Arnott, D R v Community and Public Sector Union
[1998] FCA 1675
•18 DECEMBER 1998
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
INDUSTRIAL LAW – application by constituent part of organisation for a ballot to determine whether constituent part should withdraw from amalgamation – whether application requires personal signature of each applicant – application signed by solicitors for the applicants – whether application for ballot validly commenced – whether substantial injustice caused by defect or irregularity – whether leave should be granted to amend application
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 253ZI, 253ZJ, 253ZL
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 51
Workplace Relations Regulations, regs 98I, 98J, Sch 1, Form 11ALa v Federated Furnishing Trade Society of A/asia (1993) 46 IR 164, considered
Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v R J Gilbertson (Qld) Pty Ltd (Federal Court of Australia, 21 October 1988, unreported), considered
Re Alcan Australia Ltd; Ex parte Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing and Engineering Employees (1994) 181 CLR 96, cited
ARNOTT v COMMUNITY AND PUBLIC SECTOR UNION
No VI 1402 of 1997JUDGE: NORTH J
DATE: 18 DECEMBER 1998
PLACE: MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VI 1402 OF 1997
BETWEEN:
D. R. ARNOTT
APPLICANTAND:
COMMUNITY AND PUBLIC SECTOR UNION
RESPONDENTJUDGE(S):
NORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 DECEMBER 1998
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is adjourned to a date to be fixed, to allow the parties to bring in short minutes of orders reflecting the conclusions reached in the reasons for judgment.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VI 1402 OF 1997
BETWEEN:
D. R. ARNOTT
APPLICANTAND:
COMMUNITY AND PUBLIC SECTOR UNION
RESPONDENT
JUDGE(S):
NORTH J
DATE:
18 DECEMBER 1998
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The primary question before the Court is whether an application for a ballot to decide whether a part of the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) should withdraw from the organisation is validly commenced.
The CPSU is an organisation of employees registered under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (the Act) and is the respondent to this application. The applicants are 192 members of the CPSU.
Division 7A of Part IX of the Act provides the legislative framework for the withdrawal of parts of amalgamated organisations from the organisations. Section 253ZJ(1) of the Act allows an application to be made for a ballot to decide whether a constituent part of an organisation should withdraw from the organisation, as follows:
“An application may be made to the Court for a ballot to be held, to decide whether a constituent part of an amalgamated organisation should withdraw from the organisation, if:
(a)the constituent part became part of the organisation as a result of an amalgamation under Division 7 after 1 February 1991; and
(b)the amalgamation occurred no less than 2 years prior to the date of the application; and
(c)the application is made:
(i)if the amalgamation occurred before the commencement of this Division – no more than 3 years after that commencement; or
(ii) if the amalgamation occurred after the commencement of this Division – no more than 5 years after the amalgamation occurred.”
A constituent part is relevantly defined in s 253ZI(1), as follows:
“constituent part, in relation to an amalgamated organisation, means:
(a) a separately identifiable constituent part; ....”
which is defined as follows:
“separately identifiable constituent part, in relation to an amalgamated organisation means:
(a)if an organisation de-registered under Division 7 in connection with the formation of the amalgamated organisation remains separately identifiable under the rules of the amalgamated organisation as a branch, division or part of that organisation – that branch, division or part; or
(b)if a State or Territory branch of such a de-registered organisation under its rules as in force immediately before its de-registration remains separately identifiable under the rules of the amalgamated organisation as a branch, division or part of that organisation – that branch, division or part.”
Before 1 March 1992, the Professional Officers Association, Australian Public Service (POA) was a separately registered organisation. It amalgamated with the Australian Public Sector and Broadcasting Union (Australian Government Employment) on 1 March 1992 and the amalgamated organisation was known as the Public Sector Union (PSU). On 1 July 1994, the PSU amalgamated with the State Public Service Federation (SPSF) to form the CPSU. The CPSU is made up of two groups, the PSU group and the SPSF group. The Professional Division of the CPSU is part of the PSU group and comprises the former POA membership. The Victorian Subdivision of the Professional Division of the CPSU corresponds with what was, before 1 March 1992, the Victorian Branch of the POA and is, therefore, a separately identifiable constituent part of the CPSU.
