Ashwick (Qld) No 127 Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation
[2008] FCA 764
•27 May 2008
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ashwick (Qld) No 127 Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 764
ASHWICK (QLD) NO 127 PTY LTD & ORS v THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
VID 861 OF 2006
and those matters listed in the attached Schedule
RYAN J
27 MAY 2008
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 861 of 2006
and those matters listed in the attached Schedule
BETWEEN:
ASHWICK (QLD) NO 127 PTY LTD
ApplicantAND:
THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RespondentJUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 MAY 2008
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent have leave to amend his appeal statement to conform with the proposed amended appeal statement filed herein on 11 December 2007 as supplemented by the particulars furnished by letter from the respondent’s solicitor dated 8 February 2008.
2.The applicants be at liberty to adduce orally from any deponent of an affidavit already filed herein, as part of that deponent’s evidence-in-chief, evidence directed to whether EFG Australia Pty Ltd at any relevant time carried on a business of lending money (“the new question”).
3.The applicants have leave to file and serve, by a time to be directed during the course of the trial, any affidavit by any additional deponent on which they wish to rely in relation to the new question.
4.The respondent pay, in any event, the applicants’ costs thrown away as a result of the amendment for which leave has been granted by paragraph 1 of this Order together with their costs of and incidental to the application for leave to amend.
5.Liberty be reserved to any party to apply at any time during the trial for further or other directions in relation to the new question or otherwise arising from these Orders.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 861 of 2006
and those matters listed in the attached Schedule
BETWEEN:
ASHWICK (QLD) NO 127 PTY LTD
Applicant
AND:
THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE:
27 MAY 2008
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
A taxpayer whose objection to an assessment of income tax has been rejected by the Commissioner of Taxation (“the Commissioner”) may appeal to this Court under Pt IVC of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (“the Administration Act”) by filing and serving an appropriate application. The second step is generally for the Commissioner, pursuant to an order of the Court, to file and serve an appeal statement in accordance with O 52B r 5(2)(a)(iv) and (b)(i) of the Federal Court Rules. The appeal statement is defined in O 52B r 5(3) as;
‘a statement outlining succinctly the Commissioner’s contentions and the facts and issues in the appeal as the Commissioner perceives them.’
On 28 July 2006, the applicant in proceedings numbered VID 861 of 2006 (“Ashwick”) filed and served an application to appeal from an objection decision by the Commissioner and on 24 August 2006, the applicant filed an appeal statement. On 17 October 2006, the Commissioner filed its appeal statement.
On 11 December 2007, the Commissioner filed a proposed amended appeal statement. Ashwick and the applicants in other related proceedings which have been directed to be heard together (“the applicants”) objected to the proposed amendments and, on 7 March 2008, I heard submissions by the applicants and the Commissioner in relation to the Commissioner’s application for leave to amend its appeal statement.
Background
The Commissioner’s application was brought in respect of an appeal by Ashwick, under s 14ZZ of the Administration Act, from the disallowance of objections to the Commissioner’s failure to allow deductions in Ashwick’s income tax assessment for the year ended 30 June 2001 (“the 2001 financial year”) for losses totalling $145 transferred to it by EFG Australia Pty Ltd (“EFG Australia”) and EFG Treasury Pty Ltd (“EFG Treasury”).
The applicants contend that, under ss 25-35(1) or 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (“the 1997 Assessment Act”);
(a)EFG Australia was entitled to a deduction of $1,202,441,115 upon writing off on 19 June 1998 with effect from 30 June 1998, as bad debts, amounts totalling that sum owing to it by ELFIC Pty Ltd (“ELFIC”);
(b)EFG Australia was entitled to a deduction of $100,009,231 upon writing off on 19 June 1998 with effect from 30 June 1998, as bad debts, amounts totalling that sum owing to it by EFG Securities Pty Ltd (“EFG Securities”); and
(c)EFG Treasury was entitled to a deduction of $525,260,163 upon writing off on 19 June 1998 with effect from 30 June 1998, as bad debts, amounts totalling that sum owing to it by EFG Australia.
