Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers Australia on behalf of Philip Edward Cross v Deniliquin Council
[1995] IRCA 79
•10 Mar 1995
CATCHWORDS
COURTS AND JUDGES - nature of a review of the exercise of a power by a Judicial Registrar - whether hearing de novo - rights of parties to call evidence in review
Industrial Relations Act 1988, ss 376 and 377
Industrial Relations Court Rules, O 33r3
Keating v Teico Investments Pty Ltd, 14 September 1994,
unreported, Northrop J, Federal Court of Australia
Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson (No 2) 1990 170 CLR 267
Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 23
February 1995, unreported, High Court of Australia
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and
Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 14
Re Kwiatek; Ex parte Big J Ltd v Pattison (1989) 21 FCR 374
Harris v Caladine (1990) 172 CLR 85
Aldridge v Booth (1988) 80 ALR 1
No. NI 253 of 1994
ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, SCIENTISTS AND MANAGERS
AUSTRALIA ON BEHALF OF PHILIP EDWARD CROSS v DENILIQUIN
COUNCIL
MOORE J
SYDNEY
10 MARCH 1995
IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS )
)
COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) No. NI 253 of 1994
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY )
BETWEEN: ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL
ENGINEERS, SCIENTISTS AND
MANAGERS AUSTRALIA ON BEHALF
OF PHILIP EDWARD CROSS
Applicant
AND: DENILIQUIN COUNCIL
Respondent
JUDGE: Moore J
PLACE: Sydney
DATE: 10 March 1995
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 9 December 1994 a Judicial Registrar ordered the Deniliquin Council ("the Council") to reinstate an employee. The order was made under s170EE of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 ("the Act") in an application brought under s170EA by the Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers, Australia ("the Union") on behalf of the employee. The Council has applied under s377 of the Act for a review of the exercise of the power by the Judicial Registrar to order reinstatement.
I have commenced the review and at a directions hearing an issue arose about the nature of the review. The Council said that it proposed to call witnesses who would give oral evidence and be cross-examined. The Union submitted that the review should be undertaken by reference to the evidence that had been led before the Judicial Registrar. Any further evidence that the Council might wish to call could only be called with the leave of the Court. This difference in approach has a significant bearing on the nature of the directions that should be given and the manner in which the review will proceed to hearing. Accordingly I considered it appropriate that I hear submissions from the parties on this issue at an early stage and determine whether the Council could follow the course it proposed. This judgment deals with that matter.
The issue of what is the nature of the review undertaken under s377 is of general importance and has not yet been determined by the Court though a tentative view has been expressed by Northrop J in Keating v Teico Investments Pty Ltd, unreported, 14 September 1994.
Section 377 provides:
"(1)A party to proceedings may apply to the Court to review a Judicial Registrar's exercise in the proceedings of a power delegated under section 376. An application must be made within the period prescribed by the Rules of Court or such further period as is allowed in accordance with the Rules.
On an application under subsection (1) or of its own motion, the Court may review a Judicial Registrar's exercise of a power so delegated. The Court may make whatever order it considers appropriate in relation to the matter in relation to which the power was exercised.
On the application of a party or of its own motion, the Court may refer to a Full Court of the Court an application under subsection (1)."
What is comprehended by the expression "the Court may review ... (the) exercise of a power" in s377 is ultimately a matter of construction of the provision which confers the right to appeal: see Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson (No 2) (1990) 170 CLR 267 at 273 and Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 23 February 1995, unreported, High Court at 14 per Mason CJ and Brennan and Toohey JJ, though plainly s377 has to be construed having regard to constitutional requirements concerning the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth legislation should be construed to avoid invalidity: see Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 14 per Mason CJ which is a principle embodied in s15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. It is also a principle reflected in s7A of the Act which, in substance, requires a provision of the Act to be applied in a manner consistent with Commonwealth legislative powers though the validity of that section itself is not beyond doubt.