Section 253ZJ(3)(a) provides that an application for a ballot may be made by a prescribed number of constituent members, that is to say, a member of the amalgamated organisation who is included in the separately identifiable constituent part (s 253ZI(1)). Regulation 98I of the Workplace Relations Regulations (the Regulations) prescribes the number of members as the lesser of five per cent of the constituent members on the day the application is lodged or 2,000. The requirements as to the form of the application are central to this case. They are s 253ZJ(4), which provides:
“The application must be in the prescribed form and must contain such information as is prescribed.”
And reg 98J, which provides:
“An application for a ballot under section 253ZJ of the Act must be in accordance with Form 11A and must:
(a)contain the particulars stipulated in that form; and
(b)specify a person to be the representative constituent member in relation to the ballot to receive documents on behalf of the applicant and for any other purpose specified in this Division.”
Form 11A is set out in sched 1 to the Regulations, as follows:
“Workplace Relations Act 1996
APPLICATION FOR BALLOT UNDER DIVISION 7A OF PART IX
TO: THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT OF AUSTRALIA
I/We, (full name(s) of applicant(s))/We, the applicants listed in the schedule to this application*, being the prescribed number of constituent members/ the committee of management of the constituent members:
(a)apply for a ballot to be held to decide whether (name of constituent part of amalgamated organisation) should withdraw from (name of amalgamated organisation); and
(b)specify (name), of (address) as the representative constituent member for the purposes of the ballot.
* omit if inapplicable
PARTICULARS
1. Name of the amalgamated organisation appearing on the certificate of registration of the amalgamated organisation;
2. If the constituent part of the amalgamated organisation is a part of the membership of the amalgamated organisation that would have been eligible for membership of an organisation that was formerly registered under the Act – the name appearing on the certificate of registration for that organisation immediately before amalgamation day:
3.If the constituent part of the amalgamated organisation is a part of the membership of the amalgamated organisation that would have been eligible for membership of a State or Territory branch of an organisation that was formerly registered under the Act:
(a)a statement of that fact:
(b)the name appearing on the certificate of registration of the organisation immediately before amalgamation day:
3A. If the constituent part of the amalgamated organisation is a separately identifiable constituent part of the amalgamated organisation:
(a) a statement of that fact:
(b)the name of the branch, division or part of the amalgamated organisation that is the separately identifiable constituent part:
(c)the name of the organisation, de-registered under Division 7 of Part IX of the Act in connection with the formation of the amalgamated organisation, that remains, or the State or Territory branch of which remains, separately identifiable under the rules of the amalgamated organisation as a branch, division or part:
4. Particulars of the eligibility rules of the amalgamated organisation immediately before amalgamation day:
5. Particulars of the rules, immediately before amalgamation day, of:
(a)the organisation, de-registered under Division 7 of Part IX of the Act in connection with the formation of the amalgamated organisation, or the State or Territory branch of the organisation, in relation to which the persons constituting the constituent part would have been eligible for membership if the de-registration had not occurred; or
(b)the organisation, de-registered under Division 7 of Part IX of the Act in connection with the formation of the amalgamated organisation, or the State or Territory branch of the organisation, that remains separately identifiable under the rules of the amalgamated organisation as a branch, division or part:
6. Name proposed for the amalgamated organisation after withdrawal day:
7. Name proposed for the constituent part after withdrawal day:
8. If it is proposed that the eligibility rules of the amalgamated organisation be changed after withdrawal day – particulars of those changes:
9. If it is proposed that the rules of the constituent part will differ, after withdrawal day, from the rules described in clause 5 above – particulars of those changes:
10. Particulars of the assets and liabilities of the amalgamated organisation:
11. Particulars of the assets and liabilities of the constituent part before it, or the organisation of which it was a State or Territory branch, was de-registered under Division 7 of Part IX of the Act in connection with the formation of the amalgamated organisation:
12. Particulars of any proposal by the applicant for the apportionment of the assets and liabilities of the amalgamated organisation and the constituent part to assist the court to comply with the requirements of section 253ZP of the Act:
13. Question proposed to be put to the ballot:
Dated 19 .
