Assaf v The Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union NSW
[2018] ACAT 41
•11 April 2018
ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ASSAF v THE AUSTRALIAN RAIL, TRAM AND BUS INDUSTRY UNION NSW (Residential Tenancies) [2018] ACAT 41
RT 933/2017
Catchwords: RESDIENTIAL TENANCIES – whether the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 applies in the Jervis Bay Territory (JBT) – ACAT’s jurisdiction to deal with disputes in the JBT – site lease agreements in caravan parks – not a residential tenancy agreement – not an occupancy agreement
Legislation cited: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 ss 16, 17
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 19C
Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth) s 48A
Australian Constitution s 122
Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act 1915 (Cth) ss 4A, 4B, 4D
Residential Tenancies Act 1997 ss 6A, 6B, 6F, 7, 71C, 71E, 76
Cases cited:Brown & Commonwealth; Attorney General for the ACT [2012] ACAT 83
Brown & Commonwealth of Australia and Anor [2013] ACAT 56
North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Limited v Northern Territory [2015] HCA 41
Roberts v South Canberra Holdings Pty Limited Trading as Southside Village [2017] ACAT 88
Rocks v Southside Village [2018] ACAT 40
Tribunal: Senior Member A Anforth
Date of Orders: 11 April 2018
Date of Reasons for Decision: 11 April 2018
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ) RT 933/2017
BETWEEN:
DUNIANA ASSAF
Applicant
AND:
THE AUSTRALIAN RAIL, TRAM AND BUS INDUSTRY UNION NSW
Respondent
TRIBUNAL: Senior Member A Anforth
DATE:11 April 2018
ORDER
The Tribunal orders that:
1.The Residential Tenancies Act 1997 does not apply to the dispute concerning the caravan and the application is dismissed.
NOTE:
The Tribunal may have jurisdiction over the dispute by virtue of sections 16 and 17 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 depending on the amount claimed.
2.The applicant is to file a civil dispute application outlining the amount claimed and how that amount was determined.
………………………………..
Senior Member A Anforth
REASONS FOR DECISION
1.The applicant has been a lessee of a site in a Jervis Bay Caravan Park leased by the respondent (a transport-related union) for around 22 years. The site is located within national park lands in the Jervis Bay Territory and is run as a holiday camp for members of the respondent union. The applicant and her former husband purchased the van and took over the existing site lease from a previous resident. At the time the husband was a member of the respondent union. The caravan has been the family's holiday home over this period.
2.The applicant has made significant improvements to the van over the years with the actual or implied consent of the respondent including a cement slab and a built on annex. The van is no longer mobile and would need to be demolished to be moved from the site.
3.A new lease was entered into in 2010 to include changes to a number of standard terms unrelated to this dispute. The form required the applicant to tick “yes” or “no” to indicate whether she or her husband were current or retired members of the respondent union. The applicant ticked “no” to both: her husband had once worked for State Rail but had been made redundant. The applicant and the respondent then executed the new lease. The performance of the lease by the applicant and the respondent had been without incident, including since 2010 when the parties executed the current lease.
4.In 2016 the applicant and her husband were divorced. As part of their divorce settlement the applicant and her former husband agreed that the applicant would retain the caravan and the former husband would relinquish any right he had to use the caravan and the site. The applicant’s divorce lawyer subsequently wrote to the respondent requesting information concerning the transfer of the former husband’s interest in the caravan and the site to the applicant.
5.In subsequent correspondence between the divorce lawyer and the respondent and then their lawyers, the respondent indicated that it had become aware that the applicant was neither a current or retired member of the respondent union and was therefore not entitled to lease the site at the caravan park. The respondent then issued a Notice of Termination (Notice) providing the applicant six months to vacate the site (and remove the caravan and any other items from the site).
6.The respondent has purported to rely upon a clause in the lease which, on the respondent's construction, would allow either party to terminate on six months’ written notice. The applicant contends that the Notice is invalid and the respondent has by its conduct repudiated the lease.
7.The applicant does not accept that repudiation and seeks a remedy in the nature of specific performance from the Tribunal. That application contends that the lease is a residential tenancy agreement within the meaning of the Residential Tenancy Act 1997 (RT Act) of the ACT. The respondent contends that the lease is not a residential tenancy agreement, the RT Act does not apply and the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT) does not have jurisdiction in the matter (the jurisdictional issue).