Ashwick contends that parts of the claimed tax losses had been transferred from EFG Australia and EFT Treasury, respectively, to Ashwick pursuant to loss transfer agreements in the 2001 financial year. Ashwick further claims that it was entitled to receive loss transfers in the amount of $70 from EFG Australia and $75 from EFG Treasury because each of Ashwick, EFG Australia and EFG Treasury was ultimately wholly-owned by Fosters Group Limited (“FGL”) throughout the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 2001.
On or about 28 November 2001, Ashwick lodged its income tax return for the 2001 financial year, disclosing a taxable income of $145. Under s 166A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (“the 1936 Assessment Act”), an assessment was deemed to have been made by the Commissioner of Ashwick’s taxable income in the amount of $145 (“the assessment”).
On or about 27 October 2005, Ashwick lodged a notice of objection with the Commissioner, objecting to the assessment on the ground that it was entitled to deductions totalling $145 under ss 170-20 and 36-15 of the 1997 Assessment Act.
On or about 31 March 2006, Ashwick gave the Commissioner a written notice pursuant to s 14ZYA(2) of the Administration Act, requiring the Commissioner to make a decision on the objection. The Commissioner was deemed pursuant to s 14ZYA(3) of the Administration Act to have disallowed the objection at the end of the period of 60 days after being given the notice, being 30 May 2006.
The Commissioner;
(a)disputes that the deductions claimed by EFG Australia and EFG Treasury were allowable as deductions to EFG Australia and EFG Treasury;
(b)contends that any tax loss of EFG Australia or EFG Treasury which was carried forward from the 1998 financial year was reduced in the year ended 30 June 1999 by reason of the operation of the commercial debt forgiveness provisions in Division 245 of the 1936 Assessment Act; and
(c)does not admit that the purported loss transfer agreements had been made on or before the date of lodgement of Ashwick’s income tax return, as is required by s 170-50(2)(d) of the 1997 Assessment Act.
The hearing for these proceedings is scheduled to commence on 2 June 2008.
Application For Leave To Amend Appeal Statement
According to paragraph 1 of submissions filed on 5 March 2008, the Commissioner has sought leave to amend his appeal statement in the following respects;
Paragraph number Issue to which the paragraph(s) is directed 38, 40, 40A, 40B, 40C, 41 [Facts] EFG Australia did not carry on a business of lending money from the commencement of its activities on 1 July 1986 through to late 1989. 50A, 50B [Facts] From about January 1990 EFG Australia ceased to carry on the trading activities which it had conducted from 1 July 1986. 100A [Issues] The question whether EFG Australia carried on a business of lending money in the period 1 July 1986 to 30 June 1998 is raised as an issue. 133A, 133B, 133C, 133D [Contentions] It is contended that EFG Australia did not carry on the business of lending money between 1 July 1986 and 30 June 1998.
Alternatively, if it did carry on such a business it ceased to do so from January 1990.134 [Contentions] The contention that none of EFG Australia’s loans to ELFIC and EFG Securities was made in the ordinary course of a business of lending money (already pleaded) is expressed as an alternative to the contention that EFG Australia did not carry on a business of lending money. 138 [Contentions] The new contentions raised in paragraphs 133A and 133C are given as particulars of paragraph 138 (otherwise unchanged).
Essentially, the Commissioner now seeks to put in issue whether EFG Australia carried on a business of lending money to external customers, at least for the period from 1986 to 1989. The Commissioner submits that the proposed amendments overlap with factual issues, and support alternative arguments to those already raised in the Commissioner’s appeal statement dated 17 October 2006.
The applicants contend that the application should be dismissed because the amendments;
(a)introduce an entirely new element to the Commissioner’s case, and do not signify merely a new approach to an existing issue;
(b)come too late and the delay in seeking leave to make them is insufficiently justified; and
(c)will be disruptive to the orderly preparation for trial which should not be further delayed.
Submissions
The Commissioner’s submissions
The Commissioner pressed his application to amend at a directions hearing on 14 December 2007. The application was stood over on the basis that the Commissioner would provide additional particulars, identifying the “agreed or conceded body of facts” on which the Commissioner wished to base his new contention.