........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Signature of applicant/s*
SCHEDULE
Applicants*:
* omit if inapplicable”
Two important features of the form should be observed. First, the application is to be made in the form of a statement in the first person. This follows from the first line of the body of the application. Second, the application ends with provision for the signature of the “applicant/s”.
In the present case, the application filed was in the following form:
“APPLICATION FOR BALLOT UNDER DIVISION 7A OF PART IX
TO: THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
We, the applicants listed in the schedule to this application, being the prescribed number of constituent members of the separately identifiable constituent part:
(a)apply for a ballot to be held to decide whether the Victorian Subdivision of the Professional Division of CPSU, the Community and Public Sector Union should withdraw from the Community and Public Sector Union; and
(b)specify George Weston of 1 St Kinnard Street, Essendon, Victoria 3040, as the representative constituent member for the purposes of the ballot.
PARTICULARS
1.Name of the amalgamated organisation appearing on the certificate of registration of the amalgamated organisation.
CPSU, the Community and Public Sector Union
2.If the constituent part of the amalgamated organisation is a part of the membership of the amalgamated organisation that would have been eligible for membership of an organisation that was formerly registered under the Act – the name appearing on the certificate of registration for the organisation immediately before amalgamation day:
Professional Officers Association, Australian Public Service
3.If the constituent part of the amalgamated organisation is a part of the membership of the amalgamated organisation that would have been eligible for membership of a State or Territory branch of an organisation that was formerly registered under the Act:
(a)a statement of that fact:
The constituent part is part of the membership of CPSU, the Community and Public Sector Union that would have been eligible for membership of the Victorian Branch of the Professional Officers Association, Australian Public Service, formerly registered under the Act.
(b)the name appearing on the certificate of registration of the organisation immediately before amalgamation day:
Professional Officers Association, Australian Public Service.
3A.If the constituent part of the amalgamated organisation is a separately identifiable constituent part of the amalgamated organisation:
(a)a statement of that fact:
The constituent part is a separately identifiable constituent part of the amalgamated organisation.
(b)the name of the Branch, division, or part of the amalgamated organisation that is the separately identifiable constituent part:
The Victorian Sub-Division of the Professional Division of the Community and Public Sector Union.
(c)the name of the organisation, deregistered under Division 7 of Part IX of the Act in connection with the formation of the amalgamated organisation, that remains, or the State or Territory branch of which remains, separately identifiable under the rules of the amalgamated organisation as a branch, division or part:
Professional Officers Association, Australian Public Service, Victorian Branch.
4.Particulars of the eligibility of the rules of the amalgamated organisation immediately before amalgamation day:
The eligibility rules of CPSU, the Community and Public Sector Union immediately before amalgamation day are Attachment A to this Application.
5.Particulars of the rules, immediately before amalgamation day, of:
(a)the organisation de-registered under Division 7 of Part IX of the Act in connection with the formation of the amalgamated organisation, or the State or Territory branch of the organisation, in relation to which the persons constituting the constituent part would have been eligible for membership if the de-registration had not occurred; or
Not applicable.
(b)the organisation, de-registered under Division 7 of Part IX of the Act in connection with the formation of the amalgamated organisation, or the State or Territory branch of the organisation, that remains, separately identifiable under the rules of the amalgamated organisation as a branch, division or part.
(b)Particulars of the rules of the Professional Officers Association, Australian Public Service, the organisation, de-registered under Division 7 of Part IX of the Act in connection with the formation of the amalgamated organisation, or the State or Territory branch of the organisation, that remains, separately identifiable under the rules of the amalgamated organisation as a branch, division or part, namely the Victorian Branch, are attachment B to this Application.
6.Name proposed for the amalgamated organisation after withdrawal day:
CPSU, the Community and Public Sector Union.
