Artinos & Artinos (No 3)
[2023] FedCFamC1F 85
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Artinos & Artinos (No 3) [2023] FedCFamC1F 85
File number(s): MLC 4132 of 2020 Judgment of: STRUM J Date of judgment: 7 February 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Partial property settlement – Where husband consents to a payment to wife by way of partial property settlement – Where husband also seeks a payment to him by way of partial property settlement to equalise parties’ positions – No updated Financial Statement filed by husband for over one year – Mere equalisation no basis for partial property settlement - Where wife seeks orders regarding ongoing financial disclosure of business bank accounts by way of “read only” computer access – Where the wife seeks injunctions restraining the husband from dealing with business bank accounts outside of the ordinary course of business – Undertakings previously given by husband to similar effect – No breach of undertakings - Whether the balance of convenience is met – Injunction granted in relation only to one entity. Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 5.09, 6.06(7) Cases cited: M and DB (2006) FLC 93-293; [2006] FamCA 1380
Strahan & Strahan (Interim Property Orders) (2011) FLC 93-466; [2009] FamCAFC 166
Tsiang & Wu (2019) FLC 93-911; [2019] FamCAFC 128
Waugh & Waugh (2000) FLC 93-052; [2000] FamCA 1183
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 33 Date of hearing: 7 February 2023 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Ms R. Stoikovska SC with Mr W. Newland Solicitor for the Applicant: Blackwood Family Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T. North SC with Ms T. Borger Solicitor for the First Respondent: Belleli King and Associates Solicitor for the Second to Fourth Respondents: There were no appearances on behalf of the Second to Fourth Respondents ORDERS
MLC 4132 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS ARTINOS
Applicant
AND: MR ARTINOS
First Respondent
C PTY LTD
Second Respondent
B PTY LTD (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
order made by:
STRUM J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 FEBRUARY 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Order 12 of the orders made by the Hon Justice McEvoy on 3 December 2021 be discharged.
2.Save for compliance by the First Respondent with any order of the court, until further order, the First Respondent be and is hereby restrained by himself, his servants and agents, from withdrawing or transferring from (whether by internet transfer or otherwise), drawing down or otherwise dealing with Westpac account …82 in the name of E Pty Ltd E Trust.
3.Order 10 of the orders made by the Hon Justice McEvoy on 3 December 2021 be varied so that the reference to account number ending in …07 be deleted and replaced by is a reference to the account …82 in the name of E Pty Ltd E Trust.
4.Order 11 of the Orders made by the Hon Justice McEvoy on 3 December 2021 be varied so that the reference to account number ending …91 be deleted and be replaced by reference to account …82 in the name of E Pty Ltd E Trust.
5.For the purposes of the Applicant Wife’s read only access for all bank accounts held by the C Group entities:
(a)The Applicant Wife forthwith do all things necessary to complete an up to date Westpac profile in order to obtain read only access to all bank accounts held by the C Group entities; and
(b)In the event the Wife updates her Westpac profile and after 14 days still has no read only access to the bank accounts for the C Group entities, upon providing written notice to the First Respondent that she has complied with paragraph 5(a) and has not obtained read only access, the Respondent husband forthwith provide to the Applicant Wife bank log-in details for all bank accounts held in the name of any and all C Group entities, and the Applicant Wife be restrained by herself, her servants and agents, from withdrawing or transferring from, drawing down or otherwise dealing with funds in such bank accounts.
6.The Applicant Wife serve a copy of these orders on Westpac Bank.
7.Until the mention hearing listed on 2 May 2023, or the Court otherwise orders, the First Respondent, individually and in his capacity as either shareholder or director of F Pty Ltd, be and is hereby restrained from putting into effect the Minute of Meeting dated 17 February 2022 (annexed to the Applicant wife’s Affidavit filed 25 January 2023) regarding the Third and Fourth Respondent’s costs associated in their involvement in these proceedings.
AND THE COURT ORDERS BY CONSENT THAT:
8.By way of partial property settlement, within 14 days of the date of these orders, the First Respondent pay or cause to be paid to the Applicant Wife the sum of $420,000 from the funds held in Westpac account …82 in the name of E Pty Ltd E Trust.