Judicial Registrars are appointed by the Governor-General: see s375, must have the same qualifications as those required for appointment as a Judge: see ss381 and 362(3), and receive a salary determined by the Remuneration Tribunal: see s383. Judicial Registrars hold office for a fixed term: see s382(2), until they resign: see s385 or are removed by the Governor-General for specified reasons: see s386. They take an oath of office in relevantly the same terms as that taken by a Judge: see ss387, 473 and 368. Section 379 is headed "Independence of Judicial Registrars" and states that a Judicial Registrar is not subject to direction or control when exercising delegated powers. However Judicial Registrars are not Judges in the sense that their office is not one created in conformity with the provisions of s72 of the Constitution.
The powers of Judicial Registrars are those arising from the operation of s376. Section 376(1) enables the Judges of the Court to make rules under s486 delegating to the Judicial Registrars powers of the Court in relation to proceedings of a specified type. The proceedings are claims for an amount prescribed in the rules not exceeding $10,000 though the regulations may prescribe a higher maximum: see s376(1)(a), (2)(a) and (b), and claims that the termination or proposed termination of an employee's employment was or would be unlawful. The Judges may also delegate to Judicial Registrars powers that could be or have been delegated to Registrars: see s376(3).
Sub-sections (4) and (5) of s376 provide:
"(4)A power delegated to the Judicial Registrars is, when exercised by a Judicial Registrar, taken to have been exercised by the Court or a Judge, as the case requires.
The delegation of a power to the Judicial Registrars does not prevent the exercise of the power by the Court or a Judge."
The Act reserves to Judges of the Court a power to order, upon application by a party, that a power proposed to be exercised by a Judicial Registrar in a particular case, be exercised by a Judge in that case: see s378(2). The making of such an application precludes the Judicial Registrar from exercising the power until the application has been determined: see s378(4).
It can be seen that the scheme of the Act is to create an office of Judicial Registrar with a number of the features of judicial office or variants of them and to permit a Judicial Registrar to deal with money claims for comparatively small amounts and claims of unlawful termination. Not only are the money claims that may be dealt with presently limited to $10,000 by the combined operation of s376(1)(a), (2)(a) and O74r2, but any compensation that might be awarded in a claim of unlawful termination is, somewhat simplified, limited to six months remuneration with a cap of $30,000 for employees not covered by an award: see s170EE(3) and (4). The practical effect of s170EE is to limit the compensation that might be awarded, for example, to an adult male in receipt of the average weekly ordinary time earnings of $659.10 (quarter ending August 1994) to $17,136.60. Those limits exist in a jurisdiction where the Judicial Registrars have, in substance, no power to award costs against an unsuccessful party: see s347.
Having regard to the provisions of s469, litigation before a Judicial Registrar might be conducted by a litigant in person or, if an application alleging unlawful termination is brought by an organisation: see s170EA(2), by a member, officer or employee of the organisation: see s469(6). There is no provision in the Act, regulations or rules which permits the Judicial Registrar to hear and determine proceedings other than as they would be heard and determined by a Judge. However both are empowered by O33r3 to dispense with the rules of evidence for proving any matter that is not bona fide in dispute or dispense with them in the circumstances described in O33r3(b). Order 33r3 provides:
"The Court may at any stage of the proceedings:
(a)dispense with compliance with the rules of evidence for proving any matter which is not bona fide in dispute; or
(b)dispense with compliance with the rules of evidence where such compliance might occasion or involve unnecessary or unreasonable expense or delay, including, but without limiting the generality of this power, compliance with the rules relating to proof of handwriting or of documents and the proof of the identity of parties or of authority."
Section 477 deals with evidence and subs (6) provides:
"Subject to this section, and without prejudice to any other law that would, if this subsection had not been enacted, expressly permit any testimony to be otherwise given, testimony at the trial of causes shall be given orally in court."
Section 376(6) provides:
"The provisions of this Act, the regulations and the Rules of Court, and of other laws of the Commonwealth, that relate to the exercise of a power by the Court apply, in relation to an exercise of the power by a Judicial Registrar under a delegation under subsection (1), as if a reference to the Court or a Judge, or to a court exercising jurisdiction under this Act, were a reference to a Judicial Registrar."
Accordingly, the provisions of s477(6) will apply to proceedings heard by a Judicial Registrar. Subject to the operation of O33, evidence of witnesses will thus be given orally: see s477(6), or by affidavit if directed by the Judicial Registrar or agreed: see s477(1) and (5), though subject to a right to cross-examine: see s477(4).
