Atkins v District Council of Coober Pedy - [2021] SASCA 6

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Civil)
ATKINS v DISTRICT COUNCIL OF COOBER PEDY
[2021] SASCA 6
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable President Kelly, the Honourable Justice Livesey and the Honourable Justice Bleby)
5 March 2021

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - BY LEAVE OF COURT - GENERALLY
The appellant seeks leave to appeal against a judgment given by a single Judge on appeal from a judgment of the Magistrates Court. On 13 August 2021, a Judge of this Court dismissed an application for an extension of time within which to appeal an interlocutory decision by a Magistrate, striking out the applicant’s claim against the respondent.
Held, refusing leave to appeal:
1.      The appeal does not raise any matter of general importance, nor does it enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant leave.
2.      There is no basis to question the exercise of the Judge’s discretion regarding his refusal to grant an extension of time.
3.      The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs fixed in an amount of $1,500.00.
Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 50(4)(a)(i); Local Government Act 1999 (SA) s 183, referred to.
Atkins v District Council of Coober Pedy [2020] SASC 156; Atkins v Hughes [2019] SASCFC 49; Ferdinands v District Court of South Australia [2011] SASCFC 139; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516; Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, considered.

ATKINS v DISTRICT COUNCIL OF COOBER PEDY
[2021] SASCA 6

Court of Appeal: Kelly P, Livesey and Bleby JJA
Application for leave to appeal
THE COURT:

This is an application for leave to appeal against a judgment given by a single Judge on appeal from a judgment of the Magistrates Court.[1]
[1] Pursuant to s 50(4)(a)(ii) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA).
On 13 August 2020, a Judge of this Court dismissed an application for an extension of time within which to appeal an interlocutory decision by a Magistrate, striking out the applicant’s claim against the respondent.[2]
[2] Atkins v District Council of Coober Pedy [2020] SASC 156 (Parker J).
The Judge gave ex tempore reasons, explaining in some detail why there was no merit in the grounds of appeal. Ultimately, the Judge applied Jackamarra v Krakouer, finding that because the appeal was devoid of merit it was futile to grant an extension of time.[3]
[3] Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516, 518-521 (Brennan CJ and McHugh J). His Honour also cited Ferdinands v District Court of South Australia [2011] SASCFC 139.
The essence of the applicant’s case is that he is entitled to repayment of an amount paid in respect of rates due to the respondent. Whereas the applicant wished his payment to be credited to rates due for the 2019/2020 year, they were applied in respect of rates due for the prior 2018/2019 year. The applicant relies upon a statement by a council officer in an email dated 24 September 2019 offering to repay the amount.
The Magistrate found that the Council Officer’s offer to repay was not supported by any consideration and was therefore not enforceable. However, and in any event, the Magistrate found that any offer, even if prima facie enforceable, was contrary to s 183 of the Local Government Act 1999 (SA) (Local Government Act) which directed the Council as to how it must apply monies received in respect of rates. Accordingly, the offer was in any event unenforceable as being contrary to statute.
In support of his application, the applicant raised before the Judge a number of irrelevant or unmeritorious matters, including complaints about asserted non-compliance with COVID-19 directions, bias and a suggested failure to carefully check a claim made by an unrepresented party to determine whether there may be possible merit notwithstanding a grossly deficient presentation.[4]
[4] Relying on Atkins v Hughes [2019] SASCFC 49, [39].
The Judge rejected all of these matters and upheld the rulings made by the Magistrate in support of the conclusion that the applicant’s claim had no prospect of success. The Judge dismissed the application for an extension of time to appeal the order that the Magistrates Court claim be dismissed with costs.
In this Court, the applicant raised a number of matters which were only peripherally relevant to the decisions made by the Magistrate and the Judge. For example, the grounds of appeal were expressed as follows:
·Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Not new just not explained correctly).
·Unfair procedural fairness.
·Extreme bias against the self-represented.
·All Judges erred. Their information was clearly incorrect.
I don’t know if you wish me to quote numbers and rules here but I am not a Solicitor so I present my case in laymen’s terms. (Firstly, if the court accepts that all people have the right to represent themselves in Court, then the Court has no choice but to accept the manner in which the case may be filed. However, if the Court cannot demand the self-represented must file like a Solicitor, if in fact he/she is not afforded the full benefits of a Solicitor. In laymen’s terms we are either white or black, there are no shades of grey, that is not be procedural fairness, period. …
(original emphasis)
As to why leave to appeal should be granted, no attempt was made to demonstrate whether this case raised any matter of general importance. Amongst many other complaints, the applicant submitted:
“section 183 of the Local Government Act” I must be really, really stupid or you are. The section 183 of the Local Government Act doesn’t even come close to be able to be applied in this instance. I filed the case for my money back because there is an existing relationship between myself and the [respondent], thus a Breach of Fiduciary Duty was clearly committed. The [respondent] had a duty of care and the best interests of the client to inform me, up front of what they believed would be the actions taken if I pay money to the [respondent], they did not.
Section 183 of the Local Government Act provides:
183—Application of money in respect of rates
If a council receives or recovers an amount in respect of rates, the amount will be applied as follows:
(a)     firstly—in payment of any costs awarded to, or recoverable by, the council in any court proceedings undertaken by the council for the recovery of the rates;
(b)     secondly—in satisfaction of any liability for interest;
(c)     thirdly—in payment of any fine;
(d)     fourthly—in satisfaction of liabilities for rates in the order in which those liabilities arose.
As may be seen, by s 183(d), amounts received “will be applied” in the manner directed, particularly “in satisfaction of liabilities for rates in the order in which those liabilities arose”.
In the circumstances, leave to appeal ought be refused. The appeal does not raise any matter of general importance, nor does it enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant leave. There is no basis to question the exercise of the Judge’s discretion regarding his refusal to grant an extension of time.[5]
[5] House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, [25].
Although applications for permission are normally addressed ex parte, the Court was assisted by submissions from the respondent who attended the Court of Appeal callover on two occasions. On the question of costs, written submissions were sought from the parties. The respondent submitted that it should have costs in an amount of $2,000.00. In written submissions naming “God” as the “First Interested Party” the applicant said:
3.I do understand that this submission is only to refer to the matter of costs despite the case itself is why I should not have to pay anything; thus, I will endeavour to keep it short for your benefit.
4.The bald guy, the defendants Solicitor, is going to make one of the best Solicitors, God help us if he become a Judge, that being said will, apparently, make him the best human parasite on earth but the good thing for him is the only direction for him is up. “A lawyer in either a social engineer or he is a parasite on society” Internet quote Charles Hamilton Houston.
…
13.1… it is common knowledge the legal system is a seriously inadequate abomination, the next step up is anarchy leading to a rebellion to remove the legal system period. So, what are you going to do about it, join them or fix it?
Paul-Steven ATKINS
PS. Mr Thomas is a moron period, not as an insult but as intended by psychiatrist meaning, he is educated in the Law but has no intelligentsia whatsoever, period. On the other hand, I am the opposite, intelligent with no education due to the unknowns of dyslexic. I now can get educated in the law but Thomas can’t get intelligent. PSS. There is no such thing as an insult, that is just a smoke screen to hide the truth, if Thomas is not intelligent then it is not a insult, it’s a fact, if Thomas was intelligent then again he would be offend would he? In fact the CEO of the DCCP is far more intelligent than their Solicitor, although that doesn’t say much dose it, its like saying the CEO is twice as intelligent that Thomas but that may mean Thomas is dumb but the CEO is dumb-dumb. Just humour, I like the CEO, he is intelligent.
The applicant opposed costs. In our view, it is appropriate to make a costs order pursuant to r 213.5(8)(d) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA).
The orders of the Court are:
5.Leave to appeal is refused.
6.The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs fixed in an amount of $1,500.00.