Arv17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2021] FedCFamC2G 68
•24 September 2021
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)ARV17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 68
File number(s): SYG 489 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE STREET Date of judgment: 24 September 2021 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – application for a Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) Visa – whether the Authority made an error of law – whether the Authority had a genuine intellectual engagement with the applicant’s claims - whether the Authority failed to properly consider the applicant’s claim under the Refugee Convention and complementary protection - whether the Authority failed to properly consider the evidence – whether the Authority failed to properly consider the risk of significant harm to the applicant – no jurisdictional error – further amended application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) pt 7AA; ss 5H(1), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473CB, 476 Number of paragraphs: 72 Date of hearing: 20 July 2021 Place: Sydney Counsel for the applicant: Mr S Lawrence, of Counsel Counsel for the respondent: Mr N Swan, of Counsel Solicitors for the respondent: Ms A McCormick, Minter Ellison ORDERS
SYG 489 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: ARV17
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRAT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First RespondentIMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE STREET
DATE OF ORDER:
24 SEPTEMBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The further amended application is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $7,206.00.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE STREET:
This is an application for a constitutional writ within the Court’s jurisdiction under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). The application is in respect of an Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”) decision under Part 7AA of the Act made on 30 January 2017, affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“the delegate”) not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) Visa (“the Visa”).
BACKGROUND AND APPLICANT’S CLAIMS
The applicant was found to be a citizen of Iran and his claims were assessed against that country.
In summary, the applicant claimed to fear harm from his politically powerful ex-father-in-law. The applicant claimed he had been summoned to several courts with false charges over a six-month period. The applicant claimed he was charged with beating his wife and forcing her to attend underground Christianity classes in order to convert her from Islam to Christianity.
The applicant alleged that he was dismissed from his employment without a valid reason, was sentenced to one year jail and a fine, and that his car was confiscated. The applicant alleged that he was investigated several times in different areas wherever he travelled because he had been blacklisted and could not apply for government jobs. The applicant also alleged he had been detained for having tattoos on his arm.
The applicant alleged he had been threatened in his ex-brother-in-law’s office at gunpoint, after being contacted in March 2012. The applicant alleged that, about six months later, he received from his brother in law, a divorce certificate and documents regarding the divorce from his wife. The applicant alleged that he was told by telephone that there were plans to ban him from leaving the country, because they had some “confession letters”. The applicant was informed by his father that, based on Sharia Law, he would be executed as an apostate and should escape from Iran.
On 29 January 2016, the applicant applied for protection. As a part of his Visa application, the applicant provided a detailed statement in support of why he had left the country.
The applicant identified having problems with his relationship with his ex-father-in-law, who did not like his job and personality, did not like him attending their gatherings, and attempted to change the applicant into someone he likes.
It was alleged that the ex-father-in-law changed the applicant’s employment using his governmental power and connections. The applicant referred to circumstances in which it was alleged his ex-wife was cheating on him, and that he got into serious trouble when he tried to take legal action to prove his ex-wife’s cheating. The applicant alleged that, until then, he had no idea of how intensively his ex-father-in-law was involved in political power, and that he thought he could easily divorce his ex-wife. The applicant identified that this event proved how dangerous it could be to make a complaint against his ex-wife’s family.
The applicant alleged that the problems grew worse and that the conflict was taken to both families. The applicant referred to deciding to live apart from his ex-wife for three months, taking into account his ex-father-in-law’s suggestion. The applicant asserted that the ex-father-in-law wanted the time to clear all the documentary evidence in respect of the accusation of cheating and infidelity by his daughter. The applicant alleged that, after three months, his ex-father-in-law took him to his home and asked him to commence living again with his daughter. The applicant maintained that he wanted a divorce, and to let her live with someone else that she loved. The applicant alleged that the ex-father-in-law did not want damage to his reputation, and that he threatened the applicant, saying that if the applicant intended to divorce his daughter, the ex-father-in-law would use his power to take any action against him including sending him to jail for a long time, or causing him a great deal of trouble.
The applicant then referred to receiving a court summons and being charged with religious conversion. The applicant alleged that he knew nothing about Christianity, that he never attended their religious classes or ceremonies, and that he did not know how it was possible that he had been charged with anti-Islamic activity. The applicant recalled the threat from his ex-father-in-law, and that he now knew his ex-father-in-law could make trouble for him, potentially putting his life at risk.