7.Name proposed for the constituent part after withdrawal day:
Professional Officers Association (Victoria)
8.If it is proposed that the eligibility rules of the amalgamated organisation be changed after withdrawal day – particulars of those changes:
Not proposed
9.If it is proposed that the rules of the constituent part will differ, after withdrawal day, from the rules described in clause 5 above – particulars of those changes:
It is proposed that the rules of the constituent part will differ after withdrawal day from the rules of the de-registered Professional Officers Association, Australian Public Service, Victorian Branch. Particulars of the proposed changes are set out at attachment D to this Application.
10.Particulars of the assets and liabilities of the amalgamated organisation:
Annual Returns of the PSU Group and the SPSF Group of the CPSU are attachment E to this Application.
11.Particulars of the assets and liabilities of the constituent part before it, or the organisation of which it was a State or Territory Branch, was de-registered under Division 7 of Part IX of the Act in connection with the formation of the amalgamated organisation:
The financial Statement of the Victorian Branch of the Professional Officers Association, Australian Public Service for the period ending 29 February, 1992 is Attachment F to this Application.
12.Particulars of any proposal by the applicant for the apportionment of the assets and liabilities of the amalgamated organisation and the constituent part to assist the court to comply with the requirements of section 253ZP of the Act:
That the assets detailed in the Attachment to clause 11 above be treated upon withdrawal as having been, for all purposes, assets of the constituent part in the Victorian Branch of the Professional Officers Association, Australian Public Service.
13.Question proposed to be put to the ballot:
DO YOU APPROVE THE PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL OF THE VICTORIAN SUBDIVISION OF THE PROFESSIONAL DIVISION OF THE CPSU, THE COMMUNITY AND PUBLIC SECTOR UNION AND ITS REGISTRATION AS A SEPARATE ORGANISATION UNDER THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 1996?
Dated:19th day of March 1998.
Maurice Blackburn & Co
Solicitors for the Applicant
SCHEDULE”
The schedule contained the names of 192 persons.
The application filed in the present case was signed by the solicitors for the applicants and not by the applicants.
The function of the Court in ordering a ballot of constituent members is set out relevantly in s 253ZL(1)(a), as follows:
“The Court must order that a vote of the constituent members be taken by secret ballot, to decide whether the constituent part of the amalgamated organisation should withdraw from the organisation, if the Court is satisfied that:
(a)the application for the ballot is validly made under section 253ZJ”.
Mr White, who appeared as counsel for the respondent, contended that the Court could not be satisfied, under s 253ZL(1)(a), that the application for the ballot was validly made under s 253ZJ because the application was not signed by the applicants. He relied on the decision of Gray J in La v Federated Furnishing Trade Society of A/asia (1993) 46 IR 164, in which his Honour considered the validity of an application for an inquiry into alleged irregularities in a ballot concerning an amalgamation. The application was signed by the solicitors for the applicant. The prescribed form, Form 11, was relevantly the same as Form 11A, which is presently under consideration. His Honour held that the form did not comply with the prescribed form because the applicants had not signed the application. His Honour said, at 171-172:
“The second respect in which non-compliance with the form is alleged is that the document does not bear the signature of the applicant. Form 11 contains a dotted line, beneath which appear the words ‘Signature of applicant’. [This] is plainly what the form requires. If a person is to delay the taking effect of an amalgamation by a unilateral step, that person is required to take responsibility directly for the allegations made in taking that step. ....
In my view, signature by solicitors acting on behalf of a person wishing to make an application for an inquiry under s 253M of the Act is insufficient to satisfy reg 98. Form 11 commences with a statement in the first person. It is plainly intended that the applicant complete the statement personally by signature. There are specific provisions in regs 63(3), 65, 66, 67 and 68 of the Industrial Relations Regulations, for the signature of documents by one person on behalf of another. Those provisions relate to amalgamations of organisations. They emphasise the requirement that the application the subject of reg 98 is intended to be a personal one.”