9.The time provided for in Rule 7.26 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (“the Rules”) for the parties to ask questions of Mr H regarding the Final Report dated 17 January 2023 be extended to 4:00pm on 24 February 2023.
10.Pursuant to Rule 7.27 of the Rules, Mr H provide his written responses to any questions asked of him in accordance with paragraph 9 herein within 21 days of receipt of such questions.
11.The time provided for in Rule 7.26 of the Rules for the parties to ask questions of Ms AA regarding the Residential Valuation Report dated 25 October 2022 be extended to 4:00pm on 24 February 2023.
12.Pursuant to Rule 7.27 of the Rules, Ms AA provide her written responses to any questions asked of her in accordance with paragraph 11 herein within 21 days of receipt of such questions.
13.Paragraphs [2] to [11] of the Applicant Wife’s response to an application in a proceeding filed 26 January 2023, in so far as they relate to the husband, be otherwise dismissed.
14.Any party wishing to make a costs application in respect of the Husband’s Application in a Proceeding dated 19 December 2022 (adverse expert evidence application), or 13 January 2023 (joinder of the third and fourth respondents), or the Wife’s Response to an Application in a Proceeding dated 27 January 2023 shall do so by filing written submissions by 4 pm on 6 March 2023.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Artinos & Artinos (No 3) has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DELIVERED EX TEMPORESTRUM J:
These are my ex tempore reasons for judgment in relation to the interim applications heard today in this matter. Two Applications in a Proceeding were filed by the husband, Mr Artinos (“husband”), on 20 December 2022 and on 13 January 2023, in response to which the wife, Ms Artinos (“wife”), filed one single Response on 27 January 2023. In her Response, the wife also sought further orders. Those three applications initially came before me on 1 February 2023, being the first of five days this matter was listed for trial. A number of issues in those competing applications were dealt with that day, partly by consent and partly by orders of the Court. In respect of the latter matters, namely, those not by consent, I delivered ex tempore reasons for judgment that day. By reason of the late filing by the wife of her Response, the husband only had two and a half business days to reply, and even less time in relation to the even later filing of affidavits by the wife and her solicitor on 31 January 2023, being the eve of the hearing on 1 February 2023.
At the hearing on 1 February 2023, certain paragraphs of the orders sought by the wife, as against the husband, in her Response were reserved to today, and the husband was ordered to file responding material by 1 pm yesterday, 6 February 2023, which he duly did, comprising a Reply and an affidavit. Notwithstanding the wife’s Response filed on 27 January 2023 and the husband’s Reply filed 6 February 2023, each have seen fit to provide minutes of orders respectively sought which, at least at first brush, expanded the scope of the relief sought by them. Be that as it may, a limited degree of common sense has prevailed.
Insofar as the wife seeks a partial property settlement of $420,000, the husband consents to such an order but similarly seeks a partial property settlement, albeit of $300,000, which is opposed by the wife. I shall, therefore, make an order in favour of the wife and will determine the husband’s application in that regard. Insofar as the wife seeks an order for the payment of council rates in respect of the former matrimonial home, whilst there is a dispute as to whether all or part thereof was yet owing, Senior Counsel for the husband told me from the bar table, on instructions, that his client had made the payments sought by the wife in the order of $11,000 this morning. Therefore, no order is required, but I will make a notation to the effect of what I was told by Senior Counsel for the husband. Further, the husband seeks orders consequential to those I made, and the reasons for judgment I delivered, on 1 February 2023, to which the wife consents. Therefore, the remaining issues for determination by me today are the husband’s application for a partial property settlement of $300,000, the wife’s application for “visibility” in relation to the C Group Pty Ltd bank accounts and the wife’s application for injunctions.
Partial Property Settlement
I turn first to the husband’s application for a partial property settlement. The leading authority is that of the Full Court, comprising Boland, Thackray and O’Ryan JJ, in Strahan & Strahan (Interim Property Orders) (2011) FLC 93-466. I refer, in particular, to [131] of the judgment of Boland and O’Ryan JJ, where their Honours stated:
It was submitted on behalf of the Wife that if the Wife were to demur from the reasoning of the Federal Magistrate, it would simply be that the Federal Magistrate did not sufficiently and clearly distinguish between the procedural or adjectival issue being the question of whether the Court should exercise its discretion to entertain or embark on hearing and determining an interim property settlement application and the substantive question of the nature of the order to be made once it has been decided it is appropriate or just to hear and determine an interim application. We have already said that we agree with the two stage approach.