The applicant alleged that, when he went to court, he was charged further with beating his ex-wife and forcing her to attend underground Christianity classes. The applicant alleged that the trial was held on behalf of his ex-father-in-law, and that false accusations were set out to impact upon his divorce case. As a result of the trial, the applicant alleged that he could not file divorce proceedings in the court, and consequently, could not divorce the ex-father-in-law’s daughter.
The applicant referred to his ex-wife being able to automatically divorce without divorce rights if a Muslim becomes an apostate, according to Sharia Law. The applicant believes that this was a scenario that had been planned, and that the ex-father-in-law was capable of doing anything, including causing more trouble than that if he wanted to.
The applicant alleged that his life changed completely, and that he could never live like an ordinary citizen in his country. The applicant provided information regarding the harm he had experienced in his country and referred to his employment being terminated without a valid reason, being banned from leaving the country due to preaching a non-Islamic religion, being sentenced to an imprisonment term of one year, or the payment of a fine, his car being confiscated, and being accused of using his car for preaching, being summoned to several court trials with false charges during the six months and being investigated several times in different areas whenever he travelled, even at police checkpoints, and because the applicant alleged he had been blacklisted.
The applicant further alleged that he was apprehended “for having tattoos on my arm”, and was detained at a particular detention centre for three days. The applicant alleged that he was blacklisted, and that he could never apply for employment in government organisations. The applicant alleged he was deprived of his citizenship rights until he had served the one year in prison or paid the fine.
The applicant referred to there not being any conviction of converting religion, and that the applicant could take another chance to charge his ex-wife with infidelity and divorce her.
The applicant also referred to his ex-brother-in-law having the same intensive political power as his ex-father-in-law, and that they were both capable of doing everything through loopholes in the legal system.
The applicant specifically referred to a communication from his ex-brother-in-law, asking him to forget everything. The applicant claimed that he subsequently visited his ex-brother-in-law in his office, and that he had no idea he would see his ex-father-in-law and some other people there. The applicant alleged that he was ordered to sign some documents, that he did not know what he was signing, that he signed the same in fear of his life, and that he did not tell anybody about what happened because it might cause him trouble. The applicant alleged that they then kicked him out of the office without his personal documents.
The applicant referred to the difficulty of living without personal documents. The applicant alleged that, six months later, he received his personal documents, a divorce certificate and some paperwork with his signature. This paperwork was said to have included the power of attorney to divorce his ex-wife, being one of the papers that the applicant had been forced to sign.
The applicant referred to contacting a friend of his ex-wife’s and being told they were planning to ban him from leaving the country. The applicant claimed to fear harm on return to Iran because his powerful ex-father-in-law was able to do anything.
The applicant travelled from Iran to Indonesia by air, and then from Indonesia to Australia by boat.
On 1 September 2016, the delegate found that the applicant failed to meet the criteria for the grant of the Visa.
DECISION BY THE AUTHORITY
On 7 September 2016, the Authority wrote to the applicant explaining that his application for the Visa had been referred to the Authority for review. The letter provided a fact sheet and a practice direction, giving the applicant an opportunity to put on new information and submissions. The applicant put on submissions that were expressly referred to in the Authority’s reasons.
The Authority identified the background to the Visa application, and had regard to the review material referred to them by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act.
The Authority summarised the applicant’s claims for protection in six dot points which clearly identified the claims as to his ex-father in-law being politically powerful and the threat to send him to jail or cause him a lot of trouble, the applicant’s belief that his ex-father in-law was behind the court summons charging him with religious conversion and preaching Christianity, the applicant’s dismissal from his employment, his sentence to one year’s imprisonment or a fine, and his car being confiscated, being investigated in different areas whenever he travelled because he had been blacklisted and the applicant’s inability to apply for government jobs, and that he was detained “for having tattoos on his arm”.
The Authority also referred to the alleged incident at the brother in-law’s office, the receipt of the divorce papers and other documents, and the assertion that plans were being made to prevent him from leaving the country.
The Authority identified the relevant law, including an attachment of applicable law incorporated in the Authority’s reasons.
The Authority referred first to the claims concerning the ex-father-in-law’s strong links which enabled him to bring court proceedings. The Authority referred to the applicant providing vague and contradictory information about the court proceedings and their outcome. It was in these circumstances that the Authority identified it did not accept as credible the applicant’s statements regarding his court appearances and the outcome of the court case.