The proceedings before a Judicial Registrar that are money claims may arise under s179 as the recovery of money due under an award or may arise in the associated jurisdiction: see s430, as a common law claim or cross claim in an unlawful termination claim. Money claims may arise in other ways though it is not appropriate or necessary to catalogue them exhaustively. However it can be assumed that such claims are to be determined by consideration of evidence concerning past events by reference to which the rights of the parties are established. In claims of unlawful termination the evidence will also concern past events, namely the circumstances of the termination, by reference to which any rights arising under Div3 of PtVIA of the Act will be determined. However in these claims the remedies include an order for compensation: see s170EE(2) which may be made if the Judicial Registrar thinks reinstatement is impracticable. To form the opinion that reinstatement is impracticable, the Judicial Registrar may have to consider evidence concerning events occurring between the termination and the time of hearing. Both for reasons which will be apparent shortly and having regard to the terms of s170EE, the same would be so of a Judge -hearing a review as the Judge would have to consider the provisions of s170EE, if contravention of Div3 is established, independently of any consideration the Judicial Registrar might have given them. Thus a Judge may have to consider evidence of events occurring between the time of the termination and the hearing of the review which could include evidence of events occurring after the hearing by the Judicial Registrar.
The meaning of the word "review" in s377, is considered by Northrop J in Keating, supra. His Honour, after setting out the terms of s377(1) and (2), said:
"These provisions are almost identical with provisions contained in s31A of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. Under that section certain powers of the Federal Court in identified matters may be exercised by Registrars of the Federal Court. Subsections 31A(6) and (7) are, for present purposes, identical with the provisions of ss377(1) and (2) of the Industrial Relations Act. Authorities have made it clear that a review under ss31A(6) of the Bankruptcy Act is by way of a re-hearing de novo on material put to the Court at that hearing. This is made clear by a reference to one of a number of cases on this issue, see Re Kwiatek Ex parte Big J Ltd v Pattison (1989) 21 FCR 374.
My tentative view is that a similar approach should be adopted in relation to reviews under s377 of the Industrial Relations Act with the result that when a final order is made by a Judicial Registrar in a proceeding of the kind which I will describe in a moment, a party can seek a review of that final decision. That review is as of right. The Court is under a duty to hear and determine that review in conformity with the views expressed in Re Kwiatek."
In Re Kwiatek; Ex parte Big J Ltd v Pattison (1989) 21 FCR 374, Northrop J concluded that a review of the exercise of the power by a Registrar in Bankruptcy is a hearing based on the evidence before the Registrar supplemented by any evidence the parties desired to adduce. His Honour said at 381:
"Having concluded that the review under s31A of the Act is a rehearing based upon the evidence before the Registrar, some general observations are made. In the present case, lengthy affidavits were filed on behalf of the petitioning creditor and the Trustee containing evidence of what had occurred at the hearing before the Registrar. In the present case, that evidence was not relevant to the review. In most cases evidence of that kind would not be relevant. The review is based upon the affidavits relied upon at the hearing of the application before the Registrar. If oral evidence was given at that hearing, the parties could agree that the transcript of that evidence be used on review, otherwise oral evidence would need to be led at the review itself. The hearing of the review by the Court is in reality a hearing do novo and the Court relies upon the facts properly brought before it by the parties to the review."
For reasons which I shortly explain I do not view the agreement of the parties as conditioning the use by the Court of the transcript in a review under s377.
