Athanasios TYROPANIS and Secretary, Department of Social Services

[2015] AATA 701

Administrative Appeals Tribunal

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL              )
  )         No: 2014/6341
General Division  )

Re: Athanasios Tyropanis
Applicant

And: Secretary, Department of Social Services
Respondent

CORRIGENDUM TO DECISION

TRIBUNAL:              Mr Conrad Ermert, Member

DATE:   23 September 2015

PLACE:                    Melbourne

The Tribunal directs the Registrar, pursuant to subsection 43AA(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, to alter the text of the decision in this application as follows:

1. At page one, paragraph 2, the amount of $1,494,492.43 be substituted for $1,656,000.

2. At page one, paragraph 2, the words not been made deleted and replaced with the words not having been made.

3. At paragraphs 68, 69 and 73, the amount of $1,494,492.43 be substituted for $1,656,000.

4. At paragraph 39, dot point 6, the amount of $747,246 be substituted for $747,296.

5. At paragraph 39, dot point 8, the amount of $987.44 be substituted for $987.51.

[sgd]..................................................................

Member

Tyropanis and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2015] AATA 701 (11 September 2015)

Division	GENERAL DIVISION
File Number	2014/6341
Re	Athanasios TYROPANIS
APPLICANT
And	Secretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT

Decision

Tribunal	Mr C Ermert, Member
Date	11 September 2015
Place	Melbourne

1.The decision under review is affirmed under section 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act) in so far as that Mr Tyropanis does not qualify for Disability Support Pension (claim lodged 11 June 2014) or Newstart Allowance (claim lodged 15 August 2014) due to the imposition of a compensation preclusion period.

2.The remainder of the decision under review is set aside and in substitution it is decided that:

·the amount of lump sum compensation paid to Mr Tyropanis is $1,656,000;

·the amount of $27,767 is to be treated as not been made under section 1184K(1) of the Act; and

·the matter is remitted to the Respondent under section 43 of the AAT Act for re-calculation of the preclusion period after excluding $27,767 from the lump sum compensation payment.

[sgd]..........................................
Mr C Ermert, Member

SOCIAL SECURITY – disability support pension – newstart allowance – jurisdiction - preclusion period – special circumstances – decision partly affirmed – decision partly set aside and substituted.

Legislation

Social Security Act 1991 ss 17, 1170, 1171 and s1184K

Cases

Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Groth and Secretary Department of Social Security (1995) 37 ALD 797
Ivovic and Director-General of Social Services [1984] AATA 400; (1984) 6 ALN N293
Manafikhi and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2007) AATA 1529
Hughes and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2010] AATA 600

REASONS FOR DECISION

Mr C Ermert, Member

11 September 2015

introduction

1. In 2003, Mr Tyropanis, the Applicant, was injured in a work-related accident.  He was paid periodic workers’ compensation payments until 25 April 2008.  On 29 June 2005 he received a lump sum payment of $156,000.  On 3 April 2008 Mr Tyropanis settled a compensation claim by consent orders in the NSW Supreme Court.  The matter settled in the amount of $1,500,000 of which Mr Tyropanis received $493,000.

2. On 29 April 2008 Centrelink, the service provider for the Department of Social Services, the Respondent, decided to impose a compensation preclusion period on income support payments to Mr Tyropanis from 26 April 2008 to 4 April 2025.

3. On review, an Authorised Review Officer (ARO) of Centrelink affirmed this decision on 30 May 2008.  On 6 August 2008 the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT) affirmed the ARO’s decision.

4. On 9 December 2009 this Tribunal made an Order that the application for extension of time is not granted. 

5. On 11 June 2014 Mr Tyropanis lodged a claim for Disability Support Pension (DSP).  On 15 August 2014 he lodged a claim for Newstart Allowance.  Centrelink rejected his respective claims on 9 July and 15 August 2014 as he was subject to a lump sum preclusion period.  Mr Tyropanis requested a review of these decisions.  On 2 October 2014 an ARO affirmed the decisions.  After a further review the SSAT affirmed the ARO’s decision on 24 November 2014 (the 2014 SSAT decision).

6. This matter is an application for review of the 2014 SSAT decision.

   HEARING

7. At the hearing, Mr Tyropanis represented himself, and gave his evidence under oath.  Mr Tim Noonan, a solicitor in the Department of Human Services, represented the Respondent. 