8.After hearing the parties’ submissions on the jurisdictional issue the Tribunal reserved that issue for determination.
Procedural history of the matter in the Tribunal
9.On 3 November 2017, the applicant lodged an application for resolution of dispute under the RT Act and an application for interim or other orders. The applicant sought orders for the following relief:
(a)A declaration that the Notice is invalid.
(b)A declaration that the respondent's purported termination of the lease was in breach of the lease.
(c)A declaration that the lease remains on foot.
(d)An order that, subject to the terns of the lease, the respondent not interfere with the applicant's quiet enjoyment of the site and not otherwise interfere with the applicant's rights under the lease.
(e)Such other orders as the Tribunal may consider appropriate for the resolution of this dispute.
(f)Costs.
10.The applicant appended the following documents to her application:
(a)A letter of 2 December 2010 from the respondent’s branch secretary to the applicant’s then husband (now former husband) enclosing a new resident lease with an amendment to have husband and wife named on the lease.
(b)A copy of the resident lease signed by the owner (respondent), residents (applicant and her former husband) and two witnesses.
(c)Photos of the applicant’s caravan and site.
(d)A letter from the respondent’s branch secretary to the applicant’s former husband of 18 November 2014 notifying that the applicant’s name cannot be removed from the lease unless legal documentation advising that a property settlement has been reached is provided.
(e)A letter from the respondent’s branch secretary to the applicant of 6 January 2015 enclosing invoice for caravan site rental at the RTBU Holiday Park for the period 1 January to 30 June 2015.
(f)A copy of an order in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia at Sydney of 20 February 2017 between the applicant and first respondent (her former husband) and a second respondent.
(g)A copy of consent orders in the Family Court of Australia between the applicant and her former husband.
(h)A copy of the six month Notice of 31 March 2017 issued by the respondent’s secretary to the applicant and her then husband under which the notice period ends at 5.00pm on 3 October 2017.
(i)A letter from the respondent’s secretary to the managing solicitors of Watson & Watson and One Group Legal (applicant’s previous solicitors) of 31 March 2017 making available a sale process to the applicant with the Notice attached.
(j)A letter from the applicant’s solicitor to the respondent of 30 May 2017 requesting the reversal of the decision to terminate the lease and transfer the lease into the applicant’s sole name.
(k)A letter from the respondent’s secretary to the applicant’s solicitor received on 6 June 2017 requesting particulars of the facts and law which the applicant relies upon in order for the respondent to review the matter.
(l)A letter from the applicant’s solicitor, Thurlow Fisher, to the respondent of 25 July 2017 in response to the respondent’s letter received on 6 June 2017 requesting the sections of the legislation or relevant union policy which the respondent alleged prevent them transferring the lease solely to the applicant.
(m)A letter from the respondent’s solicitor to the applicant’s solicitor of 28 July 2017 requesting information supporting the contents of their letter of 25 July 2017 and noting the liability of the applicant and her former husband to remove the caravan and all materials located on the site by the end of notice period.
(n)A letter from the applicant’s solicitor, Thurlow Fisher, to the respondent’s solicitor of 12 September 2017 requesting an extension of time of the notice period of at least 48 days and noting the applicant as a single mother of four disabled children.
(o)A letter from the respondent’s solicitor, Rowan Solicitors, to the applicant’s solicitor of 14 September 2017 requesting information about the applicant’s children and a simple sworn/affirmed Assets, Income and Liability Statement.
(p)A letter from the respondent to the applicant and her then husband of 27 September 2017 prohibiting them both entry to the Holiday Park for the purposes of access or use of caravan site 13 after the vacation date, 3 October 2017.
(q)A letter from the applicant’s solicitor, Thurlow Fisher, to the respondent’s solicitor of 28 September 2017 in response to their letter dated 14 September 2017.
(r)A letter from the respondent’s solicitor, Rowan, to the applicant’s solicitor of 28 September 2017 in response to their letter of the same day.
(s)A letter from the applicant’s solicitor, Thurlow Fisher, to the respondent of 3 October 2017 alleging unlawful termination of the lease and putting the respondent on notice that the respondent is not to deal with the applicant’s property until the matter is dealt by the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal.