In a later case concerning a review by the Federal Court arising under another section of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) of the exercise of a power by the Registrar in Bankruptcy, Re Brindle; Ex parte FB & FA McMahon Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 506, Hill J said at 511:
"In the context of a review under s31A, Northrop J held in Re Kwiatek; Ex parte Big J Ltd v Pattison (1989) 21 FCR 374 that the review was by way of rehearing, based upon the evidence before the Registrar supplemented by any evidence which the parties may desire to produce. That view is consistent with the view taken by Dawson J in Harris v Caladine that if there had been no specific provision requiring the review from a Judicial Registrar to be a hearing do novo he would have reached the result that it would be the case in any event. His Honour said (at 125):
'For where the function of exercising a discretion is delegated by a court, as it may be delegated to a Registrar, the exercise of the delegated discretion cannot confine the exercise of the same discretion by the person in which it is primarily reposed ... Upon a hearing by way of review of the decision of a Registrar the court is exercising its own discretion. There are not the same restrictions which exist when there is an appeal from a judge to whom a discretion is confided, rather than delegated, at first instance. In that event the appeal court must, before interfering, be persuaded that the judge was in error in the exercise of the discretion, either by acting upon wrong principles, mistaking the facts, or by taking into account irrelevant considerations or failing to take into account relevant considerations: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505...'"
The passage just quoted suggests Hill J was in agreement with the decision of Northrop J in Kwiatek as to the character of a review under s31A.
In Harris v Caladine (1990) 172 CLR 85 the High Court considered both the validity and effect of provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("Family Law Act") which permitted the Judges of the Family Court of Australia to make Rules delegating to Registrars powers of the Court and the validity and effect of a rule dealing with the manner in which a review might be conducted. Section 37A of the Family Law Act permitted the delegation and contained provisions similar to s376(1) and (4) of the Act. Order 36A, r7(4) relevantly provided:
"A court reviewing an exercise of power by a Judicial Registrar or a Registrar shall proceed by a way of a hearing de novo but may have regard to the proceedings, including the evidence given and any affidavit filed, before the Judicial Registrar or Registrar, as the case requires."
A majority of the Court decided s37A and O36A were valid.
An order had been made by a Deputy Registrar of the Court concerning property. It had been made by consent and was made in applications a husband and wife had made for an order for the settlement of property. The wife then applied for a review of the order pursuant to O36A but the Judge who heard the application determined that no review was available. The wife appealed and the Full Court decided a review was available and should involve a reconsideration of whether, on the material before the Deputy Registrar, together with such other evidence as might be admitted by leave, he ought to have made the order: see (1990) 97 FLR 225. From this decision the wife successfully appealed to the High Court. The Full Court of the Family Court decided that the review that would be undertaken was a review of the application of the parties for orders by consent and, by implication, should not involve consideration of evidence which might establish the subsequent withdrawal of consent by the wife: at 249 per Fogarty J and 256 per Strauss and Nygh JJ.
The general issue of the character of the review by a Judge that must exist for a law to be valid that authorises the delegation by Judges of the exercise of judicial power to an officer of a court, was expressly addressed by Mason CJ and Deane J in a joint judgment and by McHugh J. Mason CJ and Deane J said at 95:
"For present purposes it is sufficient for us to say that, if the exercise of delegated jurisdiction, powers and functions by a court officer is subject to review or appeal by a judge or judges of the court on questions of both fact and law, we consider that the delegation will be valid. Certainly, if the review is by way of hearing de novo, the delegation will be valid. The importance of insisting on the existence of review by a judge or an appeal to a judge is that this procedure guarantees that a litigant may have recourse to a hearing and a determination by a judge. In other words, a litigant can avail him or herself of the judicial independence which is the hallmark of the class of court presently under consideration."
The distinction their Honours draw in the first and second sentences between appeals on questions of fact and law and a hearing de novo suggests that the former might involve an appeal where there can be a review of the findings of fact and fresh findings made but the review would not necessarily be a hearing de novo in which there would be a rehearing of all the evidence by reference to which fresh findings of fact would be made. A process of review by a Judge of delegated powers in this way is suggested by Mason CJ and Dean J as one that would permit the exercise of judicial power to be delegated to an officer of a court.
The approach of McHugh J appears at 164:
"It follows, in my opinion, that this Court or a federal court created under s71 of the Constitution may be authorised to delegate the exercise of its judicial powers to an officer of that court provided that the exercise of the power is subject to review by way of a de novo hearing by a Justice or judge of that court who has been appointed in accordance with s72 of the Constitution. It goes without saying that the Parliament cannot require the court to delegate any of its powers. Nor, in my opinion, will anything less than a hearing de novo to review the exercise of the power by the officer be sufficient. That is to say, appellate review is an insufficient condition of the delegation of the exercise of the power; there must be a complete rehearing of the facts and the law as they exist when the Justice or judge reviews the order made by the officer. Otherwise, the officer and not the Justices or judges of the court would be exercising the original jurisdiction of the court."