The Authority then referred to the applicant’s explanation in relation to his father-in-law’s motivation to scare him into submission. The Authority did not accept that explanation as being plausible, because the ex-wife’s family forced him to sign documents that were later used by her in successful divorce proceedings against him.
The Authority referred to the applicant’s claims in respect of receiving a court summons, charging him with religious conversion and preaching Christianity. They also referred to the applicant’s claims of being summoned to several court trials and being charged with beating his wife and forcing her to attend underground Christianity classes. The Authority identified that, at the Visa interview, the applicant had been unable to recall whether he had been charged with beating his wife or forcing her to attend Christian classes, or whether he had been made to attend Court on more than one occasion.
At the Visa interview, the applicant was asked to clarify whether he had been found guilty of apostasy and said “Yes”. The inconsistency with his statement was then pointed out, and the applicant responded with a discussion about an accusation of participating in Christian information classes. The Authority did not accept as plausible the explanation advanced, that the applicant was unable to differentiate between terms, charges and convictions, and that due to a lack of understanding, the applicant stated that he was convicted of Christianity, while he actually meant he was charged with such a crime, but not convicted.
The applicant also alleged that he was found guilty of participating in Christian information classes, and that his punishment was either a fine or a year in prison.
The Authority referred to the applicant’s claims that he was dismissed from his job, had his car confiscated, and was banned from leaving the country. The Authority referred to the applicant’s submissions that the inconsistencies in the narrative were due to a passage of time. However, the Authority found that the contradictions and inconsistencies in the information were significant and did not consider that they could be explained by factors such as memory lapses.
The Authority took into account that, although the applicant had provided a document purporting to support the payment of a court-imposed fine, he had not provided any documentation supporting a court summons, appearance, conviction or sentence. Having regard to the inconsistencies between the information in the applicant’s statement and the evidence provided at the Protection Visa interview, the Authority did not accept as credible the applicant’s statements regarding his court appearances and outcome of the court case. The Authority found that the applicant’s claims regarding court actions and outcomes were not credible.
The Authority did not accept as credible the claims that the applicant had lost his citizenship rights, had his car confiscated, that he was investigated several times in different areas when he travelled, and that he had been blacklisted or that he could not apply for government jobs.
The Authority referred to a document stating that the debt was paid in full, and did not accept the document as evidence of a court-imposed fine on the applicant. Further, the Authority did not find it plausible that this was a result of the plotting by the applicant’s ex-family.
The Authority found that the applicant’s claims regarding his alleged court appearances were not credible. The Authority did not accept that the applicant would agree to a meeting with his ex-brother-in-law to resolve the outstanding court cases without knowing the details. Moreover, the Authority did not accept that the applicant was forced to hand over personal documents and did not regard these claims as credible. The Authority did not accept the applicant’s explanation as to why he would agree to such a meeting, did not accept the applicant’s account of the meeting, and did not accept that he was forced to sign letters confessing to religious conversion and heresy.
The Authority accepted that the applicant may have been dismissed from his job without a legitimate reason. The Authority noted that the applicant was not summarily dismissed, and found that the decision was not based on anything more than his services no longer being required.
The Authority referred to the applicant’s claims of having tattoos on his arms and back. The applicant specifically identified having two tattoos: one on his back and one on his forearm, and that they were simply art done a long time ago.
The applicant alleged that he was detained briefly for three days in Iran, and subsequently fined and released. It is apparent from the Visa interview that the applicant indicated that he was once captured in the street “because of my tattoos”.
The interview identifies references as to whether the tattoos would put the applicant in a position of trouble if he returns to Iran. The applicant referred to having been out of Iran for nearly four years and that, in his opinion, “They cannot pick you up for tattoos only …but tattoos and something else. They can pick on you for sure”. The applicant referred to concern, not because of the tattoos themselves, but if they connected the tattoos to something else.
The Authority accepted that a person may come to the attention of Iranian authorities for having tattoos, and referred to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“DFAT”) country information. The Authority identified the absence of any specific report of someone being targeted by security forces solely for having a tattoo. The Authority accepted that having a visible tattoo could result in some low-level harassment. The Authority also referred to DFAT not being aware of any specific penalties that could be imposed for having a tattoo, and found that it is likely such penalties would be similar to those imposed for dress or hairstyles that are deemed improper, and referred to the usual penalty, being the award of a fine.