By letter dated 8 February 2008 (‘letter of particulars’), the Commissioner provided the applicants with detailed further particulars of the basis upon which the Commissioner intended to support the argument that EFG Australia did not carry on a business of lending money. Each of the matters relied upon, it was submitted, is a feature of EFG Australia’s activities that emerges from evidence already filed in the applicants’ case.
The particulars of paragraph 133A concerned features of EFG Australia’s activities between 1 July 1986 and November 1989. The relevant activities included borrowing from external lenders for on-lending to its subsidiaries and placing funds surplus to the needs of its subsidiaries on short-term deposits with third parties. In his amended appeal statement, the Commissioner put forward a new contention, namely that these activities did not amount to a business of lending money.
The particulars of paragraph 133C advanced the alternative contention that, if EFG Australia’s activities did amount to a business of lending money during that period, the activities ceased to have that character from January 1990 upon the sale of the Finance Group Treasury operations to Dresdner Bank and the cessation of EFG Australia’s short-term money market activities. The Commissioner submitted that, from January 1990, EFG Australia was not in control of its own affairs and all its activities were directed to winding up the affairs of its subsidiaries ELFIC and EFG Securities.
The Commissioner’s existing appeal statement, without the proposed amendments, is predicated on the basis that EFG Australia’s activities from 1 July 1986 could be characterised as a business of lending money but that the loans to ELFIC and EFG Securities were not in the ordinary course of that business.
Under those parts of the existing pleading, it was submitted, the Commissioner would be entitled to adduce evidence himself and rely upon evidence from the applicants in support of the factual assertions identified in the letter of particulars as bearing upon the contention related to the “business of lending money”.
The Commissioner contended that a similar overlap exists in relation to his proposed argument that EFG Australia’s activities up to January 1990, however characterised, ceased at that time, and that, from then, the company was merely engaged in the activity of winding down its subsidiaries’ affairs. The facts of this change of activity, it was submitted, appear in the applicants’ affidavits and have already been pleaded by the Commissioner in paragraphs 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52-63 of his appeal statement, for which no amendment or addition is proposed.
According to the Commissioner, matters relevant to the proposed amended pleading have been addressed in the applicant’s evidence. There is, it was argued, a “very substantial overlap” between the facts relevant to the original allegation that the ELFIC/EFG Securities loans from EFG Australia were outside the ordinary course of the latter’s business and the facts now sought to be relied upon as establishing that that business was not one of lending money.
Thus, it was contended, the change to the Commissioner’s case consequent upon the proposed amendments would essentially be the introduction of an alternative argument as to how the Court should characterise such facts as may be found, based on the evidence already filed by the applicants. Circumstances which the Commissioner formerly would have said were indicative of loans to related parties not being within the ordinary course of an EFG Australia business of lending money would, instead, be argued to indicate that EFG Australia had no business of that nature at all.
In a letter dated 10 December 2007, the applicants asserted that, if the Commissioner “held a genuine belief that EFG Australia was not carrying on a business of lending money, it might have been expected that counsel for the Respondent would have asked relevant questions of Mr van Wyngen during his examination to address the question. He did not.”
The Commissioner submitted that Mr van Wyngen had been cross-examined about facts and indicia relevant to whether loans by EFG Australia to ELFIC/EFG Securities had been in the ordinary course of EFG Australia’s business, and that the Commissioner would wish to ask similar questions directed to whether EFG Australia’s activities had constituted a business of lending money at all. Further, the Commissioner argued that he would rely on Mr van Wyngen’s answers in support of the proposed argument that there had been no business of lending money and in support of the alternative case that, if there had been a business of lending money, loans to ELFIC/EFG Securities had not been made in the ordinary course of that business. [Pursuant to an order which I made on 24 July 2007, Mr van Wyngen, who had been the Director-Treasury of the Finance Group Treasury conducted by DFG Australia from 1986 to 1990 and whose affidavits on behalf of the applicants had been sworn on 28 March 2007 and 14 August 2007, was examined on oath on 3 September 2007. That order was made because circumstances personal to Mr van Wyngen were accepted as creating a risk that he might be unable to give oral evidence at the trial of these proceedings which by the same order of 24 July 2007 was fixed to commence on 2 June 2008.]
