FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Askari v Life Without Barriers [2022] FCA 1347
File number(s): VID 568 of 2020 Judgment of: O'CALLAGHAN J Date of judgment: 15 November 2022 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – representative proceeding – application by respondent for an order that the proceeding be dismissed immediately pursuant to r 5.23(1)(b)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – whether applicant is in default pursuant to r 5.22(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) by failing to prosecute the proceeding with due diligence – proceeding dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – costs – order sought by respondent that the applicant pay its costs of, and incidental to, the proceeding – whether applicant’s unreasonable act or omission caused respondent to incur the costs within the meaning of s 570(2)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – order made
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 544, 545, 545(1), 545(5), 570, 570(1), 570(2)(a), 570(2)(b)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Part IVA
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 5.22, 5.22(d), 5.23, 5.23(1)(b)(i)
Cases cited: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke (2008) 170 FCR 574
Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 388
Professional Administration Service Centres Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 180; (2012) 295 ALR 52
Division: Fair Work Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Number of paragraphs: 99 Date of last submission/s: 10 October 2022 Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr G Doran of Nevett Ford Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Tran Solicitor for the Respondent: Corrs Chambers Westgarth ORDERS
VID 568 of 2020 BETWEEN: MEHDI ASKARI
Applicant
AND: LIFE WITHOUT BARRIERS ACN 101 252 171
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
O'CALLAGHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 NOVEMBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to r 5.23(1)(b)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the proceeding be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of, and incidental to, the proceeding, fixed in a lump sum following a procedure and timetable to be ordered by the Court in accordance with the Costs Practice Note (GPN‑COSTS).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’CALLAGHAN J:
Introduction
This is a representative proceeding commenced in August 2020 under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), alleging, among other things, contraventions of the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Industry Award 2010 (the Award) and the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). The lead applicant (Mr Askari or the applicant) alleges that Life Without Barriers (the respondent) employed him as a cultural support worker from 22 February 2022 to 22 November 2014. By interlocutory application dated 15 July 2022, the respondent seeks orders dismissing the proceeding and, notwithstanding s 570 of the FW Act, that the applicant pay its costs of and incidental to the proceeding.
The respondent…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1347
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to r 5.23(1)(b)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the proceeding be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of, and incidental to, the proceeding, fixed in a lump sum following a procedure and timetable to be ordered by the Court in accordance with the Costs Practice Note (GPN‑COSTS).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The matter was then re‑allocated to my docket. On 1 September 2022, I directed that the parties file any written submissions on which they wished to rely. They duly did so. Having considered those submissions and Mr Woodhouse’s affidavit, I determined that it was appropriate in all the circumstances to determine the matter on the papers. Consideration By its interlocutory application, the respondent sought orders dismissing the proceeding under r 5.23(1)(b)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding. I will turn first to the question of dismissing the proceeding. Rule 5.23(1)(b)(i) provides:5.23 Orders on default (1)If an applicant is in default, a respondent may apply to the Court for an order that:(a)…(b)the proceeding be stayed or dismissed for the whole or any part of the relief claimed by the applicant:(i) immediately … Rule 5.22 defines when a party is in default, as follows:A party is in default if the party fails to:(a)do an act required to be done, or to do an act in the time required, by these Rules; or (b)comply with an order of the Court; or (c)attend a hearing in the proceeding; or (d)prosecute or defend the proceeding with due diligence. The principles relevant to the application of O 10, r 7 of the Federal Court Rules 1976 (Cth) (the predecessor to r 5.23) were discussed in Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 388 at 395‑397 (Wilcox and Gummow JJ):It is to be noted that the power given by [O 10, r 7, now r 5.23] is conditioned on one circumstance only: the failure of a party to comply with an order of the Court directing that party to take a step in the proceeding. There is no requirement of intentional default or contumelious conduct, although the attitude of the applicant to the default and the Court’s judgment as to whether or not the applicant genuinely wishes the matter to go to trial within a reasonable period will usually be important factors in weighing the proper exercise of the discretion conferred by the rule. There is no requirement of “inordinate and inexcusable delay” on the part of the applicant or the applicant’s lawyers, although any such delay is likely to be a significant matter. There is no requirement of prejudice to the respondent, although the existence of prejudice is also likely to be significant. And it must be remembered that, in almost every case, delay adversely affects the quality of the trial and is an additional burden upon the parties.…The observations which we have just made about the scope of O 10, r 7 are not intended to convey the impression that any failure to comply with a procedural direction will appropriately result in the dismissal of the proceeding. On the contrary, the rules must be administered sensibly and with an appreciation both of the fact that some delays are unavoidable, and unpredictable, by even the most conscientious parties and their lawyers, and of the likely serious consequences to an applicant of staying or dismissing a claim … We would not wish our observations to cause respondents to apply for dismissal of proceedings simply because there has been a non‑compliance with a direction by the applicant, even though it does not cause or indicate a continuing problem in preparing the matter for an early trial.The discretion conferred by O 10, r 7 is unconfined, except for the condition of non‑compliance with a direction. As it is impossible to foresee all of the circumstances under which the rule might be sought to be used, it is undesirable to make any exhaustive statement of the circumstances under which the power granted by the rule will appropriately be exercised. We will not attempt to do so. But two situations are obvious candidates for the exercise of the power: cases in which the history of non‑compliance by an applicant is such as to indicate an inability or unwillingness to co‑operate with the Court and the other party or parties in having the matter ready for trial within an acceptable period and cases – whatever the applicant’s state of mind or resources – in which the non‑compliance is continuing and occasioning unnecessary delay, expense or other prejudice to the respondent. Although the history of the matter will always be relevant, it is more likely to be decisive in the first of these two situations. Even though the most recent non‑compliance may be minor, the cumulative effect of an applicant’s defaults may be such as to satisfy the judge that the applicant is either subjectively unwilling to co‑operate or, for some reason, is unable to do so. Such a conclusion would not readily be reached; but, where it was, fairness to the respondent would normally require the summary dismissal of the proceeding.In the second of the two situations we postulate, a significant continuing default, it does not really matter whether there have been earlier omissions to comply with the Court’s directions. Ex hypothesi the default is continuing and is imposing an unacceptable burden on the respondent. But the continuance of the non‑compliance is of the essence of this situation. If, when the Court looks at the matter, the direction has already been complied with, the defaulting applicant may be ordered to pay any wasted costs; but it would be difficult to justify the dismissal of the proceeding solely because of that default.