(Emphasis added)
In relation to the procedural or adjectival issue, their Honours said at [132]:
In relation to the first stage, in our view, when considering whether to exercise the power under s 79 and s 80(1)(h) of the Act to make an interim property order the “overarching consideration” is the interests of justice. It is not necessary to establish compelling circumstances. All that is required is that in the circumstances it is appropriate to exercise the power. In exercising the wide and unfettered discretion conferred by the power to make such an order, regard should be had to the fact that the usual order pursuant to s 79 is a once and for all order made after a final hearing.
In relation to the substantive issue, the Honours said at [137]:
Once a court proceeds to exercise the power in s 79 of the Act, being in the substantive phase, a court is required to undertake consideration of the matters in s 79(4) including by reference to s 79(4)(e) the matters in s 75(2) so far as they are relevant. However consideration of such matters may be brief and if it is established that “it seems likely to the Court that … the applicant … will be likely receive by way of property settlement a sum sufficient to cover the advance, that would seem to be sufficient to enable the order sought to be made”: Zschokke; Polletti and Polletti per Nygh J and Wenz v Archer. As senior counsel for the Wife submitted, “provided scope can be found within the assets of the parties for an order of the size sought … then that should be the end of the matter”. In other words, in such circumstances the applicant would only be receiving what he or she was entitled to receive when the power was exhausted.
Both the husband and the wife concede that, by reason of the husband’s consent to the partial property settlement upon the wife, the procedural or adjectival step to which O’Ryan and Boland JJ referred, namely, whether the Court should exercise its discretion to entertain or embark on hearing and determining an interim property settlement, has been satisfied. Further, both concede that, at the substantive step to which their Honours referred, namely, the nature of the order to be made once it has been decided that it is appropriate or just to hear and determine the partial property settlement application, the wife should receive $420,000.
The question, then, is whether the husband should receive $300,000 as sought by him, and that is to be determined on the evidence. The only evidence adduced by the husband in support thereof is at [20] of his affidavit filed 6 February 2023:
By her application the wife seeks a part property payment of $420,000. The only source of funds from which to meet this part property payment are those held in credit by [E Pty Ltd]. Provided the Court allow me to draw upon those funds to meet such order, I will consent to an order providing each of the wife and me partial property payments to equalise our position in the proceedings.
I was not taken to any authority in support of the proposition advanced by the husband that, merely because the wife is receiving, by reason of the partial property settlement I will order by consent, more than him, he should therefore be entitled to an equalisation of their positions. That is not the law. Whilst, as Boland and O’Ryan JJ said in Strahan & Strahan (Interim Property Orders), there is no requirement of compelling circumstances in relation to either the procedural / adjectival step or the substantive step, that is not to say that there no requirement that there be some circumstance(s). Indeed, their Honours emphasised at [139] that “in order to establish an appropriate case for an interim property settlement order more is required than the mere fact that upon a final hearing the applicant would receive the property being sought (or an amount in excess of the funds being sought) from the other party”.
Unlike the wife, who filed an updated Financial Statement on 26 January 2023, the husband’s most recent Financial Statement was filed by him on 31 January 2022. It is clear that his financial circumstances have, at least in one respect to which I shall refer shortly, materially changed in the past 12 months. That being the case, pursuant to r 6.06(7) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (“Rules”), he should have filed an updated Financial Statement, at the very least for the purposes of this hearing, if not earlier.
Unlike the husband, who proffers no reason for seeking a partial property settlement in his favour, other than for the sake of equalisation, the wife’s evidence is that she requires such an order to meet her legal costs and living expenses. She deposes that, whilst her solicitor holds about $144,000 in trust for her anticipated costs and disbursements, she has unbilled fees in the order of $14,000, as well as unpaid barrister’s fees, and the funds in trust will not be enough for her to meet her costs up to and at trial, which is estimated to run for seven to 10 days. She also relies upon the affidavit in support of her solicitor, Ms M, filed 31 January 2023, which I have read and to which I have had regard.