(t)A letter from the applicant’s solicitor, Thurlow Fisher, to the respondent’s solicitor of 3 October 2017 in response to their letter dated 28 September 2017.
(u)A letter from the respondent’s solicitor, Rowan, to the applicant’s solicitor of 4 October 2017 in response to their letter of 3 October 2017.
(v)A letter from the respondent’s solicitor, Rowan, to the applicant’s solicitor of 5 October 2017 in response to their letter of 3 October 2017.
(w)A letter from the applicant’s solicitor, Thurlow Fisher, to the respondent’s solicitor of 10 October 2017 in response to their letter of 5 October 2017.
11.The 2010 lease was headed ‘Residential Lease (site No13)’. It provided for a periodic lease with period of six months. It otherwise relevantly provided:
3(8) He [the resident] will not construct, erect or put upon the site or other surface of the unit/caravan any fitting, improvement or thing (including annex, fence, carport, clothes line or television antennae) without the prior written consent of the Owner;
3(9) The site can only be used for residential purposes and for a continuous period of occupancy of not more than 3 months duration at any one time in a 12 month period;
…
3(12) He [resident] shall on vacating the site remove all buildings, improvements, structures (including concrete slabs) building materials and debris, and shall remove them from the site at his cost and dispose of them properly;
..
5. The Resident is not allowed to sub-let, transfer or assign the rights he has under the lease except to a purchaser of the unit/caravan and then only with the prior written consent of the Owner. The Owner will consider any application by reference to a waiting list of members seeking sites in the park which is kept by the Owner…
…
10. Where there is any failure by the Resident to abide by the terms of this lease then the Owner may at any time:
…
(3) Give to the Resident a Notice of Termination of lease as permitted by law
12.The lease contained ‘Extra Conditions’ which defined the rolling six months periodic nature of the lease and further provided for the lease to be terminated:
…by either party giving a minimum of 6 calendar months written notice of termination to the other expiring on any day…
13.The photographs of the van showed the existence of a cement slab and a built on annex.
14.On 21 November 2017, the respondent lodged an application for interim or other orders seeking the dismissal of the application for want of jurisdiction in the Tribunal.
15.The respondent sought orders that:
(a)the application for interim or other orders, and the application for resolution of dispute under the RT Act by the applicant, Duniana Assaf be struck-out/dismissed on the basis that under the authorising legislation, the RT Act, the ACAT does not have jurisdiction; and
(b)order for costs in view of the case Roberts v South Canberra Holdings Pty Limited Trading as Southside Village [2017] ACAT 88 (Roberts) which was delivered on 27 October 2017 by ACAT (parts of which will be distinguished); the simple reading, and statutory interpretation and intent of the legislation; and case law precedents of ACAT, and other jurisdictions before “bare caravan sites” became regulated under those other jurisdictions by specific legislation.
16.The respondent’s application annexed a copy of a letter from the respondent’s solicitors of 9 November 2017 giving the applicant an opportunity not to proceed with her application in ACAT.
17.The respondent sought the further orders:
(a)that the application for interim or other orders dated 3 November 2017, and filed by or on behalf of the applicant Duniana Assaf, ACAT file number RT 933/2017, and the orders being sought therein, be struck-out/dismissed;
(b)the application for resolution of dispute under the RT Act filed by or on behalf of the applicant Duniana Assaf being ACAT file number RT 933/2017, and the orders being sought therein, be struck-out/dismissed;
(c)that Duniana Assaf is not to make subsequent application(s) to the Tribunal of the kind stated in orders 1 and 2 hereto without leave of the Tribunal; and
(d)costs.
18.On 24 November 2017 directions were made for the parties to file and serve submissions on the jurisdictional issues:
(a)The applicant is to file and serve submissions on jurisdiction by 8 December 2017.
(b)The respondent is to file and serve submissions on jurisdiction by 22 December 2017.
(c)The jurisdictional issue will be determined on the papers, unless either party notifies the Tribunal by 30 December 2017 that they do not wish a determination to be made on the papers, in which case an oral hearing will be listed.