8. I had before me the documents provided by the Respondent in accordance with section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the T-documents) (the AAT Act). I had before me also Supplementary T-Documents:

   ·ST1 – Notices to Applicant and his solicitors dated 29 April 2008; and

   ·ST2 – Compensator Divisor screenshot from Mr Tyropanis’ electronic record.

9. For Mr Tyropanis I took in the letter from Adamson Legal and Conveyancing, dated 10 February 2015 (Exhibit A1).

10. For the Respondent I took in:

    ·the Secretary’s Statement of Facts and Contentions dated 10 July 2015;

    ·the decision of the SSAT dated 6 August 2008 (Exhibit R1); and

    ·a letter from ANZ dated 6 July 2015 (Exhibit R2).

11. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr Tyropanis was granted additional time to acquire documentation relating to payments made in the discharge of his mortgage.  By telephone on 14 August 2015 he advised the Tribunal that he had been unable to obtain the relevant documentation from the bank.

    legislation

12. The legislation relevant to this matter is contained in the Social Security Act 1991 (the Act).

13. In particular, the Act provides as follows:

    ·Section 17 defines the terms compensation affected payment and income cut-out amount (section 17(1)); compensation (section 17(2)) and compensation part of a lump sum payment (section 17(3)). It provides that the lump sum compensation payment excludes periodic compensation payments that have to be repaid (section 17(4)) and sets out the formula for the calculation of the income cut-out amount (section 17(8));

    ·Section 1170 defines the start and end days of the lump sum preclusion period (section 1170(1)), and the formula for the calculation of the number of weeks of the preclusion period (section 1170(4));

    ·Section 1171 provides for the aggregation of two lump sum payments in relation to the same event; and

    ·Section 1184K(1) provides that all or part of the compensation payment may be disregarded as a result of special circumstances.

    preliminary issue

14. Before proceeding I must determine whether the decision of the Tribunal on 9 December 2009 to refuse an application for an extension of time affects this Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider this application.

15. In the Secretary’s Statement of Facts and Contentions, Mr Noonan submits that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is not affected.  He contends “Although the compensation preclusion period that was the subject of the August 2008 SSAT decision is the same period as that now under review, that period is the foundation/cornerstone of the decision under review.  Consequently, the Tribunal is entitled to consider the preclusion period afresh”.

16. In order to determine whether Mr Tyropanis is disqualified for the payment of DSP and Newstart Allowance I need to satisfy myself that the lump sum preclusion period has been correctly determined and applied.  I am not able to do that without a review of the circumstances applying to the application of the preclusion period.  I find that I have the jurisdiction to consider the application of the preclusion period in considering the current application.

    evidence

17. In his oral evidence, Mr Tyropanis said he wanted the decision on the preclusion period to be overturned. He said he can not manage financially.  His sister has psychiatric problems, his mother is 82 years old, and he receives only $240 per fortnight by way of a carer’s allowance to look after them.

18. In his cross-examination, Mr Noonan referred Mr Tyropanis to his evidence given to the SSAT during the 2008 hearing.  Mr Tyropanis testified that, after receiving the compensation payment, he paid around $200,000 to discharge the mortgage on his house and $60,000 in debts (Exhibit R1, page 4).  In regard to the mortgage on the house, Mr Tyropanis said:

    ·He bought the property at 48 Murray Road, Wingham, NSW (the Property) in 2005 for the sum of $200,000;

    ·At the time he paid a deposit of $30,000 or $40,000, the money coming from his first compensation payment of $156,000;

    ·He took out a mortgage from the ANZ bank in Taree, NSW for the sum of $180,000;

    ·After receiving the second compensation payment he paid out the mortgage on the Property for a sum of $178,000.

19. Mr Noonan referred to the ANZ letter, Exhibit R2, which records “ANZ advise that after conducting a search of our records we have been unable to locate the above named customer based on the information provided”.  Mr Tyropanis confirmed that his details on the ANZ letter were correct.  He opined that the bank may not have found relevant records as the account was in joint names with his partner.  Mr Tyropanis agreed to make his own enquiries with the bank to obtain information confirming the payment of his mortgage.  As noted above at paragraph 11, after being given an opportunity to obtain relevant supporting documentation from the bank, Mr Tyropanis advised the Tribunal that he had been unable to obtain such documentation.