The husband’s bank statements were tendered, in part, today and the best evidence I have is that, as at 16 November 2022, less than three months ago, he had in excess of $220,000 in his personal bank account. Further, I was told by his Senior Counsel, albeit from the bar table, but effectively as an admission against interests, that his solicitor is holding some $276,000 on trust. Additionally, on 4 August 2022, the husband deposited a personal tax refund of some $322,000 into his personal bank account, albeit that his personal taxation had been paid out of an account in the C Group, reducing the cash resources of the group.
Notwithstanding some complaints by the wife in this regard, there was nothing improper in the husband so doing, given the terms of the restraints upon him, whether by undertakings to or injunctions of the Court. At this interlocutory stage, it is not readily apparent whether some of the husband’s tax refund forms part of the $220,000 in his personal bank account or the $276,000 in his solicitor’s trust account, and for present purposes it matters not. However, in circumstances where the husband’s application for a partial property settlement of $300,000, merely to equalise him with the wife, appears to be little more than tit-for-tat, I shall dismiss his application in that regard.
Ongoing financial disclosure of bank accounts
I turn, secondly, to the wife’s application for viewing access in respect of the C Group bank accounts. Orders were made by consent on 30 October 2020 which required the husband to do all acts and things to authorise the wife to have read-only access to online banking platforms for all accounts listed in Schedule A attached to that order. The wife complains that, in late January 2023, she discovered that her read-only access to certain accounts had been removed. By her Response filed on 27 January 2023, she sought orders for that access to be reinstated. However, in her affidavit filed on 31 January 2023, in further support of that aspect of her application, she deposed to and annexed an email from the husband’s solicitor to her solicitor dated that date, in which it was advised that what was required to reinstate the wife’s access was the updating, by her, of her Westpac Bank profile.
Senior Counsel for the wife conceded that, notwithstanding the passage of a week since receipt of that email and the fact that the email forms part of the evidence relied upon by the wife, she has taken no steps to update her profile. Senior Counsel for the husband submitted, and I agree, that her application in this regard is premature. However, it is fair to note that the husband’s application before the Court on 1 February 2023 in relation to adversarial expert evidence was similarly submitted by the wife, and found by me, to be premature. I refer in this regard to my ex tempore reasons for judgment delivered that day.
I propose to order that, in the event the wife has updated her profile, and notwithstanding that action, her read-only access has not been fully reinstated within 14 days thereafter, then, as the wife seeks, the husband provide her with the login details for all bank accounts held in the name of all C Group entities and trusts and that she be restrained personally and by her servants and agents from withdrawing or transferring from, drawing down or otherwise dealing with any funds in any such bank accounts. Senior Counsel for the husband opposed such an order on the basis that it was only sought by the wife in the minute provided by her this day. However, it was a potential solution that I mooted at the hearing last week in an endeavour, I hoped, to sensibly break the impasse between the parties. I clearly adverted to the fact that I might make such an order today.
Senior Counsel for the husband, from the bar table and without any supporting evidence, submitted that the provision by the husband to the wife of his login details might be in breach of his banking contract. However, having been put on notice by me that I might make such an order and, further, having been put on notice by the wife’s solicitors to similar effect by letter dated 3 February 2023, the fourth paragraph of which was tendered and marked exhibit W1, the husband failed to adduce any evidence in relation to the matters senior counsel sought to submit in this regard today. That is a matter for the husband and his solicitor. Insofar as is possible, I wish to avoid the parties returning to Court for even more interlocutory skirmishes than those which are already pending before the Court. I shall order that a copy of these orders be served upon Westpac Bank by the wife, as she seeks, and I shall also reserve liberty to the bank to apply in relation to this default order, if so advised.
Injunctions
I turn, lastly, to the wife’s applications for injunctions. On 15 May 2020, nearly three years ago, the husband gave an undertaking to the Court not to cause or permit any financial transaction by any corporation or trust within the C Group, as defined in paragraph 2.3 of the orders made that day, save for transactions within the ordinary course of business or to enable the husband to meet his reasonable personal expenses, including his legal expenses in relation to these proceedings and his and the wife’s liability for taxation, as and when any such liability falls due for payment as indicated by the Australian Taxation Office, or to meet reasonable expenses with respect to the children of the marriage and/or to meet obligations under any order of this Court, without first giving the wife by her solicitors 21 days’ notice in writing of an intention to do so.
