 2022, Mr Singh filed written submissions in support of his notice of motion. Those submission contain various concerning statements including that:

“The actions in the Supreme Court will kept increasing while Supreme Court turn blind eye towards such a disgraceful conduct of Deputy President of NCAT”: (17);
“he [Member Harrowell] lied in his reasons”: (18); and
“Sometimes I feel why I don’t have a Gun to do Justice myself rather than seeking from this State of NSW which has no capacity to do Justice”: (21).

On 20 September 2022, Mr Singh filed an affidavit in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/148604, in which he suggested, at (11), that “the role of those involved in these court cases against me cannot be ruled out if my death occur in manner which is unnatural or suspicious”.
On 26 October 2022, Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/148604 were dismissed in default of attendance under r 13.6. of the UCPR.

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a) and (d) of the Act as an abuse of process. The submissions filed by Mr Singh on 8 June 2022 were scandalous and threatening, as was the affidavit of 20 September 2022, which suggested that parties to the proceedings might be plotting violence against Mr Singh.

Consideration

I am satisfied that that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a) and (d) of the Act for the reasons submitted by the plaintiff.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/184500

On 24 June 2022, Mr Singh filed a summons in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/184500. He sought to appeal a decision of the Tribunal of 15 June 2022, declarations that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear various proceedings concerning the Elizabeth Cr property, a declaration that the CAT Act is inconsistent with the law of the Commonwealth and that Principal Member Harrowell and Member Gardener be restrained from any further involvement in the matter.
On 24 March 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/184500 on the grounds that they were an abuse of process since Mr Singh had sought to re-agitate the factual merits of first-instance decisions of the Tribunal in circumstances where those decisions had been affirmed on appeal: [2023] NSWSC 280 at [23]-[32].

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a) and (d) of the Act for the reasons identified by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in [2023] NSWSC 280.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a) and (d) of the Act for those reasons.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/185767

On 26 June 2022, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/185767. Mr Singh named some 21 parties as defendants, including various NSW Police Officers, the Police Commissioner, an energy provider, the State of NSW, the Lekhwars and several members of the Tribunal. The allegations in the statement of claim concerned Mr Singh’s eviction from the Jamison Rd property. The statement of claim contains various baseless and scandalous allegations, including that the State “intentionally allowed this dysfunctional state of administration of justice to prevail where trials are run by NSW Police”.
On 15 February 2023, Mr Singh sent an email to the Crown Solicitor’s Office in relation to Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/185767. In his email, Mr Singh threatened to sue the Crown Solicitor and various employed solicitors.
On 24 March 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/185767 as against the Tribunal member defendants and the registrar on the basis of judicial immunity: [2023] NSWSC 280 at [75]. The police officer defendants were removed as they ought not to have been joined to the proceedings by reason of s 9B of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW). The statement of claim was otherwise struck out as embarrassing: [2023] NSWSC 280 at [73]-[75].
On 18 May 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/185767 as against Ms Kaur on the basis that she had taken no steps to replead or pursue the claims advanced in her name in the proceeding: [2023] NSWSC 551 at [2]-[5].

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act for the reasons identified by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in [2023] NSWSC 280. Various of the defendants were immune from the claims brought and the claim was otherwise embarrassing. Further, Mr Singh’s correspondence of 15 February 2023 threatening to sue the Crown Solicitor or her employed solicitors was harassing and improper.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, for the reasons submitted by the plaintiff.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/196452