Mr Borenstein, who appeared as counsel for the applicants, raised two arguments which were not considered in La, to support the conclusion that the solicitors were entitled to sign the application on behalf of the applicants. First, he argued that, whatever the individual applicants could do themselves, they could do by an agent. In Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v R J Gilbertson (Qld) Pty Ltd (Federal Court of Australia, 21 October 1988, unreported), Gray J summarised the authorities on the point in the following passage, at pp 8-9:
“There can be no doubt that, as a general rule, where a statute requires the signature of a person, an agent may sign for that person. In R v Justices of Kent (1873) LR 8 QB 305, at 307 Blackburn J said:
‘No doubt at common law, where a person authorises another to sign for him, the signature of the person so signing is the signature of the person authorising it; nevertheless there may be cases in which a statute may require personal signature.’
This principle has been followed in a number of cases: see Re Whitley Partners, Limited (1886) 32 Ch D 337, Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd v Harston [1908] VLR 23 and London County Council v Agricultural Food Products Ltd [1955] 2 QB 218.
Cases in which statutes have been held not to permit signature by an agent include Hyde v Johnson (1836) 2 Bing (NC) 776, in which it was held that a particular statute requiring signature was to be read together with the statute of frauds, which made express provision for signature by agents where that was appropriate. In Re Prince Blucher; Ex parte Debtor [1931] 2 Ch 70, it was held that the words ‘signed by him’ in a statute dealing with bankruptcy required the personal signature of the debtor”,
and at 18, his Honour said:
“Undoubtedly, the question whether a particular form of signature is sufficient to satisfy a statutory requirement is one of construction of the particular statute”.
The short answer to this first argument is that Form 11A is obviously meant to be signed by the applicant personally. The wording at the end of the form indicates that personal signature was intended. The nature of the document, being in the form of a statement in the first person, further points to this intention. The context of the provision, in regulations which expressly provide for signature by authorised agents when this is permitted, also supports the conclusion that Form 11A was not intended to permit signature by an agent. Form 11A was inserted in the regulations commencing on 31 December 1996. This date was after the decision in La, which was made in respect of an application in the same form as Form 11A. Parliament should be taken to have intended that Form 11A would be viewed in the way determined in La. Such an approach is analogous to the principle of construction that, where words have been judicially construed, the re-enactment of the words is taken to have been made with the meaning given to them by the judicial decision: Re Alcan Australia Ltd; Ex parte Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing and Engineering Employees (1994) 181 CLR 96, at 106. Mr Borenstein drew attention to the fact that the number of applicants bringing such applications could be as high as 2,000. In that context, he argued, it could not have been intended that every individual would need to sign the application form. In this context, a requirement of personal signature seems somewhat unwieldy at first sight. The requirement may have been taken from the pre-existing Form 11 without much consideration for the different circumstances which apply to an application for a ballot to consider withdrawal from an organisation. The practicality of the requirement of personal signature on an application for an election inquiry is readily understandable because there is no need for more than one individual to commence such an application. However, on closer analysis, the requirement for personal signature by a multitude of applicants for an application for a ballot for withdrawal may be justified. Each individual must either sign the application or give instructions to a solicitor to make the application on behalf of that person. Where a solicitor is instructed, there will be some initial contact between the solicitor and the applicant. Indeed, in the present case, each applicant signed a document called a petition, which is referred to later in these reasons, and which authorised one person to bring and continue the application. There is little additional inconvenience in the applicant signing the application than in the applicant instructing another to act for that applicant. In any event, any additional inconvenience does not amount to such an imposition as to suggest that Parliament could not have intended to require personal signature by the applicants. Further, s 253ZJ(3)(b) and (c) provide alternative methods for the commencement of an application for a ballot to withdraw from an amalgamated organisation. These subsections require applications to be brought by specified committees of management representing the part of the organisation seeking to withdraw. If this method of commencement of an application is used, any inconvenience which derives from the requirement of personal signature is avoided.
The second argument was that O 45 r 1 of the Federal Court Rules permitted the solicitors for the applicant to sign the application. That rule provided:
“(1)Every matter or thing which under the Act or the Rules or otherwise by law required or allowed to be done by a party may be done by his solicitor.
