AS v Commission for Children and Young People

[2003] NSWADT 42

CITATION:	AS -v- Commission for Children and Young People [2003] NSWADT 42 revised - 13/03/2003
DIVISION:	Community Services Division
PARTIES:	APPLICANT AS RESPONDENT Commission for Children and Young People
FILE NUMBER:	014066
HEARING DATES:	09/04/2002, 07/11/2002
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	11/07/2002
DATE OF DECISION:	03/06/2003
BEFORE:	Britton A - Judicial Member
APPLICATION:	Declaration that applicant not a prohibited person
MATTER FOR DECISION:	Principal matter
LEGISLATION CITED:	Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998
CASES CITED:	Commission for Children and Young People v V [2002] NSWSC 949 R v Commission for Children and Young People [2002] NSWIR Comm 101 G v J & H [2001] NSWIR Comm 69
REPRESENTATION:	APPLICANT In applicant RESPONDENT G Moore, barrister
ORDERS:	ORDERS MADE ON 3 DECEMBER 2002; 1. Pursuant to s 9(1) of the Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 (the Child Protection Act) the Tribunal declares, subject to the conditions set out in Order 2, that the Act does not apply to the offence of "carnally know a female under the age of 16 years" for which the applicant was convicted on 28 May 1969 at East Maitland Quarter Sessions; 2. Pursuant to s 9(9) of the Child Protection Act, the declaration is subject to the following conditions:; (a) That the Applicant not engage in any child related employment other than:; (i)That associated with amateur sporting activities and ; (ii) That which involves the provision of horse riding tours conducted by the Applicant under any contract with the NSW Department of Sport and Recreation Centre ; 3. Copies of these orders to be served on the Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Services.

Section 126 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 applies to this decision.

Section 126 provides
(1A) This section applies only to the following:

(a) proceedings in the Community Services Division of the Tribunal,
(b) appeals to an Appeal Panel from a decision made by the Tribunal in the Community Services Division,
(c) such other proceedings (or class or classes of proceedings) as may be prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this section.
(1) A person must not, except with the consent of the Tribunal, publish or broadcast the name of any person:
(a) who appears as a witness before the Tribunal in any proceedings, or
(b) to whom any proceedings before the Tribunal relate, or
(c) who is mentioned or otherwise involved in any proceedings before the Tribunal,
whether before or after the proceedings are disposed of.
Maximum penalty: 10 penalty units or imprisonment for 12 months, or both.

(2) This section does not prohibit the publication or broadcasting of an official report of the proceedings that includes the name of any person the publication or broadcasting of which would otherwise be prohibited by this section.

(3) For the purposes of this section, a reference to the name of a person includes a reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the person or is likely to lead to the identification of the person.

1 This decision concerns an application made under the Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 (“Child Protection Act”). On 3 December 2002 the Tribunal handed down final orders under s 9(1) and s 9(9) of that Act. Subsequently the applicant sought written reasons for the Tribunal’s decision under s 89(3) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (“Tribunal Act”). These are the reasons in answer to that request.

2 The applicant is a “prohibited person” as defined by s 5 of the “Child Protection Act”. This Act makes it an offence for a prohibited person to apply for, undertake or remain in child-related employment. The applicant seeks a declaration under s 9(1) of that Act which, if granted, would mean that he would not be prohibited from working in child-related employment: s 5(2) of the Child Protection Act.

3 In 1973 the applicant was convicted of the offence of Carnal Knowledge Female under the age of 16 years. This offence constitutes a “serious sex offence” as defined by the Child Protection Act.

4 The applicant sought an order without conditions under s 9(1) of the Child Protection Act. That application was not opposed by the respondent.

Section 126(1) ADT Act

5 Section 126(1) of the Tribunal Act makes it an offence to publish or broadcast the name of any person to whom any proceedings before the Community Services Division of the Tribunal relate. Section 126(2) contains an exception in relation to the publication of an official report of the proceedings. However, in these reasons I have decided not to publish any details that could identify the applicant or anyone who gave evidence or was referred to in the proceedings (other than any expert witnesses). The applicant’s wife and former wife are referred to by pseudonyms. I have also avoided detailing the nature and location of the applicant’s business as to do so may inadvertently identify him. The official copy of the orders provided to the parties will include the name of the applicant and details of his place of business.