20. When asked why he decided to pay off his mortgage from the lump sum compensation payment, Mr Tyropanis said he wanted to own his own home and did not want a debt “over his head”.

21. Mr Noonan asked for more detail of the expenditure of $60,000 for the repayment of debts.  Mr Tyropanis said that at the time he had a drug problem and he spent “a good whack” of the money on drugs.

22. Mr Noonan referred to the reasons for the SSAT’s decision of 24 November 2014 in which the Member recorded “… he paid off his mortgage in the expectation that his wife would be the primary income earner for the family during the lump sum preclusion period”.  Mr Tyropanis provided the following additional information regarding the family situation at the time:

    ·He was not in a fit state to work because of the injuries from his accident;

    ·There were four children in the family aged from four to 18 years; and

    ·His wife was employed full time earning $800 to $900 net per week.

23. Mr Tyropanis confirmed that he did not consult a financial expert at the time he received the compensation payments.

24. In regard to the sale of the Property Mr Tyropanis agreed with the content of paragraphs 69 to 72 of the Secretary’s Statement of Facts and Contention and that the sum of $72,233.32 for his net receipt from the sale was “about right”.  When asked what happened to these funds Mr, Tyropanis said:

    ·He bought a Commodore car for about $8,000;

    ·He lived in a caravan park for eight months, paying $200 per week rent;

    ·He spent the rest of the money on living expenses including hotels, motels, takeaways and restaurants, parties and “wine, women and song” adding “I might as well live it up while I can”;

    ·He kept no receipts;

    ·He moved to Sydney and lived with his mother for three to four months; and then

    ·He moved to Melbourne to live with his sister at Werribee.

25. Mr Tyropanis also gave evidence of buying an AU model Ford and a SAAB from the $493,000 compensation payment.

26. Mr Tyropanis said he has been living with his sister since about October 2013.  His mother also came to live with them, three to four months ago.  He said his living expenses are now zero due to the generosity of his family.  He said his carer’s allowance lets him contribute to the food bill.  Mr Tyropanis said he intends to continue living with his sister.

27. Under cross-examination by Mr Noonan regarding his health issues, Mr Tyropanis said:

    ·He suffers from constant pain from swelling of his left leg;

    ·He cannot afford compression stockings so he sews his own from wetsuit material;

    ·He can sit for only one  – one and a half hours maximum;

    ·He cannot walk far and uses his car to drive everywhere;

    ·His mother and sister do all the shopping while he sits in the car in the car park;

    ·On a good day he can walk around a shopping centre, but that is not often; and

    ·There is nothing that can be done for his shoulder.

    submissions

28. Mr Tyropanis made no initial submissions.

29. Mr Noonan relies on the Secretary’s Statement of Facts and Contentions. 

30. He referred to paragraphs 30 to 35 and re-iterated the contention that the June 2005 payment of $156,000 was incorrectly excluded from the calculation of the lump sum compensation.

31. In regard to the repayment of the mortgage, Mr Noonan submitted that there was no evidence of such a payment to the ANZ bank.  He contended that, in any case, the repayment was the result of a personal decision of Mr Tyropanis who wanted to own his house and did not want a debt.  Mr Noonan submitted that the case law is clear on such an issue and Mr Tyropanis can not expect the taxpayer to reduce his preclusion period because of his personal desires. 

32. Mr Noonan submitted that Mr Tyropanis’ expenditure of $60,000 mainly on drugs and $72,000 on cars and wine, women and song could not be taken into account when considering special circumstances. 

33. Mr Noonan reiterated the contentions in paragraphs 69 to 76 that the marriage breakdown in 2009 should be considered as a change of circumstances. As a consequence of the application of case law the amount of $27,767 (the difference between 50 percent share of the market value of the Property ($100,000) and the net proceeds of the sale ($72,233)) should be treated as not having been made under section 1184K of the Act.

    tribunal considerations

34. I must first determine whether the lump sum preclusion period was correctly calculated and applied.  Then I must consider whether there are special circumstances such that all or part of the compensation payment should be disregarded.