The Authority accepted that the applicant may have been detained and fined previously as a result of his tattoos, and took into account the DFAT country information. The Authority found that it is unlikely Iranian authorities would maintain an interest in someone who had previously come to their attention for having a tattoo, unless the tattoo gave evidence of another crime. The Authority identified that there is nothing to indicate that the tattoos depict controversial symbols or images, or that they would be of continuing interest to the Iranian authorities. The Authority found that the applicant did not have an activist profile and that there was no evidence to indicate he would be perceived by Iranian authorities as a threat. It was in these circumstances that the Authority was not satisfied the applicant faced a real chance of significant harm from Iranian authorities on account of his tattoos.
The Authority found that the applicant was a non-practising Muslim and found that the applicant would not face a real chance of serious harm as a result of his lack of religious observance. The Authority was not satisfied that there is a real chance of the applicant being harmed for engaging in Christian activity in Iran or for attending church two or three times in Australia.
The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of harm on account of his wife’s religious beliefs.
The Authority found that the applicant did not meet the requirements of the definition of refugee contained in s 5H(1) of the Act, and found the applicant did not meet the criteria in s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
The Authority then turned to the issue of complementary protection and referred to having found that the applicant had not been threatened by members of his ex-wife’s family. The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of significant harm in this regard on return.
The Authority did not accept as credible the applicant’s claims regarding court appearances, the outcome of his court case, having lost citizenship rights or being investigated on several occasions, being blacklisted, or being unable to apply for government jobs. The Authority found that the applicant will not face a real risk of significant harm on account of any claimed court appearances or penalties.
The Authority then turned to the applicant’s other claims, and was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk the applicant would suffer significant harm as a necessary or foreseeable consequence of the applicant being returned to Iran.
The Authority found the applicant did not meet the criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, and therefore affirmed the decision of the delegate under review.
THE GROUNDS
The grounds in the further amended application are as follows:
Ground 1
WITHDRAWN
Ground 2
Error of law – The Tribunal failed to properly consider the applicant’s claim by failing to properly consider whether he might suffer serious or significant harm on account of being detained for being tattooed, including by engaging in unreasonable fact finding and reasoning and by failing to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the matter.
Ground 3
Error of Law – The Tribunal erred in jurisdiction by unreasonably failing to consider and take into account the evidence relating to the Applicant’s detention on account of having tattoos when determining whether his claim to have an adverse profile was accepted or not.
THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
On behalf of the applicant, Mr Lawrence, of Counsel, submitted that the two grounds were interrelated. Mr Lawrence took the Court to both the Court Book in respect of the applicant’s statement, and the findings by the Authority, as well as to the transcript, in contending that the Authority had not properly considered the applicant’s claim to fear harm in relation to his tattoos because of the political power of his father-in-law.
In summary, Mr Lawrence contended that there was a context in relation to the applicant’s claims, concerning what had happened in respect of his tattoos, which meant that this was misunderstood by the Authority. Further, it was the applicant’s submission that the Authority had failed to address the role of the ex-father-in-law in relation to the arrest for the tattoos.
Mr Lawrence made reference to the findings by the delegate. The submissions contended that the Authority had not engaged with why the detention had occurred, and that the applicant had advanced claims that his father in-law was connected to what had occurred in respect of the adverse attention. It was submitted that the reference to the DFAT country information demonstrated a failure to give a genuine and realistic consideration to the applicant’s claim as a whole. It was also submitted that there had been a failure to properly consider the applicant’s claim as to future arbitrary detention on account of his tattoos, and that this amounted to a jurisdictional error.
Mr Lawrence also submitted, in relation to complementary protection, that the applicant’s claim concerning the tattoo issue was overlooked, and that this amounted to a constructive failure to exercise the jurisdiction.
In relation to Ground 3, it was alleged that the Authority erred by failing to consider evidence relating to whether the applicant had acquired an adverse profile in relation to his claim to fear harm by reason of having tattoos. It was contended that the applicant had squarely linked this attention on account of his tattoos to the persecution he claimed was orchestrated by his father-in-law. It was submitted that the failure by the Authority to consider this link led to an irrational and unreasonable finding by the Authority, and a failure to properly consider the applicant’s claim as advanced. It was also contended that the failure to consider the link could be characterised as one of legal unreasonableness.
THE RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
The first respondent submitted that the Authority was plainly cognisant of the proper tests under both the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Refugee Convention”) and in relation to complementary protection, which had been set out in detail.