Background to Final Orders

6 On 21 December 2001 the Tribunal made orders under s 9(6) of the Child Protection Act. The effect of those orders was to stay the operation of the Act on condition that the only child-related employment the applicant undertake (or apply to undertake) throughout the life of the stay, was that involved with the horse riding school operated by him. Further, the applicant was required to be accompanied at all times by another adult when in the company of any “student”.

7 On 9 April 2002 the matter was set down for determination of the substantive application. Leave was granted at the conclusion of that hearing to the applicant to put on further evidence on a discrete point. Directions were made to that effect. Those directions were not complied with. Further directions were also not complied with.

8 A final hearing was held on 7 November 2002. At that hearing I declined to grant an unconditional order and foreshadowed my intention to grant an order with conditions that in effect permitted the applicant to continue in his current child-related employment. I will return to discuss the form of those orders.

Relevant legislation

9 Section 5(2) of the Child Protection Act provides that a person is not a prohibited person in respect of an offence if an order is in force under s 9 declaring that the Act is not to apply to that person. Section 9(1) provides that on the application of a prohibited person, a relevant tribunal may make an order declaring that this Act is not to apply to the person in respect of a specified offence. Section 9(2) defines a relevant tribunal to include the Administrative Decisions Tribunal. Orders made under s 9 may be made subject to conditions: s 9(9).

10 Section 9(4) provides that the tribunal is not to make an order under this section unless it considers that the person who is the subject of the proposed order does not pose a risk to the safety of children. Section 9(5) sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account in deciding whether or not to make an order under s 9:

(a) the seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a prohibited person,
(a1) the period of time since those offences were committed,
(b) the age of the person at the time those offences were committed,
(c) the age of each victim of the offences at the time they were committed,
(d) the difference in age between the prohibited person and each such victim,
(d1) the prohibited person's present age,
(e) the seriousness of the prohibited person's total criminal record,
(f) such other matters as the tribunal considers relevant.

11 Section 9(8) provides that if the relevant tribunal refuses to make an order under this section, the prohibited person is not entitled to make an application for an order under this section in respect of that offence until after the period of 5 years from the date of the tribunal's refusal, unless the tribunal otherwise orders at the time of refusal.

12 Section 9(9) provides that an order made under s 9 may be made subject to conditions.

13 Section 9(7) requires that the respondent is to be a party to any proceedings for an order under s 9 and may make submissions in opposition to or support of the making of the order.

Onus of Proof

14 Section 9(4) of the Child Protection Act requires that the Tribunal not make an order under s 9 unless it considers that the applicant does not pose a risk to the safety of children. The onus lies with the applicant to show, on the Briginshaw standard, that s/he is not a risk to children.

15 The meaning of the word “risk” for the purpose of s 9(4) was recently considered by Young J in Commission for Children and Young People v V [2002] NSWSC 949. His Honour agreed with Haylen J’s analysis of the meaning of “risk” in R v Commission for Children and Young People [2002] NSWIR Comm 101. Haylen J said that s 9(4) was focused on:

“not a mere theoretical or possible risk arising from the fact of a previous conviction, but it is a reference to an unacceptable risk, a real risk, a likelihood of harm or a recognisable potential having regard to the need to jointly protect children and employees and to preserve reasonable civil rights.” (V’s case [at 22], R’s case [at 104].)

16 Young J held that the meaning of “risk” in s 9(4) was whether in “the circumstances, there is a real and appreciable risk in the sense of a risk that is greater than the risk of any adult preying on a child.” [42]. That test is now binding on the Tribunal.

17 As observed by Kavanagh J in G v J & H [2001] NSWIR Comm 69 the effect of an unconditional order made under s 9(1) is not merely to allow the applicant to continue in particular employment. Such order attaches to the person in respect of a specified offence not particular work. Accordingly, an order made under s 9(1) allows the person to be forever exempt in respect of the offence and allows them to work in any child-related employment.

18 Young J made it clear that the ability to impose conditions should not be disregarded when considering the issue of risk under s 9(4). He dismissed the argument put for the appellant commissioner that it was not permissible to impose conditions in order to lift the applicant over the risk threshold. He held [at 46] that the power to make conditions under s 9(9) should be read so that the imposition of relevant conditions may make a person “who would otherwise pose some risk to children into a applicant who does not pose a real unacceptable risk to children”.