    Lump Sum Preclusion Period

35. Mr Tyropanis contends that the period should be calculated on the basis of the sum of money he actually received, being around $493,000.  Mr Noonan contends that the lump sum compensation is $1,494,492.43, as submitted in paragraph 32 of the Secretary’s Statement of Facts and Contentions.

36. The starting point of the calculation is determining the amount of compensation. This is defined in section 17(2) of the Act to include payment in settlement of a claim for damages or under an insurance scheme and any other compensation or damages payment. In this case, those payments were an amount of $156,000 paid in 2005 and a settlement in the sum of $1,500,000 made in 2008.

37. Section 1171(1) of the Act requires the aggregation of two lump sum payments in relation to the same event. Section 17(4) of the Act provides that any periodic compensation payments received are excluded from the lump sum compensation payment. The section provides for no other exclusions from the amount of the lump sum compensation payment.

38. Section 17(3) of the Act defines the compensation part of a lump sum compensation payment as being 50 per cent of the payment. Section 1170(4) provides the formula for the calculation of the number of weeks in the preclusion period. The number of weeks is the compensation part of the lump sum divided by the income cut-out amount. Section 17(8) sets out the formula for the calculation of the income cut-out amount. The income cut-out amount in this case is set out in the Table at ST2 and is not contested.

39. The calculation of the lump sum preclusion period is as follows:

    ·the 2005 compensation payment of $156,000 is added to,

    ·the 2008 compensation payment of $1,500,000, which gives,

    ·an aggregated lump sum compensation payment (s.1171(1)) of $1,656,000 from which must be subtracted,

    ·periodic workers compensation payments (s.17(4)) of  $161,507.57 resulting in,

    ·the gross lump sum of $1,494,492.43 to which must be applied,

    ·The 50 percent rule (s.17(3)) which results in the compensation part of the lump sum of $747,296, which must be divided by,

    ·The income cut-out amount of $756.75 (from ST2), which results in

    ·a period of 987.51 weeks, which equates to,

    ·18 years and 51 weeks.

40. The start day of 26 April 2008 is not contested.  Accordingly, I find that the lump sum preclusion period for Mr Tyropanis is from 26 April 2008 to 19 April 2027. 

41. This finding is a variation to the period determined by the SSAT in making its decision in 2008. In its determination, the SSAT did not aggregate the 2005 lump sum with the 2008 lump sum as required by section 1171(1) of the Act.

    Special Circumstances

42. Section 1184K(1) of the Act provides as follows:

    For the purposes of this Part, the Secretary may treat the whole or part of a compensation payment as:

    (a)Not having been made; or

    (b)Not liable to be made;

    If the Secretary thinks it is appropriate to do so in the special circumstances of the case

43. The only issue submitted by Mr Tyropanis as a special circumstance is his financial hardship.  Although not submitted by Mr Tyropanis I accept that his health issues and his legal costs should also be considered for acceptance as special circumstances. 

    Financial Situation

44. Mr Noonan contends that Mr Tyropanis’ financial situation should not be considered a special circumstance and cites numerous case law judgements in support of his contention.  Mr Noonan submits, however, that referring to paragraphs 69 to 76 of the Secretary’s Statement of Facts and Contentions, the sale of Mr Tyropanis’ former matrimonial home was a circumstance that altered significantly since the commencement of the preclusion period and was outside his control.  As a result of the sale, Mr Tyropanis suffered a reduction of his assets amounting to $27,767. 

45. Citing the decision in Hughes and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2010] AATA 600 Mr Noonan submitted that the amount of $27,767 should be treated as not having been made under subsection 1184K(1) of the Act.

46. The evidence of the circumstances of the sale available to me support the facts relied upon by Mr Noonan.  I accept the reasoning submitted by Mr Noonan.  I find that the reduction of his assets of $27,767 is a special circumstance to be applied in accordance with section 1184K(1) of the Act. Accordingly, I find that the amount of $27,767 should be treated as not having been made.

47. In determining whether Mr Tyropanis’ current financial situation should be considered as a special circumstance I take note of the following decisions:

    ·Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 (Beadle) where the Tribunal stated at paragraph 20:

    “It seems to us that the financial position of the applicant will not ordinarily constitute special circumstances of itself. Very many of those who seek the handicapped child's allowance are in straitened financial circumstances. That is not to say that some quite unusual expense incurred on behalf of the handicapped child during the period under consideration is not capable of constituting special circumstances. In a particular case it may do so’.