It was submitted that the Authority had acknowledged the applicant’s claim in relation to being detained for having tattoos on his arm and referred to the assessment made in paragraph 20 of the Authority’s reasons. It was submitted that the applicant’s claims for being detained for having tattoos on his arm were comprehensively addressed, and subsequently rejected on the basis it did not give rise to real chance of harm, and that any experiences that may occur in the future would not amount to serious harm.
In relation to complementary protection, it was submitted that the reference to the applicant not facing a real risk of significant harm on account of any claimed court appearances or penalties subsume the findings in relation to the applicant’s tattoos. It was submitted that the Authority gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the applicant’s claim as a whole, and that the submission advanced by the applicant was, in fact, one which invited impermissible merits review.
It was submitted by the first respondent that the test of real chance and real risk are the same, and that the finding of there being no real chance of harm necessarily meant there was no real risk of harm, and that no jurisdictional error was made out by Ground 2.
In relation to Ground 3, it was submitted that the Authority was not required to identify every piece of evidence, and that it was not required to recount all the interactions with the applicant.
The first respondent identified the applicant’s claims regarding his father-in-law as being rejected on the basis of adverse credibility findings. It was submitted that the Authority had made dispositive findings addressing the applicant’s claims to have been detained for tattoos on his arms, and that the Authority had made dispositive findings in respect of the whole of the applicant’s claims.
GROUND 2
In relation to Ground 2, the Court does not accept that the Authority failed to take into account the applicant’s assertion of his father-in-law’s role in relation to the detention for having tattoos. The context identified by the Authority in the six dot points at paragraph 5 of the decision clearly reflects the Authority’s awareness of the applicant’s claims advanced in respect of the alleged influence of his father-in-law. The Authority, however, made adverse credibility findings in that regard.
In his statement, the applicant advanced why he was concerned about detention in respect of his tattoos, being that he was previously detained “for having tattoos”. The Authority identified DFAT country information and made dispositive findings in respect of the whole of the applicant’s claims concerning his tattoos. Those adverse findings identified that it was unlikely the Iranian authorities would maintain an interest in someone who had previously come to their attention for having a tattoo, unless the tattoo gave evidence of another crime. The Authority identified that there were no symbols or images that would be of continuing interest to the Iranian authorities. The Authority also identified that the applicant did not have a profile as an activist, and that there was no evidence to indicate he would be perceived by the Iranian authorities as a threat.
In those circumstances, the Authority had a genuine intellectual engagement with the applicant’s claims. The Authority identified where the two tattoos were, what the tattoos depicted, and the period of time over which he was detained. There was no failure by the Authority to give proper, genuine and real consideration to the applicant’s claim.
There was no failure by the Authority to properly consider the applicant’s claim both under the Refugee Convention and in relation to complementary protection. The Authority expressly identified the consideration of the claim under the Refugee Convention. The Court accepts the first respondent’s submission that the Authority’s reasons in relation to complementary protection at paragraph 27 of their decision subsume the findings in relation to the tattoos in the last sentence. The reference to court appearances or penalties, on a fair reading, includes the penalty of being fined identified at paragraph 20 of the Authority’s decision.
Accordingly, no jurisdictional error is made out by Ground 2.
GROUND 3
Turning to Ground 3, the Authority’s reasons must be read as a whole. The Authority did not fail to consider the applicant’s claim in relation to having been detained in respect of his tattoos, and took into account the DFAT country information in that regard.
The Authority also considered whether the applicant had an adverse profile in the nature of an activist profile, and ultimately found that he did not.
The Authority rejected the applicant’s claims in relation to threats from the ex-father in-law, and accordingly, there was no failure to properly consider the applicant’s claim in relation to his detention on account of his tattoos. The adverse findings made under both the Refugee Convention and in relation to complementary protection were dispositive of the whole of the applicant’s claims, including his claim to fear harm in the future by reason of his tattoos.
The Authority provided an evident and intelligible justification for the adverse finding in relation to the tattoos. That evident and intelligible justification was the absence of an activist profile, the DFAT country information, the content of the tattoos and the applicant’s experience, in fact, of having been released and fined. The adverse finding in respect of the applicant’s claim concerning his tattoos cannot be said to be legally unreasonable.
No jurisdictional error as alleged in Ground 3 is made out.
Accordingly, the further amended application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding seventy-two (72) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Street. Associate:
Dated: 24 September 2021
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