Underlying the Commissioner’s unamended pleading was an acceptance that EFG Australia had lent money to entities external to FGL, in a systematic manner that could be described as a business. By the amended appeal statement, however, the Commissioner seeks to leave open an argument that the applicants’ evidence filed in the proceedings and answers given orally by Mr van Wyngen would support a characterisation of the lending to external parties as merely ancillary to EFG Australia’s business activities and not as constituting a business in itself. According to the Commissioner, that evidence is open to the interpretation that the external loans were no more than the placing on deposit of surplus funds held from time to time during the course of accumulating, and keeping on hand, enough money to fulfil borrowing requirements of ELFIC, EFG Securities and other finance group subsidiaries.
The evidence tending to establish the quantum and nature of EFG Australia’s lending to external parties, compared with the quantum and nature of its lending to ELFIC/EFG Securities, has, according to the Commissioner, always been admissible and relevant to whether the loans to the related entities were in the ordinary course of the presumed business, and the proposed amendment would necessitate no change to the evidence to be adduced or the range of factual issues to be canvassed at trial.
The Commissioner argued that, as most of the indicia on which he would rely are already in issue on the question of whether loans by EFG Australia had been in the ordinary course of a business of lending money, the change in pleading would not be likely to require the applicants to adduce substantial additional evidence. Nevertheless, the Commissioner acknowledged that, should leave be granted, the applicants would have to be afforded an opportunity to file further evidence and that the Commissioner would bear the costs, in any event, of the application for leave to amend and any costs thrown away. Moreover, the Commissioner contended, the proposed amendment was not likely to expand the parties’ obligations to give discovery or to result in other additional interlocutory steps.
Counsel for the Commissioner also addressed the applicants’ concern that the matters set out in the Commissioner’s letter of particulars had not been put to Mr van Wyngen. The Commissioner’s acceptance that if Mr van Wyngen’s evidence, as it stands, does not support the alternative case which the Commissioner now seeks to make was said to be a difficulty for the Commissioner rather than for the applicants.
The Applicants’ submissions
The applicants contended that the Commissioner’s letter of particulars raised allegations of fact that had not been agreed or conceded and would require refutation by further evidence from the applicants. The applicants instanced the following examples of further evidence which the proposed amendment to paragraph 133A would make necessary;
(a)under subheading “I” – the applicants stated that they had not agreed or conceded that EFG Australia had no intention of carrying on a business of lending money from 1984 (or 1986) to 1989. The applicants contended that the Commissioner had only referred to a narrow sample of documents (dated in 1984 and 1985) and ignored the fact that intention to carry on a business of lending money had not been an issue – especially for the period before 1989 – which the applicants had been required to address. If the Commissioner were permitted to amend his appeal statement, it was submitted, the applicants would be required to lead evidence from directors of the FGL Board of the function which they intended, in 1984, that EFG Australia should fulfil;
(b)under subheading “II” – the applicants disputed the allegation that it had been put to Mr van Wyngen that “treasury” functions did not include a business of lending money or that a business of lending money had not been authorised. If the amendments were permitted, it was contended, the applicants would then be required to lead evidence in greater detail of the various money lending functions of EFG Australia, in particular, its loan activities with external parties, the sources of its authority to carry out each of those functions and the part that the charters played in providing any such authority;
(c)under subheading “III” – the applicants argued that it had not agreed or conceded that EFG Australia was not “a lender of money but [was] a mere conduit”. Furthermore, the applicants submitted, there was no body of agreed or conceded facts to demonstrate that EFG Australia personnel did not have skills and expertise appropriate to the business of lending money;
(d)under subheading “IV” – the applicants argued that the Commissioner had failed to identify the body of agreed or conceded facts by reference to which the allegation is made. According to the applicants, the evidence of Mr van Wyngen under cross-examination to which the Commissioner had referred had been to the effect that the activity of lending moneys to external parties by EFG Australia had been both ancillary to its business of lending to its subsidiary companies and also an activity in its own right, and that all of the activities of EFG Australia had been carried out for profit;
(e)under subheading “V” – the applicants said that there was no body of agreed or conceded facts to support the Commissioner’s proposed contention. If the amendments were allowed, it was submitted, the applicants would need to adduce evidence regarding EFG Australia’s dealings with specific external accounts during the period from 1986 to 1989 and its internal systems for managing those accounts over that period; and
(f)the applicants acknowledged that subheadings “VI” to “X” concerned aspects of the dealings between EFG Australia and its subsidiaries, which seemed to fall within the ambit of the Commissioner’s case as presently framed.