Material before Tribunal

19 The following documentary material was before the Tribunal: record of police interview with applicant, December 1968; applicant’s pre-sentence report, 1969; deposition of victim, 1969; report of psychologist, Wendy Cohen, 1986; report of psychologist, Don Zacroczymski, 1986; record of police interview with applicant, 1986; record of police interview with Ms A, 1986; applicant’s pre-sentence report, 1987; antecedent form and facts re: 1986 offence; various COPS reports concerning applicant; applicant’s criminal history; statement of applicant’s wife, April 2002; reports of psychiatrist, Dr Stephen Allnutt, dated 2 April and 4 April 2002; contract between NSW Department of Sport and Recreation and the applicant.

20 In addition, the applicant, his wife, Dr Allnut and a representative of the Department of Sport and Recreation gave oral evidence in these proceedings.

The Index offence (s 9(a), s 9(a)(1), s 9(b), s 9(c), s 9(d) s 9(d1))

21 In 1969 the applicant was convicted of the offence of Carnal Knowledge Female under the age of 16 years (“the index offence”) and sentenced to nine months hard labour with a concurrent non-parole period of two years and nine months. The maximum penalty for such offence at the time was ten years imprisonment.

22 At the time of the offence, the applicant was five years and eight months older than his victim, he being 21 years of age and his “victim,” 15. He is now 55 years of age.

23 Before the Tribunal was the evidence given by the victim at the committal hearings and the applicant’s record of interview with police. In his statement to police, the applicant claimed that the girl had been a willing sexual partner. This was broadly consistent with the evidence given by the applicant in the proceedings before this Tribunal although he said that his recollection of the events surrounding the event was poor.

24 At the committal hearing, the victim gave evidence that the applicant had driven her to an isolated area some three kilometers from the nearest township. She said she had not previously had intercourse. While there were some inconsistencies in her evidence, her evidence was that she had not consented to intercourse and had been coerced or threatened.

25 The evidence before the Tribunal makes it clear that at the time of the offence the applicant was aware that the girl was under 16 years of age.

26 Taken overall, the available evidence in respect of the index evidence would not support a finding that the offence of itself was particularly serious. However in my view given the not insignificant age difference between the applicant and the girl and the conflicting evidence as to whether intercourse was consensual, I am not prepared to conclude that that offence should be given no weight in an assessment of whether the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children.

The seriousness of the applicant’s total criminal record (s 9(5)(e))

27 The applicant has a lengthy criminal record stretching over 30 years. He was charged with his first offence in 1964 at age 17. His last conviction was in 1994 when he was aged 47.

28 His record is punctuated with repeated breaches of court orders. For example, at the time he committed the index offence he was bound by recognizance.

29 The most serious of the offences for which he has been convicted occurred in 1986 and concerned a serious incident involving his (then) estranged de facto wife, Ms A. The applicant had lived with Ms A and separated after eight years. About 18 months after separation, the applicant discovered Ms A was having an affair with another man and became deeply distressed. Shortly after making that discovery, he went around to her flat and waited for her. He had been drinking heavily. On her arrival, at about midnight, he assaulted her, punching her in the stomach, chest and face with a closed fist. In a statement given to police Ms A claimed that the applicant dragged her by the hair, forced her into a car and drove her to his farm located in a remote area. Ms A stated that upon arrival the applicant forced her to sign a note to the effect that she had come to the farm of her own free will.

30 Ms A claimed that after some time the applicant calmed down and they talked. She claimed that later that evening having announced his intention to throw her over a cliff, he again forced her into a car. While the applicant was out of the car attending to a flat tyre, she locked herself in the car and attempted to drive away. The applicant then smashed the passenger side window with a wheel brace and then, according to Ms A threatened her with the brace.

31 The applicant then drove Ms A to a nearby waterfall some 40 minutes away and according to Ms A, again assaulted her and threatened to kill her. Some hours later after returning to the farm, the police arrived and arrested him. Ms A was treated at hospital for injuries sustained during this incident. According to a police report she was off work for two weeks on account of injury.