On 5 July 2022, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/196452. The statement of claim named seven defendants, including various individuals, a company, Tribunal Member Gardener and Tribunal Registrar Gainsford-Holland. By the statement of claim, Mr Singh sought to advance various claims including for intentional infliction of emotional distress and misfeasance in public office in relation to the Elizabeth Cr property and the Tribunal proceedings concerning them.
On 27 October 2022, Mr Singh filed a notice of motion in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/196452 seeking that proceedings and processes in the Tribunal and the Sheriff’s Office in relation to the Elizabeth Cr property be stayed.
On 24 March 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL struck out the statement of claim in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/196452 on the grounds that it was “clearly embarrassing” and did not “come close to pleading the material facts necessary to establish the causes of action identified in the prayers for relief”: [2023] NSWSC 280 at [34] The proceedings as against Member Gardner were dismissed on the basis of his statutory immunity: [2023] NSWSC 280 at [42]. The proceedings against Registrar Gainsford-Holland were dismissed on the basis that she enjoyed derivative immunity and that no cause of action was pleaded against her at all: [2023] NSWSC 280 at [43], [51].
On 18 May 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/196452 on the basis that Ms Kaur had taken no steps to replead or pursue the claims advanced in her name in the proceeding: [2023] NSWSC 551 at [2]-[5].

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act for the reasons identified by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in [2023] NSWSC 280. Various of the defendants enjoyed immunity and the claims made were otherwise embarrassing.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, for the reasons submitted by the plaintiff.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/247788

On 21 August 2022, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/247788. Mr Singh named Judge Street, Justice Bromwich and Registrar Bellach as defendants. The statement of claim sought exemplary damages and compensatory damages for intentional infliction of harm and misfeasance in public office. The statement of claim contained allegations including that:

(a) Judge Street “gets gratification out of his conduct of exploiting the vulnerability of one party for the amusement of the opponent” being a “common personality trait shared by” Judge Street and Justice Bromwich: at (11);

(b) Judge Street and Justice Bromwich had acted with malice: at (11), (23);

(c) Justice Bromwich’s “female associate on 23 June 2022 seemed to be actively participating in the hearing and showing secret evidence to the second defendant”: at (26);

(d) Justice Bromwich had been dishonest: at (31); and

(e) “The Full Federal Court accepted the lies of white barrister”: at (44).

On 4 October 2022, Mr Singh filed submissions in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/247788. The submissions contain various scandalous matters, including statements that:

(a) “Its an unfortunate series of events in the course of seeking Justice when elders such as Justice Davies who equates Judicial Review proceedings with Appeal … Its disappointing to see elders behave in this way without any fear of God and its curse”: at (6);

(b) “The executive and Judiciary works in concert to protect each other without giving any damn to rule of law, Justice or democratic values”: at (8); and

(c) “This is the truth as it stands now. Case law is a biggest scam on people on earth. Couple of lies, couple of half truths, few dishonest omissions and you can get a case law suitable to state or rich people”: at footnote 3.

On 18 May 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/247788 on the grounds that the first two defendants had judicial immunity, the “[t]he pleading does not properly articulate any cause of action against anyone, including the third defendant” and “[g]iven its generally vexatious nature, there is no reason whatsoever to allow liberty to re-plead”: [2023] NSWSC 551 at [17]-[23].

The plaintiff’s submissions (Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/247788)

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act for the reasons identified by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in [2023] NSWSC 551. The pleading did not properly articulate a cause of action against anyone, two of the defendants had judicial immunity and the pleading was otherwise vexatious. As well, both the statement of claim and the submission contained various scandalous and improper statements.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, for the reasons submitted by the plaintiff.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/32586

On 1 November 2022, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/32586. The statement of claim named 12 defendants, including the President of NCAT, various other Tribunal Members, Registrar Riznyczok, Mr and Mrs Sharma, a solicitor for the Sharmas, Neil Lawyers and the State of New South Wales. The statement of claim sought damages for misfeasance in public office, negligence and collateral abuse of process in relation to the conduct of proceedings in the Tribunal concerning the Elizabeth Cr property.
On 1 November 2022, Mr Singh sent a further threatening email addressed to Tribunal Member Thode attaching the statement of claim. The email read:

“You were so dishonest in the way you deal with me at the direction hearing by claiming that I was not named in the applications in the Tribunal Below. This is simply a lie and a person who lie is nothing more than a liar. I am sure you have heard ‘Once a Liar always a liar’.
Bible says some really tough words for liars like you in Revelation 21 ‘The one who conquers will have this heritage, and I will be his God and he will be my son. But as for the cowardly, the faithless, the detestable, as for murderers, the sexually immoral, sorcerers, idolaters, and all liars, their portion will be in the lake that burns with fire and sulfur, which is the second death’
I cc Crown Solicitor in this email so that they can join you in the lake with fire and sulfur. Because based on my experience with [named solicitor from the Crown Solicitor’s Office], [another named solicitor from the Crown Solicitor’s Office], etc the lakes need more sulfur. It won’t be a good feeling for someone with integrity and honesty to Argue Judicial Immunity for liars like you but [named solicitor] is so desperate to reach the top that she will do anything for it.”(emphases in original)

On 1 November 2022, Mr Singh sent an email addressed to Tribunal Members Rosser and Titterton attaching the statement of claim in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/32586. The email is threatening in its tone and includes statements that:

“In earlier days resistance to State’s Unlawful policy and the procedure was met by force and now it is met by people like you have believe in Cowboy kind of Justice without the courage to have a DUEL.”; and
“The point is that abuse of power has consequences in some form sooner or later but right now I choose to serve a Statement of Claim in accordance with the RULE OF LAW of the land for you two who believe in cowboy kind of justice.”

On 24 March 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed the amended statement of claim in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/32586 as against Armstrong J, Tribunal Members, and Registrar Riznyczok on the basis that they enjoyed immunity from the claims asserted. The claim in negligence against Armstrong J was found to be “manifestly hopeless”. No real case was pleaded against any of the other defendants and the proceedings against them were also dismissed: [2023] NSWSC 280 at [61]. [63].

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act for the reasons identified by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in [2023] NSWSC 280. Various of the defendants enjoyed immunity from the claims asserted and no real case was pleaded as against the other defendants. Mr Singh’s correspondence of 1 November 2022 directed to Members of the Tribunal was threatening and grossly inappropriate.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, for the reasons submitted by the plaintiff.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/346122

On 17 November 2022, Mr Singh filed a summons in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/346122. The summons named the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice, the Sheriff of New South Wales, Mr and Mrs Sharma and the Tribunal as defendants. The summons sought relief quashing orders of the Tribunal, restraining the Tribunal from issuing a warrant for possession of the Elizabeth Cr property and the Sheriff from enforcing such warrants.

On 8 February 2023, Cavanagh J dismissed Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/346122 under r 13.4 of the UCPR: Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 96 (“[2023] NSWSC 96”). In the course of the hearing, his Honour dismissed an application that he disqualify himself on the grounds of apprehended bias: see [2023] NSWSC 96 at [25]-[26]. Cavanagh J concluded, at [50], that the proceedings “are an abuse of process” as they “serve no utility”. His Honour noted, at [54], that Mr Singh did not have standing to bring the proceedings and, at [57], that various of the defendants had been inappropriately joined.
On 16 February 2023, Mr Singh sent five emails to Justice Cavanagh’s chambers asserting various “lies” in the judgment delivered on 8 February 2023.
On 2 March 2023, Mr Singh filed an amended summons in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/346122, notwithstanding the fact that those proceedings had been dismissed by Cavanagh J on 8 February 2023.

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a) and (d) of the Act as an abuse of process for the reasons articulated by Cavanagh J in [2023] NSWSC 96. The attempt to file an amended summons in proceedings that had already been dismissed was a further abuse of process.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a) and (d) of the Act, for the reasons submitted by the plaintiff.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/30478

On 30 January 2023, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/30478. Mr Singh named six defendants to the proceedings, being Justice Jaqueline Gleeson, “Official Receiver Australian Financial Services Authority”, Anzer Khan, Jeremy Mackenzie, Elliot Hyde, and Tribunal Registrar Szczygielski. The relief claimed included:

(a) an order that Justice Gleeson pay damages for misfeasance in public office;

(b) an order that the Official Receiver pay damages for misfeasance in public office;

(c) a declaration that Mr Khan had asked his father to swear an affidavit in circumstances when he knew its contents were untrue;

(d) a declaration that Mr McKenzie had breached the Solicitors’ Conduct Rules;

(e) a declaration that Mr Hyde had breached the Bar Rules; and

(f) an order that Registrar Szczygielski pay damages for misfeasance in public office.