Further, nearly some 18 months thereafter, on 3 December 2021, orders were made by consent at paragraphs 10, 11 and, most relevantly, 12 thereof in relation to the bank acts of E Pty Ltd. In particular, paragraph 12 provided that, save to satisfy existing obligations owed by the husband or E Pty Ltd to existing secured creditors, being Westpac Banking Corporation, the husband be restrained by injunction from drawing on funds and credit in the offset account number …91 and any drawdown facility available on loan account number …07.
In the wife’s affidavit filed 26 January 2023 and her written submissions dated 31 January 2023, it is repeatedly asserted that the husband has not complied with the undertaking given on 15 May 2020, such that she seeks an injunction in lieu thereof, albeit of broader compass, as well as a broadening of the E Pty Ltd injunction made on 3 December 2021 at paragraph 12. However, in the course of her submissions today and my exchanges with her, Senior Counsel for the wife conceded that, insofar as the wife asserts and, indeed, deposes that the husband has not complied with the undertaking, that was based upon a misreading by the wife and her solicitor of the undertaking and that, in fact, none of the transactions of which the wife complains were in breach thereof.
It is a serious matter to allege a breach of an undertaking or an order. Whilst, if the wife were a litigant in person, such a misconceived allegation might be somewhat more understandable, her solicitor should have been far more careful in the face of the wife’s allegation and the quite unambiguous terms of the undertaking. However, I shall say no more in that regard. Further, Senior Counsel for the wife could not point to any change in circumstances that had occurred since the husband gave his undertaking in May 2020 or the E Pty Ltd injunction was made in December 2021 which would warrant a broadening of the undertaking that had been given by the husband in May of 2020.
In the circumstances, I decline to make orders in the terms of paragraphs 1 and 5(a) of the minute of orders sought by the wife this day. In any event, Senior Counsel for the wife conceded that proposed paragraph 1 is already within the scope both of the undertaking given by the husband, which remains extant, and of proposed paragraph 5(a), which I decline to make, given the undertaking and the lack of any appreciable change of circumstances since then.
Insofar as the wife also seeks an injunction in the terms of paragraph 5(b) of her minute, restraining the husband from causing or permitting the establishment of any corporation, trust or entity without first giving the wife, by her solicitors, 21 days’ notice in writing of an intention so to do, I note that by paragraph 3 of the order made on 3 December 2021, the husband is already restrained from establishing or causing to be established any corporation or trust or entity with the purpose of having the same conduct of any entity now in the C Group, without first giving the wife 21 days’ notice in writing.
The wife submits that a more restrictive injunction is required because, since that order was made some 14 months ago, the husband has placed G Pty Ltd, a company formerly fully controlled by him, into administration and a new company, F Pty Ltd has been incorporated, of which he is now only a one-third shareholder and only one of three directors. Whether or not that new company is a phoenix that has arisen from the ashes of G Pty Ltd is a matter that must await trial. However, at this interlocutory stage, that proverbial horse has bolted, and the wife could point to no utility for the order she seeks. It is not for the Court to make an order in a vacuum without any need therefor established by evidence.
That then leaves two further injunctions sought by the wife. In respect of E Pty Ltd, the husband concedes that it holds the account with the most substantial funds, in the order of $2.7 million as at late 2022. A further sum, in the order of $2.2 million, is due to be received in early 2023 and a further sum of $820,000 is due to be received in about the middle of the year. Therefore, by that time, there will be in excess of $5.5 million in that account, albeit that there will be taxation payable in due course.
In respect of the E Pty Ltd account, I view the wife’s application somewhat differently to the balance of her injunctive applications. This is not the appropriate vehicle for a court at first instance to attempt to reconcile the dicta of the Full Court in Waugh & Waugh (2000) FLC 93-052 with that of a later and differently constituted Full Court in M and DB (2006) FLC 93-293. The primary focus in an application for a restraining injunction is the balance of convenience.