The applicants maintained that the amendments would impose “a heavy burden of enquiring into complicated (and now quite ancient) questions of fact”, and that the disruption to the applicants’ preparation for trial would cause a prejudice which could not be accommodated. Counsel for the applicants also noted that the Commissioner had;
(a)commenced his investigation into the events the subject of this proceeding in 1998;
(b)issued a series of 29 information requests to FGL from 1998;
(c) commenced a specific issue audit in 2001;
(d)received a detailed background paper from FGL in July 2002; and
(e)conducted interviews with numerous staff and former staff of FGL from June 2005, generating almost 2300 pages of transcript.
Furthermore, the applicants argued, the Commissioner had, in 2006, advised the applicants in writing of, amongst other things, his opinion that EFG Australia had carried on a business of lending money. He had filed an appeal statement that was consistent with that concession and had not sought to put in issue the characterisation of EFG Australia’s dealings with third parties. The Commissioner had also consented to directions being made in July 2007 for interlocutory steps to be carried out to enable a hearing of the appeal in June 2008. He had permitted the applicants to prepare their affidavits and address the evidentiary issues in accordance with the matters raised in his appeal statement. Accordingly, it was submitted, the Commissioner’s explanation that the withdrawal of his concession had been justified by evidence filed by the applicants, was unsatisfactory.
The applicants submitted that their preparation of the case currently put against them would be disrupted by having to undertake new enquiries and revisit old ground in order to address the distinct question which the Commissioner now seeks to put in issue. Such further enquiries would include, and not necessarily be limited to;
(a)a detailed review of EFG Australia’s external lending accounts and business practices over the period 1986 to 1989, including locating any additional senior staff involved in external lending operations over that period and obtaining statements regarding the range of loans, loan monitoring, credit assessment and other practices (as well as the staff’s own credentials);
(b)locating former staff of EFG Australia to obtain statements regarding their qualifications, skills and experience in credit risk management and lending practices; and
(c)locating persons who had been directors of FGL in 1984 to obtain statements about the Board’s intentions as to whether EFG Australia should carry on a business of lending money.
Finally, the applicants submitted that Counsel for the Commissioner had not raised in cross-examination of Mr van Wyngen a number of the matters which he now wishes to allege, including that;
(a) EFG Australia did not carry on a business of lending money to external customers;
(b) EFG Australia was not authorised to carry on a business of lending money;(c)personnel of EFG Australia did not have the skills and expertise appropriate to conduct a business of lending money; or
(d) EFG Australia was not a lender of money but was a mere conduit.
The applicants contended that, if the amendments to the appeal statement were permitted and the applicants did not lead further evidence, there was a risk that the issues raised by the amendments would be determined by evidence which was directed at other questions and did not fully explore the additional issues now sought to be raised.
Disposition of the application
As a general rule, an application to amend pleadings should be granted if the application is made in good faith and the amendment is necessary to permit the hearing and determination of the real questions at issue between the parties. Thus, in Queensland v J L Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146 it was observed in the joint judgment of Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, at 154;
‘… The purpose of the amendment was, according to the applicants, merely to avoid taking JLH by surprise. But if the amendment sought does raise a new defence and not merely a matter which JLH is required to prove in any event, it constitutes a substantial, if not complete, answer to JLH's claim. If it is arguable, the applicants should be permitted to argue it, provided that any prejudice to JLH might be compensated by costs. No doubt prejudice to JLH may also be averted, as Carr J in dissent in the court below pointed out, by appropriate orders expediting such procedures as the parties might seek to employ as a result of the amendment.’
