SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)
ATKINS v IINET PTY LTD
[2019] SASC 83
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bampton
24 May 2019
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY - ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION - MEDIATION
EQUITY - SETTLEMENTS - RECTIFICATION, REVOCATION, RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION
EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - MISTAKE
EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - UNCONSCIONABILITY, UNCONSCIONABLE DEALINGS AND OTHER FORMS OF EQUITABLE FRAUD
Appeal against a decision of a Magistrate refusing to set aside a settlement agreement – where appellant entered into settlement agreement reached at the conclusion of a Court appointed mediation – whether the Court should exercise its discretion to set aside a settlement agreement.
HELD, in dismissing the appeal – there are no grounds upon which to set aside the settlement agreement.
Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235; Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 366; Australia and New Zealand Banking Group v Karam (2005) 64 NSWLR 149; Matsen v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal [2017] FCA 765; Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Petelin v Cullen (1975) 132 CLR 355, applied.
Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422, discussed.
Thorne v Kennedy (2017) 91 ALJR 1260, considered.
ATKINS v IINET PTY LTD
[2019] SASC 83Magistrates Appeal: Civil
BAMPTON J: Paul Atkins issued Magistrates Court proceedings against iiNet Pty Ltd (“iiNet”) alleging that iiNet had failed “to supply vital essential services” pursuant to a mobile plan whilst he and his family were in Russia. Mr Atkins’ wife, Regina Atkins, issued separate Magistrates Court proceedings also alleging breach of contract against iiNet.
On 27 March 2018, a Magistrate referred the parties in the proceedings commenced by Mr Atkins and the parties in the proceedings commenced by Mrs Atkins to the Magistrates Court mediation service for mediation. A Notice of Mediation was sent to the parties stating that the mediation was listed for 14 May 2018 at 2.00 pm. Attached to the notice was the Magistrates Court Practice Direction concerning mediation, conciliation and arbitration.
The course of the mediation
On 14 May 2018, the parties attended the court-ordered mediation. Mr Atkins and Mrs Atkins attended in person. iiNet was represented by its general legal counsel, Mr Antony Moffatt, and a member of its customer service team, Mr Brett Niemann. The mediation commenced at 2.00 pm and concluded at or around 4.30 pm.
During the mediation, the proceedings commenced by Mr Atkins settled and a settlement agreement was signed by Mr Atkins and Mr Moffatt. The proceedings commenced by Mrs Atkins also settled during the mediation and a settlement agreement was signed by Mrs Atkins and Mr Moffatt.
The straightforward one-page settlement agreements each recorded that iiNet was to pay the amount of $300 and that “neither party is to take out any further litigation regarding this matter”. The…
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- AGLC
- Atkins v iiNet Pty Ltd [2019] SASC 83
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- [2019] SASC 83
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that there were no grounds upon which to set aside the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was read to Mr. Atkins prior to his signing it, and the court was satisfied that he comprehended what was read to him. This was supported by his actions following the signing of the settlement agreement, including providing his bank account details to iiNet to facilitate payment of the settlement monies and the settlement of his wife's claim at the same mediation. The court held that Mr. Atkins' dyslexia and learning disability did not prevent him from understanding the effect of straightforward documents and legal proceedings, particularly with extra time and support. While Mr. Atkins may have felt pressured to settle his claim at the mediation and was unhappy with the mediation process, the court found no grounds available as a matter of law upon which to set aside the settlement agreement. The appeal was dismissed.
The court's decision highlights the importance of the voluntary and binding nature of settlement agreements and the limited circumstances in which a court may intervene to set them aside. It also underscores the need for parties to carefully consider the terms of any settlement agreement before entering into it, and to seek clarification or assistance if they are unsure about any aspect of the agreement.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I accept, as described by Ms Gorgula, that Mr Atkins’ dyslexia compromises his reading comprehension skills and his ability to retain the information he reads. I accept that reading requires significant cognitive effort on his part and that he is likely to re-read information a number of times to accurately comprehend the information. I accept that Mr Atkins would rely on the opportunity to work through problems visually and his specific learning disability can exacerbate difficulties he has with comprehension of information, retaining numbers, sequencing information and as a result processing information requires great effort.Consideration The High Court in Harvey v Phillips[1] said that a settlement order is similar to a contract which cannot be set aside unless there are grounds on which it can be said to be void for example illegality, misrepresentation, non-disclosure of a material fact where disclosure is required, duress, mistake or undue influence. In other words, a party to a settlement agreement cannot ask the Court to set aside the agreement because they have had a change of mind or because of they are of the view that they did not get a good enough deal.[1] (1956) 95 CLR 235 at 243-244.Duress Mr Atkins alleges that he and his family had been the subject of a death threat made by Mr Moffatt at some point before the mediation. Mr Atkins submits that the interaction between Mr Atkins, his wife, and Mr Moffatt at the mediation resulted in his wife bursting into tears. Mr Atkins further submits that, due to Mr Moffatt needing to leave the mediation to catch a flight to Sydney, the mediation was rushed.[2] Finally, Mr Atkins submits that the mediator told him that he had to settle at the mediation and that the mediator’s conduct impacted upon his decision to settle at the mediation.[2] Mr Atkins made submissions from the bar table that Mr Moffatt had scheduled a flight at 6:00 pm on the date of the mediation, which would have required him to leave the mediation at 4:30 pm in order to arrive at the airport one hour prior to the departure time. Mr Moffatt strenuously denies in the Moffatt affidavit the allegation that he made any death threats. Mr Atkins explained to me during the hearing of the appeal that the threat he alleged was made by Mr Moffatt occurred when he received an anonymous phone call and it was while he was in the mediation “sitting there, looking at him, I realised, in my opinion, it was him ... which scared me”. Mr Atkins acknowledged to me that he had no proof of a death threat being made by Mr Moffat. In Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation,[3] Lord Scarman explained that there are two elements of duress: “(1) pressure amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim; and (2) the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted”. The development of the law of duress encompasses threatened or actual unlawful conduct:[4] The vagueness inherent in the terms “economic duress” and “illegitimate pressure” can be avoided by treating the concept of “duress” as limited to threatened or actual unlawful conduct. The threat or conduct in question need not be directed to the person or property of the victim, narrowly identified, but can be to the legitimate commercial and financial interests of the party. Secondly, if the conduct or threat is not unlawful, the resulting agreement may nevertheless be set aside where the weaker party establishes undue influence (actual or presumptive) or unconscionable conduct based on an unconscientious taking advantage of his or her special disability or special disadvantage, in the sense identified in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio.It will suffice to consider whether any pressure was exerted on Mr Atkins illegitimately.[3] [1983] 1 AC 366 at 400. Though his Lordship was in dissent, this articulation of the elements has been universally adopted, see Australia and New Zealand Banking Group v Karam (2005) 64 NSWLR 149.[4] Australia and New Zealand Banking Group v Karam (2005) 64 NSWLR 149 at 168 per Beazley, Ipp and Basten JJA cf the contemplation of lawful act duress in Thorne v Kennedy (2017) 91 ALJR 1260 at [26]–[29] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ and at [70]–[73] per Nettle J.