Subsequent to those two cases, the Full Court in Tsiang & Wu (2019) FLC 93-911 held at [25] that a party seeking an order to preserve property does not need to prove a positive intention to dispose of assets to defeat a party’s claim, but merely the possibility of the event occurring and that the determination about the balance of convenience may be an inference drawn from facts and circumstances established by the applicant’s evidence. That inference is to be drawn from the facts and circumstances established by the wife’s evidence, and in part conceded by the husband, to which I will return shortly. Further, at [26], the Full Court continued, saying that:
Nor is it the role of the judge determining the question of the injunction to, in effect conduct a trial of the disputed evidence to resolve those disputes (see Shercliff v Engadine Acceptance Corporation Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 729).
That must await the adjourned trial before me later this year. Given the husband’s actions in placing G Pty Ltd (formerly solely controlled by him) into administration and the subsequent incorporation of F Pty Ltd, in which he now has only a one-third interest and control, and the timing of those actions, it may at trial or upon my consideration of the evidence at trial transpire that the new company is, in fact, a phoenix which has arisen from the ashes of the former company, with a reduction in the husband’s interest and control to put assets beyond the reach of the wife. I simply do not know at this interlocutory stage, nor is it something that I can presently resolve. However, it is clearly something that attracts the wife’s interest and, prima facie, that of the Court pending a full exploration of the evidence.
The husband in his affidavit filed yesterday merely deposes that he has needed to draw upon funds available in the entities in the C Group, including but not limited to E Pty Ltd, and that, without access to those funds, he will not be able to meet his existing obligations under orders made in these proceedings, any further part-property settlement sought by the wife and his further legal expenses in these proceedings. Insofar as his legal expenses are concerned, I have already referred to the funds held in his solicitor’s trust account, as well as in his personal bank account. Insofar as his existing obligations and the further part property settlement to the wife are concerned, they are provided for by the introductory words in paragraph 2 of the orders sought by the wife, namely, the exception “save for compliance by the first respondent with any order of the Court”. Therefore, the husband’s concerns are in part misplaced, given the funds available to him and in his solicitor’s trust account, and by reason of the exception provided for by the wife which addresses his two other concerns.
In the circumstances, I propose to discharge paragraph 12 of the orders made on 3 December 2021 and to make an order in the terms of paragraph 2 sought by the wife. In respect of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the orders made on 3 December 2021, which also relate to E Pty Ltd, it is agreed that the bank account numbers therein referred to are now, with the passage of time, inapplicable and that they should be replaced with account number ending …82, and I shall order an amendment accordingly.
Lastly, in respect of paragraph 6 of the orders sought by the wife, it would provide that: “Pending order of the Court, the first respondent either individually or in his capacity as either shareholder or director of [F Pty Ltd] be restrained from putting into effect the minute of meeting dated 17 February 2022 annexed to the wife’s affidavit filed 25 [sic] January 2023 regarding the third and fourth respondents’ costs associated in their involvement in these proceedings”. The reference to 25 January 2023 should, in fact, be to the following day, 26 January 2023.
Upon perusal, it would appear that the provisions of that minute of resolution may not presently be applicable and that is the husband’s submission this day. However, in circumstances where he does not assert that any payment is imminent and the position of the recently joined third and fourth respondents is presently unknown, I find that the balance of convenience presently favours the wife. Accordingly, I shall grant the injunction sought by her in paragraph 6 of her minute of orders until the mention on 2 May 2023, at which the third and fourth respondents are required to appear, or further order of the Court, whichever last occurs. If the third and fourth respondents interpret the resolution differently to the husband, they can make application in relation thereto.
Given the length of the hearing, which occupied some three hours, rather than the two hours ordinarily provided for interim hearings in accordance with r 5.09 of the Rules, I require the parties, through their lawyers, to prepare a minute of orders to reflect both the matters to which I have referred as being already agreed upon between them and these reasons for judgment in relation to the matters in dispute which I have resolved for them. I require such minute to be submitted to my chambers by no later than 4.15pm on 8 February 2023.
I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Strum. Associate:
Dated: 21 February 2023
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
MLC 4132 of 2020 Respondents
Fourth Respondent:
D PTY LTD
0
3
0