(2)Sub-rule (1) does not apply where the context or subject matter otherwise indicates.”
For the reasons just expressed, the context and subject matter of reg 98J and Form 11A indicate that the personal signature of each applicant is required. Thus, sub-rule (2) applies, so that sub-rule (1) does not operate to permit signature by the solicitors. Consequently, in my view, the failure of the applicants to sign the application form personally was a failure to comply with the requirements of reg 98J and Form 11A.
In La, Gray J considered the consequences of such non-compliance, in the light of s 51 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, which provided:
“(1) No proceedings in the Court are invalidated by a formal defect or an irregularity, unless the Court is of the opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and that the injustice cannot be remedied by an order of the Court.
(2) The Court or a Judge may, on such conditions (if any) as the Court or Judge thinks fit, make an order declaring that the proceeding is not invalid by reason of a defect that it or he considers to be formal, or by reasons of an irregularity.”
His Honour said, at 174-175:
“What was lodged in the present case is clearly an attempt to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction. It bears a heading referring to the Court. It refers to the ‘Victoria Registry’, presumably meaning the Victoria District Registry and to the ‘Industrial Division’. It purports to be an application of a kind permitted by s 253M of the Act. It is true that it suffers from several defects which are more than trivial. Taking the view as I do that the provisions of reg 98 are mandatory, I cannot view those defects as being mere formal defects. Section 51 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, however, saves proceedings from being invalidated by an ‘irregularity’, as well as by a formal defect. In my view, that word is broad enough to encompass failures to comply with mandatory provisions of regulations as to form, and with such matters as failure to supply information required and lack of verification. All are matters which are capable of being rectified if the applicant is in truth able to make a case. In my view, s 51 requires that Mr La be given that opportunity. It prevents the invalidation of his attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. No substantial injustice has been caused by the irregularities which cannot be remedied by an order of the Court. ....
.... If the matter is to continue, I should propose to give directions to the effect that the irregularities be remedied by the filing of an application in the proper form, properly verified, within a very short time. If this is done, then I should be disposed to make an order under s 51(2) ....”
The application of s 51 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 in the present case is different from its application in La.
Section 51 envisages three situations:
(1)where the Court does not form the opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity, the proceedings are valid by automatic operation of s 51(1),
(2)where the Court does form the opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and the injustice cannot be remedied by orders of the Court, the proceedings are invalid by operation of s 51(1), or
(3)where the Court does form the opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and the injustice can be remedied by orders of the Court, the proceedings are valid. Further, s 51(2) gives the Court the power to make such remedial orders.
Section 51(2) gives the Court power to declare the position, so that the parties can be certain of the validity of the proceedings.
In La, Gray J held that no substantial injustice which could not be remedied by orders of the Court was caused by the non-compliance. The remedial orders required that, inter alia, the application be filed in proper form, namely, signed by the applicant. La was thus a case which fell within the third situation outlined above. There, the effect of bringing an application for an inquiry into an amalgamation ballot was to delay the taking effect of the amalgamation by a unilateral step. The requirement of personal signature was necessary to indicate acceptance of the responsibility for the effect of the making of the application. It is implicit in his Honour’s analysis that it was unjust for a person to achieve a delay in the commencement of an amalgamation by instituting an inquiry without signing the application personally. In the present case, the application has a more limited effect. It activates the Court process for the purpose of seeking orders for a ballot to be conducted. It does not have an immediate effect on any action or event. Indeed, if a ballot is ordered, there will be a vote on the question of withdrawal. That is not to say that the requirement should not be complied with. It is only to observe that the same injustice which was apparently found in La does not exist in the present case. Further, it was not contended that the solicitors who signed the application did so without instructions. Indeed, the evidence was that each of the applicants signed a “petition” in the following form:
“WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 1996
APPLICATION FOR BALLOT UNDER DIVISION 7A OF PART IX
TO: The Federal Court of Australia
We, the persons whose signatures appear below, being members of the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) and persons who would have been eligible for membership of the Victorian Branch of the Professional Officers Association, Australian Public Service, prior to its deregistration on amalgamation with the VCPSU, HEREBY DETERMINE:
1.To make application to the Court for a ballot to decide whether the Victorian Sub-Division of the Professional Division of CPSU the Community and Public Sector Union should withdraw from CPSU the Community and Public Sector Union and seek registration as a separate union to be known as Professional Officers’ Association (Victoria)
2.To approve the application presented to us at the time of signing this petition for filing with the Federal Court.