It is not entirely clear from this passage what form his Honour considers the evidence should take to permit findings of fact to be made. Plainly his Honour sees it as necessary that evidence of events occurring after the determination by the court officer must be able to be considered in the review if the evidence is relevant. In Harris, supra, the evidence of that character was the withdrawal of the wife's consent. However McHugh J later observed that O36A did not purport to give any conclusory or presumptive effect to any finding of a judicial registrar and concluded that O36A was validly made and does not contravene the Constitution. Order 36A permitted a Judge undertaking a review to have regard to the evidence given and any affidavit filed before the Judicial Registrar.
While the remainder of the majority, Dawson and Gaudron JJ, did not expressly address generally the nature of a review of the exercise of delegated judicial power that would be necessary to conform with chIII of the Constitution, it is apparent from their reasons for judgment that O36A was, in their opinion, valid. It was valid even though the Judge undertaking the review could refer to the evidence given before the court officer.
It is unnecessary to canvas the authorities dealing more generally with the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth and the purpose of chiii of the Constitution. The purpose of s72, which is central to a consideration of the validity of a provision such as s377, was described by Brennan J in his dissenting judgment in Harris, supra, at 108:
"If either the Parliament or Ch. III judges constituting the respective federal courts or a federal court were authorized to delegate the jurisdiction vested in that court to a person who is not a Ch. III judge, the constitutional provisions governing appointment, remuneration and tenure of Ch. III judges could be circumvented. The primary and manifest purpose of those provisions is to guarantee impartiality and independence in the hearing and determination of legal controversies and that purpose would be frustrated if court officers, lacking the protection which those provisions are intended to secure, were empowered to hear and determine legal controversies."
In Brandy, supra, the High Court considered the validity of a Commonwealth law providing for a review by the Federal Court of a determination of an administrative body. The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 ("the Discrimination Act") invested specified members of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission ("HREOC") with a power to determine complaints of alleged breaches of the Discrimination Act. Members of HREOC could, if the complaint was made out, make a determination declaring that the respondent to the complaint pay the complainant damages by way of compensation. The determination could then be lodged in the Registry of the Federal Court of Australia and it then had effect as if it were an order of the Court. The Discrimination Act gave the respondent to the determination a right to apply to the Federal Court for a review. The review was made under s25ZAC of the Discrimination Act which provided that the Court "may review all issues of fact and law" and a party to it "cannot adduce new evidence without the leave of the Court".
Mason CJ, Brennan J and Toohey JJ, in a joint judgment, contrasted the right of review that had been considered in Harris, supra, with that arising under the Discrimination Act. Their Honours did so in the context of dealing with a submission of the Commonwealth that even if the Commission had been exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth, the law authorising it to do so was valid having regard to the review of the exercise of that power that could be undertaken by the Federal Court. Their Honours pointed out that under s25ZAC the Federal Court is not obliged to review all issues of fact and law and whether it does is a matter for the Court to decide in the light of argument put to it. They appear to treat the statutory limit on adducing new evidence without the leave of the Court as a reference to evidence about matters on which no evidence was led before the Commission. They viewed the hearing as other than a hearing de novo in which the complainant starts again and has to make out his case and call his witnesses. In their Honours' view, the provisions establishing the scheme authorising the determination by the Commission, the lodgment of the determination with the Court to render it enforceable and providing for the review by the Federal Court, were invalid. Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in a joint judgment reached the same conclusion and referred to the same limiting features of the review procedures.
Returning to the review undertaken under s377 of the Act, the subject matter of the proceedings that can be dealt with by Judicial Registrars and the limits on the amounts of money they might order be paid, coupled with the inability, in substance, to award costs to a successful party suggest that it may have been intended by Parliament that the review process would not entitle an unsuccessful litigant before a Judicial Registrar to require the application to be heard again by a Judge as if the proceedings before the Judicial Registrar had never occurred. A review conducted this way in an application alleging unfair termination could be oppressive to an employer who had succeeded before the Judicial Registrar and had to bear the cost and disruption of a further potentially lengthy hearing. It could be oppressive to an employee who was legally represented and had succeeded in obtaining compensation by order of the Judicial Registrar. The combined cost of representation before the Judicial Registrar and in the review could consume a portion, and potentially a significant portion, of any compensation which the employee might be awarded in the review if again successful.
