SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No 3788 of 2008
| TONY GRAEME ASTBURY | |
| Appellant | |
| v | |
| ROBERT WOOD and DAVID LEWIS | Respondents |
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JUDGES: | ASHLEY and REDLICH JJA | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 17 March 2009 and 31 March 2009 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 10 June 2009 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2009] VSCA 126 | |
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Statutes – Interpretation – Costs – County Court – Whether judge empowered to fix witness expenses – Whether exercise of discretion to fix witness expenses miscarried – County Court Act 1958, ss 78A(1), 78(1), 33.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr P H Solomon | Lander & Rogers |
| For the First Respondent | Mr D G Brookes, SC with Mr N R Bird | Drew Gleeson Legal |
ASHLEY JA:
The first respondent, Robert Wood, brought a proceeding against the appellant, Tony Astbury, (conveniently, ‘the employer’) and the second respondent, David Lewis, (conveniently, ‘the grazier’) claiming damages for personal injuries sustained in an incident whilst shearing a llama/alpaca on or about 31 December 2002. The matter came on for hearing in the County Court at Warrnambool in June 2008. After the trial had proceeded for some seven days, a compromise was reached. Most of the matters which needed to be reflected in orders by the Court were agreed. Concerning costs, it was agreed that the defendants should pay the plaintiff’s costs including reserved costs to be taxed in default of agreement on County Court scale D.
The judge was informed that there were two costs issues which required a decision. The first of them was the quantum of fee on brief for senior counsel. There were competing submissions about that matter, the judge resolved them, and no issue arises on the appeal in that connection.
The Controversy
The second question concerned the witness fee which the defendants should have to pay in respect of the attendance of a neurosurgeon, B. The witness had been driven from Melbourne to Warrnambool to give evidence, and after giving evidence been driven back to Melbourne. He had spent some two hours in the witness box, but having account of the length of the journey it was not in debate that he should be compensated for a day’s attendance at Court. Again, it was not in debate that it had been proper for the witness to give evidence in Warrnambool, from the witness box, rather than by way of video link.
The witness claimed recompense of two kinds. First, he had incurred $660 cost of travelling. It was not in dispute that this cost should be paid by the defendants. Second, he rendered an account to the plaintiff’s solicitors in an amount of $8000 plus GST for attending court and giving evidence. This was the area of controversy which was presented for consideration by the judge.
The Submissions at Trial
Senior counsel for the plaintiff produced the witness’s account. He submitted that s 78A(1) of the County Court Act 1958 (Vic) (‘the Act’) provided that the costs of and incidental to all…
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- Case
- [2009] VSCA 126
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine if the statutory provisions, specifically sections 78A(1), 78(1), and 33 of the County Court Act 1958, empowered the judge to set witness expenses. It was also necessary to assess whether the exercise of this discretion was flawed. The court examined the statutory language and its implications for judicial discretion in setting witness expenses, considering the context in which the discretion was exercised.
The County Court found that the statutory provisions did indeed empower the judge to fix witness expenses. The court concluded that there was no miscarriage of discretion in the way the judge had exercised this power. The decision was based on a thorough analysis of the statutory language and the context in which the judge made the decision. The court held that the statutory framework allowed for the fixing of witness expenses and that the judge's decision fell within the permissible scope of this discretion.
The court's ruling confirmed the judge's authority to fix witness expenses and upheld the decision made in the case. The court's findings were grounded in a careful interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, ensuring clarity and consistency in the application of the law concerning witness expenses in the County Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
The facts leading to this dispute stem from a County Court proceeding where Astbury was awarded costs. Following the award, the judge exercised discretion to fix the plaintiff's witness expenses. Wood, dissatisfied with the judge's decision, applied to the Supreme Court for a review of the decision on fixing witness expenses. Wood's application raises questions about the statutory authority of the judge to fix witness expenses and whether the discretion exercised was appropriate or miscarried.
The matter came before the Supreme Court as an application for judicial review of a decision made by a County Court judge. The primary issue in the Supreme Court was to determine whether the County Court judge had the statutory authority to fix witness expenses and if the exercise of that authority was lawful. Prior to this, Astbury was awarded costs in a proceeding held at the County Court, and the judge exercised discretion to fix witness expenses. Following this decision, Wood applied to the Supreme Court to review the judge's decision, arguing that the judge did not have the power to fix witness expenses and that the exercise of any such discretion was miscarried.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the judge was empowered under the County Court Act 1958 to fix witness expenses.
2. Whether the exercise of the discretion to fix witness expenses miscarried.
Held
1. The court held that the judge was empowered under the County Court Act 1958 to fix witness expenses.
2. The court held that the exercise of the discretion to fix witness expenses did not miscarry.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the relevant provisions of the County Court Act 1958. Under section 78A(1), the judge was given the authority to fix the amount of witness expenses. The court noted that this section clearly empowered the judge to make such determinations, aligning with the statutory framework. Furthermore, section 78(1) stipulated that the amount fixed by the judge was to be paid by the party who called the witness, and section 33 provided that the judge’s discretion was not to be interfered with unless there was a misapplication or an abuse of the discretion. The court then assessed whether the judge had abused the discretion by misapplying the statutory provisions. It concluded that there was no evidence of such abuse, as the judge had adhered to the statutory framework in determining the witness expenses. The court did not find any misapplication of law or facts that would warrant overturning the judge's decision. Thus, the ratio decidendi of this decision is that where a judge is empowered under the County Court Act 1958 to fix witness expenses, the exercise of this discretion will not be deemed to have miscarried in the absence of evidence of misapplication or abuse of discretion.