3.To appoint George Weston to be the representative constituent member for the purposes of the ballot.
4.To further appoint George Weston to be our duly authorised agent for the purpose of conducting the application in the Court, including but not limited to instructing legal representatives and giving instructions in relation to the conduct of the application including any amendment of the application and the preparation and/or amendment of any other documents necessary or incidental to the making and progressing of the application.
Witness Signature
NAMESignature & Date & Date Work Address”
Although it was not demonstrated that the form of the application before the Court was the form of the application referred to in par 2 of the petition, the contents of par 1 are sufficient to show that the signatories desired a ballot in respect of withdrawal from the CPSU. Their signature on the petition was acceptance of responsibility for making the application. The respondent has argued a narrow technical non-compliance. It has not contended that any substantial injustice flows to it, or anybody else, as a result of the irregularity. In those circumstances, it is appropriate to declare, pursuant to s 51(2), that the proceeding is not invalid by reason of the failure of the applicants to sign the application. Once the proceeding is declared not to be invalid by reason of the failure of the applicants to sign the application, the Court is able to be satisfied under s 253ZL(1)(a) that the application for the ballot is validly made under s 253ZJ.
The remaining question before the Court is raised by a motion, notice of which was filed by the applicants on 7 August 1998, which seeks leave to amend the application by:
“(a).... adding the words ‘from The CPSU, The Community and Public Sector Union’ after the words “The CPSU, The Community and Public Sector Union’ [in par 13 of the particulars of the application];
(b)substituting for the accounts contained in Attachment E thereto, the financial accounts contained in exhibits ‘A’ and ‘B’ to the affidavit of Anne Gooley dated 7 August, 1998, and filed herein; and
(c)substituting for the rules contained in Attachment D thereto, the rules contained in exhibit ‘D’ to the affidavit of Anne Gooley dated 7 August, 1998, and filed herein.”
The amendment referred to in par (a) is to correct a typographical error and is uncontroversial. The amendment referred to in par (b) has the effect of supplementing the accounts originally annexed to par 10 of the application with accounts which have come to light on further enquiry by the applicants. The most complete set of accounts should be annexed to the application and, consequently, it is desirable to allow this amendment also. The amendment referred to in par (c) replaces rule changes referred to in par 9 of the application with a new document. The new document corrects a number of typographical errors referred to in par 11 of the affidavit of Anne Gooley, sworn 7 August 1998. These corrections are uncontroversial and should be allowed. Rule 65 subrule (2) of the rules of the proposed organisation establishes a transitional executive council. The proposed amendment deletes two proposed members of the executive council, Cox and Palmer, and adds six new proposed members, Killingsworth, Hicks, Fillingham, Chung, Podlesak and Hollis. These amendments are more significant than the others. The application for the amendments is sought by the applicants on instructions from Mr Weston, who was authorised in the petition by each applicant to conduct the application including instructing solicitors to seek amendments of the application. The respondent did not suggest that the amendment would cause it any prejudice. If the withdrawal goes to a ballot, the acceptability of the proposed rules will be voted upon. I therefore intend to give leave to the applicant to amend the application in this respect as well.
The application is adjourned to a date to be fixed, to allow the parties to be bring in short minutes of orders reflecting the conclusions expressed in these reasons.
I certify that the preceding twenty-five (25) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice North Associate:
Dated: 18 December 1998
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr H Borenstein Solicitor for the Applicant: Maurice Blackburn & Co Counsel for the Respondent: Mr E White Solicitor for the Respondent: Ryan Carlisle Thomas Date of Hearing: 11-12 August 1998 Date of Judgment: 18 December 1998
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