However it is plain from Harris and Brandy, supra, that the maintenance of the integrity of the separation of powers arising from the application of the provisions of chiii of the Constitution, requires s377 to be construed so as to treat the review as a hearing de novo. In such a hearing the parties are not bound to or limited by the evidence before the Judicial Registrar and may adduce evidence that was not put to the Judicial Registrar because either a party neglected to call it or it concerns events occurring after the hearing. The Judge must decide the matter by reference to evidence led in the review and independently of the decision of the Judicial Registrar.
However efficient case management by the Court and the factors I earlier identified as suggesting Parliament may not have intended that a review be conducted as if the hearing before the Judicial Registrar had never occurred, justify the exercise to their fullest extent the powers the Court has to ensure, while affording procedural fairness, that evidence given before the Judicial Registrar is, wherever possible, used when undertaking a review, at least in cases concerning alleged unlawful termination. There will be situations where it will be necessary for some or all of the oral evidence given before the Judicial Registrar, both in chief and cross examination, to be given again. As Spender J said in Aldridge v Booth (1988) 80 ALR 1 at 7, which is a passage referred to by Mason CJ and Brennan and Toohey JJ in Brandy, supra:
"How matters of fact are established to the satisfaction of the court will depend upon the nature of the case but where, as here, the dispute requires an assessment of the credibility of the parties and their witnesses, it seems to me impossible to avoid the conclusion that those issues must be determined on the basis of oral evidence."
In the present case, the Council has indicated that it wishes to call witnesses that gave oral evidence before the Judicial Registrar to give their evidence orally in the review. It is said that this is necessary because the Registrar had observed that the applicant impressed him as a witness and that the evidence of several Council members was "unsatisfactory". However the Judicial Registrar's views are, in a sense, immaterial. What is pertinent is whether there was any conflict in material evidence that would need to be resolved in deciding the application in the review where the demeanour of the witnesses might be relevant to its resolution. Also material is whether there is any real issue of fact between the parties concerning any matter about which there was a conflict in the evidence. While often there would be, it should not be assumed there is.
It is not yet apparent to me that there was a conflict in the evidence before the Judicial Registrar that renders it necessary for me to observe the demeanour of the witnesses giving the relevant evidence. If there is, then the Council's case for calling the relevant witnesses again will be a compelling one. However, I have not heard submissions of these issues of detail. I propose to adjourn the matter to hear submissions on the question of the extent to which and the manner in which the provisions of O33r3 should be applied to enable the evidence given before the Judicial Registrar to be used in the review. At that hearing I would expect both parties to be able to identify both facts in issue and not in issue and the evidence before the Judicial Registrar, both the evidence found in the transcript and documentary evidence, that might be relevant to the proof of both classes of facts. I will list the matter for further directions upon application of the parties.
I certify that this and the preceding eighteen (18) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour Justice Moore.
Associate:
Date:10 March 1995
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R.F. Crowe
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr I. Taylor
of APESMA
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P.M. Kite
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr J. McConnell
of Shires Association
of NSW
Date of hearing: 17 & 23 February 1995
Date of judgment: 10 March 1995
IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS )
)
COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) No. NI 253 of 1994
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY )
BETWEEN: ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL
ENGINEERS, SCIENTISTS AND
MANAGERS AUSTRALIA ON BEHALF
OF PHILIP EDWARD CROSS
Applicant
AND: DENILIQUIN COUNCIL
Respondent
JUDGE: Moore J
PLACE: Sydney
DATE: 24 March 1995
CORRIGENDUM
The following amendments are made to his Honour's judgment of 10 March 1995:
Add to the end of the first sentence on page 7 the words "which are the trial of a cause".
Delete the text "(1) and" on the fifth line of page 7.
Associate:
Date:24 March 1995
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