    ·Groth and Secretary Department of Social Security (1995) 37 ALD 797 (Groth) where the Tribunal stated:

    “It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary” and

    “Therefore, there will be special circumstances if the circumstances are such that it is unreasonable, unjust or inappropriate not to treat whole or part of a compensation payment as not having been made bearing in mind that the provisions are intended to ensure that a person is not paid from two sources in respect of the same period of time”. .

    ·Ivovic and Director-General of Social Services [1984] AATA 400; (1984) 6 ALN N293 (Ivovic) where the Tribunal stated:

    “the evidence suggests that the applicant has either deliberately or recklessly embarked on a course of conduct which has created the circumstances of hardship on which he now relies”;

    ·Manafikhi and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2007) AATA 1529 (Manafikhi) in which the Tribunal stated:

    “… the way in which financial hardship was caused and Mr Manafikhi’s contribution to this state of his affairs must also be examined.  I agree with the view of Dwyer SM when she stated in Re Kryswak (1998) 15 ALD 690 at paragraph 39:

    In my view the circumstances out of which hardship arose and the degree of hardship, are both relevant in deciding whether and how the discretion under s.156 should be exercised”.

1. In 2005 Mr Tyropanis received a lump sum payment of $156,000.  In 2008 he received a further $493,000.  This amount of $649,000 was to financially provide for Mr Tyropanis until April 2027.  He states that he now has nothing left.  At the time, he did not take expert financial advice but said in evidence that he now wished he had taken that advice.

2. I commence by considering the major expenses incurred by Mr Tyropanis.

3. His initial evidence was that he paid $200,000 to discharge his mortgage on the Property and he paid off debts of $60,000.  In further evidence, he said he paid $30,000 to $40,000 for the initial deposit on his house and that he paid $178,000 to discharge his mortgage.

4. I note the fact that Mr Tyropanis was not able to provide documentation from his bank to support his testimony regarding a mortgage repayment.  Accordingly, I have no corroborated evidence that such a payment was made.

5. However, even if he did make such a payment, I note his reasons for paying off his mortgage were that he wanted to own his home and did not want a debt hanging over his head.  This was a decision made by Mr Tyropanis that was wholly under his own control.  It was not an unexpected commitment and was not unusual in the sense of the decision in Beadle.  I do not accept this payment as a special circumstance.

6. In regard to the debt Mr Tyropanis says he paid a good part of the $60,000 to drug dealers.  This expenditure was made as a result of Mr Tyropanis’ lifestyle choice.  I do not accept this as a special circumstance. 

7. In regard to the balance of the $649,000 Mr Tyropanis gave evidence that he bought three cars and spent the rest of his money on living expenses including hotels, motels, takeaways and restaurants, parties and “wine, women and song”. In giving that evidence he added “I might as well live it up while I can”. 

8. Since 2005 Mr Tyropanis has spent $649,000 in (possibly) paying off a mortgage with the remainder paying for his adopted style of living.  Adopting the reasoning in Ivovic the evidence suggests that Mr Tyropanis has either deliberately or recklessly embarked on a course of conduct which has created the circumstances of hardship on which he now relies.  There are no quite unusual expenses incurred in this case which could be considered by way of the reasoning in Beadle.  Following the reasoning in Manafikhi, I consider Mr Tyropanis’ previous lifestyle to be a relevant circumstance out of which the hardship arose.

9. In regard to the degree of hardship, I note the evidence that Mr Tyropanis is living with his sister and is not paying rental costs.  In addition I note that he receives a carer’s allowance in respect to his sister.  Although his circumstances are undoubtedly straitened I do not accept that his financial circumstances are, of themselves, necessarily unusual or exceptional. 

10. In considering the circumstances out of which his financial hardship has arisen and the degree of hardship being suffered I am satisfied that Mr Tyropanis’ financial situation can not be considered as a special circumstance in the terms of the Act.  I find accordingly.

11. In applying Groth I do not consider there is anything unfair, unintended or unjust in this finding.  Mr Tyropanis’ spending was clearly the result of his own decisions and choice of lifestyle.  I consider it unfortunate that Mr Tyropanis did not take some expert financial advice when he received his lump sum payments.