19.On 14 December 2017, the applicant filed her submissions on jurisdiction. She submitted that:
(a)her case was compromised by the lack of access to the documents recording the original purchase of the premises (a ‘caravan’, with improvements and structures later added), and anticipated that copies of those documents were held by the respondent;
(b)section 4A of the Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act 1915 (Cth) (JBTAA) provides that the laws of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) apply to the Jervis Bay Territory (JBT) and the RT Act has application in the present matter;
(c)the JBTAA applies ACT laws to the Jervis Bay Territory as if the Jervis Bay Territory formed part of the ACT, but only so far as the ACT laws are not inconsistent with an Ordinance (Cth). In the present case there is no relevance Ordinance and no inconsistency;
(d)section 4D of the JBTAA provides that the ‘courts’ of the ACT have jurisdiction in the JBT. Section 4D does not define the term ‘court’ but the applicant submitted it should be construed broadly in light of the evident purpose of section 4D of the the JBTAA to provide for the governance of the Jervis Bay Territory (including administrative and judicial functions) by the ACT;
(e)other Commonwealth legislation concerned with courts and the judicial function, including the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) extends the term ‘court’ to include persons or bodies authorised to hear, receive or examine evidence, such as, for example, the Refugee Review Tribunal. By the same reasoning ACAT ought to be considered a ‘court’ for the purposes of the JBTAA;
(f)section 4B of the JBTAA extends the jurisdiction ‘persons or authorities’ exercising ACT legislative power to the JBT. Even if ACAT is not a ‘court’ for the purpose of the JBTAA it is an ‘authority’ and so section 4B will extend the exercise of ACAT’s powers and functions under the RT Act to the JBT;
(g)the terms ‘caravan’ and ‘mobile home park’ are not defined for the purpose of section 6F of the RT Act. The present van with its improvements is no longer a caravan and no longer moveable. Accordingly section 6F does not preclude it being the subject of a residential tenancy agreement; and
(h)the applicant (and her former husband) would not have purchased the van without a right of exclusive possession of the site and would not have leased the site without purchasing the van. The land and van came as a package.
20.The applicant sought orders that a direction be given to the respondent to produce a copy of the original lease and van purchase documents. The applicant’s solicitors also issued a summons to the respondent to produce these documents.
21.On 28 December 2017, the respondent filed their submissions on jurisdiction. The respondent’s submitted that:
(a)ACAT is not a ‘court’ for the purposes of section 4D of the JBTAA. The separations of powers doctrine applies to ACT legislation and prohibits the conferral of judicial power on ACAT;
(b)the RT Act is not a law applicable in the Jervis Bay Territory under section 4A of the JBTAA;
(c)the common law lease between the applicant and the respondent does not satisfy section 6B(c) of the RT Act in that it does not expressly state (cannot be imported by implication) unambiguously or otherwise that it is a residential tenancy agreement;
(d)even if the RT Act applies in the JBT the site agreement would still be excluded from the operation of the RT Act for the reasons given in Roberts.
22.Notwithstanding the agreement on 24 November 2017 that the jurisdictional issue be determined on the papers after written submissions, on 16 January 2018 the respondent’s solicitor request a relisting for further oral submissions. The matter was relisted for 23 January 2018.
23.On 19 January 2018 the respondent filed further written submissions which were said to contain a revised position. In particular the respondent submitted:
(a)the separation of powers doctrine does not apply to ACT legislation and there is no Constitutional impediment to ACAT exercising judicial power. However by application of the principles of statutory interpretation applied to the JBTAA as a whole, it is still the case that ACAT is not a ‘court’ for the purposes of section 4D of the JBTAA; and
(b)ACAT is not ‘person or authority’ for the purposes of section 4B of the JBTAA.
24.On 23 January 2018 Mr Byrne of counsel appeared for the applicant by telephone and Mr Rowan, solicitor appeared for the respondent by telephone.
25.Mr Rowan advised that his client had been unable to locate the documents that were the subject of the summons.
26.The parties traversed their written submissions. There was nothing additional other than it was agreed that the park was not located on any land leased to any indigenous group.
27.The matter was again reserved for decision on the jurisdictional issue.
Issues
28.There are two jurisdictional issues raised between the parties:
(a)Whether the RT Act applies in the JBT;
(b)Whether ACAT continues to be the adjudicative body under the RT Act in its application to JBT.