32 In his statement to police, the applicant stated that he took Ms A to his farm and later the falls to discuss reconciliation. He denied that he forced her to accompany him to the farm. He agreed he had hit the window of the car with the wheel brace. He said the reason he took Ms A to the falls some 60 kilometers away in the early hours of the morning was for sentimental reasons and to “ sight-see.” He denied trying to push her over the falls.

33 The applicant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, assault and malicious injury. He was sentenced to 250 hours community service and placed upon a recognisance to be of good behaviour for a period of five years.

Other matters as the tribunal considers relevant (s 9(5)(f)).
Expert Evidence

34 At the request of the respondent, psychiatrist Dr Stephen Allnut assessed the applicant. Dr Allnut prepared a written report, which was tendered in these proceedings and gave supplementary oral evidence.

35 Dr Allnut noted that the applicant had suffered severe depression in the mid 1980s for between 12 to 18 months. He reported that the applicant had told him that the depression had not resurfaced until late 2001 when he became aware he was a prohibited person.

36 Dr Allnut concluded that the applicant had a history of depression and currently presents with a mild to moderate depressive order. He noted that his use of alcohol until age 36 was heavy and while his alcohol consumption has reduced there is a risk that he continues to drink heavily.

37 Dr Allnut tested the applicant’s recidivist tendencies in respect of children using the Static –99 test. Static -99 is an actuarial tool used to measure recidivism among sex offenders. Dr Allnut says this test is regarded as the most accurate of all measures in predicting sexual recidivism. Applying this measure, Dr Alnutt concluded that at the time of the applicant’s release from incarceration in 1971 he would have been regarded as posing a medium to low risk of recidivism. Static-99 does not provide rates for reoffending after 24 years. In Dr Allnut’s view, it is questionable whether recidivism rates among sex offenders taper off in the long term. He noted that there is some evidence to suggest that there are modest declines only in recidivism rates among sex offenders who offend against extra-familial children (Hanson 2001).

38 In Dr Allnut’s view, there is little relationship between the applicant’s 1986 convictions (involving Ms A) and his risk to children. He concluded that the risk that the applicant could be physically violent towards children would be greater than the risk presented by the average man. He categorised that risk (physical violence) as moderate/high in respect of adults.

39 Dr Allnut recommended that the applicant reduce his consumption of alcohol and see a psychiatrist for assessment of likely depression and memory difficulties.

Family Life

40 The applicant met his current wife Mrs B, a schoolteacher, in about 1990. They have been married for approximately six years and have three children. They enjoy a close and supportive relationship.

41 Mrs B gave evidence that her family had been under considerable stress for the past few years. The financial position of their rural property was at best precarious. The applicant had recently been forced to move to Sydney on an indefinite basis to find work. A young son had been extremely ill requiring frequent medical attention in Sydney.

42 Mrs B attested that her husband had coped well with these pressures. She claimed that he had reduced his alcohol consumption on Dr Allnut’s recommendation.

43 She said that she had observed her husband in many different situations dealing with children over the years and his manner was consistently firm and fair. She said that her husband commonly took on a protective role in respect of children in his care.

Type of Employment

44 Detailed evidence was given about the horse riding school operated by the applicant. In summary, the applicant was contracted by the Department of Sport and Recreation (“the Department”) to provide trail rides, overnight camps and riding tuition to school students who participated in various holiday programs organised by the Department. A copy of that contract was provided to the Tribunal. The applicant did not offer the services of his school directly to the public. Evidence was given on behalf of the Department, that no adverse report had been made about the applicant since he commenced providing services to the Department about eight years ago.

45 According to the applicant, between six and 12 students attend each overnight camp. The students are accompanied by himself, between two to four adults (employed by the applicant) and (usually) his wife. At the stay hearing, the applicant claimed that on all occasions at least one staff member from the Department of Sport and Recreation attends the camps. He said that if for one reason or another a Department officer could not attend he would cancel the camp, out of concern for the children and for “insurance reasons”. However, on the final day of hearing he recounted an occasion on an overnight camp and noted that no Department staff were in attendance.

46 The applicant claimed that during the day trail rides at least one adult employee ( of the applicant) was present in addition to a member of the Department’s staff. He said that there was never an occasion when he would be alone with a child

47 The applicant coached the local junior soccer team. His evidence, corroborated by his wife, was that a significant number of parents and supporters always attended training and matches.