    Health Issues

12. In his evidence Mr Tyropanis clearly described the problems he suffers as a result of his work-related injury.  In his cross examination, Mr Noonan helpfully elicited from Mr Tyropanis the effects of his left leg, left hip and left shoulder injuries on his ability to function. 

13. In his submissions Mr Noonan referred to the content of paragraphs 81 to 85 of the Secretary’s Statement of Facts and Contentions.

14. In considering this issue I have regard to the decision in Najdovska and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1998) 54 ALD 184 (Najdovska), in which the Tribunal said:

    “Mrs Najdovska does have health problems which are the reason for her receipt of disability support pension ... There is no evidence which would allow me to find that her health problems are special or unusual…”

15. There is no evidence of health issues that did not result from the workplace injury.  Nor is there evidence of health issues which are unexpected and might be considered as a special circumstance.

16. Following the same reasoning as in Najdovska, I find that Mr Tyropanis’ health issues are not special circumstances for the application of section 1184K(1) of the Act.

    Legal Costs

17. Mr Tyropanis did not submit his legal costs as an issue to be considered as a special circumstance.  Mr Noonan referred to paragraphs 86 to 99 of the Secretary’s Statement of Facts and Contentions, contending that legal costs are not relevant to the consideration of special circumstances in section 1184K(1) of the Act.

18. At paragraph 39, I excluded Mr Tyropanis’ legal costs in calculating the lump sum compensation payment he received.  His legal costs were not an expenditure from his receipts of $649,000 to which I referred earlier.  His legal costs do not influence my finding that his financial situation is not a special circumstance in the context of section 1184K(1) of the Act.

    Preclusion Period

19. Prior to my consideration of special circumstances, I found that the preclusion period extended from 26 April 2008 to 19 April 2027.  After considering the issue of special circumstances I found that the lump sum compensation payment used to calculate the preclusion period is to be reduced by the amount of $27,767.  As a result, the preclusion period will need to be re-calculated.

20. Although the preclusion period will be reduced, the reduction will not be such as to end the period earlier than the dates in 2014 on which Mr Tyropanis lodged his claims for DSP and Newstart Allowance.

    Conclusion

21. I have found that the SSAT in making its 2008 decision erred in not aggregating the lump sum compensation payments made in 2005 and 2008.  As a result, I have found that the total lump sum compensation paid to Mr Tyropanis amounted to $1,656,000 ($156,000 plus $1,500,000).

22. Using the sum of $1,656,000 as the amount of the lump sum compensation paid to Mr Tyropanis I found that the lump sum preclusion period extends from 26 April 2008 to 19 April 2027. I found further that the sum of $27,767 is to be treated as not been made under section 1184K(1) of the Act. As a result, the end-date for the preclusion period must be re-calculated. Nevertheless the end-date will still be well beyond the dates in 2014 on which Mr Tyropanis lodged his applications for DSP and Newstart Allowance.

23. As the preclusion period is in force at the time of Mr Tyropanis’ claims for DSP and Newstart Allowance I find that these applications must be refused.

24. After considering all the evidence available to me regarding the circumstances of Mr Tyropanis, I found that his health issues and legal costs do not constitute special circumstances.  In regard to his financial situation, I found that the reduction in his assets of $27,767 is to be treated as not having been made and therefore not liable to be included in the lump sum compensation payment used to calculate the preclusion period. 

    decision

25. The decision under review is affirmed under section 43 of the AAT Act in so far as that Mr Tyropanis does not qualify for DSP (claim lodged 11 June 2014) or Newstart Allowance (claim lodged 15 August 2014) due to the imposition of a compensation preclusion period.

26. The remainder of the decision under review is set aside and in substitution it is decided that:

    ·the amount of lump sum compensation paid to Mr Tyropanis is $1,656,000;

    ·the amount of $27,767 is to be treated as not been made under section 1184K(1) of the Act; and

    ·the matter is remitted to the Respondent under section 43 of the AAT Act for re-calculation of the preclusion period after excluding $27,767 from the lump sum compensation payment.

I certify that the preceding 73 (seventy-three) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr C Ermert, Member

[sgd].......................................................................

Associate

Dated 11 September 2015

Date of hearing	31 July 2015
Applicant	In person
Advocate for the Respondent	Mr Tim Noonan, Department of Human Services