29.A third jurisdiction issue has arisen since the last hearing. It arises from the ratio of the decision in Rocks v Southside Village [2018] ACAT 40 which is a decision given by the presently constituted Tribunal contemporaneous with this decision. It concerns the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in common law contractual disputes that arises under sections 16 and 17 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACAT Act).
30.To the extent that the parties wish to do so, the Tribunal’s position on this third issue will be open to argument on the resumption of this matter.
Legislation relevant to the JBT jurisdictional issue
31.The JBT is a separate non-self governing Commonwealth Territory. It does not form part of the ACT, either geographically or constitutionally. The JBTAA is a piece of Commonwealth legislation which has the effect that the laws of the ACT apply to the JBT insofar as they are applicable, and providing that they are not inconsistent with an Ordinance in the Territory. The JBTAA was enacted before self government in the ACT. Section 4A of the JBTAA states:
4A(1) Subject to this Act, the laws (including the principles and rules of common law and equity) in force from time to time in the Australian Capital Territory are, so far as they are applicable to the Territory and are not inconsistent with an Ordinance, in force in the Territory as if the Territory formed part of the Australian Capital Territory.
32.Section 4B of the JBTAA extends the jurisdiction of administrative ‘persons or authorities’ of the ACT to JBT:
4B(1) Subject to subsection (2), where, by a law of the Australian Capital Territory in force in the Territory because of section 4A, a power or function is vested in a person or authority (not being a court), that power or function is, in relation to the Territory, vested in, and may be exercised or performed by, that person or authority.
(2) The Governor-General may direct that a power or function vested in a person or authority (not being a court) by a law of the Australian Capital Territory in force in the Territory because of section 4A shall, in relation to the Territory, be vested in, and may be exercised or performed by, such other person or authority as the Governor-General specifies.
33.The JBTAA does not define ‘a person or authority’ and nor does the ACT (Self Government) Act 1988. Section 19C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) contains a general definition of ‘authority’ for Commonwealth purposes and is sufficiently broad to catch any statutory body charged with statutory functions, such as ACAT. ACAT is a statutory body with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide any matter arising from residential tenancy agreements under section 76 of the RT Act albeit within its jurisdictional monetary limits. It has exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the termination of residential tenancy agreements without a monetary limit. ACAT has the same exclusivity of jurisdiction in relation to ‘occupancy agreements’ under Part 5A of the RT Act.
34.Section 4D of the JBTAA extends the jurisdictions of ACT ‘courts’ to the JBT:
4D(1) Each court of the Australian Capital Territory has jurisdiction in and in relation to the Territory, and the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court Act 1933 and the practice and procedure of each such court for the time being in force apply in the Territory as if the Territory formed part of the Australian Capital Territory.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a reference in the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court Act 1933 to an Ordinance or enactment is a reference to an Ordinance or enactment, as the case may be, in force under this Act.
Consideration of the JBT jurisdictional issue
35.There is no serious question that ACAT is the appointed adjudicative body under the RT Act. There is also no serious issues that the RT Act is ACT legislation and that section 4A of the JBTAA applies ACT legislation to the JBT, save where there is some inconsistency with Commonwealth law. There is no Commonwealth residential tenancy law that applies to the residential tenancies of ordinary citizens (and companies). Therefore the only possible source of inconsistency can arise from the appointment of ACAT as the adjudicative body under the RT Act.
36.The respondent argues that the inconsistency arises because section 4D of the JBTAA relevantly limits the application of ACT law to those laws which appoint ‘courts’ of the ACT as the adjudicative body and ACAT is not court.
37.The respondent no longer argues that the separation of powers doctrine applies to the Territories Power in section 122 of the Constitution and so there is nothing intrinsically unlawful in conferring judicial powers on ACAT. The Tribunal accepts this concession as rightly made.[1]
[1] Brown v Commonwealth [2013] ACAT 56; North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Limited v Northern Territory [2015] HCA 41
38.The respondent now limits its arguments to one of statutory construction, namely that section 4D of the JBTAA in fact limited the bodies that could exercise judicial powers deriving from ACT legislation in the JBT. In short, the express reference to the ACT Supreme Court in section 4D of the JBTAA implicitly excludes ACAT.