Findings and Conclusions

48 The issue for determination is whether I can be comfortably satisfied that the applicant does not pose a real and material risk to the safety of children. In making this determination I am obliged to take into account the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in s 9(5).

49 As noted, an order without conditions made under s 9(1) permits the applicant to work in any child-related employment. If the evidence does not support a finding that the applicant does not pose a relevant risk in any child-related employment, the next issue for determination is whether that risk could be cured by the imposition of conditions. If I conclude that even with appropriate conditions the applicant continues to pose a risk, no order under s 9 can be made.

50 The applicant seeks an unconditional order and argues that he does not present a risk to children. In essence he argues that he is a reformed character. He submits that significant weight must be given to the fact that the index offence is the sole offence of a sexual nature for which he has been convicted. Further, he argues it is relevant in respect of that offence that intercourse was consensual, and involved a girl just under the age of consent. Those incidents which involved his former de facto wife, which he concedes demonstrate some lack of control, occurred at a time when he was suffering from severe depression. It was, he says in effect, a “crime of passion” and cannot be seen as indicative of a pattern of behaviour.

51 The applicant’s arguments are persuasive. His self-assessment that he does not pose a risk to children is broadly supported by the expert evidence. Dr Allnut takes the view that there are reasonable grounds for concluding that the applicant’s risk of sexual offending against children tend toward that of the average man. Relevantly the applicant’s current wife, on whose evidence I place great weight, gave evidence to the effect that she had never observed her husband acting in an improper manner towards children. The respondent does not oppose the application. I infer from that fact, that it joins with the applicant, his wife and Dr Allnut in concluding that the applicant does not pose a relevant risk.

52 Against these compelling submissions, I remain troubled by a number of matters. First I am not comfortably satisfied that the sexual intercourse which led to the index offence was completely consensual, as the applicant claims. (I note that in this respect I depart from the respondent’s view that for the purpose of this application the Tribunal should proceed on the basis that intercourse was consensual as the applicant was charged with the lesser charge of carnal knowledge.). While the index offence is not determinative in assessing whether the applicant poses a risk to children, given the possible absence of consent it cannot in my view be dismissed as irrelevant to that assessment.

53 Second, the applicant has a lengthy criminal history. Of particular concern are the bundle of serious offences which involved the applicant’s estranged wife. Dr Allnut is of the opinion that these events bear no relationship to the applicant’s propensity to sexually re-offend in respect of children. He concludes, on the basis of this incident (and the applicant’s general criminal record), that the applicant may have a propensity to conduct himself violently towards adults in certain circumstances. He concludes that there is a moderate risk that the applicant will act violently towards adults, and a lesser risk in respect of children. Dr Allnut puts the risk that the applicant may act violently towards children as low, but higher than the risk of him sexually re-offending towards children. Given the definition of adult used in the Child Protection Act, ie persons under 18 years of age, I do not share Dr Allnut’s optimism that a person who presents as a moderate risk to adults (in respect of violence) presents a low risk to persons under the age of 18, especially those nearing the cut-off age.

54 It is of course impossible to say with any certainty whether the type of behaviour exhibited by the applicant in 1986 will be repeated. It may be that the unique cocktail of circumstances surrounding the incident alone were responsible for that explosive outburst. Conversely, it may be that with the right mix of factors, this conduct could be repeated. While this incident does not indicate that the applicant may have a propensity to sexually offend in respect of children, it does raise a concern that he may represent a risk to the safety of children ( in terms of physical violence), albeit older children.

55 Third, I note Dr Allnut’s concern about the applicant’s use of alcohol. In Dr Allnut’s view, in an intoxicated state the applicant, like many people, may act impulsively and aggressively. The applicant claims that he has significantly reduced his alcohol consumption after reading Dr Allnut’s report and, in any event, has never consumed alcohol while working with children. While this may be the case, and is broadly corroborated by Mrs B, I have some difficulties with this claim.

56 A number of inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence became apparent in the course of these proceedings. First, initially in evidence to the Tribunal, the applicant claimed in respect to the index offence (to which he pleaded guilty) that he had not been aware that the girl was under 16 years of age. This conflicts with his statement given to police following the incident and the victim’s own statement. Second, in his account given to the Tribunal of the attack on his estranged wife he sought to underplay the violent nature of that incident. Third, in evidence given in the course of the stay hearing, the applicant claimed that he had never attended an overnight camping trip without staff of the Department in attendance. His evidence given on the final day of hearing stands in direct conflict.