To similar effect, Hely J said in Advanced Switching Services Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales (2001) ATPR 41-848 at [8];
‘Where a party satisfies a court that the party genuinely desires to amend the pleading so as to alter an existing claim or to introduce a new claim, leave should be granted, subject to proper terms, unless the proposed amendment is obviously futile or would cause substantial injustice which cannot be compensated for. See, for example, Posselt v Wolfenden (Nicholson J, 5 May 1998, unreported).
In the present case, I am satisfied that the Commissioner genuinely desires to make the proposed amendment to raise a new issue which could be determinative of the ultimate question whether the bad debts relied on by the applicants were deductible. It is not suggested that the new issue is obviously futile so it becomes necessary to consider whether the proposed amendment, if allowed at this late stage of the litigation, would cause substantial injustice to the applicants which cannot be alleviated by appropriate procedural directions and compensated for by an order indemnifying the applicants against any costs thrown away.
I accept that allowing the proposed amendments may make it necessary or desirable for the applicants to adduce evidence which is separate and distinct from, or goes beyond, that which is to be found in the affidavits already filed on their behalf and on which it was intended that the trial for this action should be conducted. In my view, it would be unduly burdensome now to require the applicants, at a point so close to trial, to put on further affidavits directed to whether EFG Australia at any relevant time carried on a business of lending money (“the new question”). I shall, therefore, direct that the applicants be at liberty to adduce orally from any deponent of an affidavit already filed before trial as part of that deponent’s evidence-in-chief, evidence directed to the new question. As well, I shall permit the applicants to file and serve by some time during the course of the trial, to be fixed by later direction, any affidavit from any additional deponent on which it wishes to rely in relation to the new question. In the circumstances, no adverse inference will be drawn against either party from any failure to adduce evidence from Mr van Wyngen or to cross-examine that witness about matters relevant to the new question. Of course that is not to say that the probability of other evidence specifically directed to the new question may not be tested by reference to the general tenor of Mr van Wyngen’s evidence.
As I apprehend it, a resolution in favour of the Commissioner of the new question will be determinative against the deductibility of the losses claimed in respect of the period from 1984 to 1989. It may, therefore, be appropriate at some point in the hearing, when all the evidence bearing on the new question is in, to seek to resolve the new question separately from, and in advance of other questions, pursuant to O 29 r 2 of the Rules of this Court. However, if and when that point is reached, an application for an order under that rule can be made, if necessary pursuant to the liberty reserved today.
I certify that the preceding forty (40) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Ryan.
Associate:
Dated: 27 May 2008
Counsel for the Applicants:
Mr G Davies QC with Mr L Armstrong
Solicitor for the Applicants:
Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Counsel for the Respondent:
Ms J Davies SC with Mr D Fagan SC with Mr P Nicholas
Solicitor for the Respondent:
Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing:
7 March 2008
Date of Judgment:
27 May 2008
SCHEDULE
VID 123 of 2007 Ashwick (Qld) No 127 Pty Ltd (ACN 010 577 456) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 124 of 2007 Ashwick (Qld) No 127 Pty Ltd (ACN 010 577 456) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 125 of 2007 Ashwick (Qld) No 127 Pty Ltd (ACN 010 577 456) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 126 of 2007 Nexday Pty Ltd (ACN 003 621 681) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 127 of 2007 EFG Investments Pty Ltd (ACN 006 169 955) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 128 of 2007 Amayana Pty Ltd (ACN 006 908 737) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 129/07 Fosters Group Ltd (ACN 007 620 886) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 130 of 2007 Elfic Pty Ltd (ACN 007 606 206) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 131 of 2007 EFG Treasury Pty Ltd (ACN 050 431 699) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 132 of 2007 EFG Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 006 357 035) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 133 of 2007 Elfic Pty Ltd (ACN 007 606 206) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 134 of 2007 Elfic Pty Ltd (ACN 007 606 206) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia;
VID 135 of 2007 EFG Securities Pty Ltd (ACN 005 489 029) v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia.
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