The statement of claim contains various scandalous and grossly offensive allegations including:

(a) that “courts are the institution in which I suffered worst form of racial discrimination in this country after I arrived in 1997” and “This form of Racial Discrimination appears to have mastered by majority of the majority white and jewish judicial community (following the footsteps of nazis so far as discrimination is concerned)”; and

(b) that Justice Gleeson “lied”, acted “in bad faith” and knowingly out of jurisdiction.

On 11 February 2023, Mr Singh filed an amended statement of claim in Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/30478. By his amendments, Mr Singh sought to join Justice Colvin, Prime Minister Albanese, and former Premier Perrottet as the seventh, eighth and ninth defendants. Mr Singh sought damages from Justice Colvin for misfeasance in public office, declaratory relief concerning the constitutionality of provisions of the CAT Act and Bankruptcy Act, declaratory relief concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and damages “as a result of facing racial discrimination in Federal Court”. Mr Singh alleged that Justice Colvin had acted with malice, dishonestly and an intent to harm him. For example, Mr Singh stated that his Honour:

(a) applied the “wrong legal test with malicious intent of dishonesty to hurt plaintiff and appease white primary Judge and White Barrister”: at (60);

(b) “went on to decide the whole matter as if he is Dictator not bound by any rules and law whose only mission is to save his fellow white Judge decision from being set aside and in doing so he will favor his fellow white barrister”: at (86); and

(c) “blamed the delay on me [which] is another example of his racist and colonial mindset where he believes he has Authority from the God to rule over other race using centuries old model to look decent but act dishonestly”: at (89).

On 18 May 2023, Garling J summarily dismissed Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/30478: Singh v Gleeson [2023] NSWSC 629 (“[2023] NSWSC 629”). His Honour held that the claims against Justices Gleeson and Colvin “cannot possibly succeed” by reason of their judicial immunity for acts done in their judicial capacity: [2023] NSWSC 629 at [34]-[35]. The claim against the Official Receiver was dismissed on the basis that it was an attempt to relitigate the validity of the bankruptcy notices (which had already been finally determined) and the proceedings were therefore “vexatious, disclose no reasonable cause of action, and constitute an abuse of the process of this Court”: [2023] NSWSC 629 at [41]-[42]. The claim against the third defendant was found to be “vexatious and oppressive” as raising no cause of action known to the law: at [46]. The claims against the fourth and fifth defendants was also found to be “demonstrably hopeless”: at [54]. The proceedings against the sixth defendant were “an abuse of process of the Court and could not possibly succeed”: [2023] NSWSC 629 at [61]. Similar findings were made in respect of the claims against the eighth and ninth defendants: [2023] NSWSC 629 at [65].

The plaintiff’s submissions

These proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act as an abuse of process for the various reasons identified by Garling J in [2023] NSWSC 629.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, for the reasons submitted by the plaintiff.

Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/44063

On 9 February 2023, Mr Singh filed a statement of claim in this Court commencing Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/44063. The statement of claim named Justice Cavanagh, Justice Rothman, the Chief Justice, former Premier Perrottet and Prime Minister Albanese as defendants. Mr Singh included the words “Racist Judge” in the “Your reference” section of the filing details. The statement of claim sought relief in relation to claims that Justices Cavanagh and Rothman had acted dishonestly “in the course of misfeasance in public office” and had violated their judicial oaths, that the Chief Justice “is negligent towards self represented litigants”. The statement of claim made various concerning allegations including:

(a) that a racist “scam is prevalent in Supreme Court and Court of Appeal where self represented litigants are regularly be fooled”: at (20); and

(b) “The colonial mindset of first respondent truly reflects allegiance to King whose ancestors responsible for establishing slave trade and human misery worldwide and till now King has masters such as first defendant to treat us like slaves without due process”: at (22).