57 It may be that the applicant did not intentionally seek to mislead the Tribunal and that these inconsistencies are simply attributable to the passage of time and the applicant’s poor memory, as identified by Dr Allnut. Whatever the cause, these inconsistencies have left me with some doubts about the reliability of parts of the applicant’s evidence.

58 Assessing how a particular individual is likely to behave in the future is the difficult task the Tribunal is called upon to perform in respect of applications brought under the Child Protection Act. To do so, an understanding about how that individual has behaved in the past is necessary. The quality of any assessment made by the Tribunal, or an expert, will be determined in part by the reliability of the material before it about the applicant. Much of that material can only be obtained from applicants themself. It is often the case that there is little reliable independent evidence to corroborate an applicant’s account of how they have behaved towards children over an extended period of time. In this context, the reliability of the applicant’s evidence takes on great significance.

59 Having taken into account all the material before me I am not comfortably satisfied that the applicant has discharged the evidentiary onus of establishing to the Briginshaw standard that at this point in time he does not pose a real and material risk to children in any child-related employment. This is not to say that I have formed the view that the risk the applicant poses could be considered high. The risk he represents is, in my view, real and material, albeit at the low end of the scale. Had the evidence supported a finding that the applicant had reduced his alcohol consumption on a permanent basis my conclusion may have differed. However, even if the applicant’s evidence in respect of alcohol consumption is accepted, six months, in my view is too short a period to conclude that his resolve to reduce consumption is likely to continue.

60 As noted, the applicant seeks an order without conditions. He told the Tribunal he did not intend expanding his current voluntary and paid child-related employment, beyond that which he currently undertakes. It is irrelevant for the purpose of a determination under s 9 that an unconditional order may not be necessary for an applicant to continue to work in their chosen area. If the Tribunal is satisfied that an applicant does not present a relevant risk, an unconditional order should be granted irrespective of whether from a practical point of view the applicant “needs” an unconditional order to continue to work or seek work in their chosen field.

61 The uncontested evidence is that in respect of his current employment (both voluntary and paid) at all times the applicant works in the company of adults. Even if on occasion, officers of the Department do not attend the overnight camps, the evidence establishes that other adult employees will be present. The type of employment undertaken by the applicant is readily distinguishable from employment such as baby-sitting where safeguards such as the presence of other adults do not exist. Providing that the applicant is restricted to his current child-related employment, given the nature of that employment, I am comfortably satisfied that he does not pose a risk to children. Accordingly, I believe this to be an appropriate case to exercise my discretion under s 9(9) to make an order subject to conditions.

Form of Orders

62 At the conclusion of these proceedings, I announced my intention to grant an order under s 9 subject to conditions. I outlined in broad terms the conditions I considered appropriate: namely restricting the applicant’s child-related employment (voluntary and paid) to that currently undertaken.

63 The parties were given the opportunity to confer in respect of those orders. Draft orders were filed by the respondent on 3 December 2002 and effect given to those draft orders on the same day.

64 Subsequently I have been advised by the Registrar that AS claims he was not contacted by the respondent about the form of those orders. If this is correct (and I note that the respondent has not been given the opportunity to address that claim) it is regrettable. But in any event these orders in my view are consistent with the outline of the form of appropriate orders given by me on the final day of hearing.

Orders and Directions

1. Pursuant to s 9(1) of the Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 (the Child Protection Act) the Tribunal declares, subject to the conditions set out in Order 2, that the Act does not apply to the offence of “carnally know a female under the age of 16 years” for which the applicant was convicted on 28 May 1969 at East Maitland Quarter Sessions.

2. Pursuant to s 9(9) of the Child Protection Act, the declaration is subject to the following conditions:

(a) That the Applicant not engage in any child related employment other than:
(i)That associated with amateur sporting activities and
(ii) That which involves the provision of horse riding tours conducted by the Applicant under any contract
with the NSW Department of Sport and Recreation Centre, [text omitted to preserve anonymity of applicant].

3. Copies of these orders to be served on the Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Services.

Revision

Paragraph 64 amended by deletion of applicant's name and addition of AS.