39.The argument is not without some force but the present Tribunal is of the view that section 4B should receive a literal reading such that its opening clause – “Each court of the Australian Capital Territory has jurisdiction in and in relation to the Territory” – is sufficient to catch all courts of the ACT and not just the Supreme Court. In this event the logic expressed by Senior Member Lennard in Brown v Commonwealth [2013] ACAT 56 appears apposite:
48. The creation of the “super tribunals” such as ACAT has had the effect of creating hybrid bodies which are neither courts of law in the traditional sense, nor purely administrative tribunals. To the extent that ACAT hears civil claims such as contract, negligence, trespass and nuisance it may be exercising traditional judicial functions …
49. There are a number of decisions by superior courts whereby various tribunals have been held not to be courts.[14] A decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland Court of Appeal held that the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) is a court of a state. [15] ACAT’s functions and constitution are similar to QCAT, however ACAT is not a court of record. None of these decisions is binding upon ACAT, but the Queensland decision is highly persuasive. However, because of the conclusions reached above, and taking into account the decision in Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, where it was held that when the Commonwealth legislates in respect of territory courts, it is not bound by the separation of powers doctrine in Chapter III, because Territory courts are not Federal courts as that term is used in section 71 of the Constitution[16], it is not necessary for ACAT to determine whether it is a court.
50. ACAT is therefore not persuaded by the submissions of the Commonwealth that its jurisdiction to regulate and make decisions with regard to disputes arising from residential tenancies matters in the Jervis Bay Territory is an exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. ACAT’s jurisdiction arises under Commonwealth legislation which relates to the Jervis Bay Territory, and under which the Commonwealth clearly intended that the Commonwealth as landlord should be subject to the provisions of the Residential Tenancy Act 1997 (ACT) (JBT), which includes the exclusive jurisdiction of ACAT as set out in section 76 of that Act.
40.But even if it is wrong to conclude that ACAT is a court for the purposes of section 4D of the JBTAA, it seems beyond argument that ACAT is an ‘authority’ within the meaning of section 4B of the JBTAA. This finding alone would be sufficient for the RT Act to apply with ACAT as the adjudicative body and the present Tribunal so finds.
Does the RT Act apply to the caravan
41.The answer to this question appears equally obvious to the present Tribunal for the reason set out at length in Rocks v Southside Village [2018] ACAT 40 and Roberts which are not materially distinguishable from the present case. The reasoning in Rocks is incorporated by reference into this decision.
42.The RT Act does not apply to the applicant’s van.
Does ACAT otherwise have jurisdiction over the dispute
43.The fact that the RT Act does not apply is explicable in terms of the express and implicit exclusion of the category of residency agreements to which the RT Act applies. The RT Act is not a code on the justiciable categories of residency agreement. There are many and varied categories of tenancies and contractual license arrangements that are not caught in the RT Act. They are nevertheless contractual in nature and for that reason may be caught by ACAT’s power in relation to civil disputes (sections 16 and 17 ACAT Act).
44.This matter is dealt with at length by the presently constituted Tribunal in Rocks and is not repeated here. Suffice it to say that the present dispute is one concerning a contractual licence at common law and perhaps a contractual lease. It is a matter within ACAT’s jurisdiction subject to the jurisdictional monetary limit of $25,000. Whether the present dispute falls within this monetary cap is a matter that will need to be explored with the parties. At the same time the parties will be permitted to reopen the issue of the jurisdiction arising under sections 16 and 17 ACAT Act in order that the matter be fully ventilated.
Conclusion
45.ACAT does not have jurisdiction under the RT Act in respect of the caravan but may have jurisdiction under sections 16 and 17 ACAT Act.
………………………………..
Senior Member A Anforth
HEARING DETAILS
FILE NUMBER:
RT 933/2017
PARTIES, APPLICANT:
Duniana Assaf
PARTIES, RESPONDENT:
The Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union NSW
COUNSEL APPEARING, APPLICANT
Mr Byrne
COUNSEL APPEARING, RESPONDENT
N/A
SOLICITORS FOR APPLICANT
Thurlow Fisher
SOLICITORS FOR RESPONDENT
Rowan Solicitors
TRIBUNAL MEMBERS:
Senior Member A Anforth
DATES OF HEARING:
23 January 2018
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