On 18 May 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL gave summary judgment in Supreme Court Proceedings 2022/44063 in favour of Justices Cavanagh and Rothman and the Chief Justice on the basis that they had immunity from the claims and dismissed the proceedings in respect of former Premier Perrottet and Prime Minister Albanese “given that the pleading is otherwise unintelligible and appears to be vexatious”: [2023] NSWSC 551 at [6]-[11].

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act for the reasons articulated by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in [2023] NSWSC 551.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, for the reasons submitted by the plaintiff.

Court of Appeal Proceedings 2023/69493

On 2 March 2023, Mr Singh filed a summons in the Court of Appeal commencing Court of Appeal Proceedings 2023/69493. The summons named 13 defendants, including the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice, the Sheriff of New South Wales, Mr and Mrs Sharma, the Tribunal and various Tribunal Members. The summons sought to set aside various decisions made by the Tribunal in proceedings concerning the Elizabeth Cr property. The grounds stated in the summons contained various scandalous matters, including:

(a) a Tribunal Member “lied on the record of tribunal”: at (2); and

(b) that Tribunal Members were “motivated by racial discrimination to protect their white counterpart”: at (15).

On 9 March 2023, Mr Singh sent an email in relation to Supreme Court Proceedings 2023/69493 addressed to Registrar Riznyczok, the Chief Justice, Justice Cavanagh, Registrar Jones, and a solicitor of Wotton & Kearney. The email contained serious allegations including:

(a) “that the Chief Justice of NSW (decision maker), Registrar of the Court of Appeal, and Justice Cavanagh have acted dishonestly and criminally to further delay and harm me”; and

(b) of “a conspiracy between Wotton Kearney, Karen Jones, [the solicitor of Wotton & Kearney], and Justice Cavanagh to engage in unlawful means (email to move court) and unlawful purposes (delay and deprive determination of relief) to delay the relief I seek”.

Also on 1 June 2023, Beech-Jones CJ at CL dismissed Court of Appeal Proceedings 2023/69493 under r 13.4 of the UCPR: Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 613. His Honour found that the proceedings were vexatious, stating:

“9   The mere fact that someone did invoke that jurisdiction [under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act] would, of itself, not be sufficient to answer the description of the proceedings being frivolous and vexatious. However, when that is accompanied with the fact that the summons names numerous people, many of whom have no tangible connection to the proceedings, then it starts to acquire a vexatious flavour.
10   The vexatious flavour becomes much more concrete when one examines the grounds to which I have made reference. As I have noted, they are generally unintelligible and, in one respect, contain a baseless but serious allegation.
11   When one steps back from it, it is clear that Mr Singh is simply seeking to re-agitate the same dispute as was addressed in Singh v Singh via a different mechanism in circumstances where a more simple mechanism, which would only involve the truly affected parties, may have been available to a proper party to the residential tenancy agreement.”

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a) and (d) of the Act for the reasons articulated by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 614 at [9]-[11] and that Mr Singh’s correspondence of 9 March 2023 was grossly improper, harassing and abusive.

Consideration

I am satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a) and (d) of the Act, for the reasons submitted by the plaintiff.

Submissions by Mr Singh

Mr Singh made oral submissions at the hearing by way of a running commentary to a copy of the plaintiff’s written submissions. His submissions were in the form of what I understood to be an explanation of his filings. There was no glimmer of insight into the inappropriateness of his filings, particularly the more scandalous of his filings.
I have taken into account his closing written submissions, although filed well out of time and thus absent an opportunity for the plaintiff to respond to them. Regrettably, they also suggest his entrenched view of his predicament as being that of a victim to injustice with no realisation that his modus of responding to that belief, by engaging in this form of litigation, is highly inappropriate.

Consideration and determination of the application

Various proceedings initiated by Mr Singh have been characterised as having vexatious qualities by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in [2023] NSWSC 280 at [83]-[87], Kunc J in [2023] NSWSC 420 at [4] and [111] and Garling J in [2023] NSWSC 629 at [41]-[42].
Although the proceedings canvassed in this judgment span only the last seven years, it is apparent that Mr Singh has repeatedly engaged in behaviour that is caught by one or more of the categories in s 6 of the Act, and that there is an acceleration in the frequency and seriousness of those filings.
An exercise of the discretion made available by s 8(1) of the Act in Mr Singh’s favour is inappropriate in view of the absence of any reasonable basis for concluding that he would not continue to commence and continue proceedings that do not have a reasonable basis or that the scandalous or abusive nature of some of their contents will cease.
Accordingly, it is appropriate to make an order that Mr Singh be prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales, without leave of this Court.

Costs

As to costs, I note that the nature of a vexatious proceedings application is not punitive: Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) at [56]. Although I have found in favour of the plaintiff, I decline to make an order for costs.

Orders

I made the following orders on 26 April 2024:

Pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) Gurjit Singh is prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales other than with leave of an appropriate court under that Act.

No order is made as to costs.

**********

Endnotes

Decision last updated: 30 April 2024

Medium Neutral Citation:	Attorney General for NSW v Singh [2024] NSWSC 449
Hearing dates:	8 December 2023
Decision date:	26 April 2024
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Ierace J
Decision:	(1) Pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) Gurjit Singh is prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales other than with leave of an appropriate court under that Act. (2) No order is made as to costs.
Catchwords:	CIVIL PROCEDURE — whether defendant’s prior claims constitute “vexatious proceedings” pursuant to s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) — whether the defendant has “frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia” pursuant to s 8(1)(a) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW)
Legislation Cited:	Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40, 60 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) ss 78, 80 Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW) s 9B Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) ss 70, 71 Property and Stock Agents Act 2002 (NSW) Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) ss 4, 6, 8
Cases Cited:	Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria [2008] FCAFC 29 Khan v Singh [2021] FCCA 950 Lekhwar v Singh [2022] NSWCATCD 108 Singh v Carroll & Ors [2023] NSWSC 245 Singh v Charles [2022] NSWSC 743 Singh v Charles [2023] NSWSC 623 Singh v Fobubu Pty Ltd; Singh v Khan [2018] NSWSC 1817 Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 127 Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 182 Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCATAP 111 Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCATAP 34 Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2020] FCA 886 Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd, in the matter of Singh [2021] FCAFC 14 Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd; Singh v Khan [2020] NSWCATAP 11 Singh v Gleeson [2023] NSWSC 629 Singh v Harrowell & Ors [2023] NSWSC 420 Singh v Khan (No 2) [2021] FCA 463 Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCA 196 Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCAT, 20 May 2019 Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCATAP 2 Singh v Khan [2019] NSWCATAP 45 Singh v Khan [2019] NSWSC 211 Singh v Khan; Singh v Fobupu Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 485 Singh v Khan [2021] FCA 140 Singh v Khan [2021] NSWSC 1093 Singh v Khan [2023] FCA 76 Singh v Lekhwar [2022] NSWCATAP 158 Singh v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2022] NSWSC 78 Singh v Sharma; Singh v Energy Services Management Pty Ltd t/as Glow Power; Singh v Harrowell; Singh v Cavanagh; Singh v Tidball; Singh v Street [2023] NSWSC 551 Singh v Singh; Singh v RCMO Pty Limited; Singh v Sharma; Singh v Murphy; Singh v Armstrong; Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 280 Singh v State of NSW; Singh v Lekhwar [2021] NSWCA 260 Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 613 Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 614 Singh v Tidball [2023] NSWSC 96 Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125 Viavattene v Attorney General (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 44 Vito Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; Nina Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited [2018] NSWCA 317
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Attorney General for the State of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Gurjit Singh (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: Mr H Atkin (Plaintiff) In person (Defendant) Solicitors: Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
File Number(s):	2023/171969